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Abstract
Despite a political environment fraught with core policy differences, between 1979 and 1983, six governments and two international safeguards directorates—the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate—negotiated an agreement to preserve the core verification principles behind the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At first, even agreement to talk was in doubt. Other governments questioned US motives; they wondered whether US motives in promoting the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation had been to evaluate or to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from deploying uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies. In addition, Germany and Japan disagreed with the United States on whether NPT safeguards were to address undeclared materials or activities. Notwithstanding this environment, the participants reached agreement first to negotiate, and then on specific technical measures, even when the approach implied a policy consensus where none existed. At the conclusion, agreement was reached on specific technical measures for safeguards at gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants, and all participating states, including two nuclear weapon states, made diplomatic commitments to adopt this approach for current and future centrifuge plants. This article examines the factors that facilitated agreement and considers what lessons can be learned for future efforts to solve complex technical issues in a politically charged environment and in the absence of complete agreement even on the objectives to be realized.
Notes
1. In addition to the case examined here—safeguards for gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants—safeguards approaches for spent fuel reprocessing plants and light water power reactors provide examples. However, the policy versus technical issues created greater tension in the centrifuge plant case than in the others.
2. See David Fischer, “International Safeguards,” in Jozef Glodblat, ed., Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1985), pp. 70–73, for a discussion of the issues debated at the time. The European Communities (also known as the European Community) consisted of three international organizations: the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community.
3. See Fischer, “International Safeguards,” pp. 104–105.
4. I am particularly indebted to former State Department official John Boright and former Oak Ridge National Laboratory official and scientific advisor to the US HSP delegation David Swindle for their descriptions of the activities they participated in during the early and mid-1970s. Their guidance and insight was essential to researching and writing this section.
5. National Security Council, National Security Study Memorandum 101, “Review of Security Requirements regarding Uranium Enrichment Technology,” September 14, 1970, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, <http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_101.pdf>.
6. National Security Council, National Security Study Memorandum 120, “United States Policy on Peaceful Applications of Atomic Energy,” February 19, 1971, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, <http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_120.pdf>.
7. National Security Council, National Security Study Memorandum 150, “U.S. Policy on Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium,” March 13, 1972, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, <http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_150.pdf>. However, this review was not to “affect the transfer requested by EURATOM” for the German high temperature reactor prototype power plant.
8. National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 235, “NSSM 150, United States Policy on Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium for Fueling Power Reactors,” October 4, 1973. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, <http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_235.pdf>.
9. National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 235, “NSSM 150, United States Policy on Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium for Fueling Power Reactors,” October 4, 1973. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, <http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_235.pdf>.
10. National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 250, “U.S. Policy Toward Purchase of Soviet Uranium Enrichment Services,” March 29, 1974, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, <http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_250.pdf>
11. National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 255, “Security and Other Aspects of the Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries,” June 3, 1974, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, <http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_255.pdf>. The President also mandated “prompt study” of a possible convention on physical security.
12. John Boright, former senior State Department official, principal in creating the HSP, telephone interview with author, October 22, 2010.
13. The only reference to an Indian nuclear test in any released Nixon administration NSDM or NSSM is in NSSM 156 (“Indian Nuclear Developments,” July 5, 1972) ordering study of the “likely impacts of a possible test on the policies and actions of India's neighbors in South Asia” and the “likely political, military, and economic implications for India's other policies and programs.” See National Security Council, National Security Study Memorandum 156, “Indian Nuclear Developments,” July 5, 1972, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, <http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_156.pdf>
14. This is certainly the popular perception, both at the time and today. However, President Ford was the first to make a significant nuclear nonproliferation statement: “I have concluded that the reprocessing with recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless there is sound reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation.” Gerald R. Ford, “Statement on Nuclear Policy,” October 28, 1976, The American Presidency Project, <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6561>. I thank Michael Rosenthal for providing this insight.
15. R. Skjöldebrand, “The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation—INFCE,” IAEA Bulletin, 22/2 (1981), p. 30, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull222/22204883033.pdf>.
