Nuclear energy and nuclear-weapon potential: A historical analysis of Japan in the 1960s

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes Japan's development of civilian nuclear energy and its potential for developing nuclear weapons in the late 1960s. First, it examines two technological studies of Japan's nuclear fissionable material production capability: one sponsored by the Japanese government and the other sponsored by the US government. A comparative analysis of them reveals that the Japanese study did not investigate the full range of feasible measures toward Japan's nuclear armament. Further scrutiny of Japanese nuclear-energy development in relation to its policy-making structure at that time draws out the following arguments: (1) Japan's civilian nuclear program clearly contributed to its acquisition of a latent nuclear weapon potential; (2) Japan had not deliberately developed the latent capability, which reflected the lack of coordination among political actors; (3) Japan increased its dependence on the United States in the nuclear-power field, making its pursuit of nuclear weapons politically more difficult. This case study of Japan illustrates not only the intricate relationship between the development of civilian nuclear power, the development of nuclear-weapon potential, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also the effects of the state’s nuclear-policy-making structure on its nuclear posture.

KEYWORDS:

• Japan
• proliferation
• civilian nuclear power
• nuclear latency

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI Grant Number JP25245030 and JP16K03507. I also would like to thank Editage (www.editage.jp) for English-language editing.

Notes

1 Asahi Shimbun, “Kakubuso kanou daga motenu” [Japan is capable of possessing nuclear weapons, but it cannot do so], November 13, 1994; Asahi Shimbun, “Reisengo towareru ‘hikaku’” [“Non-nuclear” Japan called into question after the end of the Cold War], November 13, 1994.

2 Yoshitaka Sasaki, “Kakusenryaku no naka no Nihon” [Japan in the nuclear strategy], in Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed., Kaku to Ningen I: Kaku to taiketsu suru 20 seiki [Nuclear weapons and men, Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), pp. 260–64; Masakatsu Ota, Meiyaku no yami: “Kaku no kasa” to Nichi-Bei domei [The darkness of the pact] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 2004), pp. 249–51; Hiroki Sugita, Kensho hikaku no sentaku: kaku no genba o ou [An examination of the non-nuclear option] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), pp. 70–72; Akira Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichi-Bei kankei: Amerika no kaku fukakusan gaiko to Nihon no sentaku 1960–1976 [Nuclear weapons and Japan–US relations] (Tokyo: Yushisha, 2006), pp. 278–79; Tetsuo Arima, Genpatsu to genbaku: “Nichi Bei Ei” kakubuso no anto [Nuclear power generation and the atomic bomb] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2012), pp. 116–17; NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan, “Kaku” o motometa Nihon: Hibakukoku no shirarezaru shinjitsu [Japan questing for the bombs] (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 2012), pp. 72–81; Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, Nichi-Bei domei to genpatsu: kakusareta kaku no sengoshi [The Japan–US alliance and nuclear power generation] (Nagoya: Chunichi Shinbunsha, 2013), pp. 125–29; NHK ETV Tokushu Shuzaihan, Genpatsu merutodaun heno michi: Genshiryoku seisaku kenkyukai 100 jikan no shogen [The path toward nuclear meltdown] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2013), pp. 332–34; Masakatsu Yamazaki, “Keisuiro no Nihon heno donyu to beikoku no kaku fukakusan seisaku 1964–1968 nen: Chugoku no kakujitsuken to Nihon no kakuhoyu soshi saku toshite no genshiryoku” [The Chinese nuclear test and atoms for peace as a measure for preventing nuclear armament of Japan: the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the United States and the introduction of light water reactors into Japan, 1964–1968], Kagakushi Kenkyu, No. 270 (2014), pp. 205–06. This article's analysis of the Naicho study is based on the author's previous study: Akira Kurosaki, “Nihon kakubuso kenkyu (1968 nen) toha nandattaka: Beikoku seihu no bunseki tono hikaku no shiten kara” [Reexamining the 1968 report on Japan's nuclear weapons capability: from a comparative perspective], Kokusai Seiji, No. 182 (2015), pp. 125–39. Kase's article introduced the Naicho study to readers in the English-speaking world: Yuri Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 (Summer 2001), pp. 55–68.

