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Abstract
“French nuclear diplomacy” is the French government's use of civilian nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) to advance specific commercial and strategic interests. During the heart of the so-called nuclear renaissance, the Élysée Palace aggressively peddled France's nuclear expertise and technology abroad, signing over a dozen new NCAs in an effort to bring in business for the French industry, forge diplomatic relationships, and promote global nonproliferation norms. Several years later, however, the outcomes of France's aggressive global nuclear power push appear nominal at best. This article explores the mixed results of this nuclear campaign, and through three case studies, illustrates how many of France's commercial and political disappointments stem from unrealistic expectations and the disorganization of the French nuclear complex.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to thank the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique for its support during her Fulbright year in Paris, in particular Camille Grand and Bruno Tertais. She would also like to express her utmost gratitude to the dozens of individuals in the French government and industry who generously contributed their time, expertise, and knowledge to this project.
Notes
1. For more on the history of the establishment of the French nuclear energy program, see Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), and Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
2. Recipients of French sensitive nuclear technology were: Israel (1957–67), Spain (1960), India (1969), Italy (1971), Japan (1971–74), Iraq (1974–81), Taiwan (1975), South Korea (1975), and Pakistan (1974–81).
3. Bruno Tertrais, “France and Nuclear Non-proliferation. From benign neglect to active promotion,” in Olav Njolstad, ed., Nuclear Proliferation and International Order, (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 217–26.
4. Nuclear Power in France, World Nuclear Association, <www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/France/>.
5. Didier Kechemair, former deputy director of international affairs at the French Atomic Energy Agency (CEA), personal interview with author, April 2013, Paris, France. He explained that the path to an NCA is not always top down—it can also begin with scientific cooperation between research bodies or industry-driven interest in a new market, which then leads to political involvement.
6. France also offered agreements to Egypt, Argentina, Chile, Turkey, and Indonesia, but talks did not lead to an NCA.
7. See William Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (March 1996), p. 77, and William Long, Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), for an analysis of how economic incentives drive a state's internal preferences and decision making.
8. “Le modèle d'Areva, c'est Nespresso,” Anne Lauvergeon, former CEO of AREVA, interview with Challenges, July 10, 2008, <www.challenges.fr/magazine/20080710.CHA9488/le-modele-d-areva-c-est-nespresso-l-interview.html>.
9. Official at the French Treasury (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, May 2013.
10. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, January 2013.
11. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, June 2013.
12. David Styan, France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy Making in the Middle East (London: I.B Tauris, 2006), p. 124.
13. Cecile Maisonnaueve, former head of international affairs for CEO at AREVA, personal interview with author, February 2013, Paris, France.
14. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, June 2013, Paris, France.
15. Matthew Fuhrmann, “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 181–208. See also Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), on how trade can strengthen bilateral relations when one state depends on the supplier state for a particular asset.
16. French nuclear industry official (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, February 2013.
17. This hypothesis for why a state may engage in nuclear trade follows the rational-actor strategic model of state behavior. Indeed, by bolstering the NPT, France is enhancing its own national security and therefore strategic position. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
18. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, January 2013.
19. For example, in his 2005 speech to the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared, “We are concerned that once certain powerful states completely control nuclear energy resources and technology, they will deny access to other states and thus deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international community.” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Address before the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 17, 2005, <www.iran.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf>.
20. “Sarkozy in the Gulf: France Aims at Nuclear Deal with United Arab Emirates,” Spiegel Online International, January 14, 2008, <www.spiegel.de/international/europe/sarkozy-in-the-gulf-france-aims-at-nuclear-deal-with-united-arab-emirates-a-528453.html>.
21. While not a case study, the NCA with Libya was particularly notable for the disagreements it stirred within the French nuclear complex. President Sarkozy wished to sell Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi a nuclear reactor for water desalination as both a “reward” for dismantling his illicit nuclear program in 2003, but also to facilitate other negotiations on the table. But the industry was uneasy with the accord for economic and political reasons. “AREVA saw [working with Libya] as a commercial and ethical risk,” explained one industry official. “How do you work with a country like that?” The prospective NCA prompted a widely publicized dispute between President Sarkozy and Lauvergeon, symbolic of broader misaligned interests and priorities of the two figures. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, June 2013.
22. IAEA, “Developing Infrastructure for New Nuclear Power Programmes,” September 2011, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/NuclearPower/npinfrastruture0911.pdf>.
23. French nuclear industry official (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, February 2013.
24. Philippe Delaune, deputy director of international affairs at the CEA, personal interview with author, Paris, France, June 2013. Algeria also recently announced its intentions to build a nuclear power plant by 2025, but several French government officials expressed sincere doubt that France will be the country to supply this reactor.
