Reflections on Transparency and Monitoring under the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement

ABSTRACT

The 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement between the United States and Russian Federation is often described as one of the world's most successful nuclear nonproliferation programs. In 2013, the two states achieved the agreement's major goals of downblending 500 metric tons of Russian weapon-origin HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) and delivering all resultant LEU to the United States. At one time, the LEU delivered under the agreement generated nearly 10 percent of all electricity in the United States. The agreement achieved its nonproliferation goals through a unique government/industry partnership. Commercial executive agents contracted for the annual sale and delivery of downblended LEU, while the US and Russian governments exercised reciprocal transparency monitoring measures to demonstrate that all LEU delivered under the agreement was derived from Russian weapons-origin HEU, and that the same LEU was used for exclusively peaceful purposes in the United States. The commercial development, negotiations, and implementation of the agreement have been well documented. This article describes the scope of US transparency monitoring activities in Russian HEU processing facilities, as well as Russian monitoring in the United States. In addition, it discusses the results of twenty years of reciprocal transparency monitoring and data analysis, and outlines lessons learned that are potentially applicable to future transparency monitoring and verification regimes and similar cooperative efforts.

KEYWORDS:

• Highly enriched uranium
• fissile materials
• downblending
• United States
• Russia
• Soviet Union
• transparency
• verification

Notes

1. Thomas L. Neff, “A Grand Uranium Bargain,” New York Times, October 24, 1991, Op-Ed Section.

2. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, February 18, 1993, <http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/pi_iec_local/098b7ef98002cabd.pdf>.

3. Anne-Marie Corley, “A Farewell to Arms,” MIT Technology Review, August 19, 2014, <www.technologyreview.com/article/529861/a-farewell-to-arms/>.

4. Aleksandr Pavlov and Vladimir Rybachenkov, “HEU-LEU Project: A Success Story of Russian-US Nuclear Disarmament Cooperation,” Center for Energy and Security Studies, May 27, 2013, <http://ceness-russia.org/data/doc/HEU-LEU_Agreement_ENG.pdf>.

5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, Articles IV and VI.

6. See “Megatons to Megawatts History,” USEC, 2014, <http://web.archive.org/web/20140807093500/http://www.usec.com/russian-contracts/megatons-megawatts/timeline>.

7. Discussions between the authors and Rosatom and Tenex Officials (V. Kuchinov, I. Evplanov and M. Aboimov), St. Petersburg, Russia, November 14, 2013.

8. “The Deal Within the Deal of the Century,” NUKEM Market Report, May-June 1999. See also James P. Timbie, “Energy from Bombs: Problems and solutions in the implementation of a High Priority Nonproliferation Project,” Science & Global Security 12 (December 2004), pp. 165-91.

9. Discussions between the authors and Rosatom and Tenex Officials (V. Kuchinov, I. Evplanov and M. Aboimov), St. Petersburg, Russia, November 14, 2013, and Washington, DC, United States, December 10, 2013.

10. United States General Accounting Office, “NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: Status of Transparency Measures for U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium,” September 1999, <www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=10191>.

11. Ibid.

12. “Determination of Completion of the Russian HEU Agreement for Purposes of the USEC Privatization Act of 1996, As Amended,” December 18, 2013, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/02-14-inlinefiles/2014-02-11%20Signed%20S1%20Determination%2018%20December%202013.pdf>.

13. Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574 (2008), <www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ329/PLAW-110publ329.pdf>, pp. 3, 647-51.

14. UK Ministry of Defence, “UK/Norway Initiative on nuclear warhead dismantlement verification,” March 31, 2010, <www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-norway-initiative-on-nuclear-warhead-dismantlement-verification--2>.