No EU, no Iran deal: the EU's choice between multilateralism and the transatlantic link

ABSTRACT

The Iran deal is a European success story of “effective multilateralism.” An initiative by three European states, initiated in response to the US-led military action in Iraq, ultimately demonstrated that proliferation risks can be addressed by diplomacy. Over a decade's time, the European Union (EU) framed the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program in a way that enabled two hostile parties—the United States and Iran—to meet in talks leading to a successful understanding. Two years after its implementation, the deal seems to be working. However, despite Iranian compliance, the deal now faces an uncertain future. The Donald J. Trump administration's Iran policy remains unclear, though there are indications to expect diverging views between the United States and the European Union, further challenging a transatlantic link that had already faced challenges during the negotiations. This article re-examines the history of the negotiations through the lens of the strategic choice the EU faces in its foreign and security policy: steering between effective multilateralism and transatlantic relations.

KEYWORDS:

• Iran
• European Union
• diplomacy
• multilateralism
• transatlantic link
• non-proliferation
• JCPOA

Two years after the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or “Iran deal”) between Iran, the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the European Union, the future of the deal remains uncertain. President Donald J. Trump has decided not to “certify” Iranian compliance with the deal (required under the US Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act), arguing that a tougher deal needs to be put in its place.¹ The European Union, together with the other parties, supports the JCPOA as agreed. Understanding the role of the transatlantic link during the deal's negotiation can help to understand and manage these challenges to the deal's continued implementation.

Based on interviews with US and European decision makers in the spring of 2015 and in November 2017, this article uses the JCPOA negotiations as a case study for analyzing the role of the transatlantic link in EU foreign and security policy, particularly in comparison with “effective multilateralism.” The latter concept was first articulated in the 2003 European Security Strategy, adopted on the heels of the US-led invasion of Iraq, just as suspicions over Iran's nuclear program began to percolate. The concept is juxtaposed with the United States's more assertive modus operandi. The article then undertakes a review of the JCPOA negotiations to understand where and why the policies of the EU and the United States converged and diverged. The third section turns to implementation, and identifies the issues in the current US debate that are the focus of disagreement between the United States and the other JCPOA parties. It further considers the EU's capacity to act and possibly deter any renegotiation or unraveling of the JCPOA. The conclusion summarizes the EU's fundamental choice between a rules-based multilateral order and the transatlantic link.

Visions of multilateralism

The EU is committed to international law and well-functioning international institutions, the fundamental framework of which is the United Nations Charter. This rules-based system, where international norms are respected and breaches are acted upon, is the foundation for wielding “effective multilateralism,” as declared in the 2003 European Security Strategy: “We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.”²

The EU adopted this strategy in 2003, after an Iranian dissident group revealed undeclared nuclear facilities, prompting inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and fueling suspicions of Iranian noncompliance. The European Security Strategy, however, was less a reaction to Iran's nuclear activities than it was to the US-led Iraq War. A senior European Union External Action Service official underlined in 2015, “Effective multilateralism was an explicit critique of the US behavior in Iraq. Iraq was a case of ineffective unilateralism. In the view of the EU, at least, the US should have let the IAEA finish their work with inspections and consult the UN. My preference is that there always is a legal framework.”³

There were deeper roots to effective multilateralism as a guiding principle as well. The strategy aimed to counter deficiencies in EU foreign policy, such as a lack of cohesion, the pursuit of an autonomous European identity, and the EU's lack of legitimacy as a global actor.⁴ Effective multilateralism aimed to address these problems.

While the EU advocated effective multilateralism, the United States preferred the concept of assertive multilateralism. The divide between the two was a common thread throughout the entire Iran process, following into the deal's implementation phase. In 1993, US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright defined “assertive multilateralism” as “using the new setting of the international community to bring about agendas that are good not only for the United States, but the entire world,” a way by which the United States “assert[s] American leadership within a particular setting” in order to achieve “a multiplier effect.”⁵

For the United States, multilateralism is a means to an end, but, for Europeans, it is an end in itself. This distinction was further elaborated in 2003 by Robert Kagan, who referred to a US form of “effective” multilateralism as a distinctly US utilitarian and outcome-oriented brand of multilateralism. According to Kagan, the European form of multilateralism was a “weapon of the weak,” a tool of states that lacked the power to impose solutions to international problems that served their own interests, and a way to constrain powerful states by compelling them to consult with international bodies as a prerequisite for action.⁶ A decisive example of these differing views of multilateralism is the role of the Security Council. For the United States, support of the Security Council is desirable but never essential, whereas the EU views the Security Council as the indispensable authority.

Throughout the twelve-year process of engaging with Iran to ameliorate concerns over its nuclear program, contrasting US and EU views of multilateralism shaped the direction of the negotiations. Ultimately, the European view prevailed, and the JCPOA as a final agreement is an illustration of how agreed rules can constrain power politics and contribute to a more peaceful, fair, and prosperous world.

Strategic goals

As concerns over the Iranian nuclear program surfaced, the EU's most obvious goal was to avoid a military confrontation and a repeat of the US action in Iraq. Since the revelations of the previously undeclared Arak heavy-water plant and Natanz uranium-enrichment plant, the threat of military action was present. Both Israel and the United States made clear that they were willing to attack Iranian nuclear facilities and destroy them by force. The EU did not participate in the calls for military action.

The Iraq War had begun without a Security Council mandate. The March 2003 invasion effectively forced the early termination of the multilateral inspections that had been operating under the auspices of the Security Council and the IAEA, despite pleas from the chief inspectors for more time to conclude their work.⁷ Seen from the “effective multilateralism” perspective, the invasion of Iraq represented a clear disregard for international norms and a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the UN Security Council: it was closer to the spirit of assertive multilateralism. The United States sought the support of the Security Council to legitimize the war, but ultimately discarded pursuit of such support when it could not be secured.

