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ABSTRACT
The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) is a unique bilateral nonproliferation regime created by Brazil and Argentina after a long process of negotiations and confidence building. The creation of the agency in July 1991 marked a paradigmatic shift in the Brazilian-Argentine relationship, converting their long rivalry into a profound strategic partnership. This article presents a historical overview of the creation of ABACC and discusses how it paved the way for the integration of Brazil and Argentina into the nonproliferation regime. The article also shows how ABACC tackled nonproliferation challenges in the twenty-first century, helping Brazil and Argentina continue their nuclear programs with fewer risks to the autonomy and development goals traditionally defended in their foreign policies.
Notes
1 The National Atomic Energy Commission of Argentina (CNEA) was created in 1950. The National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil was created in 1956. Both commissions were responsible for studies in and development of the nuclear field. At least thirteen countries currently have well-established uranium-enrichment programs: Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is also believed that North Korea has developed the capacity to enrich uranium. South Africa does not currently enrich uranium.
2 See Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement Brazil and Argentina,” 1968, <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1968/b_5/at_download/arquivo>. In December 1967, the director of the CNEA wrote a letter to the Argentinian foreign minister suggesting an agreement on nuclear cooperation between Brazil and Argentina that could solve scientific and technological problems of common interest. In 1968, a draft of the agreement was written, but the only official document signed by the two countries was a general joint statement in 1968. See “Letter, Director of the Argentinian National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) to the Foreign Minister on Nuclear Cooperation with Brazil,” History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archive (Brasília), <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116855>. See “Draft of Argentinian-Brazilian Agreement in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archive (Brasília), <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116879>.
3 See Monica Hirst and Hector Eduardo Bocco, “Brazil-Argentina nuclear cooperation and integration,” Contexto Nuclear 4 (January/June 1986), p. 63; Odete Maria Oliveira, “A integração bilateral Brasil-Argentina: tecnologia nuclear e Mercosul,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 41 (January/June 1998), p. 12, <www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73291998000100001>; Rodrigo Mallea, Matias Spektor, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds., Origens da cooperação nuclear: uma história oral crítica entre Argentina e Brasil [Origins of Nuclear Cooperation: An Oral History between Argentina and Brazil], (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2015), p. 3, <www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20Origins%20of%20Nuclear%20Cooperation--A%20Critical%20Oral%20History.pdf>.
4 Letter from the secretary general of the National Security Council to the minister of foreign affairs on nuclear cooperation with Argentina, September 1974, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116858#document-0>.
5 Héctor A. Subiza, “Cooperation With Brazil In The Nuclear Field,” August 1979, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861#document-1>.
6 Hugo Boatti Osorio, Argentinian diplomat, statement to the Brazilian magazine Veja 352 (June 4, 1975), p.14, <https://acervo.veja.abril.com.br/#/edition/34200?page=1§ion=1>.
7 Celso Amorim, “Speech during the seminar in celebration of the 25th anniversary of ABACC,” Rio de Janeiro, December 5, 2015, <www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzqpKJwciP0>.
8 The decision on which countries of each region were going to be on the Board of Governors of the IAEA was based on the criterion of the most advanced country in the nuclear field in each region. Since the agency was not able to decide which country had the most advanced technology in South America, Brazil and Argentina decided to take turns on the board. For more details see David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Agency. The first 40 years (Vienna: The Agency, 1997), <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1032_web.pdf >.
9 Barry R. Schneider and William L. Dowdy, Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), p. 72.
10 John R. Redick, “Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil,” Occasional Paper 25 (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), p. 24, <www.acamedia.info/politics/IRef/StimsonC/redick.pdf>.
11 The “disarmament of the disarmed” was a common position shared by Argentina and Brazil and can be found in the speeches of their foreign ministers throughout the 1960s and 1970s. See statement by Araujo Castro, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, to the Brazilian war college, “Freezing of World Power,” statement to the Brazilian War College <www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/180480/000341583.pdf?sequence=1>; José Maria Ruda, “La posición argentina en cuanto al Tratado sobre la No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares,” Estrategia 9 (January/February 1971), p. 77.