3 Hitoshi Yoshioka, “Nuclear Power Research and the Scientists’ Role,” in Sigeru Nakayama, Hitoshi Yoshioka, and Kunio Goto, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan: Road to Self-Reliance, 1952–1959, Vol. 2 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2006), p, 114.

4 Kurosaki, Kakuheiki, pp. 10–11.

5 Ibid., pp. 187–216; Ayako Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy,” Journal of American–East Asian Relations, Vol. 15 (2008), pp. 25–50.

6 Sasaki, “Kakusenryaku,” p. 251; Akira Kurosaki, “Chugoku no kakujitsuken to Amerika no tai Nichi seisaku heno eikyo” [China's nuclear test of October 1964 and its impacts on US policy toward Japan], Nenpo Nihon Gendaishi, No. 7 (2001), pp. 254, 259–60; Kurosaki, Kakuheiki, pp. 49–50, 55–56.

7 NHK Supesharu. “Kaku,” pp. 64–68; Arima, Genpatsu, pp. 114–53. Levite defines the concept of nuclear hedging as “a national strategy maintaining, or at least appearing to maintain, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capacity to produce them within a relatively short time frame ranging from several weeks to a few years.” Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27 (Winter 2002/03), p. 71.

8 Levite, for example, regards Japan as “the most salient example of nuclear hedging to date.” Hughes, however, puts forward doubts about such a view based on his survey of Japan's civilian nuclear-energy program. Examining nuclear-policy arenas in Japan, Hymans also argues against the claim that Japan has been following a nuclear-hedging strategy. Levite, “Never Say Never Again,” p. 71; Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan,” International Security, Vol. 31 (Spring 2007), pp. 80–81; Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 36 (Fall 2011), p. 188.

9 Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 218–53; James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo's Nuclear Option,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), pp. 99–113; Schoff, James L., “Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), pp. 115–32; T. V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill–Queens University Press, 2000); Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, Vol. 10 (September 2008), pp. 420–50; Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, GE: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Etel Solingen, “The Perils of Prediction: Japan's Once and Future Nuclear Status,” in William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective, Vol. 2 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 131–57.

10 Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 13.

11 Jacques E. C. Hymanns, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapter 1.

12 Kurosaki, “Chugoku,” pp. 262–65; Ota, Meiyaku, pp. 216–18; Kurosaki, Kakuheiki, pp. 60–63; Yamazaki, “Keisuiro,” pp. 200–03.

13 Although this article focuses on the 1968 report's assessment of Japan's nuclear fissile-material production capability, the report comprehensively analyzes Japan's capability to develop and possess nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. An overview of the 1968 report is quoted in Sasaki, “Kakusenryaku,” pp. 260–62.

14 Yuki Tatsumi and Robert Weiner, “Political Influence on Japanese Nuclear and Security Policy: New Forces Face Large Obstacles,” US Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) Report Number 2014-004 (February 2014), p. 9.

15 Ibid., p. 15.

16 Ibid., p. 16.

17 Hitoshi Yoshioka, Datsu genshiryoku kotsuka heno miti [A path toward a nuclear-power-free state] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012), p. 27. Similarly, Hiroshi Honda, a Japanese political scientist, considers the LDP, atomic energy industry, electric power industry, MITI and its affiliates, and STA and its affiliates as actors promoting nuclear energy development in Japan in the 1960s. Hiroshi Honda, Datsu genshiryoku no undo to seiji: Nihon no enerugī seisaku no tankan ha kano ka [Social movement and politics of nuclear power phase-out] (Sapporo: Hokkaido Daigaku Tosho Kankokai, 2005), pp. 57–67.

18 Hitoshi Yoshioka, “The Development and Utilization of Nuclear Reactors,” in Shigeru Nakayama, Hitoshi Yoshioka, and Kunio Goto, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan: High Economic Growth Period, 1960–1969, Vol. 3 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2006), p. 224.