Three EU states—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, or the “E3”—after disagreeing on Iraq, came together in the Iran case. This bridge-building effort was unintentional. The French originally intended to engage Russia and Germany—two states that had, along with France, opposed the Iraq War in the Security Council—in talks with Iran. There were two reasons that France decided to exclude the Russians and invite the British instead. First, the Russians did not agree on the demand for Iran to stop enrichment, only to suspend it. Second, the Russians could not build a bridge to the United States as effectively as the British.⁸

Ambition also played a role in the EU's motivation. Despite the European Security Strategy's assertion that the EU's sheer size meant it was “inevitably a global player,” this was not necessarily a given.⁹ Despite the structural changes to the EU arising from the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, such as increased formal powers of the high representative and the creation of the European External Action Service, foreign and security policy remained under the purview of its member states. During the twelve years of diplomatic effort in the Iran nuclear case, the EU had a chance to test its potential for a global role in nonproliferation.

The four roles of the EU

During the twelve years of negotiation with Iran, the EU's role changed. In 2003, the E3 began as a unified, autonomous negotiator. By 2015, the EU had become a more pragmatic facilitator between the United States and Iran. The process, too, evolved, and can be marked by four different approaches: persuasive engagement, coercive containment in the Security Council, the dual track (sanctions with diplomacy), and a US–Iran bilateral phase, characterized and made possible by the political will of the US and Iranian presidents (see Table 1). Below is a short narrative of each of these phases.¹⁰

Table 1. The transatlantic link and the role of the EU (2003–15)

	Persuasive engagement: 2003–05	Coercive containment: 2006–10	Dual track: 2010–13	Political will: 2013–15
US policy	Isolate Iran; regime change	Report Iran to the UN Security Council; exert pressure; no normalization	Dual track with focus on diplomacy	Bilateral negotiations within the P5+1
EU policy	Negotiate with Iran; achieve a deal	Report Iran to the UN Security Council; work on plan to resolve outstanding issues	Dual track with focus on sanctions	Facilitating the P5+1 (France had a tougher position)

Source: Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, pp. 17–28.

The E3 as autonomous negotiator (2003–05)

In 2003, three European foreign ministers, Dominique de Villepin of France, Jack Straw of the United Kingdom, and Joschka Fischer of Germany, wrote a letter to Tehran offering technical and trade cooperation if Iran halted its uranium enrichment and implemented the IAEA Additional Protocol. Iran agreed to suspend enrichment on a temporary and voluntary basis, and the EU acknowledged Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program and refrained from referring Iran to the Security Council. Iran also signed and agreed to implement (though stopping short of ratifying) the Additional Protocol to its IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement.

The negotiations were not easy. The first controversy was over enrichment and how to define its suspension. The Iranians, viewing enrichment as an “inalienable right” deriving from Article IV of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),¹¹ supported a narrow definition, as proposed by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei: refraining from feeding uranium hexafluoride gas into centrifuges. The Europeans aimed at broadening this definition to include the dismantling of centrifuges and facilities related to enrichment.¹² In 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted the European definition, and called on Iran to suspend enrichment. The second controversy was over the “objective guarantees” to be included in a long-term agreement ensuring that Iran's nuclear program would remain “exclusively for peaceful purposes.”¹³ The Europeans saw the permanent suspension of uranium enrichment as the only objective guarantee, whereas the Iranians promoted the Additional Protocol—and, with it, increased access for safeguards inspectors—as a sufficient guarantee.¹⁴ In late 2004, EU High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana entered the negotiations, introducing a more formal EU role.

By spring 2005, the negotiations were at a crossroads. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remained critical of the Paris agreement, which did not leave Iran with, in his view, enough centrifuges to conduct laboratory-scale enrichment.¹⁵ Furthermore, the Americans were about to get involved, the Iranians were threatening to restart enrichment as a way to pressure the E3 to speed up negotiations, and Iranian presidential elections were underway. Hardliners in Iran labeled the reformist President Mohammad Khatami's team as traitors, spies, and tools of the West who sold out the country's rights and ambitions.¹⁶

In June, contrary to the West's expectations that the moderate former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani would win, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president. The E3 negotiators had chosen to wait until after the election before tabling any proposals. Finally, on August 5, 2005, the Europeans tabled a proposal called “A Framework for a Long-Term Agreement,” which included, inter alia, a ten-year suspension of all nuclear-fuel-related activities.¹⁷ The newly elected president rejected the proposal because it denied Iran's right to enrichment, despite the possibility of reviewing the question in ten years. The E3's 2005 strategy of playing for time failed. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran was in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.¹⁸

The EU as coordinator (2006–10)

In January 2006, Iran removed the IAEA seals at Natanz and at its uranium-conversion facility at Isfahan and resumed research and development on uranium enrichment. On January 12, 2006, the European Council issued a statement by the E3 foreign ministers and HR Solana calling Iran's decision to restart enrichment “a clear rejection” of the process in which the E3 and Iran had been engaged for two years, and concluded that the negotiations had reached an impasse: “the time has now come for the Security Council to become involved to reinforce the authority of the IAEA Resolutions.”¹⁹

The P5+1 grouping began when China, Russia, and the United States joined the EU in a proposal to Iran in June.²⁰ They offered to suspend the discussions in the UN Security Council if Iran suspended all enrichment and reprocessing activities. Tehran rejected the proposal.²¹ In July, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, referring to the suspension of “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities” as “mandatory” under the UN Charter's Chapter VII, which includes authorization of the use of force—requiring Iran's full cooperation with the IAEA, and threatening economic sanctions.²² This resolution marked a new phase; all five permanent members were now in agreement, although Russia and China underlined that the reference to Chapter VII was not a mandate for military action.²³

Throughout the next several years, as the Security Council passed additional resolutions, there were further contacts and proposals for negotiations, but no agreements.²⁴ In the fall of 2006, HR Solana and the Iranian chief negotiator, Ali Larijani, discussed research cooperation and even pilot-scale enrichment. In 2007, IAEA Director-General ElBaradei produced a work plan to address outstanding issues, though it was never implemented.²⁵ In December of that year, the United States released “key judgments” of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that concluded Iran had a structured nuclear-weapons program before 2003, but that this activity had not been resumed by mid-2007. The report judged that Iran wanted to keep its options open and sought to develop a capability to build nuclear weapons.²⁶