12 USA Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, <www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1327/ML13274A492.pdf>, p. 1,073.
13 Telegram “Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, ‘Visit of an Embassy Employee to the Nuclear Center [at] ATUCHA’,” July, 1974, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856>.
14 Hugo de Andrade Abreu, “Explanatory memorandum from the National Security Council to the president of Brazil,” September 1974, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853>.
15 “Letter to Hugo Abreu on a conversation between vice-chief of staff of the armed forces Admiral José Calvente Aranda and the Argentine ambassador Oscar Camilón,” March 1977, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/123284>.
16 Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves, Memorandum Dem/132, December 1979, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/123293>.
17 Chistopher Darnton, Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), p. 94.
18 Agreement between the Brazilian Government and the Argentinian Government for the development and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, May 1980, <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1980/b_33>.
19 Brazil and Argentina Joint Statement, May 1980, <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1980/b_37/at_download/arquivo>.
20 See “Note from Argentine ambassador García del Solar to the Argentine Foreign Ministry,” January, 1985, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121386>; and “Memorandum from Brazilian ambassador Roberto Abdenur to Minister Saraiva Guerreiro, ‘Brazil-Argentina. Nuclear Energy’,” January 1985, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116862>.
21 “Memorandum from Brazilian ambassador Roberto Abdenur to Minister Saraiva Guerreiro, 'brazil-argentina. nuclear energy,” January 1985, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116862>.
22 “Brazil-Argentina Foz do Iguaçu Joint Declaration on Regional Nuclear Policy,” Department of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Ministry of External Relations, November 1985, obtained and translated by Fundação Getúlio Vargas, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117521.pdf?v=5cbdb3cbe61b1cdc4d830647f2e00939>.
23 The working group met seven times between November 1985 and December 1988. In April 1988, the group was transformed into a permanent committee divided into groups of technical coordination, foreign-affairs coordination, and legal and technical aspects. See “Declaration of Iperó – Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy,” April, 1988 <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1988/b_19>.
24 It is worth mentioning that the two countries exchanged information regarding their accomplishment in the uranium-enrichment process. Argentina sent a note to Brazil, November, 1983, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116864>, and Brazil sent a note to Argentina, September 1987, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117523>. This exchange of information also contributed to the confidence-building process.
25 From May 1980 to July 1991, Brazil signed the following agreements in the nuclear area: Acordo de Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento e a Aplicação dos Usos Pacíficos da Energia Nuclear (May 1980), Protocolo de Cooperação Industrial entre Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras S/A e a Comissão Nacional de Energia Atômica da Argentina (May 1980), Declaração Conjunta (May 1980), Protocolo de Execução N° 01 entre a Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear do Brasil e a Comissão Nacional de Energia Atômica da Argentina, sobre Informação Técnica (August 1980), Protocolo de Execução N° 02 entre a Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear do Brasil e a Comissão Nacional de Energia Atômica da Argentina, para Cooperação no Campo da Formação de Recursos Humanos no Setor Nuclear (August 1980), Declaração Conjunta sobre Política Nuclear (November 1985), Declaração do Iguaçu (November 1980), Declaração Conjunta sobre Política Nuclear (December 1986), Declaração Conjunta sobre Política Nuclear (July 1987), Declaração de Iperó (April 1988), Declaração Conjunta sobre Política Nuclear: Declaração de Ezeiza (November 1988), Declaração sobre Política Nuclear Comum Brasileiro-Argentina (November 1990). The agreements can be found at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/pesquisa_ato_bil>.
26 Hirst and Bocco, “Brazil-Argentina nuclear cooperation and integration,” p. 63; Sarah Kutchesfahani, Politics & The Bomb: Exploring the Role of Epistemic Communities in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Outcomes (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 114.
27 Kutchesfahani, Politics & The Bomb, p. 106.
28 Julio Carasales, “The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement,” Nonproliferation Review 2 (Spring/Summer 1995), p. 42.
