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Abstract
Pakistan, the fastest growing nuclear weapon state in the world, has established over the last decade a nuclear management system it holds to be “foolproof.” Despite the explosion of radical groups challenging the writ of the state, it dismisses concerns by critics that its nuclear weapons are not safe and secure as “preposterous” and an attempt to “malign” the state. This article examines Pakistan's nuclear management system in four functional areas: command-and-control, physical security, nuclear surety, and doctrine. It describes what is publicly known in each area, identifies areas of omission and inadequacy in each one, and examines several premises of the nuclear program the author considers to be unfounded. Comparing these deficiencies in Pakistan's nuclear management system to the current problems plaguing the US nuclear management system, the author concludes that complacency and unfounded confidence in the efficacy of such programs, if not addressed and corrected, could lead to a future nuclear catastrophe in South Asia.
Notes
1. Andrew Bast, “Pakistan's Nuclear Calculus,” Washington Quarterly, September 14, 2011, <www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2011.609063#.UuV9OrAo7IU>.
2. Estimates of each country's nuclear arsenal vary slightly with each source. An illustrative example by the Ploughshares Fund lists the following: Russia—8,500 weapons; United States—7,700; France—300; China—250;--United Kingdom—225; Pakistan—120; India—100; Israel—80; and North Korea—less than 10. “World Nuclear Stockpile Report,” August 28, 2014, <http://ploughshares.org/world-nuclear-stockpile-report>.
3. The total deaths included 3,001 civilians, 676 members of the security forces (police, paramilitary, and military forces), and 1,702 militants. South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2013,” <www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/fatilities_regionwise2013.htm>.
4. The term “reasonable transparency” was used frequently by the first director general of the Strategic Plans Division, then-Major General Khalid Kidwai, in the first years following the creation of that organization in February 2000, as a way to assuage western concerns about the new nuclear capabilities rapidly coming on line.
5. Indo-Asian News Service, “10,000 men guarding Pakistan's nuclear arsenal: official,” Gaea Times, May 28, 2009, <http://news.gaeatimes.com/10000-men-guarding-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-official-66399/>.
6. Khalid Kidwai, Keynote address delivered at a workshop, “Defence, Deterrence & Nuclear Weapons,” Islamabad, March 7, 2014, <www.ciss.org.pk/publication_inner.php?publication_id=7>.
7. See, for just two examples, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Pakistan's nuclear weapons safety and security,” Nation, September 19, 2014, <www.nation.com.pk/columns/23-Feb-2013/pakistan-s-nuclear-weapons-safety-and-security> and Malik Qasim Mustafa, “Are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe?,” CSS Forum, September 19, 2014, <www.cssforum.com.pk/css-compulsory-subjects/current-affairs/33010-pakistani-nuclear-safe.html>. Not every Pakistani analyst follows this line. Pakistani columnist Ejaz Haider has criticized the lack of civilian input into nuclear decision making and the development of tactical nuclear weaponry. See “Stupidity Goes Nuclear—I and II,” Express Tribune, April 25–26, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/156311/stupidity-/goes-/nuclear-/-/i/> and <http://tribune.com.pk/story/157064/stupidity-goes-nuclear--ii/>.
8. “US welcomes Pakistan's commitment on Nuclear safety,” Nation, September 5, 2013, <www.nation.com.pk/international/05-Sep-2013/us-welcomes-pakistans-commitment-on-nuclear-safety>.
9. Quoted in Bast, “Pakistan's Nuclear Calculus.”
10. “US embassy cables: Punjab, ISI and a distracted president trouble Pakistan,” Guardian, November 30, 2010, <www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/190330>.
11. Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller, “WikiLeaks cables show U.S. focus on Pakistan's military, nuclear material,” Washington Post, November 30, 2010, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/30/AR2010113007679.html>.
12. Between 1950 and 1980, at least thirty-two significant incidents and accidents involving US nuclear weapons, some of them thermonuclear, occurred. See “Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1950–1980,” Department of Defense, <http://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/635.pdf>. For a more comprehensive understanding of the flaws in the US nuclear management system during the Cold War, see Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Incident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: The Penguin Press, 2013).
13. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, (New Haven CN: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 3 and 179.
14. Sébastien Miraglia, “Deadly or Impotent? Nuclear Command and Control in Pakistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36 (2013), p. 842.
15. Quoted in Ian Bremmer and Maria Kuusisto, “Pakistan's Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters,” SASSI Research Report 15, May 2008, <www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Pakistan%20Nuclear%20Command%20and%20Control%20Final.pdf>. See the summary of Kidwai's keynote speech at Workshop, “Defence, Deterrence & Nuclear Weapons,” March 7, 2014.
16. The best history of the evolution of the National Command Authority (NCA) and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which acts as the secretariat of the NCA, is by Brigadier (ret.) Feroz Khan, who worked first in the Combat Developments Directorate, the predecessor organization of the SPD, and then served as the SPD's first director for arms control and disarmament affairs. See Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 321–37. My description of the NCA and SPD, including the figure of 28,000 security force personnel, is taken from this source.