In this phase, there were two parallel actors: the Security Council and the P5+1. The Security Council adopted new resolutions and discussed sanctions. The texts were drafted either by the French and British or by the United States. The P5+1 continued to seek negotiations with Iran and was responsible for offering concrete proposals, following up on the earlier negotiations by the E3. The EU was the coordinator of the P5+1, and had the important role of preventing the use of a veto by any UN Security Council permanent member. Though the Security Council never formalized a mandate for the negotiators, its resolutions endorsed the P5+1 role, and the EU's role within it.²⁷

The EU as sanctions enforcer (2010–13)

Newly elected President Barack Obama had campaigned on a promise to negotiate with Iran directly and without preconditions. In September 2009, Obama—along with UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy—announced the revelation that Iran had begun construction of a new enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom. The next month, the Americans, together with the Russians and French, met directly with the Iranians for the first time, under the chairmanship of the IAEA. This “Vienna Group” proposed to take 75 percent of Iran's low-enriched uranium (1,200 kilograms [kg]) outside of the country to enrich it to a level suitable for medical isotopes for use in Iran.²⁸ Although Ahmadinejad supported the deal, his opponents, both conservatives and reformists, denounced it as a sell-out of Iranian interests. In the end, the agreement failed to materialize, mostly due to opposition within Iran.

In the aftermath, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey met Ahmadinejad in May 2010 and signed the Tehran Declaration, in which Iran promised to send the 1,200 kg of uranium to Turkey, to be returned to Iran as fuel rods for the research reactor within one year.²⁹ The Brazilians thought they were implementing US objectives. To Brazil's surprise, the State Department rejected the declaration. The United States had plans for additional sanctions in the Security Council, and the Russians and the Chinese were about to agree.

By February 2010, Iran began enriching fuel to the 20-percent level, justifying it as necessary for producing medical isotopes at the Tehran Research Reactor. IAEA reports in 2010 discussed the “possible military dimensions” of Iran's nuclear program in detail, allegations of which Iran asserted as “baseless.”³⁰

Citing the November 2010 IAEA report, the United States and the EU called for new sanctions. The French president sent a letter to his British, German, American, Canadian, and Japanese counterparts, as well as to the EU, proposing an import ban on Iranian oil. China and Russia argued against new sanctions. Both the United States and the EU approved unilateral sanctions in addition to new Security Council sanctions, including sanctions on trade, insurance, banking, and transport, as well as a prohibition on investment in and technology transfers to Iran's oil and gas sector.³¹ When the EU foreign and defense ministers met in December 2011, they concluded that,

given the seriousness of the situation, including the accelerations of the near 20% enrichment activities by Iran, in violation of six UN Security Council resolutions and eleven IAEA Board resolutions, and the installation of centrifuges at a previously undeclared and deeply buried site in Qom, as detailed in the IAEA report, the EU should extend the scope of its restrictive measures against Iran.³²

In 2012, the EU banned the import of oil and gas from Iran and imposed limitations on financial transactions.³³ Negotiations had come to a standstill, although the P5+1 agreed to meet in late January 2012 in Turkey.

The EU's role in this phase was stronger than it previously had been. Catherine Ashton replaced Javier Solana as the HR, a role that had been strengthened by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. While the Obama administration had rejected the zero-enrichment policy, the Europeans, particularly the French, had become more hawkish. The EU decision, reached by consensus, on unilateral sanctions was both an acceptance of US pressure for more sanctions and also a way to avert an Israeli military strike on Iran's facilities.³⁴ The P5+1 role here was limited to organizing negotiations at regular intervals; with diplomatic efforts straining under the weight of overwhelming sanctions, it was difficult even to agree when to hold the next meeting.

The EU as a facilitator (2013–15)

The 2013 Iranian presidential election was a breakthrough. The pragmatic, moderate Hassan Rouhani won the elections, which had focused mainly on the catastrophic state of the economy. President Rouhani was well acquainted with the nuclear issue. He had been Iran's chief negotiator in 2004–06, negotiating the voluntary suspension and implementation of the Additional Protocol with the E3. Javad Zarif, his new foreign minister, had been Iran's ambassador to the United Nations when Iran was referred to the Security Council. When President Obama, in the context of attending the UN General Assembly in September 2013, talked to President Rouhani over the phone, the scene was set for more constructive negotiations.

Before this, in 2011, Supreme Leader Khamenei already had approved bilateral Iran–US negotiations mediated by the Sultan of Oman, Qaboos bin Said al-Said, at Obama's request. After an initial meeting in March 2013, there were up to ten meetings in Oman, a process accelerated by the election of Rouhani.³⁵ They agreed to reach an interim deal first, to be followed by a final one. Both Iran and the United States had their proposals ready in October 2013.

The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), the interim deal, was concluded on November 24, 2013. Under the plan, Iran agreed not to advance its nuclear activities, and to remove all of the near-20-percent-enriched uranium from the country. The P5+1 and Iran agreed to a two-step process “to reach a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful.” A framework agreement was concluded on April 2, 2015, covering the key parameters for a final deal. The final deal, the JCPOA, was concluded on July 14, 2015. It sets in place restrictions on Iran's enrichment program for years to come.

The IAEA will monitor stored centrifuges and related infrastructure for fifteen years and verify component inventories and facilities for twenty. While these safeguards apply only to declared sites, the JCPOA includes a mechanism to allow access to undeclared sites “if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities inconsistent with” the JCPOA.³⁶ A Joint Commission established between the P5+1 and Iran, with the EU as chair, will facilitate the implementation of the deal.