29 Celso Amorim, speech during the seminar in celebration of the 25th anniversary of ABACC, Rio de Janeiro, December 5, 2015, <www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzqpKJwciP0>.
30 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed, in March 1991, the Asunción Treaty, an agreement that created the South Common Market and established a free-trade area between its members. The conversations for the creation of a free-trade area in the Southern Cone started in 1988, when Presidents Sarney and Alfonsín signed the Argentina-Brazil Integration and Economics Cooperation Program.
31 Amorim, speech during the seminar in celebration of the 25th anniversary of ABACC.
32 Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Article 1, <www.abacc.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/bilateral_agreement.pdf>.
33 John R. Redick, “Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil,” Occasional Paper 25 (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), p. 24, <www.acamedia.info/politics/IRef/StimsonC/redick.pdf>.
34 From the Argentinian point of view, being outside the regime was the cause for the constraints on access to sensitive technology for nuclear energy. The Foreign Ministry stated that once Argentina signed the NPT, it would gain the confidence of the international community and be able to receive technology for peaceful nuclear activities. From Brazil's point of view, there were no advantages to signing the NPT, considering that the country had already accepted all kinds of restriction by acceding to other treaties. The opposition to the treaty had to be sustained. The decision to sign the NPT was not consensual and even today there are voices inside the Brazilian government that criticize the decision, affirming that no good came from joining the NPT. The restrictions on technology remain, the nuclear states still have not established any timetable for nuclear disarmament, and countries outside the NPT, such as India and Israel, were able to cultivate special relationships with the United States and were not constrained at all.
35 The 2015 National Military Strategy of the United States declares, “The U.S. military deters aggression by maintaining a credible nuclear capability.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: The United States Military's Contribution to National Security,” June 2015, <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf>. In the same vein, the 2015 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom affirms that it has chosen to “deter potential adversaries, including through renewal of our nuclear deterrent.” “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 12015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom,” November 2015, <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf>. The Russian Military Doctrine, approved in 2014, affirms that “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to use against it and (or) its allies of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when under threat the very existence of the state,” <www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Russia-s-2014-Military-Doctrine.pdf>. It is also known that China is developing nuclear missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles; see US Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2015,” <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf>.
36 For more on India's safeguards, see “Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities,” INFCIRC/754, May 29, 2009, <www.dae.nic.in/writereaddata/ncpw/infcirc754.pdf>.
37 Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, The Bazilian-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, and the International Atomic Agency for the application of Safeguards, December 1991,<www.abacc.org.br/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/10/Acordo-Quadripartite-inglês.pdf>.
38 President George W. Bush, speech to the National Defense University, February 11, 2004. <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2004-book1/pdf/PPP-2004-book1-doc-pg200.pdf>.
39 ABACC Annual Report, 2004, <www.abacc.org.br/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/relanual_abacc_2004.pdf>.
40 The Nuclear Fuel Factory of Resende is “an industrial complex of production units where four stages of the nuclear fuel cycle are carried out: uranium enrichment, [uranium hexafluoride] to [uranium dioxide] conversion, production of pellets and fabrication of the fuel assemblies for energy generation in reactors of nuclear power plants.” For more information about the Nuclear Fuel Factory, go to <www.inb.gov.br/en-us>. See also Gerardo José de Pontes Saraiva, Caderno de Estudos Estratégicos 8 (Rio de Janiero: Escola Superior de Guerra, 2007), p. 136, <www.esg.br/images/Revista_e_Cadernos/Cadernos/CEE-008.pdf>.
41 Jeffrey Lewis pointed to the relevance of the ABACC to Brazilian safeguards in comparison to the Iranian case: Jeffrey Lewis, “Brazil: Milhollin Goes HEU Over Resende,” Arms Control Wonk, October 24, 2004, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/200214/brazil-milhollin-goes-heu-over-resende/>.