25. France used the Algerian Sahara to conduct seventeen nuclear weapon tests between 1960 and 1966.
26. “Algérie: l'accord sur le nucléaire civil est une ‘marque de confiance’, selon Sarkozy,” Liberation, December 5, 2007, <www.liberation.fr/monde/2007/12/05/algerie-l-accord-sur-le-nucleaire-civil-est-une-marque-de-confiance-selon-sarkozy_6967>.
27. “France signs Algeria nuclear deal,” BBC, June 21, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7467438.stm>.
28. Ariel Farrar-Wellman, “Algeria-Iran Foreign Relations,” American Enterprise Institute, May 9, 2010, <www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/algeria-iran-foreign-relations>.
29. Ariel Farrar-Wellman, “Algeria-Iran Foreign Relations,” American Enterprise Institute, May 9, 2010, <www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/algeria-iran-foreign-relations>.
30. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 66.
31. “The World From Berlin: Sarkozy's Libya Nuke Deal ‘A European Disgrace,’” Spiegel, July 27, 2007, <www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-sarkozy-s-libya-nuke-deal-a-european-disgrace-a-496914.html>.
32. Mycle Schneider, nuclear energy consultant, personal interview with author, Paris, France, January 2013.
33. Mycle Schneider, “The reality of France's aggressive nuclear power push,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 3, 2008, <www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-reality-of-frances-aggressive-nuclear-power-push>.
34. It is worth noting, however, that LWR fuel can still be diverted for military purposes. See e.g., Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, and Harmon Hubbard, “Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, October 22, 2004, <http://npolicy.org/article_file/A_Fresh_Examination_of_the_Proliferation_Resistance_of_Light_Water_Reactors.pdf>.
35. Anne Lauvergeon, prepared statement for Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/npc_lauvergeon4.pdf>.
36. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, June 2013.
37. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, January 2013.
38. Anne Lauvergeon, La Femme Qui Resiste. (Paris, France: Plon, 2012).
39. Thierry Gadault, AREVA, Mon Amour: Enquête sur un pouvoir qui les rend fous, (Paris: Bourin Editeur, 2012), p. 132.
40. Former AREVA official (name withheld by request), phone interview with author, January 2013.
41. They lowered the price by 10 percent in the final stages of negotiations, but this adjustment was not enough to tip the scale.
42. Daniel Bardsley, ”First South Korean Troops On Way to UAE,” National, January 11, 2011, <www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/first-south-korean-troops-on-way-to-uae>.
43. Nuclear Power in the United Arab Emirates, World Nuclear Association, <www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/United-Arab-Emirates/>.
44. Michel Abu Najm, “France sets sights on Gulf market after losing Brazilian fighter jet contract,” Asharq Al-Awsat, December 22, 2013, <www.aawsat.net/2013/12/article55325606>.
45. However, the agreement does contain a clause allowing the UAE to request renegotiation if other states in the region conclude 123s with more favorable terms. See Jessica Varnum, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation as Nonproliferation: Reforms, or the Devil You Know?” Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 27, 2012, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/us-nuclear-cooperation-nonproliferation-reforms-or-devil-you-know>.
46. For more on French nuclear policies in the UAE, see Benoît Pelopidas, “French nuclear idiosyncrasy: how it affects French nuclear policies towards the United Arab Emirates and Iran,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25 (March 2012), pp 143-69.
47. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, June 2013.
48. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, June 2013.
49. Philippe Delaune, personal interview with author, Paris, France, June 2013.
50. Didier Kechemair, personal interview with author, Paris, France, April 2013.
51. Official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, June 2013.
52. For more on why the China-Pakistan nuclear deal is problematic for international nuclear trade norms, see Mark Hibbs, “The Breach,” Foreign Policy, June 4, 2010, <www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/04/the_breach>.
53. French nuclear industry official (name withheld by request), personal interview with author, Paris, France, January 2013.
54. For more on the AREVA contract with China, see “Taishan 1&2–China,” <www.areva.com/EN/operations-2404/china--taishan-12.html>.
55. France lost additional potential customers of the EPR when several European states, including Germany and Italy, abandoned nuclear plans in the wake of Fukushima.
56. The French government sees the proliferation of SMRs as problematic because it reduces the barriers to enter nuclear production, will increase the number of nuclear plants, and therefore raise the chances of subpar safety and security regulations on such plants.
57. Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements.”
58. For more on how to promote responsible nuclear supply, see Sharon Squassoni, “Responsible Nuclear Suppliers: India, South Korea and China,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 11, 2013, <http://csis.org/publication/responsible-nuclear-suppliers-india-south-korea-and-china>.
59. President Hollande's government has pledged to reduce reliance on nuclear energy from 75 percent to 50 percent by 2025. Geraldine Amiel, “France to Dim Its Reliance on Nuclear Power,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/articles/france-to-dim-its-reliance-on-nuclear-power-1403113287>.