19 Walsh's pioneering study, for instance, uses Australia and Egypt as cases to illuminate the impacts of institutions and the internal politics of the decision-making on their nuclear abstention. With regard to Japan, Hymans proposes the historical institutional, veto-player approach focusing on veto players in the various dimensions of Japan's nuclear policy to explain Japan's nuclear restraint. Hughes also looks into Japan's nuclear-policy-making process to explain its nuclear forbearance. James Joseph Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics,” PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001; Hymans, “Veto Players;” Hughes, “Why Japan.”

20 Kurosaki, Kakuheiki, pp. 101–11, pp. 188–90; Hitoshi Yoshioka, Genshiryoku no shakaishi: Sono Nihon teki tenkai [A social history of atomic energy] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1999), pp. 63–88.

21 Kurosaki, Kakuheiki, pp. 16–17.

22 Sasaki, “Kakusenryaku,” pp. 260–64; Ota, Meiyaku, pp. 249–52; Sugita, Kensho, pp. 70–72; NHK Supesharu, “Kaku,” pp. 74–80; Chunichi Simbun, Nichi-Bei domei, pp. 128–30.

23 “Nihon no kakuseisaku ni kansuru kisoteki kenkyu (sono ichi): Dokuritsu kakusenryoku sosetu no gijutsuteki soshikiteki zaiseiteki kanosei” [A basic study of Japan's nuclear policy, Vol. 1: The technical, organizational, and financial possibility of creating independent nuclear forces], September 1968 (hereafter the “1968 report”). Professor Emeritus at Tokyo Institute of Technology Masakatsu Yamazaki generously shared with me copies of the 1968/70 report which he had obtained from a third person. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to him. The quote is from the first page of the unnumbered preface.

24 1968 report.

25 “Nihon no kakuseisaku ni kansuru kisoteki kenkyu (sono ni): Dokuritsu kakusenryoku sosetu no senryakuteki gaikoteki seijiteki shomondai” [A basic study of Japan's nuclear policy, Vol. 2: Strategic, diplomatic, and political problems with creating independent nuclear forces], January 1970 (hereafter the “1970 report”). In the spring of 1970, the 1970 report was published in Naicho's monthly bulletin, with minor wording modification: Naikaku Kanbo Chosashitsu, “Nihon no kakuseisaku ni kansuru ichi kosatu: Dokuritsu kakusenryoku no senryakuteki gaikoteki seijiteki shomondai (Itaku kenkyu hokoku shokai)” [A study of Japan's nuclear policy: strategic, diplomatic, and political problems with independent nuclear forces], Naikaku Kanbo Chosa Getsuppo, Vol. 15, No. 5 (1970), pp. 1–17.

26 1968 report, p. 2.

27 Ibid., pp. 3–4; Hitoshi Yoshioka, “Forming a Nuclear Regime and Introducing Commercial Reactors,” in Sigeru Nakayama, Hitoshi Yoshioka, and Kunio Goto, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan: Road to Self-Reliance, 1952–1959, Vol. 2 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2006), pp. 90–95.

28 Ibid., pp. 3–4.

29 Hitoshi Yoshioka, “The Development of Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Technology,” in Sigeru Nakayama, Hitoshi Yoshioka, and Kunio Goto, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan: Transformation Period, 1970–1979, Vol. 4 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2006), p. 233.

30 Nihon Genshiryoku Sangyo Kaigi, ed., Genshiryoku ha ima: Nihon no heiwa riyo sanju nen (jo.) [Nuclear energy now, Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Nihon Genshiryoku Sangyo Kaigi, 1986), p. 230.

31 1968 report, pp. 5–7.

32 Genshiryoku Kaihatsu 30 Nenshi Henshu Iinkai, ed., Genshiryoku kaihatsu 30 nenshi [A thirty-year history of nuclear energy development in Japan] (Tokyo: Nihon Genshiryoku Bunka Shinko Zaidan, 1986), pp. 104–05; Ryukichi Imai, IAEA sasatsu to kakukakusan [IAEA inspection and nuclear proliferation] (Tokyo: Nitkkan Kogyo Shinbunsha, 1994), pp. 34–35.

