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Abstract
This essay provides an overview of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative changes in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and their impact on deterrence stability vis-à-vis India. Prominent among these trends is a major expansion in fissile material production that enables the manufacture of lighter and more compact warheads optimized for battlefield missions; the development of cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles possessing dual-use capabilities; and a greater emphasis in doctrinal pronouncements on the need for strike options geared to all levels of conflict. Although these trends pose problematic ramifications for the risks of unauthorized and inadvertent escalation, deterrence stability in South Asia is not as precarious as many observers fear. The challenges of fashioning a robust nuclear peace between India and Pakistan cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and policy makers would do well to undertake some reinforcing measures.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to thank Sumit Ganguly, Stephen I. Schwartz, and other participants at the Nuclear Stability in South Asia 2014 Symposium for their constructive feedback.
Notes
1. Clinton quotation is in Judith Miller and James Risen, “A Nuclear War Feared over Kashmir,” New York Times, August 8, 2000, p. A8. For an argument about Rawalpindi's risk-taking propensities, see S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).
2. R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, “Nuclear Aims By Pakistan, India Prompt US Concern,” Washington Post, May 28, 2009, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/27/AR2009052703706.html>. Also consult Tom Shankar and David E. Sanger, “Pakistan Is Rapidly Adding Nuclear Arms, US Says,” New York Times, May 17, 2009, p. A1.
3. See David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy,” New York Times, January 31, 2011, p. A1; Karen DeYoung, “New estimates put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at more than 100,” Washington Post, January 31, 2011, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/30/AR2011013004136.html>; and Andrew Bast, “Pakistan's Nuclear Surge,” Newsweek, May 15, 2011, <www.newsweek.com/2011/05/15/fourth-nuclear-reactor-at-pakistan-s-khushab-site.html>. For an estimate that the size of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear arsenals could surpass the United Kingdom's by the mid-2020s, in part due to London's desire to reduce its own weapon stockpile, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69 (September-October 2013), pp. 75–81.
4. Throughout this essay, Rawalpindi is used deliberately instead of Islamabad to underscore the military establishment's predominant authority in national security decision making in Pakistan.
5. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, “Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy in Pakistan,” Landau Network-Centro Volta, January 2002, <www.centrovolta.it/landau/content/binary/pakistan%20Januray%202002.pdf>.
6. David Leigh, “Wikileaks cables expose Pakistan nuclear fears,” Guardian, November 30, 2010, <www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-cables-pakistan-nuclear-fears>.
7. Warhead production figures taken from “Pakistan,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, February 3, 2013, <http://fissilematerials.org/countries/pakistan.html>.
8. Estimates in Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945–2006,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 2006); and Kristensen and Norris, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2013.”
9. Christopher Clary, “The Future of Pakistan's “Nuclear Weapons Program,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner, eds., Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (Seattle and Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), p. 137.
10. This level may represent what Rawalpindi is striving to achieve. According to a senior Pakistani official, “if China doesn't need more than 200–250 weapons, why should we?” Quoted in Mark Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers, Adelphi Paper 443 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2014), chapter 1.
11. For evidence of Pakistan's progress in warhead design, see Joby Warrick, “Smugglers Had Design for Advanced Warhead,” Washington Post, June 15, 2008, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/14/AR2008061402032.html>.
12. Usman Ansari, “Pakistan Navy Test-fires Land-Attack Missile,” Defense News, December 21, 2012, <www.defensenews.com/article/20121221/DEFREG04/312210004/Pakistan-Navy-Test-fires-Land-Attack-Missile>; Iskander Rehman, “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 65 (Autumn 2012), pp. 64–88; Usman Ansari, “Experts Wary of Pakistan Nuke Claims,” Defense News, May 26, 2012, <www.defensenews.com/article/20120526/DEFREG03/305260001/Experts-Wary-Pakistan-Nuke-Claims>; and S.M. Hali, “Second strike capability,” Nation (Lahore), August 15, 2006, <www.nation.com.pk/daily/august-2006/16/columns5.php>. According to recent media reports, Pakistan is renewing efforts to modernize its submarine arm through the purchase of eight diesel-powered attack submarines from China. Usman Ansari, “Pakistan to Buy 8 Submarines From China,” Defense News, April 3, 2015 <www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2015/04/03/pakistan-to-buy-8-submarines-from-china/25233481/>.
