Making Us Disarmament Commitments Credible

Abstract

President Barack Obama's 2009 commitment to pursue a world without nuclear weapons struck some as incredible given political resistance to arms control treaties and unilateral reductions. This viewpoint describes steps that can demonstrate a commitment to nuclear disarmament that do not rely on warhead dismantlement. These steps include the collation and release of nuclear data; the renovation and construction of facilities to new transparency standards; and the selective modification of conventional weapon systems. The steps may make a disarmament agreement more likely by assuaging the difficulty the United States will have committing to a verification scheme, given its capacity to circumvent such a scheme. A more credible disarmament pledge could also secure substantial fiscal and diplomatic gains.

KEYWORDS:

• United States
• disarmament
• verification
• dual-use
• transparency

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to Simon Collard-Wexler, Rebecca Gibbons, and Brian Radzinsky for comments on earlier drafts, to Linton Brooks, Steve Pifer, Shirley Johnson, Hans Kristensen, Doug Shaw, David Shlapak, David Frelinger, David Blair, Keir Lieber, and Dan Nexon for discussions on related issues, and to groups at the George Washington University, the University of California, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Notes

1. Barack Obama, ‘‘Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic,’’ April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered>.

2. This may be true in cases where there is a causal relation between the two norms—as in the common worry that test bans cause states to “rust toward disarmament”—and also where there is not. In this line of thought, states come to inhabit generalized pro- or anti-nuclear positions. In other words, actions on related norms of nuclear restraint can increase the credibility of disarmament pledges by raising the budgetary or the reputational costs of continued armament.

3. This relies on stated doctrine reflecting actual doctrine.

4. Steve Fetter and Ivan Oelrich, “Verifying a Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons,” in Barry M. Blechmann and Alexander K. Bolfrass, eds., Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2010) and James M. Acton, “Fissile Materials and Disarmament,” in Catherine M. Kelleher and Judith Reppy, eds., Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), pp. 245–59. The United States recently announced a multilateral initiative “to better understand the technical problems of verifying nuclear disarmament, and to develop solutions.” Rose Gottemoeller, “State’s Gottemoeller in Prague on Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Prague, December 4, 2014, <http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/12/20141204311707.html>.

5. Fetter and Oelrich, “Verifying a Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons.”

6. Alexander H. Montgomery and Adam Mount, “Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs,” Intelligence and National Security 29 (2014), pp. 357–86, <www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2014.895593#.VLacocZBaE4>.

7. Acton, “Fissile Materials and Disarmament.”

8. Alexander Glaser, “Facilitating Nuclear Disarmament: Verified Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks and Production,” Nonproliferation Review 19 (March 2012), pp. 125–35. James Acton also made similar arguments in Acton, “Fissile Materials and Disarmament,” pp. 252–54.

9. US Department of Energy, “Openness Press Conference,” June 27, 1994, <www.osti.gov/opennet/forms.jsp?formurl=document/press/pcconten.html#ZZ0>. Data released included selected pieces of information about the size, yield, and retirement of nuclear weapons, the production and inventories of fissile materials, and information about nuclear tests. The recent release extended stockpile size and dismantlement data to the present day. US Department of State, “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” April 29, 2014, <www.state.gov/documents/organization/225555.pdf>.

10. US Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” May 3, 2010, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf>.

11. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Obama Seeks Further U.S.-Russian Nuke Data Sharing,” Global Security Newswire, August 5, 2011, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/obama-seeks-further-us-russian-nuke-data-sharing/>.

12. US Department of Energy, “Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States plutonium production, acquisition, and utilization from 1944 through 1994,” DOE/DP-037, February 1996, <www.fissilematerials.org/library/doe96.pdf>.

13. US Department of State, “Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (and Protocol Thereto),” 1977, <www.state.gov/t/isn/5209.htm>. The most pertinent data would include downblending operations and data from the Y-12, Savannah River, and Hanford sites, where highly enriched uranium and plutonium were manufactured.

14. Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. 1) Part F, p. 24, May 2010, <www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/>.

