The Relative Efficacy of the Biological and Chemical Weapon Regimes

Abstract

The biological and chemical weapon nonproliferation and disarmament regimes are often put forward as models of what the nuclear nonproliferation regime could (or should) be. But are these regimes effective? If so, is one stronger and/or more effective than the other? What is it that makes them relatively stronger than the nuclear nonproliferation regime? In this article, we return to and expand upon a framework for assessing regime health and effectiveness. We utilize this framework to engage in a comparative analysis of the chemical weapon (CW) and biological weapon (BW) nonproliferation regimes, respectively. Our analysis reveals that these two regimes are comparatively healthier than their nuclear counterpart. While some of their behavioral features might be troubling—such as the disputes over stockpile destruction of CW—these tend to be mitigated by the presence of a strong norm against possession and proliferation of both CW and BW. This norm is adequately embedded into the existing institutional features of the regimes in ways that do not exist in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

KEYWORDS:

• Biological weapons
• chemical weapons
• nonproliferation
• Syria
• Iran
• Iraq

DISCLAIMER

The views and analysis in this article are the authors' alone and do not represent those of the Department of Defense or the US government.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An earlier version of this article was presented at Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 2011. We thank David Gartner, Jeffrey Knopf, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Notes

1. For example, see Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, “Going to Zero With Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons From the Chemical Weapons Convention,” a talk delivered at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 16, 2009, <www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/pfirterspeechfinal.pdf>.

2. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36 (1982), pp. 185-205. Though there is a large literature on this with varying definitions, Krasner's articulation gets to the heart of our purpose here. For a good overview of the debates on regime definition, see Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

3. Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 (1987), p. 496; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes; Oran R. Young, ed., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999).

4. Jeffrey Fields and Jason S. Enia, “The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Returning to a Multidimensional Evaluation,” Nonproliferation Review 16 (2009), pp. 173–96.

5. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences;” John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (1982), pp. 379–415.

6. While regimes and institutions can reinforce one another, it can be a mistake to presuppose an automatic relationship between them. In fact, regimes can exist separately from specific and formal institutions. See Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” p. 498.

7. Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 133.

8. Keohane and others use the economic concept of market failure to illustrate the ways that the costs of transaction (e.g., information, monitoring, enforcement, etc.) can inhibit cooperation in an anarchic international environment. Institutions and regimes theoretically mitigate some of these issues. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

9. Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

10. Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” pp. 496–97.

11. Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, “International regimes: lessons from inductive analysis,” in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, p. 63.

12. Fields and Enia, “The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” p. 178.

13. Puchala and Hopkins, “International regimes: lessons from inductive analysis,” p. 66.

14. Fields and Enia, “The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” p. 178.

15. Puchala and Hopkins, “International regimes: lessons from inductive analysis,” p. 64.

16. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (1988), pp. 427–60.

17. Keohane, “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.”

18. Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” p. 496.

19. See, for example, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

20. Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2 (2000), p. 71.

21. Vaughn P. Shannon, “Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation,” International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000), pp. 300–03; Alice D. Ba, “On Norms, Rule-Breaking and Security Communities: A Constructivist Response,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 5 (2005), p. 260.

22. Fields and Enia, “The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” p. 178.

23. Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 14–43. Jonathan Tucker notes that the Lieber Code of Conduct issued by the US War Department in 1865 banned the use of poison and the Brussels Declaration, signed (but not ratified) by fourteen European nations, banned the use of poison, poisonous gas, and weapons that inflicted unnecessary suffering. Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York: Anchor Publishing, 2007).

24. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 120.

25. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, <www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/pdf/Status_Protocol.pdf>.

26. Marie Isabelle Chevrier, “Review of The Chemical Weapons Taboo,” American Political Science Review  92 (1998), pp. 507–08; Price, “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,” especially pp. 74–79.

27. See OPCW, “Report of the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” April 19, 2013, <www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/RC-3/en/rc303__e_.pdf>.

28. See OPCW, “Syria's Accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention Enters into Force,” October 14, 2013, <www.opcw.org/news/article/syrias-accession-to-the-chemical-weapons-convention-enters-into-force/>.

29. The treaty, signed in Geneva in 1925, does not prohibit production and stockpiling of biological and chemical agents.

30. World Health Organization, “Biorisk Management: Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance,” WHO/CDS/EPR/2006.6, September 2006, <www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6.pdf>.

31. See World Health Organization, “International Health Regulations,” 2nd ed., (2005), <whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf>.

32. Kashef Ijaz et al., “International Health Regulations—What Gets Measured Gets Done,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 18 (July 2012), p. 1,054.

33. The International Atomic Energy Agency predates the NPT (established in 1957) and its mission is “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.” The difference may seem trivial, but the IAEA existed before the NPT and presumably would continue to exist should that treaty dissolve. See “The Statute of the IAEA,” <www.iaea.org/About/statute.html>.

34. For a discussion of protocol negotiations, see Kenneth D. Ward, “The BWC Protocol: Mandate for Failure,” Nonproliferation Review 11 (Summer 2004), pp. 1–17.

35. Rebecca Whitehair and Seth Brugger, “BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Following U.S. Rejection,” Arms Control Today, September 2001, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_09/bwcsept01>; Judith Miller, “U.S. Explores Other Options on Preventing Germ Warfare,” New York Times, July 25, 2001, <www.nytimes.com/2001/07/25/international/25WEAP.html>.