16. Michael D. Rosenthal, retired Arms Control and Disarmament Agency official and senior advisor to the United States HSP delegation, telephone interview with author, October 19, 2010.
17. Appendix H—World Enrichment Plants, table adapted and updated from Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 2006 (Nuclear Engineering International, 2006), <http://tinyurl.com/kolf4lf>.
18. D.W. Swindle, Jr., and L. E. Wheeler, “An Overview of Enrichment Plant Safeguards,” Paper for presentation at the American Institute of Chemical Engineers Winter 1982 National Meeting, February 28–March 3, 1982, Orlando, Florida, <www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/5859084-o9L9Xs/>.
19. Boright, telephone interview with author, October 22, 2010. Also David W. Swindle, Jr., former Oak Ridge National Laboratory official and scientific advisor to the United States HSP delegation, telephone interview with author, October 21, 2010.
20. The Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States entered into force in December 1980, following Senate advice and consent to ratification.
21. On the US commitment, see H.G. Handyside, “Statement for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement,” June 22, 1979, quoted in Swindle, Jr. and Wheeler, “An Overview of Enrichment Plant Safeguards.”
22. Rosenthal, telephone interview with author and Swindle, telephone interview with author.
23. Joerg H. Menzel, retired Arms Control and Disarmament Agency senior official and head of United States HSP delegation, telephone interview with author, October 27, 2010.
24. Joerg H. Menzel, retired Arms Control and Disarmament Agency senior official and head of United States HSP delegation, telephone interview with author, October 27, 2010.
25. Joerg H. Menzel, retired Arms Control and Disarmament Agency senior official and head of United States HSP delegation, telephone interview with author, October 27, 2010. While this trust was, to a necessary degree, established early in the HSP process, it was still fragile and incomplete in the mid-1980s as the United States and the IAEA negotiated a Facility Attachment specifying specific technical methods for the Department of Energy's Portsmouth, Ohio plant.
26. Michael Rosenthal, e-mail correspondence with author, December 13 2010.
27. Michael Rosenthal, e-mail correspondence with author, December 13 2010.
28. Menzel, telephone interview with author and Swindle, telephone interview with author.
29. Zangger Committee, Information Circular 209, “Communications Received from Members regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material,” September 3, 1974. The original 1974 entry concerning uranium enrichment technologies read in its entirety: “2.5.1. Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium,“ and the Annex expansion read simply: “Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium’ includes each of the major items of equipment especially designed or prepared for the separation process.” The December 1977 updates to the Trigger List, INFCIRC/209/Mod.1, stated that, “Such items include: … gas centrifuge assemblies, corrosion resistant to UF6.” It was not until 1984, following conclusion of the HSP, that specific gas centrifuge components were added to the Trigger List.
30. Rosenthal, telephone interview with author and Menzel telephone interview with author.
31. Rosenthal telephone interview with author.
32. Menzel telephone interview with author.
33. Joerg H. Menzel, ed. (authored by the Hexapartite Safeguards Project), “Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Type Enrichment Plants,” Journal of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 12 (Winter 1983), p. 31.
34. Menzel, “Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Type Enrichment Plants,” p. 31.
35. Joerg H. Menzel, John P. Boright, and Leonard M. Brenner, “Views on International Safeguards at Uranium Enrichment Plants,” Journal of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 9 (Summer 1980), pp. 60–64.
36. Joerg H. Menzel, John P. Boright, and Leonard M. Brenner, “Views on International Safeguards at Uranium Enrichment Plants,” Journal of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 9 (Summer 1980), p. 62.
37. Menzel, “Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Type Enrichment Plants,” p. 31.
38. Boright, telephone interview with author.
39. At that time, the concept of a Regional System of Accounting and Control had not been developed. Even the concept for a State System of Accounting and Control was relatively nascent. I thank an anonymous reviewer for identifying this question.
40. Author's personal observation as a member of the US delegation to the HSP negotiations, 1982–83.