17. Bruno Tertrais, “Pakistan's nuclear and WMD programmes: status, evolution and risks,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, No. 19, July 2012, <www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=151272>.
18. Syed Irfan Raza, “Govt forced to withdraw ISI decision,” Dawn, July 28, 2008, <www.dawn.com/news/313820/govt-forced-to-withdraw-isi-decision>.
19. Global Security Newswire, “Pakistani Army Chief Said to Oppose ‘No First Use’ Nuke Rule,” May 9, 2011,<www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistani-army-chief-said-to-oppose-no-first-use-nuke-rule/>.
20. Bracken, pp. 100 and 34.
21. During the Cuban missile crisis, US Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay argued strongly for permission to bomb the Soviet missile sites and opposed the naval quarantine generally credited with ending the crisis without resorting to war. Kennedy later said of him, “If you have to go, you want LeMay in the lead bomber. But you never want LeMay deciding whether or not you have to go.” Time, October 18, 1968, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,902426,00.html>.
22. “Rare visit to NCA: Pakistan is not in an arms race, says PM,” Express Tribune, October 5, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/613826/rare-visit-to-nca-pakistan-is-not-in-an-arms-race-says-pm/>.
23. Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 78.
24. Quoted in Zulfikar Khan, “India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Mutual Deterrence,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute Paper 9, January 2005, <http://ipripak.org/papers/india-pakistan.shtml>.
25. “Rare visit to NCA: Pakistan is not in an arms race, says PM.”
26. Pakistan Army Web Portal, “A Journey From Scratch to Nuclear Power,” undated, <www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=18> and PakistaniDefence.com, “Harris Corporation Awarded $68 Million Contract to Provide Falcon® II Tactical Radios to Government of Pakistan,” February 1, 2005, <http://forum.pakistanidefence.com/index.php?showtopic=41139>.
27. David O. Smith, “The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia,” Stimson Center, March 4, 2013, <www.stimson.org/summaries/smith-on-tactical-nuclear-weapons-in-south-asia-/>.
28. See “Submarine Communications Master Plan,” December 1995, especially Appendix A, <www.fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/scmp/part06.htm>. Pakistan's dilemma is similar to that of the United Kingdom during the 1982 Falklands War, when communications between Whitehall and its submarines were sent every two hours via a surfaced ultra-high frequency antenna. Any change in orders would not have been possible for a minimum of two hours until the next available communications window. See Desmond Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea,” International Security 10 (Winter, 1985–86), pp. 3–31, <www.jstor.org/stable/2538940>.
29. “Operation Hangover: India's three-year silent cyber war on Pakistan,” Pakistan Today, May 21, 2013, <www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/05/21/news/national/operation-hangover-indias-three-year-silent-cyber-war-on-pakistan/>.
30. Farzana Shah, “Pakistan's New Battleground: Cyber Warfare,” Southasia Global Affairs, October 2009, <www.saglobalaffairs.com/back-issues/299-cyber-warfare-pakistans-new-battlefield.html>.
31. “New War Ground Between India and Pakistan: Cyber Warfare,” Asian Defence News, August 2011, <www.asian-defence.net/2011/08/new-war-ground-between-india-and.html>.
32. Naeem Salik and Kenneth N. Luongo, “Challenges for Pakistan's Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, March 2013, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/Challenges-for-Pakistans-Nuclear-Security>.
33. Tertrais, “Pakistan's nuclear and WMD programmes: status, evolution and risks.”
34. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, November 18, 2007, <www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html>.
35. Jeffrey Lewis, “Managing the Danger from Pakistan's Nuclear Stockpile,” National Security Studies Program Policy Paper, The New America Foundation, November 2010, <http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/111010lewis_paknukes.pdf>. See also Sanger and Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms.”
36. Khan, Eating Grass, p. 344.
37. See, for example, Kerr and Nikitin, p. 15; and Tertrais, “Pakistan's nuclear and WMD programmes: status, evolution and risks.”
38. The terms “short-range nuclear system,” “battlefield nuclear weapon,” “non-strategic nuclear weapon,” and “tactical nuclear weapon” are often used interchangeably. The reference to “sealed pit” weapons is from Schlosser, p. 161.
39. Mark Thompson, “Does Pakistan's Taliban Surge Raise a Nuclear Threat?” Time, April 24, 2009, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1893685,00.html#ixzz2pue9qbUu>.
40. Tertrais, “Pakistan's nuclear and WMD programmes: status, evolution and risks.”
41. Lewis, “Managing the Danger from Pakistan's Nuclear Stockpile.”
42. In Project 56, between November 1955 and January 1956, four warhead designs were repeatedly tested in the Nevada desert. Only three achieved the one-point safety standard. Schlosser, p. 163.
43. NTI Nuclear Materials Index, Pakistan. <http://ntiindex.org/countries/pakistan/>.
44. Chaim Braun, “Security Issues Related to Pakistan's Future Nuclear Power Program,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2008, <http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/security_issues_related_to_pakistans_future_nuclear_power_program/>.
45. Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “The Ally from Hell,” Atlantic, October 28, 2011, <www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/308730/>.