During this bilateral phase, the EU became a practical facilitator. A former US negotiator summarized the situation as follows:

It is difficult to negotiate in a multilateral form. Seven entities is cumbersome as they all have to make a statement. Not only because of [Saeed] Jalili, it is cumbersome even now when he is gone. The P5+1 has been an important surrogate for the international community, all five Security Council members, a kind of stand-in and more legitimate than the US alone. But it was very inefficient. The reason the JPOA was achieved was because it was the US and Iran bilaterally. They produced 95 percent of the JPOA, gave it to Cathy [HR Catherine Ashton] who distributed it to the others. They were OK with it, only France was unhappy that they were not consulted. But without bilateral negotiations, no JPOA.³⁷

The bilateral negotiations could not have been possible without the framework of the P5+1. The ultimate proof of the importance of this framework is that the deal was approved in both Washington and Tehran. The Obama administration defended the deal by insisting that a harsher deal with additional sanctions was not an alternative. Should the deal be reopened, the partners of the P5+1 would withdraw their support. Similarly, the Iranian parliament was critical of negotiations with the United States. Members of the Majlis summoned the former negotiator Jalili to testify, and he emphasized that the negotiations were not carried out with the United States but rather with the P5+1.³⁸

The aching backbone

The transatlantic link is, according to the EU's Security Strategy, the backbone of the EU Foreign and Security Policy. Yet the positions of the United States and the EU were not always in lockstep; indeed, at times they were in stark contrast.

Table 1 situates the transatlantic link within the four phases of the negotiations as described above. It illustrates how the EU's role changed from an autonomous negotiator to a facilitator, while relations between the United States and the EU also changed with each phase. Even in phases where there was seemingly agreement on how to approach Iran, there was a difference in goals.

In the “persuasive engagement” phase (2003–05), the United States and the EU pursued opposing policies. The United States sought regime change in Iran. The Bush administration assumed that, as a side effect of regime change in Iraq, the neighboring regimes would collapse.³⁹ Iran did not collapse, but proposed instead in 2004 to the United States—via Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann—the most far-reaching offer to solve not only the nuclear issue but also regional conflicts.⁴⁰ At that time, Iran's investments in nuclear technology were practically non-existent, its centrifuges were few, and research on enrichment was still in a relatively early phase. There was a reformist president who wanted to improve Iran's relations with the West and open a dialogue with it. The Iranian proposal of 2004 never received an answer.

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton sought to have the IAEA refer Iran to the Security Council. This, in turn, would enable the imposition of new sanctions on Iran. The EU initiative derailed this plan. Bolton was extremely critical of the E3 negotiations: “Even if I agreed with seeking a deal with Iran, which I definitely did not, what was gained by pushing to engage now? Why not wait until Iran was referred to the Council, where we could put some pressure on them, rather than agreeing to talk beforehand?”⁴¹

In March 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice informed the Europeans that the United States supported their efforts on Iran, allegedly to put the blame for a coming failure on Iran: “Washington recognized that a show of support for the E3 efforts would help ensure that a failure of the talks would be blamed on Tehran, rather than Washington. This would strengthen Washington's position to rally European support for sanctions if the issue was referred to the Security Council.”⁴²

The Americans and Europeans disagreed on the suspension of enrichment. For the Americans, zero enrichment was a precondition for any negotiations. For the Europeans, suspension was a desired outcome of the negotiations, not a precondition to them. In the spring, the Europeans accepted the US preconditions policy. In April 2005, French Ambassador to Tehran François Nicoullaud told Seyed Hossein Mousavian, spokesperson for the Iranian negotiators, that, “for the U.S., the enrichment in Iran is a red line which the EU cannot cross.”⁴³ The Americans went to great lengths to convince the Europeans that Iran was developing nuclear weapons, citing documents discovered on a laptop that reportedly constituted evidence of a nuclear-weapon program.⁴⁴ The Iranians, in turn, revealed plans to start the uranium-conversion plant at Isfahan, as a way of pressuring the Europeans to conclude a deal.

When the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's noncompliance to the Security Council in 2006, EU and US policies seemingly converged. Both agreed on the need for UN sanctions and succeeded in convincing Russia and China to support them as well. Nevertheless, differences remained. The United States wanted to keep the Iran matter before the Security Council, where they had a veto and would be able to push for more sanctions. The Europeans, on the other hand, were committed to achieving a deal, and wanted to “scare” Iran into agreeing to one.⁴⁵

Once Iran's noncompliance was reported to the Security Council, the Europeans lost influence over the course of events. Though the United Kingdom and France succeeded in softening the language in Security Council resolutions, they did not attempt to change the policy. The Russians and Chinese remained critical but not obstructive; in their view, the issue should be solved by negotiations.

At the same time, all involved agreed to the EU being a coordinator for the P5+1:

The Americans would feel comfortable, since this would spare them the need for being exposed directly … the Russians and the Chinese would feel more comfortable with an EU leadership than an American one; and the E3 could be sure that important elements needed in the package proposals to be offered to Iran could be delivered.⁴⁶

Later, during the “dual-track” phase of “crippling” sanctions, the US and EU policies again converged, but with different foci. While Obama focused on achieving a deal, the Europeans focused on the sanctions—a reversal of priorities reflecting not just the stark differences between the Bush and Obama administrations but also a more aggressive French president.

In the final, “political will” phase, the European negotiators were sidelined in what was largely a bilateral effort. The Omani-brokered bilateral talks between Iran and the United States facilitated great progress. As mentioned above, both Iran and the United States had their proposals ready by October 2013, though with France playing the hawk, demanding changes regarding the heavy-water reactor in Arak, they did not obtain P5+1 approval until November.

In the first and final phases of this twelve-year process, the positions of the EU and the United States were most at odds. In the first, “persuasive-engagement” phase, the Europeans were an autonomous negotiator, while the United States promoted regime change from the sidelines, aspiring to report Iran to the Security Council. In the last, “political-will” phase, the EU was sidelined, despite its role as a coordinator. The negotiations largely took place between Iran and the United States, leading to the final deal in July 2015.

Perceptions on partnership

During twelve years of negotiations, the transatlantic link fluctuated between complete opposition to cooperation based on shared interests. Did the EU and the United States perceive each other as partners at all times? If so, what was the nature of the partnership?