13. Inter-Services Public Relations, “Press Release No. PR104/2011,” April 29, 2011, <www.ispr.gov.pk/front/t-press_release.asp?id=1732>.
14. Usman Ansari, “Pakistan Continues Short-Range Ballistic Missile Test,” Defense News, February 18, 2013, <www.defensenews.com/article/20130218/DEFREG03/302180016/Pakistan-Continues-Short-Range-Ballistic-Missile-Tests>.
15. “Pakistan test fires nuclear-capable missile,” Dawn, February 11, 2013, <www.dawn.com/news/785266/pakistan-conducts-successful-test-of-hatf-ix-nasr>.
16. Miniaturized designs would also permit Pakistan to mate warheads to its existing inventory of Harpoon and Exocet anti-ship/land-attack cruise missiles that are deployed on conventional submarines. Questions persist, however, about whether Pakistan would be content to rely on an untested warhead design.
17. For a view that “Pakistan will never have the fissile material production capacity to develop battlefield nuclear weapons for war-fighting even on a modest scale,” see the argument presented by Mansoor Ahmed in Michael Krepon, “The Tortoise and the Hare: A Rebuttal,” Arms Control Wonk, April 23, 2013, <http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3754/the-tortoise-and-the-hare-a-rebuttal>. Naeem Salik concurs, noting that “India and Pakistan do not have the luxury of excess fissile materials to be directed for manufacturing ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons.” Naeem Salik, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability,” Naval Postgraduate School, 2012, <www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2012/2012_002_Salik.pdf>, p. 2.
18. Salik, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability,” p. 3.
19. Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34 (Winter 2009/10), p. 44. Also see Evan Braden Montgomery and Eric S. Edelman, “Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37 (2014), pp. 1–24.
20. Sam Perlo-Freeman et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2012 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2013), Figure 3, <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf>; Jay Menon, “India Remains World's Largest Arms Importer, Sipri Says,” Aviation Week, March 18, 2013, <http://aviationweek.com/defense/india-remains-worlds-largest-arms-importer-sipri-says>; and “India set to overtake UK's defence spend by 2017: Report,” Economic Times, July 10, 2013, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-set-to-overtake-uks-defence-spend-by-2017-report/articleshow/21008002.cms>. A recent study by the US intelligence community estimates that the Indian economy could easily double in size relative to Pakistan's by 2030. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, December 2012), p. 15.
21. Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2013 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2014).
22. Scott D. Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 250. An address last year by the chairman of India's national security advisory board seemed to confirm this interpretation. See Shyam Saran, “Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” address at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, August 24, 2013, <http://ris.org.in/publications/reportsbooks/654>.
23. Shivshankar Menon, “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs,” Speech to the National Defence College, October 21, 2010, <www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/798/Speech+by+NSA+Shri+Shivshankar+Menon+at+NDC+on+The+Role+of+Force+in+Strategic+Affairs>.
24. For more background, see Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32 (Winter 2007–08), pp. 158–90; and Lydia Polgreen and Mark Landler, “Obama Is Not Likely to Push India hard on Pakistan,” New York Times, November 5, 2010, p. A8.
25. For more on this point, see Shashank Joshi, “India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36 (2013), pp. 512–40; Azam Khan, “Understanding India's ‘cold start’ doctrine,” Express Tribune, October 18, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/276661/understanding-indias-cold-start-doctrine/>; and Sandeep Unnithan, “War Strategy: The Collapse of Cold Start,” India Today, December 4, 2010, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/war-strategy-the-collapse-of-cold-start/1/122058.html>.
26. Indicative of Rawalpindi's confidence is a commentary piece, titled “From Cold Start to Cold Storage!” that is posted on the website of its military press service: <www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-article&id=87>.
27. Peter R. Lavoy, “Islamabad's Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, January 2008), p. 134.
28. Quotation in Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 77–78.
29. Cyril Almedia, “Full-spectrum deterrence,” Dawn, September 8, 2013, <www.dawn.com/news/1041382>.
30. Inter-Services Public Relations, “Press Release, No. PR94/2011,” April 19, 2011, <www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721>.
