Building trust in nonproliferation: transparency in nuclear-power development

ABSTRACT

Nuclear transparency is beneficial to nonproliferation. It helps non-nuclear-weapon states demonstrate their commitment to the nonproliferation regime and nuclear-weapon states account for their stockpiles. It also buttresses the safeguards process of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This article discusses the need for better transparency in nonproliferation efforts and offers a new tripartite model of nuclear transparency which emphasizes not only the states that want to prove their nonproliferation compliance through transparency, but also the audience for such transparency, and how transparency information is transferred from providers to recipients. The article discusses a range of issues concerning how such information is generated, appraised, and presented, taking into account the effect of cultural influences on different states’ transparency practices. To better synthesize various pieces of information intended to demonstrate nuclear transparency, we propose a nuclear-transparency dataset that includes nuclear-related factors as well as socio-political variables. Regression results using the dataset and responses from an expert survey show that the proposed transparency indicators provided a relatively similar assessment to the IAEA’s level of confidence about a state’s safeguards record, as stated in its 2013 safeguards report. Finally, the article proposes a direction for the development of this transparency index, as well as means by which states can improve their nuclear transparency.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear energy
• nonproliferation
• nuclear security
• export control
• International Atomic Energy Agency

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Jeemin Ha, So Young Kim, Hyeon Seok Park (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology), Bo Yeon Jang (Columbia University), Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, Steven Miller (Harvard University), and participants in the International Security Program seminar at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School for their helpful discussions. This article also benefited from the detailed and constructive comments made by the anonymous reviewers and the editors at the Nonproliferation Review. This research was supported by the Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning of Korea (NRF-2016R1A5A1013919).

Notes

1 Scott D. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 14 (2011), pp. 225–44.

2 “IAEA Safeguards Glossary – 2001 Edition,” International Nuclear Verification Series No. 3, IAEA, 2002, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf>.

3 Alexander S. Kolbin, “‘Disarmament Market’ Effects of Information Disclosures: Hypothesizing about the Role of Economic Theory in Analyzing the Transparency of Nuclear Disarmament,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2014), pp. 229–38.

4 Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, “Regime Architecture: Elements and Principles,” in Janne E. Nolan, ed., Global Engagement – Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 81.

5 Ronald B. Mitchell, “Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42 (March 1998), pp. 109–30.

6 Morten Bremer Maerli and Roger G. Johnston, “Safeguarding This and Verifying That: Fuzzy Concepts, Confusing Terminology, and Their Detrimental Effects on Nuclear Husbandry,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 54–82.

7 Ibid.

8 Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, “Nuclear Transparency and Registers of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials, PRIF-Report No. 97, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2010, <www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif97.pdf>.; Gunnar Arbman, “Nuclear Transparency from the Perspective of the Non-nuclear Weapon States,” in Nicholas Zarimpas, ed., Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 225–44.

9 Hans Blix, “The IAEA, United Nations, and the new global nuclear agenda,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 3 (1995), <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull37-3/37301280209.pdf>.

10 Pierre Goldschmidt, “The Proliferation Challenge of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Non-nuclear Weapon States,” IAEA, April 26, 2004, <www.iaea.org/PrinterFriendly/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2004/goldschmidt26042004.html>.

11 “Membership of Nonproliferation Export Control Regimes, HCOC and PSI,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies – Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2015, <www.nti.org/media/pdfs/apmnecr_1tPM3OB.pdf?_=1477953540>.

Major agreements are: The Nonproliferation Treaty; Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; Additional Protocol; Nuclear Suppliers Group; Zangger Committee; Missile Technology Control Regime; Hague Code of Conduct; Australian Group; Wassenaar Arrangement; Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

12 Tongfi Kim, “Asymmetric Strategic Problems in Nuclear Nonproliferation,” International Relations of the Asia–Pacific, Vol. 14 (2014), pp. 191–213.

13 Steven Aftergood and Frank N. von Hippel, “The U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Declaration: Transparency Deferred but Not Denied,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2007), pp. 149–61; David Albright, “Secrets that Matter,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 6 (2000).

14 Ann M. Florini, “A New Role for Transparency,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2 (September 1997), pp. 51–72.