Interviews with US officials reveal that there was only one phase where the United States saw the EU as a partner: the dual-track phase of imposing unilateral sanctions (2010–13). Pressure on Iran would not have had the same force without the EU sanctions, since US–Iran bilateral trade had already been low due to sanctions that had been in place since 1979; consequently, any effects of new US sanctions would be negligible. The 2012 EU sanctions—particularly Iran's exclusion from a key European financial institution, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)—were partly a result of US pressure and partly a result of the IAEA's disclosures on “possible military dimensions” in 2011. Furthermore, in 2010–11, there was an acute threat of an Israeli military intervention; the EU's decision to work with the United States on stronger sanctions effectively subverted that threat.⁴⁷

Following the imposition of “crippling” sanctions, the partnership faded. To many in the United States—particularly in the US Congress—the two-year-long “political will” phase had become the whole story of the Iran negotiations.⁴⁸ Former secretaries of state Hillary Clinton and John Kerry both refer to how they assembled the Europeans, the Russians, and the Chinese to work on the JCPOA and successfully brokered a deal. According to this version, the Iran negotiations started with the secret meetings in Oman, after which the United States initiated the discussions with the P5+1.⁴⁹ However, the group of P5+1 was already formed when Iran was reported to the Security Council. It worked in parallel with the Security Council and had regular meetings between 2006 and 2015.

There are, of course, some in the United States who acknowledge the entire twelve-year process. According to an Obama White House advisor on Iran:

There would today be no deal without the EU. The US was deep in the morass of Iraq, damaging the transatlantic relations. This led to the E3 initiative. Washington was opposed to these negotiations, but had no way to block them. Most were against the EU initiative; some hoped they would be successful. The EU was successful in 2003–2005. The EU protected Iran in the IAEA, blocked it [from] being sent to the Security Council in the Board of Governors together with Russia and China. The US could not force a vote.⁵⁰

Looking at the process from the EU side, 2005 was a critical year. The EU lost its strategic autonomy by accepting the US red line of zero enrichment. When the EU acquiesced to the US position, it lacked a clear strategy on Iran beyond playing for time, waiting for Rafsanjani to win the presidential election. The EU had no strategy in place to deal with the hardline Ahmadinejad government.

US involvement was controversial in the EU, marked by a divide between the diplomats and the politicians. The former tended to view US participation as unavoidable; without the Americans on board, there would be no deal. At the political level, however, there was a desire to conclude a “European” deal. Germany's Joschka Fisher is reported to have told Rouhani in 2006 that the United States was preventing a compromise between the EU and Iran.⁵¹ On August 3, 2013, when Rouhani was inaugurated as president, former Foreign Secretary Straw stated,

I’m absolutely convinced that we can do business with Dr Rouhani, because we did do business with Dr Rouhani, and had it not been for major problems within the US administration under President Bush, we could have actually settled the whole Iran nuclear dossier back in 2005, and we probably wouldn't have had President Ahmadinejad as a consequence of the failure as well.⁵²

The US challenge to the way forward

During the US presidential campaign, candidate Trump opposed the deal, repeatedly calling it the “worst deal ever.” Since then, he has called it an embarrassment for the United States and has demanded a tougher deal be put in place. The deal needed “fixing” by the United States and its allies, he said in October 2017, or else it needed to be scrapped.⁵³

The Trump administration's concerns have been focused on three factors. The main concern has been Iran's increasing influence in the region. US partners have met this criticism by referring to the JCPOA as a nuclear-only agreement. It was a unanimous decision by the states negotiating with Iran that regional problems would be excluded. Iran, on the other hand, sought to integrate regional aspects, such as cooperation on Afghanistan and combating terrorism. Nevertheless, there has been widespread criticism in the United States that the JCPOA did not curb Iran's influence in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.⁵⁴

Iran's missile development and testing are a second sore point. While one of the UN Security Council resolutions included sanctions on Iran's missile development, the JCPOA only calls upon Iran to refrain from testing of missiles that could carry a nuclear payload. The question was subject to intense debate during the negotiations. Iran referred to its need for self-defense given the level of investment in weapon systems, including missiles, by neighboring states, notably Saudi Arabia. After the approval of the deal, Iran has continued occasional missile testing, and, in July 2017, the United States imposed targeted sanctions on the institutions in charge of missile developments.⁵⁵ The Europeans agree on this criticism, but do not see this as a reason to renegotiate the deal.

Third, there is the fear of what Iran may do after the deal. Aspects of the JCPOA are time limited; most of the provisions to curtail Iran's nuclear program start expiring after ten to fifteen years. At the same time, some critical provisions, such as Iran's commitment to refrain from spent-fuel reprocessing and to ratify the Additional Protocol, are permanent.⁵⁶ The idea that Iran will become a “normal” NPT party has been criticized, particularly by Israel. The expectation expressed by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is that Iran will start developing nuclear weapons as soon as the JCPOA limitations on enrichment expire.⁵⁷

According to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), the president must issue a certification to Congress every ninety days that Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA.⁵⁸ Failure to issue a certification gives Congress the option to re-impose US sanctions suspended or waived under the JCPOA. Furthermore, the president must waive US sanctions every 120 days to be in compliance with the deal. In October 2017, President Trump failed to certify the deal and in January 2018 he decided to waive the sanctions for the last time.⁵⁹ In his statement, he underlined, “Despite my strong inclination, I have not yet withdrawn the United States from the Iran nuclear deal. Instead, I have outlined two possible paths forward: either fix the deal's disastrous flaws, or the United States will withdraw.”⁶⁰ This was a message to both Congress and European allies, who should work with the White House to address US issues within 120 days. This ultimatum not only puts pressure on Europeans, it holds them hostage to achieve an agreement on issues of US interest. If there is no fixing of the deal, the Europeans will be blamed for the US exit.