15. Jonas Siegel, John Steinbruner, and Nancy Gallagher, “Comprehensive Nuclear Material Accounting”, Center for International and Security Studies, March, 2014, <www.cissm.umd/edu/publications/comprehensive-nuclear-material-accounting>. The monograph surveys current accountancy standards and suggests several productive revisions. This step might also be regarded as part of the facility renovation project in the next section.

16. George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), pp. 61–65.

17. For an overview of the SBD standard, see National Nuclear Security Administration, “Final Report,” Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards: Safeguards by Design, December 14–15, 2010, Washington, DC, <https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/494952.pdf>.

18. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA safeguards,” STR 360, 2009, <www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/STR_360_external_version.pdf>.

19. See Michael H. Ehlinger and Shirley J. Johnson, “Lessons Learned in International Safeguards—Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reproccessing Plant,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, December 2009, <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke/rokkasho.pdf>, and S. J. Johnson et. al., “Development of the Safeguards Approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant,” International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-SM-367/8/01, 2002, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20files/Session%208/Paper%208-01.pdf>.

20. The new pit disposition procedure will scale up the nondestructive assay process developed in the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System at Los Alamos. This process is described in Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Integrated Nondestructive Assay Solutions for Plutonium Measurement Problems of the 21th Century,” LA-13367-MS, 1997, <library.lanl.gov/cgi-bin/getfile?00412532.pdf>.

21. On the United States Enrichment Corporation plant, see Matthew L. Wald, “Loan Request by Uranium-Enrichment Firm Upends Politics as Usual,” New York Times, November 25, 2011, p. B5. The government’s assumption of responsibility for the disposition of the “tails” from the site means that careful records can be preserved and the tails can be made available for future examination.

22. US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report” (Washington DC: DOD, April 2010), p. 28, <www.defense.gov/npr/>.

23. Hans M. Kristensen, “US Navy Instruction Confirms Retirement of Nuclear Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, March 18, 2013, <http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/03/tomahawk/>.

24. US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” p. 27.

25. Madelyn Creedon and Andrew Weber, “Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for Department of Defense Nuclear Forces Programs,” Prepared Statement for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, March 28, 2012, <www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Creedon-Weber%2003-28-12.pdf>.

26. The software to afford the F-35 a nuclear capability is still under development and planned for speedy inclusion in the program. Though this alone would not void the other two steps, it might dilute them slightly.

27. Congress’s fiscal year 2014 funding bill eliminated $10 million to adapt the B61 for the F-35 and cut the B61 LEP by $34.9 million. For a breakdown, see Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Department of Defense—FY 2014 Budget Request and Appropriations for Replacement Nuclear Delivery Systems and Warhead Life Extension Support,” February 2014, <http://armscontrolcenter.org/assets/pdfs/FY14DoDNukePrograms.pdf>. Overall, the Congressional Budget Office estimates the development costs for the nuclear modifications at $350 million (to be followed by implementation costs). Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Cost of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014–2023,” December, 2013, <www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/12-19-2013-NuclearForces.pdf>. The magnitude of the total cost savings would depend on the particulars of the verification agreement and how military sites are selected for inspection. Over time, the change could also lower costs domestically by exempting more bases from the burdensome Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections.

28. Former Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz has recommended that the nuclear variant be canceled altogether, absent NATO burden-sharing. See Aaron Mehta, “Former USAF Chief of Staff: Move Away from Nuclear F-35,” Defense News, January 17, 2014, <http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140117/DEFREG02/301170028/Former-USAF-Chief-Staff-Move-Away-From-Nuclear-F-35>. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates repeatedly questioned the need to maintain the triad, for instance in: US Department of Defense, “News Transcript,” April 15, 2009, <www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4403>, and US Department of Defense “News Transcript,” May 18, 2011, <www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4823>.

29. US Department of Defense, “B-1B Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP),” 2004, <www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2004/pdf/af/2004B-1BCMUP.pdf>.

30. James N. Miller, prepared statement for the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 4, 2011, <www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testMiller05042011.pdf>.

31. US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April, 2010, <www.defense.gov/npr/>. Rose Gottemoeller, “U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Policy,” Washington, DC, December 17, 2014, <www.brookings.edu/events/2014/12/17-us-nuclear-arms-control-ukraine-russia-non-proliferation-gottemoeller-pifer>.