WMD elimination in Iraq, 2003

Abstract

The full picture of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs became clear after 2003. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) had extraordinary access to people, documents, and sites. The findings revealed much about Iraq's decision making regarding WMD as well as the success of UN inspection activities. Pre-war errors in process and judgments concerning Iraq's WMD must be considered in the context of the times. This is especially true regarding pre-war intelligence assessments that were based on bad analysis, insufficiently caveated, and grossly wrong.

The investigative process of the ISG built on the background of UN inspection teams (the UN Special Commission and its successor, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission). The unique access the ISG had to Iraqi decision making—including detailed debriefings of Saddam Hussein and all his key lieutenants—provided insight into how the inspected country reacted to international inspections. The window into Saddam's decisions in response to inspections and his future intentions provides important background and lessons relevant to new monitoring regimes.

KEYWORDS:

• Iraq
• weapons of mass destruction
• elimination
• disarmament

Disclaimer

The views expressed are those of the author only and not the US government or United Nations.

Notes

1. Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), pp. 34-36.

2. Ibid., p. 65.

3. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), pp. 307-13.

4. UNSCOM and its successor, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), were responsible for locating and verifiably destroying any potential biological, chemical, or missile (over the range of 150 kilometers) programs, while the IAEA was responsible for the nuclear program.

5. Iraqi authorites relayed this to the author on September 18, 1995, as well as on multiple occasions to the ISG. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” Section: Regime Strategic Intent, September 30, 2004, pp. 27 and 33, <www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004>.

6. Conversation between Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler during the final series of meetings between the two during the first week of August 1998, where the author was present.

7. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 227.

8. Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, eds., “Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,” March 31, 2005, <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?granuleId=&packageId=GPO-WMD>.

9. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2010), pp. 229-30.

10. Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers 2011), pp. 169-72.

11. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 223-53.

12. Jeanne Guillemin, American Anthrax: Fear, Crime, and the Investigation of the Nation's Deadliest Bioterror Attack (New York: Times Books, 2011), pp. 109-11.

13. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 157-59; George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), pp. 278-79.

14. Michael R. Gordon, “A Nation Challenged: Weapons; US Says if Found Qaeda Lab Being Built to Produce Anthrax,” New York Times, March 23, 2002, <www.nytimes.com/2002/03/23/world/nation-challenged-weapons-us-says-it-found-qaeda-lab-being-built-produce-anthrax.html>.

15. For a picture of Chalabi's pre-war activities in promoting the removal of Saddam, see Richard Bonin, Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War (New York: Random House, 2011), and Aram Roston, The Man Who Pushed America To War: The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi (New York: Nation Books, 2008).

16. See Bob Drogin, Curve Ball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man who Caused a War (New York: Random House, 2007). See also 60 Minutes, “‘Curve Ball’ speaks out,” CBS News, March 13, 2011, <www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kB2LOmo8Ao>.

17. Silberman and Robb, “Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

18. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 226-30.

19. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), p. 26; Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 189-91; also, Rice, No Higher Honor, pp. 86-87.

20. Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Penguin Group 2011), p. 435. Also, Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 226-27.

21. George W. Bush, “State of the Union,” Washington, DC, January 29, 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

22. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed,. pp. 238-39.

23. George W. Bush, “Statement by President Bush,” United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002, <www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/statements/020912usaE.htm>.

24. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 251.

25. Sharon A. Squassoni, “Iraq: UN Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 7, 2003, pp. 10-11, 16.

26. Ibid.

27. National Intelligence Estimate, “Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” NIE 2002-16HC, approved for release December 9, 2014, <www.scribd.com/doc/259216899/Iraq-October-2002-NIE-on-WMDs-unedacted-version#scribd>.

28. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 261.

29. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 430.

30. Drogin, Curve Ball, p. 186.

31. Barton Gellman, “Frustrated, US Arms Team to Leave Iraq,” Washington Post, May 11, 2003, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/12/AR2006061200917_2.html>.

32. Judith Miller, The Story: A Reporter's Journey (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015), pp. 173-84.

33. Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 401.

34. Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, New York, February 5, 2003, <www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa>.

35. Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 403.

36. For a description of the ISG components, see Charles Duelfer, “The Iraq Survey Group and the Search for WMD,” Studies in Intelligence 49, declassified March 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB520-the-Pentagons-Spies/EBB-PS37.pdf>.