The EU's tough choices

After the US president failed to certify the JCPOA in October 2017, the leaders of the three European signatories—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—were quick to respond. They stated, “We stand committed to the JCPOA and its full implementation by all sides. Preserving the JCPOA is in our shared national security interest.”⁶¹ The European leaders called on the United States to consider the implications for US and allied security before re-imposing sanctions. While the Europeans objected to any renegotiation of the deal, the leaders expressed willingness to address, together with the United States, issues outside the scope of the JCPOA, such as Iran's ballistic-missile program and its regional activities.

The day before President Trump's ultimatum on January 13, 2018, the European parties met with Foreign Minister Zarif. At a news conference, representatives of the EU, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany reiterated their support for the nuclear deal. EU HR Federica Mogherini underlined that “the unity of the international community is essential to preserve the deal that is working, that is making the world safer and that is preventing a potential nuclear arms race in the region. And we expect all parties to continue to fully implement this agreement.”⁶²

Although the Europeans partly agree with the US criticism on the regional and missile issues, the European agenda is different. The EU sees the integration of Iran into the international community as a way to reduce its latent interest in nuclear weapons, a principle that is confirmed in the EU's nonproliferation strategy of 2003.⁶³ In the economic sphere, interests also diverge. US sanctions, even if they are not in direct breach of the JCPOA, can directly or indirectly impact third countries doing business with Iran. The risk of retroactive fines and penalties, or possibly even a prohibition on participating in US financial markets, for doing business in Iran has meant that international European banks have refrained from renewing their dealings there. This has undermined both Iran's and Europe's expectations of economic cooperation after the signing of the JCPOA.⁶⁴ The 2015 prediction by a US economist that Europeans must choose between doing business with the United States or with Iran may come true, though the choice is unevenly matched: European companies would choose between accessing the $19 trillion US market or the $400 billion Iranian one.⁶⁵

Recent US statements on the effects of sanctions on European companies have been contradictory. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told the Wall Street Journal after October 13 that the United States does not intend to disrupt European business deals, saying, “The president's been pretty clear that it's not his intent to interfere with business deals that the Europeans may have under way with Iran.”⁶⁶ Nevertheless, when visiting Saudi Arabia on October 22, Secretary Tillerson warned the Europeans not to invest in certain Iranian businesses, as “both of our countries (US and Saudi Arabia) believe that those who conduct business with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, any of their entities—European companies or other companies around the globe—really do so at great risk.”⁶⁷

To address this dilemma, the EU could use its own economic instruments in relation to the US. As several observers have suggested, this could be done by including the US sanctions in the 1996 blocking statute that shields European companies “against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.”⁶⁸ Additionally, it has been suggested that the EU could explore offshore dollar-clearing facilities to substitute for US-based financial transactions with Iran. One potential partner in such an effort could be China, which has both extensive trade relations with Iran and the economic base necessary for creating alternative financial networks.⁶⁹

It is unclear whether the EU would ultimately find the political will and unity to engage in an economic confrontation with the United States. Nevertheless, the threat of a US return to a policy of isolating Iran has activated EU representatives to lobby the US Congress. The EU Ambassador to the US David O'Sullivan stated in an interview in The Atlantic:

Our view is that while it is legitimate to contemplate sanctions on issues not related to the nuclear deal, it is not consistent with this deal to seek to put back sanctions which were clearly related to the nuclear program. If that were to happen … we will certainly explore all means to protect the legitimate interests of European companies who are trading legitimately with Iran in the post-deal context.⁷⁰

The European Commission has proposed to allow the future operation of the European Investment Bank in Iran. EU business leaders have said they are prepared to do everything they can to salvage the JCPOA in the event of a US withdrawal.⁷¹ Austria, Denmark, and Italy have stepped in to provide export guarantees to Iran.

Finally, more important than any economic or security interests is the fundamental question of the EU as a supporter of the rules-based international order, the raison d’être of the EU and the fundamental pillar of both its European Security Strategy of 2003 and the Global Strategy of 2016. According to the latter:

The EU will promote a rules-based global order. We have an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.⁷²

In a forceful statement at a press conference in Washington in November 2017, the EU HR Federica Mogherini underscored the stakes from a European perspective:

This is not a bilateral agreement. This is not an agreement that involves six or seven parties. This is a UN Security Council Resolution with an annex. And as such, all Member States of the United Nations are considered to be bound to the implementation of it. So, it doesn't belong to one country, to six countries, to seven countries, to the European Union—it belongs to the international community.⁷³

Conclusion

UN Security Council Resolution 1696 (2006), the first after the IAEA Board of Governors referred the Iran nuclear issue to the Security Council, affirmed the search for a “long-term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.”⁷⁴ The preamble of the JCPOA confirms that “The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA.”⁷⁵

During the deal's first two years, these goals of the international community have been achieved: the IAEA has repeatedly confirmed that Iran is in compliance with the agreement, its nuclear program has been curtailed, and it is exclusively peaceful. UN sanctions have been removed, as have the EU's unilateral sanctions and the US nuclear-related sanctions. Given the uncertainty related to the remaining and possibly new US sanctions on Iran, the JCPOA has not met European and Iranian expectations for economic cooperation. Nevertheless, the deal is a success in that it demonstrates that nuclear nonproliferation can achieved by diplomatic rather than military means.

The challenging criticism by the US administration has made the deal's future uncertain and revealed cracks in the transatlantic link. As in the early phases of the Iran negotiations, the United States and the European Union today hold opposing views: the EU wants to integrate Iran into the international community and the United States wants to isolate it. The EU and other partners want the deal to be implemented as agreed; the United States wants to renegotiate. While the Europeans have indicated a willingness to negotiate a separate agreement on missile testing, the United States wants any missile-testing agreement to be tied to the nuclear deal.⁷⁶

If the EU accepts the US position, it will lose its credibility as chair of the Joint Commission, responsible for JCPOA implementation. EU acquiescence would also break the consensus of the Security Council, and risk Russia and China using their veto power on further resolutions, a situation that was avoided during twelve years of negotiations. If, on the other hand, the deal cannot be saved and President Trump fulfills his campaign promise and exits the deal, the global nonproliferation regime will lose one of the very few examples where multilateral negotiations prevented the emergence of another nuclear-weapon state.

