IAEA “significant quantity” values: time for a closer look?

ABSTRACT

The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a concept of “significant quantity” to establish accounting limits and to determine how much nuclear material can be unaccounted for before the construction of a nuclear device becomes possible. Under the current SQ values, some materials could potentially be under-regulated, while others have disproportionately tight accounting practices, thus interfering with optimal safeguards efficacy. This article compares the SQ values of various materials and reviews the categories adopted by a variety of national regulators to show similarities and differences of approaches. The article concludes by offering possible solutions to increase safeguards efficacy and reduce costs, while acknowledging potential drawbacks. All findings and conclusions are based on open-source publications and publicly available information.

KEYWORDS:

• Significant quantity (SQ)
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• safeguards

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Robert Kelley for his comments on this paper.

Notes

1 Critical mass is the amount of nuclear material needed to achieve a self-sustained neutron-induced fission chain reaction. International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safeguards Glossary,” IAEA/NVS/2, 2001 Edition, Vienna, Austria (2001) <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf>.

2 US Department of Energy, Office of Declassification, “Restricted Data Declassification Decisions: 1946 to the Present,” para. V.A.2.u, and V.A.2.x., (2001) <www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/rdd-7.html>.

3 US National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Nuclear Pulse Space Vehicle Study,” GA-5009, vol. III, pp. 104–106, September 1964, <www.projectrho.com/rocket/supplement/GA-5009vIII.pdf>.

4 Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, “Interesting Document about Soviet Nuclear Tests in 1953,” October 2012, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/interesting_document_on_soviet.shtml>.

5 M.M. Miller, “Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?,” Nuclear Control Institute, August 1990, <www.nci.org/k-m/mmsgrds.htm>.

6 United Nations, “Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons,” A/6858, Annex IV, p. 23, October 1967; Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons,” Natural Resources Defense Council, April 1995.

7 United Nations, “Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons,” p. 23.

8 N. Gyldén and T. Karlén, “Betraffande förfrågan ang. massfordelning i kärnladdningar,” Försvarets forskningsanstalt, Institution 25, in Krigsarkivet, Försvarets forskningsanstalt, Administrativa byrån, Äldre dokument om kärnvapenforskning, uppslag 23–31, 1962–73, Serie Ö IV, volym 9, (June 1964).

9 US Department of Energy, “Restricted Data Declassification Decisions: 1946 to the Present,” para. V.A.2.u and V.A.2.x; US National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Nuclear Pulse Space Vehicle Study,” pp. 104–06

10 G. Kessler, “Plutonium Denaturing by Pu-238,” Nuclear Science and Engineering 155 (2007); D. Albright and H. Feiveson, “Plutonium Recycling and the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation,” Annual Review of Energy 13, pp. 239–65 (1988); Thomas Cochran, “Proliferation and the Nuclear Disarmament Process,” Energy Policy 23 (1995), pp. 195–207, <http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_03009501a_136.pdf>.

11 J.C. Mark, “Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” Science and Global Security 4 (August 1993), pp. 111–28 <http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs04mark.pdf>; US Department of Energy, “Additional Information Concerning Nuclear Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” Fact Sheet, June 27, 1994, <www.osti.gov/opennet/document/press/pc29.html>; Richard L. Garwin, “Reactor-Grade Plutonium can be Used to Make Powerful and Reliable Nuclear Weapons: Separated Plutonium in the Fuel Cycle Must be Protected as if it were Nuclear Weapons,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 1998, <www.fas.org/rlg/980826-pu.htm>.

12 US Department of Energy, “Restricted Data Declassification Decisions: 1946 to the Present,” para. V.A.2.u and V.A.2.x.

13 Kessler, “Plutonium Denaturing by Pu-238,” pp. 53–73; G. Kessler, C. Broeders, W. Hoebel, B. Goel, and D. Wilhelm, “A New Scientific Solution for Preventing the Misuse of Reactor-Grade Plutonium as Nuclear Explosive,” Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008), pp. 3429–44.

14 A. Kimura, H. Cho, N. Toda, R. Kasada, K. Yutani, H. Kishimoto, N. Iwata, S. Ukai, and M. Fujiwara, “High Burnup Fuel Cladding Materials R&D for Advanced Nuclear Systems,” Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology 44 (2007), pp. 323–28; Kessler, “Plutonium Denaturing by Pu-238,” pp. 53–73; B. Goddard, W.S. Charlton, and S.M. McDeavitt, “Development of a Real-Time Detection Strategy for Process Monitoring during Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing using the UREX+3a Method,” Nuclear Engineering and Design 240 (2010) pp. 3904–09; H. Sagara, M. Saito, Y. Peryoga, A. Ezoubtchenko, and A. Takivayev, “Denaturing of Plutonium by Transmutation of minor-Actinides for Enhancement of Proliferation Resistance,” Nuclear Science and Technology 42 (February 2005), pp. 161–68.

15 The United States Department of Energy, “Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives,” DOE/NN-0007, January (1997), <www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/425259>.

