The Requirements of Nuclear Stability in South Asia

Abstract

While recent history arguably demonstrates a high level of nuclear stability in South Asia, this article argues that this stability has historically been a function of India's relative weakness. It argues that, as India becomes stronger, attention must be paid to the technical and political requirements of nuclear stability: the reliability of weapons and command and control and the political conditions that underpin stable relations between nuclear-armed states. It concludes by recommending the United States aim to modify the perceptions of regional elites about their various intentions and decision-making processes and the role of the United States as crisis manager.

KEYWORDS:

• South Asia
• nuclear stability
• India
• Pakistan
• China

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful above all to Sumit Ganguly for his generous invitation to participate in the Nuclear Stability in South Asia workshop held at Indiana University in March 2014. Thanks are also due to all the participants for their comments and questions, and especially to Nicolas Blarel for his advice and organizational acumen.

Notes

1. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Second Strike: Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia (New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2005), pp. 31–32.

2. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). For a representative mainstream view in India, see Shivshankar Menon, “Patel, India and the World,” Sardar Patel Memorial Lecture, October 16, 2013, <http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=emerging&nid=6220>.

3. Rajesh Basrur, “Strategic Stability”, in P. R. Chari, Sonika Gupta, and Arpit Rajain, eds., Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), p. 81. On the Indian tendency to emphasize the supposedly stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons, see also Michael Ryan Kraig, “The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” India Review 2 (2003), especially pp. 4–10.

4. Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), p. 40.

5. There are a number of good interpretations of his position. See, for example, Rajesh M. Basrur, “International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence,” India Review 4 (2005), pp. 125–43.

6. See, for example, Neil Joeck, Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia, Adelphi Paper 312 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997).

7. See, for example, Sumit Ganguly, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security 33 (Fall 2008), pp. 45–70 and S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia,” International Security 33 (Fall 2008), pp. 71–94.

8. Jonathan Marcus, “Analysis: The world's most dangerous place?,” BBC News Online, March 23, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/687021.stm>.

9. Here I follow the lead of Chari, Gupta, and Rajain (eds.), Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia.

10. This position is described in Feroz Hassan Khan, “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” Nonproliferation Review 10 (2003), p. 62.

11. On India's development of missile defence capabilities, see Ashok Sharma, India's Missile Defence Programme: Threat Perceptions and Technological Evolution, Manekshaw Paper 15 (New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2009), <www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1262760881MP_15___111209.pdf>.

12. See the data compiled by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (2012), <www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-today/>.

13. For some representative doubts, see Harsh V. Pant, “India's Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for India and the World,” Comparative Strategy 24 (2005), p. 288.

14. For a discussion of some concerns about India's tests, see Bharat Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy (Westport, CT and London: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 67–71.

15. On the 1974 test, see Verghese Koithara, Managing India's Nuclear Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2012), p. 95. Regarding the Shakti 1 test, see Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 252.

16. Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 97–99.

17. Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India: the Logic of Assured Retaliation,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 202.

18. Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p. 260.

19. Ibid., p. 264.

20. The Military Balance 2014 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014), p. 231.

21. See, for example, Koithara, Managing India's Nuclear Forces, pp. 247–74.

22. Manjeet S. Pardesi, “China's Nuclear Forces and their Significance to India,” Nonproliferation Review 21 (September/December 2014), pp. 337–54; Richard B. White, “The Command and Control of India's Nuclear Forces,” Nonproliferation Review 21 (September/December 2014), pp. 261–74; and David O. Smith, “The Management of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal,” Nonproliferation Review 21 (September/December 2014), pp. 275–94.

23. Lyle J. Goldstein, ed. with Andrew S. Erickson, China's Nuclear Force Modernization, Newport Papers 22 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2005), <www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/-Newport-Papers/Documents/22-pdf.aspx>.

24. Mark. A. Stokes, “China's Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Institute, March 12, 2010, <www.project2049.net/documents/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf>.

25. Larry M. Wortzel, China's Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), pp. 22–26.

26. Ibid., p. 26.

27. Koithara, Managing India's Nuclear Forces, p. 101.

28. Ibid., p. 104.

29. Gurmeet Kanwal, “India's Nuclear Forces: Doctrine and Operationalization,” in Rajesh Basrur, Ajaja Kumar Das, and Manjeet S. Pardesi, eds., India's Military Modernization: Challenges and Prospects (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 89, 107–08. See also Saran Shyam's defense of India's command and control arrangements: Saran Shyamn, “Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Credible?,” speech delivered at the India Habitat Centre, April 24, 2013, <http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf>.