15 Jim Walsh, “Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation,” Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2005, <www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/wmdcno41.pdf>.

16 Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.”

17 Mitsuru Kitano, “Opaque nuclear proliferation revisited: determinants, dynamism, and policy implications,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 23, Nos. 3–4 (November–December 2016), pp. 459–79; Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation,” in William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory, Vol. 1 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

18 Kitano, “Opaque nuclear proliferation revisited.”

19 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Beyond Waltz’s Nuclear World: More Trust May Be Better,” International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3 (October 2009), <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0047117809340489>.

20 Fred F. McGoldrick, Robert J. Einhorn, Duyeon Kim, and James L. Tyson, ROK–U.S. Civil Nuclear and Nonproliferation Collaboration in Third Countries (Washington, DC: the Brookings Institution, 2015), pp. 66–86; Victor Cha and Marie DuMond, The Politics of U.S.–Korea Civil Nuclear Cooperation: A Report of the CSIS Korea Chair, Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 17, 2015), p. 9, <www.csis.org/analysis/politics-us-korea-civil-nuclear-cooperation>.

21 Pierre Goldschmidt, “Exposing Nuclear Non-compliance,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2009).

22 Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Richard Tanter, “South Korea’s Nuclear Surprise,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2005).

23 Seongwhun Cheon, Toward greater transparency in non-nuclear policy (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005).

24 Mark Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016), pp. 17–64.

25 Olli Heinonen, “The Verification of the Peaceful Nature of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in Jungmin Kang, ed., Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013); Ralph A. Cossa, PACATOM: Building Confidence and Enhancing Nuclear Transparency: A Report from the International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures (Honolulu, HI: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 1998).

26 Cheon, Toward greater transparency in non-nuclear policy.

27 Berkhout and Walker, “Transparency and Fissile Materials.”

28 Ronald B. Mitchell, “Transparency for Governance: The Mechanisms and Effectiveness of Disclosure-Based and Education-Based Transparency Policies,” Ecological Economics, Vol. 70, Issue 11, (2011), pp. 1882–90.

29 Schaper, Looking for a Demarcation between Nuclear Transparency and Nuclear Secrecy.

30 Maerli and Johnston, “Safeguarding This and Verifying That.”

31 Ibid.

32 James Larrimore, Myron Kratzer, John Carlson, and Bruce Moran, “Transparency and Openness: Roles and Limitations in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Verification System,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Fall 2006), pp. 36–51.

33 Rublee, “The Threshold States.”

34 Tanya Ogilvie-White and Maria Rost Rublee, “The Nuclear Energy Aspirants – Egypt and Vietnam,” in Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, eds., Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012).

35 Yury Yudin, Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: The Need to Build Trust (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2010), p. 36.

36 Richard Wallace and Arvid Lundy, “Using Open Sources for Proliferation Analysis,” in James E. Doyle, ed., Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation: – Achieving Security with Technology and Policy (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008).

37 Ibid.

38 Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 134.

39 Berkhout and Walker, “Transparency and Fissile Materials.”

40 Robert Zarate, “On the Non-use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence: The Cases of North Korea and Iran,” Korea Observer, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2013), pp. 411–41.

41 Alexander H. Montgomery and Adam Mount, “Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2014), <doi: 10.1080/02684527.2014.895593>.

42 Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2006), pp. 433–54.

43 Graham Allison, “Nuclear Disorder – Surveying Atomic Threats,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2010), <www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-disorder-surveying-atomic-threats>.

44 Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall 2011), pp. 154–89.

45 Mark Hibbs, “Chung Mong-joon, the 123, and the State-Level Approach,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 14, 2013, <www.carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/14/chung-mong-joon-123-and-state-level-approach-pub-51502>.

46 James Brooke, “Brazil Uncovers Plan by Military to Build Atom Bomb and Stops It,” New York Times, October 9, 1990, <www.nytimes.com/1990/10/09/world/brazil-uncovers-plan-by-military-to-build-atom-bomb-and-stops-it.html>.

47 Jacqueline Shire, “The Silent Proliferators – Syria and Myanmar,” in Ogilvie-White and Santoro, eds., Slaying the Nuclear Dragon.