According to its global strategy, the European Union is committed to a multilateral, rules-based system supporting the full implementation and enforcement of multilateral treaties and regimes. The EU's framing of the Iran negotiations over twelve years was ultimately successful in sustaining both this objective and transatlantic ties. But with the JCPOA's future thrown into question, so, too, is the EU's continued ability to maintain both.

Notes

1 HR 1191, Pub. Law 114-17, May 2015.

2 Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World,” December 12, 2003, <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world>, p. 9.

3 Author's interview with a former senior European Union External Action (EEAS) official, March 18, 2015, London.

4 For a detailed analysis of the CFSP in relation to effective multilateralism, see Ben Kienzle, “The EU and the International Regimes in the Field of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” paper delivered to the Network of Excellence on Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation, 6th EU Framework Programme for Research Conference, Brussels, April 24–26, 2008. 


5 Madeleine K. Albright, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), <https://archive.org/stream/usparticipationi1994unit/usparticipationi1994unit_djvu.txt>, p. 13.

6 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review (June–July 2002), <www.hoover.org/research/power-and-weakness>.

7 Chief inspector Hans Blix testified to the Security Council, on March 7, 2003, that verification of Iraq's compliance with its nonproliferation obligations “would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever.” Briefing of the Security Council, March 7, 2003: oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, <www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/security_council_briefings.asp#7>. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the IAEA, testified on the same day that “With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us avoid a war. We trust that we will continue to have your support as we make every effort to verify Iraq's nuclear disarmament through peaceful means, and to demonstrate that the inspection process can and does work, as a central feature of the international nuclear arms control regime.” Mohamed ElBaradei, “The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq,” statement to the United Nations Security Council, January 27, 2003, <www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbaradei27jan03.htm>

8 The French ambassador to the United States explains the background for the E3 in Kelsey Davenport and Elizabeth Philipp, “A French View on the Iran Deal: An Interview with Ambassador Gérard Araud,” Arms Control Today, July 5, 2016. <www.armscontrol.org/print/7550>.

9 Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy,” p. 1

10 For a more in-depth analysis, see Tarja Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran: Inside EU negotiations (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017).

11 “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1970, Article IV, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf>.

12 Seyed Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), p. 124.

13 IAEA, INFCIRC/637, November 26, 2004, p. 4.

14 For the conflict of objective guarantees, see Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, pp. 34–35.

15 Oliver Meier, “European Efforts to Solve the Conflict over Iran's Nuclear Programme: How Has the European Union Performed?,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium: Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 27, February 2013, <www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/publications/nonproliferationpaper-27>.

16 Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, p. 169.

17 Arms Control Association (ACA), “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Fact Sheets and Briefs, January 21, 2014, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals>.

18 Jean du Preez, “The New IAEA Resolution: A Milestone in the Iran–IAEA Saga,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 1, 2005, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/new-iaea-resolution/>.

19 Derek Scally, “Rice Supports EU Call for UN Action on Iran,” Irish Times, January 13, 2006, <www.irishtimes.com/news/rice-supports-eu-call-for-un-action-on-iran-1.1001096>.

20 The negotiations are referred to either as “P5+1,” indicating the permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, or as “E3+3,” indicating the three EU states plus China, Russia, and the United States. I have used “P5+1” to underline the role of the UN Security Council as indicated in the EU understanding of multilateralism (see Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 8)

21 ACA, “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue.”

22 UN Security Council Resolution 1696, July 31, 2006, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1696%282006%29>.

23 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 41.

24 UN Security Council Resolution 1737, S/RES/1737, December 23, 2006; UN Security Council Resolution 1747, S/RES/1747, March 24, 2007; UN Security Council Resolution 1803, S/RES/1803, March 3, 2008; UN Security Council Resolution 1835, S/RES/1835, September 27, 2008; UN Security Council Resolution 1929, S/ RES/1929, June 9, 2010.

25 On the uncompleted work plan, see Peter Crail, “IAEA: Iran Work Plan Progress Incomplete,” Arms Control Today, March 1, 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/IAEA>.

26 NIE, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2007), <www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf>.

27 The UN Security Council “Endorses, in this regard, the proposals of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, for a long term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.” UN Security Council Resolution 1969, S/RES/1696, July 31, 2006.

28 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, pp. 41–43.

29 For the Tehran Declaration text: <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/joint-decl.pdf>.

30 See each of the IAEA Board Reports for 2010: <www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports>.

31 Council Decision 2007/140/CFSP of July 26, 2010, concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position, 2010 OJ 195/39, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:195:0039:0073:EN:PDF>.

32 “3130th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs,” press release, Council of the European Union, Brussels, November 30 and December 1, 2011, <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126518.pdf>.

33 Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of January 23, 2012, amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, 2012. OJ L 19/22, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:019:0022:0030:EN:PDF>.

34 Politiken, “Ashton – No Talk Now of Iran Military Action,” News in English, January 11, 2012, <http://politiken.dk/newsinenglish/ECE1504639/ashton--no-talk-now-of-iran-military-action/>.

35 Laura Rozen reports there were “about nine or 10 secret US–Iran bilateral meetings over the nine months between March and November 2013.” Laura Rozen, “Inside the Secret US–Iran Diplomacy that Sealed Nuke Deal,” Al-Monitor, August 11, 2015, <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/iran-us-nuclear-khamenei-salehi-jcpoa-diplomacy.html>.

36 JCPOA, Vienna, July 14, 2015. <http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensiveplan-of-action_en.pdf>.

37 Author's interview with a former senior State Department official, February 9, 2015, Washington.

38 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 110.

39 Joseph Cirincione, “Origins of Regime Change in Iraq, Proliferation Analysis,” March 19, 2003, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/19/origins-of-regime-change-in-iraq-pub-1214>.

40 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 47.

41 John Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad (New York: Threshold, 2007), p. 144.

42 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran's Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London, 2011), p. 26.

43 Seyed Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012).

44 A laptop was received by US intelligence with information on Iran's nuclear program. The origins of these documents have not been revealed. See Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, pp. 34, 62–63.