37. CIA, “The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD,” Section Regime Strategic Intent, Annexes B and C.

38. See text of statement in Craig R. Whitney, The WMD Mirage: Iraq's Decade of Deception and America's False Premise for War (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), pp. 179-97.

39. Ibid, pp. 465-67.

40. David Kay, “Statement on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” 107th Cong., 2nd sess., October 2, 2003, <http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/dkay100203.html. Accessed October 23 2015>.

41. UNSCOM costs are difficult to compare because many staff members were seconded from governments. Also, materials and support—such as helicopters—were often provided gratis by supporting governments. However, a rough figure for annual costs was about $10-15 million. See UNSCOM, “Fifth report of the Executive Chairman,” S/25977, June 21, 1993, <www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres25977.htm>.

42. Duelfer, Hide and Seek, pp. 362-64.

43. A case in point was former oil minister and key counterpart to UN inspectors, Mohammed Amer Rasheed al-Obeidi. See Charles Duelfer, “The Iraqi Who Knew Too Much,” Foreign Policy, August 6, 2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/08/06/the-iraqi-who-knew-too-much-2/>.

44. CIA, “Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq WMD,” Section on Regime Strategic Intent, p.1 and Chemical Section, p. 1.

45. Ibid.

46. Charles Duelfer and Stephen Dyson, “Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The US-Iraq Experience,” International Security 36 (Summer 2011), pp. 73-100.

47. The full quote as translated/transcribed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service is “If the world tells us to abandon all our weapons and keep only swords, we will do that. We will destroy all the weapons, if they destroy their weapons. But if they keep a rifle and then tell me that I have the right to possess only a sword, then we would say no. As long as the rifle has become a means to defend our country against anybody who may have designs against it, then we will try our best to acquire the rifle.” The broadcast video shows Saddam examining a brand-new rifle given to him by Abd al-Tawab Mulla Huwasysh, head of military industries, who relayed to the ISG that Iraq had considered reconstituting its WMD programs. See Duelfer, “Hide and Seek,” p. 406.

48. Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark E. Stout, The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime 1978-2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). This is a fascinating collection of transcripts that allows the reader to witness the decision making of Saddam's regime.

49. CIA, “The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD,” Volume I.

50. There was a pronounced Iranian presence in Iraq. Iran had provided advanced improvised explosive devices (IEDs) using explosively formed projectiles that were responsible for killing hundreds of Americans.

51. The unique capability that the ISG embodied might have been applied to other priorities in Iraq—such as countering the IED attacks. I believe that if the ISG had been re-missioned to go after the IED problem in Iraq, it would have been more effective than the large and expensive counter-IED organization later established in the United States.

52. UNSCOM reported its overall CW assessment in “Letter Dated 27 January 1999 from the Permanent Representatives of the Netherlands and Slovenia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/1999/94, <www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s99-94.htm>.

53. C.J. Chivers, “The Secret Casualties of Iraq's Abandoned Chemical Weapons,” New York Times, October 14, 2014, <www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/14/world/middleeast/us-casualties-of-iraq-chemical-weapons.html>; C.J. Chivers, “Thousands of Iraq Chemical Weapons Destroyed in Open Air, Watchdog Says,” New York Times, November 22, 2014, <www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/world/middleeast/thousands-of-iraq-chemical-weapons-destroyed-in-open-air-watchdog-says-.html>; C.J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt, “CIA Is Said To Have Bought and Destroyed Iraqi Chemical Weapons,” New York Times, February 15, 2015, <www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/world/cia-is-said-to-have-bought-and-destroyed-iraqi-chemical-weapons.html>.

54. See “Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,” as well as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report on the US Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments on Iraq,” 2004, <http://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/ssci_concl.pdf>. See, too, the description of CIA's internal Iraq Review Group, in Michael Morell, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight against Terrorism from al Qa’ida to ISIS (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2015), pp. 99-105.

55. For a full examination of the creation of the DNI, see Michael Allen, Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence After 9/11 (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2013).

56. See the long Iraqi list of oil allocations copied verbatim in Annex B of “The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD,” Volume I. Also see pp. 116-19 for discussion of the illicit contracts and military equipment transfers between Russian entities (including Rosoboronexport) and Iraq.