33 1968 report, pp. 1–24.

34 This article's account of the examination of US nuclear nonproliferation policy toward Japan within the Johnson administration is based on the author's earlier historical studies based on declassified US documents. See Kurosaki, “Chugoku,” pp. 262–64; Kurosaki, Kakuheiki, pp. 60–63.

35 Memorandum for the Members of the Committee of Principals, report on “Japan's Prospects in the Nuclear Weapons Field: Proposed US Courses of Action,” June 25, 1965, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament Committee of Principals Vol. 2, Box 14, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.

36 Ibid., p. 1.

37 Annex A: Technological Factors, attached to ibid., p. A2.

38 Ibid., p. A4.

39 Ibid., p. A8.

40 Yoshioka, Genshiryoku, pp. 108–09.

41 Annex A: Technological Factors, p. A9.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., pp. A9–10.

45 Ibid., p. A3.

46 Ibid., pp. A5–6.

47 Kakihana recollected, “Personally I was against Japan's nuclear armament. Most of the other members involved in producing the reports were of the same opinion.” Asahi Shimbun, “Reisengo towareru ‘hikaku’,” November 13, 1994. The analysis of the 1970 report drafted by Michio Royama, another core member of the Naicho study, was extensively discussed in Kase's article. Kase, “The Cost and Benefits.”

48 Sasaki, “Kakusenryoku,” pp. 262–64; Chunichi Shimbun, Nichi-Bei domei, p. 128.

49 According to Shigaki's recollection, he heard from the Director of the Naicho that the latter emphasized at his meeting with Sato that it was technologically possible for Japan to produce nuclear weapons, but Sato, in response, admonished him that “going nuclear is much harder than you believe.” Although no document proves that this exchange actually took place, the Naicho reports were discovered in materials owned by Chief Secretary to Prime Minister Sato, Minoru Kusuda. Shakaibu, Nichi-Bei domei, p. 130.

50 Kurosaki, “Chugoku,” pp. 254, 259–60. See also Sato's statement in the Diet Record: Dai 51 kai Kottkai Sangiin yosaniin kaigiroku [The Record of the Budget Committee of the Upper House at the 51st Session of the National Diet], No. 22, April 1, 1966, p. 11.

51 In retrospect, it could be argued that the Naichō study provided the Japanese government with reasonable grounds to justify the non-nuclear policy. Kakihana, for example, testifies that “these reports explained reasons why Japan could not go nuclear.” Asahi Shimbun, “Reisengo towareru ‘hikaku’,” November 13, 1994.

52 NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan, “Kaku,” pp. 64–98; Arima, Genpatsu, pp. 114–53.

53 Mainichi Shimbunsha, ed., Seiken [Political power] (Tokyo: Mainichi Simbunsha, 1970), p. 27.

54 Yasuhiro Nakashone, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Nakasone Yasuhiro ga kataru sengo Nihon gaiko [An oral history of Yasuhiro Nakasone on the diplomacy of postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2012), p. 214.

55 Kurosaki, Kakuheiki, p. 257.

56 Ibid., pp. 55–56. Prime Minister Sato's senior secretary, Minoru Kusuda, recorded in his journal an interesting conversation between them. In September 1968, Sato privately suggested resigning his post after claiming that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons, and Kusuda remonstrated that it was too early. Evidently, Sato supported Japan's eventual nuclear armament even after he had declared the TNNP, but he was well aware that he could not publicly express his interest in Japan's possessing nuclear weapons without risking his political career. Munoru Kusuda, Kusuda Munoru Nittki [The journal of Minoru Kusuda] (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2001), p. 260.