46. One analyst estimates the number to be 70,000. See Shaun Gregory, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Safety”, CTC Journal 4 (June 2011), p. 5.
47. Tertrais, “Pakistan's nuclear and WMD programmes: status, evolution and risks,” Box 1: Screening Programmes.
48. For certain operations, there may be a three-man rule in effect. Statement made by Kidwai to the author in September 2001.
49. See Tertrais, “Pakistan's nuclear and WMD programmes: status, evolution and risks;” Peter Wonacott, “Inside Pakistan's Drive To Guard Its A-Bombs,” Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2007, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB119629674095207239>; Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/khan>; Khan, Eating Grass, p. 374; and Shaun Gregory, “The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons,” CTC Sentinel, July 15, 2009, <www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-terrorist-threat-to-pakistan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-weapons>.
50. Khan, Eating Grass, pp. 361–63.
51. US Embassy Islamabad cable, SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: CJCS MULLEN MEETS WITH GENERAL KIDWAI ON SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR ASSETS, 201228Z FEB 08, released by the Wikileaks organization and reprinted in Dawn on June 3, 2011, <http://x.dawn.com/2011/06/03/2008-nuclear-security-in-charge-dismissed-idea-of-rogue-officers-in-pak-military/>.
52. Wonacott, “Inside Pakistan's Drive to Guard Its A-Bombs.”
53. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), p. 105.
54. Associated Press, “Air Force cheating scandal: 92 nuclear missile launch officers are implicated,”
January 30, 2014, <www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0130/Air-Force-cheating-scandal-92-nuclear-missile-launch-officers-are-implicated>; Jim Miklaszewski and Jeff Black, “Nuclear letdown: Navy suspends 30 instructors at reactor school for alleged cheating,” NBC News, February 4, 2014, <http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/02/04/22574124-nuclear-letdown-navy-suspends-30-instructors-at-reactor-school-for-alleged-cheating?lite>; Craig Whitlock, “Report: U.S. Air Force general drank too much, fraternized with foreign women in Moscow,” Washington Post, December 19, 2013, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/report-us-air-force-general-drank-too-much-fraternized-with-foreign-women-in-moscow/2013/12/19/7f3cdba0-68ed-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html>; “U.S. Navy Vice Admiral fired from nuclear post amid gambling probe,” CBS News, October 30, 2013, <www.cbsnews.com/news/us-navy-vice-admiral-fired-from-nuclear-post-amid-gambling-probe/>.
55. US Embassy Islamabad cable, 201228Z Feb 08.
56. The history of these various conspiracies and plots to murder army chiefs can be found in many histories of the Pakistan Army. See, for example, Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008). For a more recent example of issues of officer misconduct, see “Brig Ali Khan, four army officers convicted over Hizbut Tahrir links,” Dawn, August 3, 2012, <www.dawn.com/news/739474/brig-ali-khan-four-other-officers-convicted-in-mutiny-case>.
57. Army Regulation 50–5, <www.apd.army.mil/jw2/xmldemo/r50_5/cover.asp>.
58. The US Department of Defense recognizes three levels of war: the “Strategic Level of War” is the level at which a nation determines national security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. The “Operational Level of Warfare” is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. The “Tactical Level of Warfare” is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to a tactical unit. Department of Defense, “Operational Level of War,” <http://usmilitary.about.com/od/glossarytermso/g/o4531.htm>.
59. Michael Krepon, “Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability,” in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, (Washington DC: The Stimson Center, 2014), p. 44.
60. Meeting at SPD headquarters in Rawalpindi, February 20, 2007, attended by the author. Kidwai presumably thought that Pakistan's longer-range missiles and air-delivered weapons were sufficient to deter an Indian military operation across the international border. Later, he apparently developed misgivings about their ability to deter a Cold Start-style operation and accelerated the development of short-range nuclear delivery systems.
61. See Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Press Release, April 19, 2011, <www.ispr.gov.pk/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2011/4/19>; ISPR Press Release, March 11, 2011, <www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2011/3/11>.
62. These officials consider that the Nasr missile system restores balance between India and Pakistan by “closing the gap at the operational and tactical level … Nasr pours cold water on Cold Start … thus it is a weapon of peace.” Khan, Eating Grass, p. 396.
63. Usman Ali Khan, “Azm-e-Nau 4,” Pakistan Observer, June 20, 2013, <http://pakobserver.net/201306/20/detailnews.asp?id=210300>.
64. Smith, “The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia.”
65. This statement is based on conversations with western officers who attended the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College in 2011–13. The draft Indian nuclear doctrine is available at: <www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/ffja99>.
66. Smith, “The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia.”
67. Statement made by a senior SPD official, interview with author, 2013.
68. Bracken, p. 168.
69. Rick White, “Command and Control of India's Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 21 (September/December 2014).
70. This was true in both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. The most current statement of these concerns in in National Security Strategy, May 2010, <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>.
71. Barak Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” West Point, NY, December 1, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.
72. Schlosser, p. 481.
73. Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army, (New York: Broadway Books), 1996.