36. In 1997, Cuba accused the United States of using an aircraft to spread the crop-eating insects thrips palmi over the province of Matanzas in 1996. Cuba requested a “special consultative meeting” concerning the purported attack. However, lack of objective evidence hampered the investigation. See also Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Assessing U.S. Proposals to Strengthen the Biological Weapons,” Arms Control Today, April 2002, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/tuczilapril02>. “Cuban Accusations of U.S. Insect Raid on Island to Be Studied,” New York Times, August 28, 1997, <www.nytimes.com/1997/08/28/world/cuban-accusations-of-us-insect-raid-on-island-to-be-studied.html>.

37. See “Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction (Geneva, 20 November–8 December 2006), Final Document,” (BWC/CONF.VI/6), <www.opbw.org/rev_cons/6rc/docs/6/BWC_CONF.VI_6_EN.pdf>.

38. For an overview of the origins of the intercessional process, see Jonathan Tucker, “The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment,” Nonproliferation Review 11 (Spring 2004), pp. 26–39.

39. Fields and Enia, “The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” p. 184.

40. See Article XI of the CWC, available at <www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-xi-economic-and-technological-development/>.

41. In addition, Myanmar is said to be “making preparations to ratify” both the CWC and BWC. See Radio Free Asia, “Myanmar Prepares to Ratify Chemical, Biological Weapons Treaties,” December 2013, <www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/weapons-12112013192030.html>. Angola and South Sudan are preparing to join the CWC, according to the head of the OPCW, Ahmet Üzümcü. See Reuters, “OPCW Chief Urges Israel to Join Chemical Arms Treaty,” December 10, 2013, <www.jpost.com/Middle-East/OPCW-chief-urges-Israel-to-join-chemical-arms-treaty-334562>.

42. Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 141–43.

43. Jonathan Tucker, “The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Compliance Protocol,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_2a.html>. One might argue this should be less of a concern because the norm against BW proliferation is arguably stronger than that of nuclear proliferation or at least their utility. However, the question of the military utility of BW is still the subject of some debate. See Alexander Kelle, Kathryn Nixdorff, and Malcom Dando, Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012), for a recent discussion around these issues.

44. National Research Council, Countering Biological Threats: Challenges for the Department of Defense's Nonproliferation Program beyond the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2009), p. 4, <www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id = 12596>.

45. Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, “Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP),” <www.cdham.org/cooperative-biological-engagement-program-pakistan>.

46. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Committees,” July 2013, <www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2013/211884.htm>.

47. Department of State, “Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction: Condition (10)(C) Report,” January 2013 <www.state.gov/documents/organization/212108.pdf>. The report addresses reporting issues with Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Russia but does not suggest blatant violations of the CWC.

48. Regarding Cuba, see note 36 and Charles H. Calisher, “Scientist in a Strange Land: A Cautionary Tale,” Nonproliferation Review 16 (November 2009), pp. 509-19. States must file yearly reports as part of BWC confidence-building measures. However, only seventy-three state parties did so in 2010. See Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Considers Alternatives to BWC Verification Protocol,” June 20, 2011, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110620_5767.php>.

49. Kirk C. Bansak, “Enhancing Compliance With an Evolving Treaty: A Task for an Improved BWC Intersessional Process,” Arms Control Today, June 2011, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_06/Bansak>.

50. While the 2008 CWC RevCon did produce a consensus document and many of the participants viewed the final outcome a success, others noted that the success was “modest” and that “agreement was only possible at the price of avoiding contentious issues and copying large sections from the final document of the first CWC review conference in 2003.” See Oliver Meier, “CWC Review Conference Avoids Difficult Issues,” Arms Control Today, May 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_05/CWC>.

51. The taboo against CW use has not been absolute since World War I. Italy used chemical weapons in the 1930s against Ethiopia. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran during the war the two countries fought in the 1980s. Iraq again used CW (mustard gas and nerve agents) against portions of its own Kurdish population of Halabja, in northern Iraq in 1988. Finally, most recently there was the use of chemical weapons in 2013 in the Syrian civil war.

52. See, for example, Price and Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence.”

53. Tucker, War of Nerves.

54. For examples, see Department of State Action Memorandum, “Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons,” November 21, 1983, <www2.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq25.pdf>; Department of State telegram, “UN Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq,” March 14, 1984, <www2.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq47.pdf>.

55. The issue of incapacitants that can be used for law enforcement is an issue often discussed within the proceedings of CWC meetings. However, state parties have not come to agreement on how to deal with them. The final document of the Third CWC RevCon does not mention them. Though the CWC bans riot control agents in war, it does not proscribe their production and use for domestic law enforcement purposes. While this issue is obviously an important one to some states, we mention them here only in passing because we see a fundamental difference between incapacitants of the sort used by law enforcement and potentially lethal chemical weapons designed expressly for use in warfare.

56. Nina Rathbun, “The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Nonproliferation Review 13 (2006), p. 228.

57. See Frederic J. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Constraints (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, vol. 5 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971); Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo.

58. Richard Price, “Chemical Weapons: How We Built a Taboo,” Boston Globe , September 7, 2013, <www.boston.com/2013/09/08/chemical-weapons/4LmSkZpbXgLDpVYpKBOnwJ/story.html>.

59. Robert A. Wampler, ed., “The Nixon Administration's Decision to End US Biological Warfare Programs,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 58, updated December 7, 2001, <www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58/>.

60. Only one state, South Africa, has ever developed a functioning nuclear weapon capability and later abandoned it.

61. Several authors have written on the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. See for example, T.V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Palo Alto: Stanford Security Studies, 2009).