57 Kurosaki, Kakuheiki, especially Chapter 5; Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet.”

58 Sasaki, “Kakusenryaku,” pp. 256–57; Sugita, Kensho, pp. 67–70; Anzenhosho Chosakai, ed. “Waga kuni no kakuheiki seisan senzai noryoku,” in Anzehosho Chosakai, ed., Nihon no anzenhosho: 1970 nen heno tenbo [The security of Japan: an outlook toward 1970] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1968), pp. 291–342.

59 Yasuhiro Nakasone, Jiseiroku: Rekishi no hotei no hikoku to shite [A record of my introspection] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2004), pp. 224–25; Nakasone, Nakasone, p. 215.

60 Dai 480 kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai kiroku [The Record of the 480th Meeting of the Foreign Policy Planning Council], November 20, 1968, <www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokoku/pdfs/kaku_hokoku13.pdf>. Yatabe remembers that his comment at the meeting was “a mere echo” of a view that he had heard from Ryukichi Imai at the Japan Atomic Power Company. Masakatsu Ota, Nihon ha naze kaku o tebanasenainoka: “Hikaku” no shikaku [Why could Japan not quit its dependence on nuclear energy and weapons?] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), p. 123; Dai 480 kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai kiroku.

61 Atsuhiko Yatabe, “Fukakusan joyaku go no Nihon no anzenhosho to kagaku gijutsu” [The security and science and technology of Japan after the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty], attached to the Record of the 480th Meeting of the FPPC cited in note 59. On the process of producing this document, see NHK ETV Tokushu, Genpatsu merutodaun, pp. 329–30.

62 Gaimu Sho Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai, Wagakuni no gaiko seisaku taiko [The outline of our foreign policy], September 25, 1969, <www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokoku/pdfs/kaku_hokoku02.pdf>; Sugita, Kensho, pp. 75–76.

63 Kenji Hayao, The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 1993).

64 According to JAEC, this policy was based on the following considerations. First, it was imperative for Japan, given that it was lagging behind in nuclear-energy development, to introduce conventional-type nuclear-power reactors such as the US-made LWR, which would help establish its own nuclear technology in the future. But it was not desirable for Japan to depend solely on conventional-type reactors for nuclear-power generation in terms of securing a stable supply of nuclear fuel, diversification of nuclear-fuel uses, developing Japan's own technology, raising the level of Japanese science and technology, and consolidating the Japanese nuclear industry. Genshiryoku Iinkai, ed., Genshiryoku hakusho Showa 41 nen ban [White paper on atomic energy 1966], 1966, pp. 25–27.

65 Allice Buck, “The Atomic Energy Commission,” US Department of Energy (July 1983), p. 11, <https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/AEC%20History.pdf>.

66 Henshubu, “Shikin rittsuchi de mometa saishori kaihatsu [The development of fuel reprocessing in trouble with the issues of financing and location], Genshiryoku Kogyo [Nuclear energy engineering], Vol. 18 (May 1972), p. 54.

67 Yoshioka, “The Development of Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Technology,” pp. 235–36.

68 Donen 10 Nenshi Henshu Iinkai, ed., Donen 10 nenshi [A Ten-year history of Donen] (Tokyo: Doryokuro Kakunenryo Kaihatsu Jigyodan, 1978), pp. 7–38.

69 Henshubu, “Shikin rittsuchi,” p. 56; Yoshioka, “The Development of Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Technology,” p. 236.

70 Yoshioka, “The Development of Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Technology,” p. 235.

71 Genshiryoku Iinkai, ed., Genshiryoku hakusho Showa 41 nen ban, p. 26; Yoshioka, “The Development and Utilization of Nuclear Reactors,” p. 223. A detailed analysis of state–business relations in the nuclear-power field in Japan is presented in Richard J. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), especially Chapter 7.

72 Hidetake Kakihana, “Genshiryoku kaihatsu no genjo to rinen” [The current situation and idea of nuclear energy development], Chuo Koron, Vol. 83 (March 1968), pp. 79–80; Atsuhiko Yatabe, “Shin Nichi-Bei genshiryoku kyotei no igi ni tsuite” [On the meaning of the new Japan–US atomic energy agreement], Toki no Horei, No. 654 (September 23, 1968), pp. 25–26.