31. This quotation is found in many publications, including David O. Smith, “The US Experience With Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2013), p. 80; and Shashank Joshi, “Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà vu?” Washington Quarterly 36 (Summer 2013), p. 162.
32. Adil Sultan, “Pakistan's emerging nuclear posture: impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine,” Strategic Studies (Islamabad, Winter 2011-Spring 2012), p. 159. Sultan argues that Pakistan's development of deterrence capacity at various tiers of conflict—something he calls “assured deterrence”—is similar to current US concepts of “flexible deterrence options.” For a contrary Pakistani view, one emphasizing that the movement away from a countervalue strategy epitomized by the Nasr's development will erode deterrence credibility, see Ejaz Haider, “Stupidity goes nuclear—I,” Express Tribune, April 26, 2011 <http://tribune.com.pk/story/156311/stupidity-goes-nuclear--i/> and “Stupidity goes nuclear—II,” Express Tribune, April 27, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/157064/stupidity-goes-nuclear--ii/>.
33. “Text: Musharraf rallies Pakistan,” BBC News, September 19, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1553542.stm>. Musharraf repeated this rationale in his memoir, In the Line of Fire (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 202.
34. The Obama administration has largely continued with the strategic focus on India. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance skipped over long-standing Asian allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia to give singular mention of India as “a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.” Department of Defense, “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January 2012, <www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf>.
35. Gil Plimmer and Victor Mallet, “India becomes biggest foreign buyer of US weapons,” Financial Times, February 24, 2014, <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ded3be9a-9c81-11e3-b535-00144feab7de.html>.
36. In February 2011, the Indian Air Force evaluated Raytheon Company's Joint Standoff Weapon as part of its medium multirole aircraft competition. See N. Ramakrishnan, “Raytheon keen to sell HEAT missile to IAF,” Hindu, November 11, 2011, <www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/raytheon-says-keen-to-sell-heat-missile-to-iaf/article2617701.ece>. On US overtures for a closer defense technology relationship with India, see Leon Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, India,” June 6, 2012, <www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5054>, and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, US Advance Strategic Relations,” Defense News, January 28, 2015 <www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/industry/2015/01/28/india-obama-modi-dtti-us-agreement-weapons-coproduce-bilateral-russia/22457599/>.
37. See Amit Baruah, “US, India Have Gone beyond Talking about Ballistic Missile Defences,” Hindu, October 9, 2004, <www.hindu.com/2004/10/09/stories/2004100912031200.htm>; Sanjoy Majumder, “India briefed on Patriot missile,” BBC News, September 9, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4229292.stm>; “NATO Offers Missile Defence Cooperation to India,” Hindu, September 4, 2011, <www.thehindu.com/news/national/nato-offers-missile-defence-cooperation-to-india/article2424128.ece>; “Potential for cooperation with India to develop BMD: US,” Business Standard, July 23, 2012, <www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/potential-for-cooperation-with-india-to-develop-bmd-us-112072300442_1.html>; and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, Israel to Build Anti-Missile System,” Defense News, February 6, 2014, <www.defensenews.com/article/20140206/DEFREG03/302060025/India-Israel-Build-Anti-Missile-System>.
38. “US embassy cables: Pakistan's position on treaty to control fissile material,” Guardian, November 30, 2010, <www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/236375>.
39. Toby Dalton and Jaclyn Tandler, “Understanding The Arms ‘Race’ in South Asia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2012, p.12.
40. “US embassy cables: Pakistan's position on treaty to control fissile material.”
41. Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, and R. Rajaraman, “Exploring Uranium Resource Constraints on Fissile Material Production in Pakistan,” Science and Global Security 17 (2009), pp. 77–108. Ahmed estimates that Pakistan's domestic supply of uranium ore will be exhausted by 2020; Ahmed, “The Tortoise and the Hare.”
42. Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 185. For estimates by other Pakistani officials, see “Pakistan for Reducing Existing Stocks of Fissile Material: Wajid,” Associated Press of Pakistan, October 19, 2010, <www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=119587>; Tariq Osman Hyder, “Strategic restraint in South Asia,” Nation (Lahore), March 20, 2013, <www.nation.com.pk/columns/20-Mar-2013/strategic-restraint-in-south-asia>. For a critical exploration of these concerns, consult Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal,” in Sokolski, ed., Pakistan's Nuclear Future, pp.167–218. For a view downplaying these fears, see Ashley J. Tellis, “Atoms for War? US-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2006, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf>.
43. Lavoy, “Islamabad's Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” pp. 148, 156.
44. For a view that Rawalpindi “now also sees the bomb as a useful deterrent against Washington,” see Bruce Riedel, “South Asia's Looming Arms Race,” Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703712504576245690427793516>. For an argument by the current chairman of India's national security advisory board that uncertainty about US strategic intentions is now the primary driver of Pakistani nuclear behavior, see Shyam Saran, “Dealing with Pakistan's brinkmanship,” Hindu, December 10, 2012, <www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/dealing-with-pakistans-brinkmanship/article4171664.ece>.
45. Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons: Musharraf Says Arsenal Is Now Secure,” Washington Post, November 11, 2001, p. A1.
46. See, for example, Anwar Iqbal, “US contingency plans for Pakistani nukes,” United Press International, January 19, 2005, <www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2005/01/19/US-contingency-plan-for-Pakistani-nukes/UPI-40031106180971/>; Thomas E. Ricks, “Calculating the Risks in Pakistan,” Washington Post, December 2, 2007,<www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/01/AR2007120101618.html>; Ewen MacAskill, “Pentagon readies plans for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal,” Guardian, December 28, 2007, <www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/28/usa.pakistan>; Seymour M. Hersh, “Defending the Arsenal,” New Yorker, November 16, 2009, <www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/11/16/091116fa_fact_hersh>; Christina Lamb, “Elite US troops ready to combat Pakistani nuclear hijinks,” Sunday Times (London), January 17, 2010, <www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6991056.ece>; Robert Windrem, “US prepares for worst-case scenarios for Pakistan nukes,” NBC News, August 3, 2011, <http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/08/03/7189919-us-prepares-for-worst-case-scenario-with-pakistan-nukes>; and Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “The Ally From Hell,” Atlantic (December 2011), <www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/308730/>.
47. US warnings are recalled in Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), pp. 341–43. Also see Bob Woodward, Obama's Wars (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2010), p. 364.
48. David Ignatius, “Our high-maintenance relationship with Pakistan,” Washington Post, July 13, 2012, <www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-pakistan-us-have-a-neurotic-relationship/2012/07/13/gJQABEDoiW_story.html>.
49. Ejaz Haider, “General Impressions,” Newsweek Pakistan, November 29, 2013, <http://newsweekpakistan.com/general-impressions/>; and David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Random House, 2012), p. 108.
50. Almeida, “Full-spectrum deterrence.”
51. According to one unconfirmed report, Pakistan attempts to frustrate US surveillance of its nuclear weapon depots by moving fully assembled devices around in civilian-style vehicles, accompanied by a low-profile security detail so as to escape detection. Goldberg and Ambinder, “The Ally From Hell.”
52. Admittedly, this is a contestable proposition. Pakistan denies US reports that it mobilized weapons during the 1999 crisis. On these reports, consult Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Center for the Advanced Study of India, May 19, 2002, <www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/685898/posts>; and Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). Also see Alan Sipress and Thomas E. Ricks, “Report: India, Pakistan Were Near Nuclear War in ’99,” Washington Post, May 15, 2002, p. A1. A recent assessment of these reports, however, finds that at most, Pakistani dispersal of its “nuclear-capable missiles out of storage sites for defensive [original emphasis] purposes,” was likely “misinterpreted by intelligence agencies as an operational deployment.” See Timothy D. Hoyt, “Kargil: the nuclear dimension,” in Peter R. Lavoy, ed., Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 159. But see “North Korea's missiles tied to Musharraf blunder,” Japan Times, January 28, 2013, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/01/28/asia-pacific/norths-missiles-tied-to-musharraf-blunder/>, for a report that Musharraf wanted to deploy Ghauri missiles during the crisis but was thwarted when he found out that its guidance system was faulty.