42 Even before ABACC, Argentina and Brazil informed each other about the development and mastering of enrichment technology. In the same way, Brazil made transparent its plans for an industrial enrichment plant and for the production of nuclear-propelled submarines. These activities were conducted with the knowledge of ABACC and the IAEA. This kind of behavior is well acknowledged and differs from the secrecy of the Iranian nuclear program. See note 23.
43 “Powell calls Brazil ‘serious candidate’ for U.N. Security Council,” CNN, October 6, 2004, <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/10/05/powell.brazil/index.html?eref=sitesearch>.
44 Laura Rockwood, “The IAEA's State-Level Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences,” Arms Control Today, September 2014, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_09/Features/The-IAEAs-State-Level-Concept-and-the-Law-of-Unintended-Consequences>.
45 Kory W. Budlong Sylvester, Joseph F. Pilat, and Chantell L. Murphy, “Developing State-Level Approaches under the State-Level Concept,” paper delivered at the Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People, Viena, Austria, October 20–24, 2014, <www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2014/home/eproceedings/sg2014-papers/000292.pdf>.
46 The Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation is an advisory group to the IAEA director general created in 1975 to provide advice on topics related to the objectives and implementation parameters of IAEA safeguards. James Tape, “The State Level Approach: Moving Beyond Integrated Safeguards,” paper delivered at the Symposium of the European Safeguards and Development Association, Tokyo, Japan 2008, <http://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-UR-08-06114>.
47 Mark Hibbs, “The Plan for IAEA Safeguards,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 20, 2012, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/11/20/plan-for-iaea-safeguards/>.
48 Laura Rockwood, “The IAEA's State Level Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences.”
49 Hibbs, “The Plan for IAEA Safeguards.”
50 Orpet Peixoto, “Twenty years of ABACC. Accomplishments, lessons learnt and future perspectives,” paper delivered at the Symposium of the European Safeguards and Development Association, Budapest, Hungary, 2011, <www.abacc.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ESARDA_2011_orpet.pdf>.
51 ABACC Annual Report, 2012, <www.abacc.org.br/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/11/2012_EN.pdf>.
52 Antonio Abel Oliveira, Statement by ABACC to the 2012 IAEA General Conference, September 17–21, 2012, <www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/Statements/abacc_sp.pdf>.
53 Japan Ministry of Foreign Relations, “Further Measures to be taken for strengthening the NPT (21 measures for the 21st century),” Working Paper for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 2005, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/fmv0504/npt2.pdf>.
54 Nuclear Suppliers Group Public Statement, delivered at the NSG Plenary Meeting, Brasília, Brazil, 2006, <www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/Files/Documents-page/Public_Statements/2006-07-Brasilia.pdf>.
55 John Carlson, “Is the Additional Protocol ‘Optional’?,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 1, 2011, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/additional-protocol-optional/>.
56 “The combination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol is recognised in international practice as the NPT safeguards standard.” David Stuart, ambassador of Australia, speech at the 59th Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference, Viena, September 16, 2015, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/australia2015.pdf>.
57 “We will also work to establish the Additional Protocol as an essential standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.” “L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation,” G8 Summit, L'Aquila, Italy, July 8–10 2009, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2009/statement.pdf>.
58 NSG Guidelines for the export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r13p1.pdf>.
59 Mark Hibbs, “Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA Additional Protocol.
60 Brazilian National Defense Strategy, 2012, <www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/estado_e_defesa/END-PND_Optimized.pdf >.
61 Ambassador Laercio Vinhas, speech at 60th IAEA General Conference, Vienna, September 26–30, 2016, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/09/brazil2016.pdf>; Ambassasor Laercio Vinhas, speech at 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 28, 2015, <www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/BR_en.pdf>.
62 Ambassador María Cristina Perceval, speech at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 28, 2015, <www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/AR_en.pdf>.
63 David S. Jonas, John Carlson, and Richard S. Goorevich, “The NSG Decision on Sensitive Nuclear Transfers: ABACC and the Additional Protocol,” Arms Control Today, November 5, 2012, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_11/The-NSG-Decision-on-Sensitive-Nuclear-Transfers-ABACC-and-the-Additional-Protocol>.