73 Masakatsu Yamazaki, “1968 nen Nichi-Bei genshiryoku kyoryoku kyotei kaitei to kaku hukakusan taisei 1955—1970: Beikoku sei keisuiro yui taisei no seiritsu” [Introducing US light water reactors into Japan: the 1968 atomic energy pact between Japan and US and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1955–1970], Gijutsu Bunka Ronso, No. 15 (2012), p. 26.

74 Seishi Kikuchi, “Noshuku uran seizo kenkyu o sokushin subeshi” [We should facilitate uranium enrichment research], Nihon Genshiryoku Gatsukaishi, Vol. 9 (March 1967), p. 1. Kikuchi, a Japanese physicist, served as director of the JAERI from 1959 to 1964.

75 Yoshioka, “The Development of Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Technology,” p. 243.

76 Genshiryoku Iinkai Getsuppo, “Genshiryoku no higunjiteki riyo ni kansuru kyoryoku no tameno Nihon-koku seihu to Amerika Gatsushukoku seihu tono aidano kyotei kokan kobun” [Agreement for cooperation between the government of Japan and the government of the United States of America concerning civil uses of atomic energy], Vol. 3 (June 1958), pp. 4–17.

77 Genshiryoku Iinkai Getsuppo, “Shin Nichi-Bei genshiryoku kyoryoku kyotei” [The new Japan–US atomic energy cooperation agreement], Vol. 13 (July 1968), pp. 13–34. On the joint determination provision, see Article 8 (2) F of the agreement text. According to Bertrand Goldschmidt, the purpose of the clause had been to ensure that the plutonium-extraction installation was built so as to facilitate effective safeguards. In 1977, however, the Carter administration used it to object to the Japanese plan to start the experimental operation of the Tokai reprocessing plant. Bertrand Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy (La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1982), p. 420; Yoshioka, “The Development of Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Technology,” p. 237.

78 Atsuhiko Yatabe, “Kakuheiki no fukakusan jyoyaku to hosho soti” [The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards], Jurisuto, No. 409 (1968), p. 60.

79 While the NPT was under negotiation in the late 1960s, the Japanese government expressed its position on various issues discussed in the negotiations such as nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the security of non-nuclear weapon states. With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Japanese government insisted, in essence, as follows: The treaty should not obstruct the research, development, and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and discriminate against non-nuclear weapons states. The parties of the treaty should promote the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, and share the benefits, including the exchange of information on science and technology. International safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear material for peaceful purposes to military ones should be applied to every party of the treaty. If the peaceful uses of nuclear explosion be put to practical use, equal access to the benefits under the control of an appropriate international organization should be guaranteed to every party of the treaty. After the signing of the NPT by the government, Japan did not ratify it until June 1976. A major cause of this delay was the prolonged IAEA–Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community) negotiations on their safeguards agreement. Since the Japanese government, as required under the treaty, sought to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA, under which Japan would be treated as equally as non-nuclear weapon states in Euratom, it had to proceed with the ratification process and negotiations with the IAEA in view of the IAEA–Euratom negotiations concluded in 1973. Gaimu Sho, ed., Waga gaiko no kinkyo [Diplomatic bluebook] (Tokyo: Gaimu Sho, 1968), pp. 104–09. Japanese responses to the NPT negotiations and the treaty ratification are discussed in detail in Kurosaki, Kakuheiki, Chapters 2 and 6.

80 Solingen, Nuclear Logics, p. 73.

81 In Japan, debates and conflicts over the pros and cons of nuclear power arose in the 1970s. Hitoshi Yoshioka, “Nuclear Power Plant Location Dispute,” in Sigeru Nakayama, Hitoshi Yoshioka, and Kunio Goto, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan: Road to Self-Reliance, 1952–1959, Vol. 4 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2006), pp. 208–32. On US intervention in Japan's nuclear fuel reprocessing program in the 1970s, see ibid., p. 237.