53. Naeem Salik, however, asserts that “the notion of the Pakistani arsenal being kept in a disassembled form is without basis.” Naeem Salik, “Ignore Hersh,” Pakistanpal's Blog, December 2, 2009, <https://pakistanpal.wordpress.com/2009/12/02/ignore-hersh/>. Kidwai has suggested the same thing; see Mauricio Martellini, “Security and Safety Issues about the Nuclear Complex: Pakistan's Standpoints,” Landau Network, 2008.
54. Quotations in “Security and Safety Issues about the Nuclear Complex: Pakistan's Standpoints,” (2008) and Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini, “Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy in Pakistan.”
55. Moore and Khan, “Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons.”
56. Sebastien Miraglia, “Deadly or Impotent? Nuclear Command and Control in Pakistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36 (December 2013), p. 853, n. 42; and Narang, “Posturing for Peace?” pp. 66–67. But for a claim by a former Pakistani army brigadier that nuclear weapons are not co-located on regular bases, see Shaiq Hussain, “Militants storm Pakistan air base; 10 killed,” Washington Post, August 15, 2012, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/militants-storm-pakistan-air-base-eight-killed/2012/08/16/a11a1a3c-e746-11e1-936a-b801f1abab19_story.html>.
57. Bruno Tertrais, “Pakistan's nuclear programme: a net assessment,” Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, June 13, 2012, p. 22, n. 121. For an argument that “due to security concerns, Pakistan is unlikely to operate its nuclear forces outside” of its Punjabi heartland, see Gregory S. Jones, “Pakistan's ‘Minimum Deterrent’ Nuclear Force Requirements,” in Sokolski, ed., Pakistan's Nuclear Future, p. 92.
58. Peter Wonacott, “Inside Pakistan's Drive to Guard It's A-Bombs,” Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2007, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB119629674095207239>; and Khan, Eating Grass, p. 331.
59. Quotation in Ron Moreau, “Pakistan Insists Nuke Are Safe,” Newsweek, January 25, 2008, <www.newsweek.com/pakistan-insists-nukes-are-safe-87459>. Also see Robin Walker, “Pakistan's Evolution as a Nuclear Weapons State,” address by Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 27, 2006, <www.nps.edu/academics/centers/ccc/news/kidwaiNov06.html>.
60. Shaun Gregory, “The Security of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan,” Brief No. 22, Pakistan Security Research Unit, University of Bradford, November 18, 2007, p.3.
61. Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,” Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37, Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004, <www.sandia.gov/cooperative-monitoring-center/_assets/documents/sand2004-3375p.pdf>, p. 33.
62. Amir Mir, “The real fingers on Pakistan's nuclear trigger,” News International, November 16, 2011, <www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-77796-The-real-fingers-on-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-trigger>.
63. Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring the Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), p. 8.
64. Khalid Banuri and Adil Sultan, “Managing and securing the bomb,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 30, 2008, <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/30-May-2008/view-managing-and-securing-the-bomb-khalid-banuri-and-adil-sultan>. Also see Elaine M. Grossman, “Pakistani Leaders to Retain Nuclear-Arms Authority in Crises: Senior Official,” Global Security Newswire, February 27, 2014, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistani-leaders-retain-nuclear-arms-authority-crises-senior-official/>. General Kidwai has recently argued that the added deterrent value of tactical nuclear weapons like the Nasr strongly outweighs “the lesser issues of command and control and the possibility of their falling into wrong hands.” Opening remarks at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, March 23, 2015, <carnegieendowment.org/files/General_Kidwai_Remarks.pdf>.
65. Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini, “Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy in Pakistan,” p. 4.
66. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia during Peace, Crisis, and War,” Contemporary South Asia 14 (June 2005), p. 169.
67. Narang, “Posturing for Peace?” p. 70.
68. Miraglia, “Deadly or Impotent?” pp. 856, 859.
69. For more on this, see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia, pp. 219–63.
70. See Miraglia, “Deadly or Impotent?” for a fuller exposition of this point. As one Pakistani commentator notes, “in practice, it is the all-powerful army leadership that will have the decisive say in the use of nuclear weapons if it ever comes to that.” Mir, “The real fingers on Pakistan's nuclear trigger.”