30. Sébastien Miraglia, “Deadly or Impotent? Nuclear Command and Control in Pakistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36 (2013), pp. 841–66.

31. Smith, “The Management of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal.”

32. Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 19.

33. On this point, see especially Keith Payne, “The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction,” Comparative Strategy 22 (2003), p. 416.

34. Michael Krepon, “Is Cold War Experience Applicable to South Asia?,” in his edited Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2004), p. 8.

35. See, for example, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Columbia, 2010) or Timothy Hoyt, “Politics, Proximity and Paranoia: The Evolution of Kashmir as a Nuclear Flashpoint,” India Review 2 (2003), pp. 117–44.

36. Krepon, “Is Cold War Experience Applicable to South Asia?,” p. 9.

37. Rajagopalan, Second Strike, p. 109.

38. Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34 (Winter 2009/10), p. 51.

39. Ibid., p. 62.

40. Rajagopalan, Second Strike, p. 116.

41. Ibid., p. 118.

42. Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, Narendra Modi: The Man, The Times (Chennai: Tranquebar, 2013), p. 237.

43. Yang Jinjie, “China unveils nuke submarine fleet,” Global Times, October 29, 2013, <www.globaltimes.cn/content/820977.shtml>.

44. Rajagopalan, Second Strike, p. 84 (on “slow motion nuclear deployment”) and p. 69 (on elite attitudes).

45. Bhumitra Chakma, “Nuclear Arms Control Challenges in South Asia,” India Review 9 (2010), pp. 364–84.

46. Shashank Joshi, “Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà Vu?,” Washington Quarterly 36 (2013), p. 160.

47. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures,” Naval College War Review 63 (2010), pp. 114–16.

48. The Lahore Declaration and Memorandum of Understanding, February 21, 1999, <www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/ip_lahore19990221.pdf>.

49. Šumit Ganguly, “India's Pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defenses,” Nonproliferation Review 21 (September/December 2014), pp. 373–82. See also Kanwal, “India's Nuclear Forces,” pp. 109–11.

50. This possible danger has been noted in Ganguly, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” p. 334.

51. Joshi, “Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Nightmare,” pp. 159–72. As Joshi notes, Pakistani analysts generally deny that the country is developing tactical weapons. See Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 396.

52. Ian Hall, “China Crisis? Indian Strategy, Political Realism and the Chinese Challenge,” Asian Security 8 (2012), pp. 84–92. For the strongest recent argument in favor of the idea that India habitually practices strategic restraint, see Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2011).

53. Narang, “Posturing for Peace,” p. 41.

54. Shulong and Yu, “China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence,” pp. 166–71.

55. Ibid., pp. 171–73.

56. Rajagopalan, Second Strike, pp. 25–28.

57. For some trenchant criticism of this position, see Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy.

58. Narang, “Posturing for Peace,” p. 59.

59. Ibid., pp. 61–64.

60. On this kind of “cultural discounting” and its influence on decision making, see V. R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Escalation in South Asia,” Nonproliferation Review 8 (2001), p. 91.

61. See, for example, Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy, p. 138.

62. On November 3, 2011, for instance, China's ambassador to India told Indian journalists to “shut up” about Arunachal Pradesh. See “China envoy to journos: ‘shut up’ on Arunachal,” IBN Live, <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/china-envoy-tells-scribes-to-shut-up-on-arunachal/198931-3.html>.

63. Daniel Markey, “Developing India's Foreign Policy ‘Software’,” Asia Policy 8 (2009), pp. 73–96.

64. T. V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), especially pp. 26–28.

65. Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. x.

66. Maj. Gen. V. K. Singh, India's External Intelligence: Secrets of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2007), p. 35.

67. Rudra Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947 (London: Hurst, 2014), pp. 81–114.

68. Nicolas Blarel and Hannes Ebert, “Deterrence at Risk in South Asia,” ISN, August 30, 2012, <www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=152193>.

69. Bhumitra Chakma, “Escalation Control, Deterrence Diplomacy and America's Role in South Asian Nuclear Crises,” Contemporary Security Policy 33 (2012), pp. 554–76.

70. Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 158–90.

71. This argument parallels that of Christopher Clary, “Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2013), pp. 135–60.

72. Ian Hall, “Narendra Modi and India's Manifesto Destiny,” Canberra Times, April 16, 2014, <www.canberratimes.com.au/comment/narendra-modi-and-indias-manifesto-destiny-20140422-zqvii.html>.

73. Gaurav Kampani, “Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes? Data, Interpretation and Fact,” Nonproliferation Review 21 (September/December 2014), pp. 383–98.