16 Henry Sokolski, “Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom,” The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College, March 2008, Chapter 6, pp. 121–57, <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB841.pdf>.

17 International Atomic Energy Agency, “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/153, para. 104, (June 1972), <www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/44/089/44089080.pdf>.

18 International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safeguards Glossary,” IAEA/NVS/2, 2001 Edition.

19 International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safeguards: Staying Ahead of the Game,” IAEA Department of Safeguards, pp. 13, Vienna, Austria, July 2007, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/safeguards0707.pdf>.

20 G. Kessler, C. Broeders, W. Hoebel, B. Goel, and D. Wilhelm, “A New Scientific Solution for Preventing the Misuse of Reactor-Grade Plutonium as Nuclear Explosive,” pp. 3429–44; D. Albright and K. O’Neill, “The Challenges of Fissile Material Controls,” The Institute for Science and International Security, Washington, DC (1999), <http://isis-online.org/books/detail/challenges-of-fissile-material-control/>; D. Albright and K. Kramer, “Neptunium 237 and Americium: World Inventories and Proliferation Concerns,” The Institute for Science and International Security, Washington, DC, (August 2005) <www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/np_237_and_americium.pdf>; L. Rothstein, “Explosive Secrets,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55 (March/April 1999), pp. 7; L.R. Morss, N.M. Edelstein, and J. Fuger, The Chemistry of the Actinide and Transactinide Elements, (Netherlands: Springer, 2007), pp. 703.

21 US Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety and Security, “Restricted Data Declassification Decisions 1946 to the Present (RDD-8),” January (2002), <http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/decl/rdd-8.pdf>.

22 R. Sanchez, D. Loaiza, R. Kimpland, D. Hayes, C. Cappiello, W. Myers, P. Jaegers, S. Clement, and K. Butterfield, “Criticality of a 237Np Sphere,” ICNC2003, Proceedings of the seventh international conference on nuclear-criticality safety: challenges in the pursuit of global criticality safety, October 2003, Ibaraki, Japan, <www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/36/116/36116453.pdf>.

23 International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Material Report 2006: Developing the Technical Basis for Policy Initiatives to Secure and Irreversibly Reduce Stocks of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials,” September 2006.

24 B. Goddard, W.S. Charlton, and S.M. McDeavitt, “Development of a Real-Time Detection Strategy for Process Monitoring during Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing using the UREX+3a Method,” pp. 3904–09; C. Leggett, “Development of a Modified TALSPEAK Process to Separate Americium from Curium in Spent Nuclear Fuel,” Proceedings of Waste Management 2010, Phoenix, AZ, March 7–11, 2010.

25 J.A. Hassberger, T.H. Isaacs, and R.N. Schock, “A Strategic Framework for Proliferation Resistance: A Systematic Approach for the Identification and Evaluation of Technology Opportunities to Enhance the Proliferation Resistance of Civilian Nuclear Energy Systems,” Proceedings of Global 2001, Paris, France, September 10–15, 2001, UCRL-JC-142356, <https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/240059.pdf>.

26 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, INFCIRC/225/Revision 5, (2011), <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf>.

27 Ibid, p. 20.

28 Ibid, p. 14.

29 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, “Security Programs for Category I or II Nuclear Material or Certain Nuclear Facilities,” Regulatory Guide G-274, (March 2003), <https://cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/pubs_catalogue/uploads/G-274_e.pdf>.

30 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Safeguarded Categories of SNM,” April 2015 <www.nrc.gov/security/domestic/mca/snm.html>.

31 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Rulemaking for Enhanced Security of Special Nuclear Material,” NRC-2014-0118, January 2015, <http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1432/ML14321A007.pdf>.

32 US Department of Energy, “Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability,” DOE Standard, DOE-STD-1194-2011, June 2011, <www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/09/f2/DOE-STD-1194-2011_CN2.pdf>.

33 Russian Federation, “Basic Rules of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials,” Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service, NP-030-01, May 2006, <http://en-doc.ru/np-030-05/print>.

34 H. Zhang and T. Zhang, “Securing China's Nuclear Future,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March 2014, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/securingchinasnuclearfutureenglish.pdf>.

35 C. Bathke, B. Ebbinghaus, B. Collins, B. Sleaford, K. Hase, M. Robel, R. Eallace, K. Bradley, J. Ireland, G. Javinen, M. Johnson, A. Prichard, and B. Smith, “The Attractiveness of Materials in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles for Various Proliferation and Theft Scenarios,” Nuclear Technology 179 (2012), pp. 5–30; S. Chirayath, D. Giannangeli, R. Elmore, G. Hollenbeck, N. Chandregowda, W. Charlton, R. Metcalf and J. Ragusa, “Proliferation Resistance Analysis and Evaluation Tool for Observed Risk (PRAETOR) Methodology,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management (2015), pp. 22–47.

36 B. Goddard, “Development of a Real-Time Detection Strategy for Material Accountancy and Process Monitoring during Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing using the UREX+3a Method,” Thesis. Texas A&M University, (December 2009) <http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7218/GODDARD-THESIS.pdf>.