71. Miraglia, “Deadly or Impotent?” p. 861.
72. The classic statement on this danger is Barry R. Posen, who argues that this peril “looms large for small and medium-sized nuclear forces, since they will have the most difficult time building nuclear forces that can survive.” Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 2.
73. Smith, “The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear Forces,” p. 85; and Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “Doctrine, Capabilities and (In)Stability in South Asia,” in Krepon and Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, p. 100 . As Gaurav Kampani's contribution in this issue points out, however, it is unclear whether procedures exist, at least in the Indian case, to allow for the mating of warheads with delivery vehicles in the field. Gaurav Kampani, “Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes? Data, Interpretation, and Fact,” Nonproliferation Review 21 (December 2014).
74. Salik, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability,” p. 3
75. Usman Ansari, “Pakistan Tests ‘Nuke-Capable’ Short-Range Missile,” Defense News, April 20, 2011.
76. Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan's answer to Cold Start?” Friday Times, May 13–19, 2011, <www.thefridaytimes.com/13052011/page7.shtml>.
77. At the height of the 2001–02 crisis with India, Rawalpindi conducted a rapid series of missile tests in order to send deterrence signals.
78. Seth G. Jones, “Preventing a Nuclear ‘Great Game’,” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323855804578509120321743386>; and “Pakistan will not accept Indian role in Afghanistan: Yasin,” Pakistan Today, January 23, 2014, <www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/01/23/national/pakistan-will-not-accept-indian-role-in-afghanistan-yasin/>.
79. These possibilities are suggested by Kanti Bajpai, “The BJP and the Bomb,” and Vipin Narang, “Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia,” both in Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia, pp. 25–67 and pp. 137–183, respectively. Also see Sanjeev Miglani and John Chalmers, “India's BJP puts ‘no first use’ nuclear policy in doubt,” Reuters, April 7, 2014, <http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/07/india-election-bjp-manifesto-idINDEEA3605820140407>.
80. On these doubts, see Rama Lakshmi, “Key Indian Figures Call for New Nuclear Tests Despite Deal with US,” Washington Post, October 5, 2009, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/04/AR2009100402865.html>; P.K. Iyengar, “Non-Fissile Doubts,” Outlook, October 26, 2009, <www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?262331>.
81. Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times Books, 2012); Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012); Tellis, Denmark, and Tanner, eds, Asia in the Second Nuclear Age; Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell, “India's Submarine Deterrent and Asian Nuclear Proliferation,” Survival 56 (August-September 2014), pp. 157–174; and the roundtable discussion on “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia's Multipolar Nuclear Future,” Asia Policy 19 (January 2015), pp.1–48.
82. Chidanand Rajghatta, “India's nuclear expansion not targeted at Pakistan but at China,” Times of India, June 16, 2013, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/stoi/Indias-nuclear-expansion-not-targeted-at-Pakistan-but-at-China/articleshow/20611583.cms>.
83. This point is made in Dalton and Tandler, Understanding The Arms ‘Race’ in South Asia. In early 2012, the Indian army chief downplayed the value of battlefield nuclear weapons; see “Nukes only for strategic purposes: army chief,” Indian Express, January 16, 2012, <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/nukes-only-for-strategic-purposes-army-chief/900159/>.
84. Khan, Eating Grass, p. 396.
85. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).
86. Clary, “The Future of Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 153.
87. The SPD operates a well-regarded nuclear security and safety training academy in Punjab province and has offered it as a regional center of excellence under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
88. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Strategic Restraint Regime 2.0,” in Krepon and Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, p. 170.
89. Jehangir Khan and Shashi Tyagi, “No dispute about this,” Hindustan Times, March 20, 2012, <www.hindustantimes.com/comment/columns/no-dispute-about-this/article1-828400.aspx>.
90. For more on this point, see David J. Karl, “Obama must support India-Pakistan rapprochement,” Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 2012, <www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0216/Obama-must-support-India-Pakistan-rapprochement>.