45 Author's interview with a former E3 ambassador, England, December 18, 2015.

46 Annalisa Giannella, “EU Non-Proliferation Policy and Implementation,” paper delivered to the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference, Brussels, February 3–4, 2012.

47 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 96.

48 See, for example, “Lunchtime keynote with U.S. Senator Tim Kaine,” Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Washington, DC, March 20, 2017, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/20/lunchtime-keynote-with-senator-tim-kaine-pub-68235>.

49 See for example Suzanne DiMaggio, “Dealing with North Korea: Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” Arms Control Association, July/August 2017.

50 Author's interview with a former White House advisor on nonproliferation, Boston, May 22, 2015.

51 Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, p. 165.

52 David Morrison and Peter Oborne, “US Scuppered Deal with Iran in 2005, Says then British Foreign Minister,” Open Democracy, September 23, 2013, <www.opendemocracy.net/david-morrison-peter-oborne/us-scuppered-deal-with-iran-in-2005-says-then-british-foreign-minister>.

53 “Trump Threatens to Rip up Iran Nuclear Deal unless US and Allies Fix ‘Serious Flaws’,” The Guardian, October 13, 2017, <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/13/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-congress>.

54 In 2004, Iran proposed to the United States that negotiations can include not only the nuclear issue but also regional aspects. The proposal communicated to President Bush through the Swiss ambassador never received an answer. See footnote 55 and Robert M. Shelala II, Nori Kasting, and Anthony H. Cordesman, “US and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of the EU, the EU3 and the Non-EU European States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2, 2012, <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130602_AfPak_Cent_Asia.pdf>.

55 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Slaps New Sanctions on Iran, after Certifying Its Compliance with Nuclear Deal,” Washington Post, July 18, 2017, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-certifies-that-iran-is-meeting-terms-of-nuclear-deal/2017/07/17/58d0a362-6b4a-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html?utm_term=.452e7c023838>.

56 Paul R. Pillar, “Fake Arguments for Killing Iran-Nuke Deal,” Consortiumnews.com, September 18, 2017, <https://consortiumnews.com/2017/09/18/fake-arguments-for-killing-iran-nuke-deal/>.

57 The prime minister stated that ”I opposed the the deal because it doesn't prevent Iran from getting nukes. It paves the way for Iran to get nuclear weapons.” Reuters, “Benjamin Netanyahu to Discuss ‘Bad’ Iran Nuclear Deal with Donald Trump,” The Guardian, December 4, 2016, <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/04/benjamin-netanyahu-donald-trump-iran-nuclear-deal>.

58 Pub. Law 114-17, 114th Cong., 1st sess., May 2015, <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-114publ17/html/PLAW-114publ17.htm>.

59 Matthew Lee, “Trump Hands Nuke Deal ‘Last Chance,’ Waives Iran Sanctions,” Washington Post, January 12, 2018, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/officials-iran-deal-survives-trump-will-waive-sanctions/2018/01/12/02677228-f7b1-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.215742f871ba>.

60 Holland, “Trump Issues Ultimatum to ‘Fix’ the Iran Nuclear Deal,” <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-decision/trump-issues-ultimatum-tofix-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKBN1F108F>.

61 Joint Statement from Prime Minister Theresa May, Chancellor Angela Merkel, and President Emmanuel Macron following President Trump's Statement on the United States' New Iran Strategy, Iran Watch, October 13, 2017, <www.iranwatch.org/library/governments/france/president/joint-statement-prime-minister-theresa-may-chancellor-angela-merkel-president-emmanuel-macron>.

62 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Trump to Extend Sanctions Waiver-Reports,” BBC News, January 12, 2018, <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42657313>.

63 Council of the European Union, “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 9, 2003. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015708%202003%20INIT>.

64 “U.S. Will Not Interfere in EU Trade with Iran: Tillerson,” Reuters, October 20, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa/u-s-will-not-interfere-in-eu-trade-with-iran-tillerson-idUSKBN1CP1NL>.

65 Author's interview with a US economist in Washington, February 20, 2015.

66 “European Business Deals with Iran Are Safe: Tillerson,” Al-Monitor, October 20, 2017, <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2017/10/us-diplomacy-iran-europe-trade.html#ixzz4ys9mxILa>.

67 Cardiner Harris, “Tillerson Warns Europe against Iran Investments,” New York Times, October 22, 2017, < www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/world/middleeast/tillerson-iran-europe.html?_r=0>.

68 European Council, “Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 Protecting against the Effects of the Extra-territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom,” November 22, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996R2271:EN:HTML>.

69 Tarja Cronberg and Tytti Erästö, “Will the EU and the USA Part Ways on the Iran Deal?” SIPRI, October 22, 2017, <www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/will-eu-and-usa-part-ways-iran-deal>.

70 Krishnadev Calamur, “Iran Deal Has ‘Implications for the Credibility’ of the U.S., EU Ambassador Says,” The Atlantic, October 6, 2017, <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/eu-ambassador-iran-deal/542307/>.

71 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Europe's Business Heads Aim to Keep Iran Nuclear Deal despite US Threat,” The Guardian, October 6, 2017, <www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/06/europes-business-heads-aim-to-keep-iran-nuclear-deal-despite-us-threat>.

72 Council of the European Union, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy,” June 2016, <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf>.

73 Remarks by HR/Vice-President Federica Mogherini following the Ministerial Meeting of the E3/EU + 3 and Iran, EEAS, September 21, 2017, <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_az/32546/RemarksbyHighRepresentative/Vice-PresidentFedericaMogherinifollowingtheMinisterialMeetingoftheE3/EU+3andIran>.

74 S/RES/1696 (2006), paragraph 4.

75 JCPOA, p. 3, point viii, <www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf>.

76 At the January 12, 2018, presentation of the his statement, President Trump called for long-range missiles and nuclear-weapon programs to be tied together, and for the threat of “severe sanctions” for further missile tests. See Holland, “Trump Issues Ultimatum to ‘Fix’ the Iran Nuclear Deal.”