48 Kurt M. Campbell and Robert J. Einhorn, “Avoiding the Tipping Point: Concluding Observations,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

49 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “The Defiant States – North Korea and Iran,” in Ogilvie-White and Santoro, eds., Slaying the Nuclear Dragon.

50 Wallace and Lundy, “Using Open Sources for Proliferation Analysis.”

51 Fung et al., Full Disclosure, p. 132.

52 Maerli and Johnston, “Safeguarding This and Verifying That.”

53 Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser, “Confronting the ‘Perpetual Menace to Human Security’,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 2014), pp. 65–75.

54 Nicholas Zarimpas, “Conclusions,” in Zarimpas, ed., Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions.

55 Mitchell, “Sources of Transparency.”

56 Schaper, Looking for a Demarcation between Nuclear Transparency and Nuclear Secrecy.

57 Mark Fitzpatrick, “Policy Options for Preventing a Proliferation Cascade,” in Mark Fitzpatrick, ed., Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008).

58 Rublee, “The Threshold States.”

59 Eun-ha Kwon and Won Il Ko, “Evaluation Method of Nuclear Nonproliferation Credibility,” Annals of Nuclear Energy, Vol. 36 (2009), pp. 910–16.

60 Bryan R. Early, “Turning Transparency into Knowledge: Enhancing How the 1540 Committee Shares Information,” paper delivered at the UNSCR 1540 Civil Society Forum: A Dialogue with Academia and Civil Society, UN Headquarters, New York, April 11–12, 2016.

61 Peter Crail, “Report: Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 355–99.

62 Walker, “Reflection on Transparency and International Security.”

63 Berkhout and Walker, “Transparency and Fissile Materials.”

64 David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Winter 2010–11), pp. 7–52.

65 Based on the lack of available information about China’s plans and measures to protect its fissile materials, the Nuclear Threat Initiative assessed that China has not been completely transparent about the security of such a repository. However, other experts noted that the increasing participation of China in nonproliferation and disarmament regimes and the official declaration of the no-first-use policy are evidence of the improvement of nuclear transparency in this country even though the term “nuclear transparency” is still negatively perceived by China as a forceful measure by the United States to gain access to the country. Dingli Shen, “China’s Nuclear Security Status Is Underestimated,” Global Asia, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2016), pp. 112–17; Hui Zhang, “A Discussion of China’s Nuclear Transparency Options,” paper delivered at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), Indian Wells, CA, 2001; Lora Saalman, “Placing a Renminbi Sign on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Reduction,” in Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson, eds., Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2013).

66 Bill Robinson, “Transparency with Accountability: Reporting by States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2004), <www3.carleton.ca/cfpj/articles/PDFfiles/11.1%20PDFs/CFP_11_1.pdf>.

67 Grand, “Nuclear Weapon States and the Transparency Dilemma.”

68 Cheon, Toward Greater Transparency in Non-nuclear Policy.

69 Müller and Schaper, Nuclear Transparency and Registers of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials.

70 Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.”

71 Wheeler, “Beyond Waltz’s Nuclear World.”

72 Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers, pp. 127–60.

73 Ann M. Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1996), pp. 363–89.

74 Cohen and Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation.”

75 Christopher E. Paine, “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Global Security, and Climate Change: Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Nuclear Power Expansion,” University of Richmond Law Review, Vol. 44 (2010), pp. 1047–1102.

76 Matthew Bunn, “Corruption and Nuclear Proliferation,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Corruption, Global Security, and World Order (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

77 Cheon, Toward Greater Transparency in Non-nuclear Policy.

78 Chris Ajemian, Michael Hazel, Carol Kessler, Carrie Mathews, Fred Morris, and Amy Seward, Peaceful Uses Bona Fides: Criteria for Evaluation and Case Studies (Oak Ridge, TN: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 2007).

79 Campbell and Einhorn, “Avoiding the Tipping Point.”

80 Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach, “Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2015).

81 Kang Choi and Joon-Sung Park, “South Korea: Fears of Abandonment and Entrapment,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow – Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

82 James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, “The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2006).

83 Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke, “The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 21 (2004), pp. 443–61.

84 Trade Profiles 2013 (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2013).

85 Fuhrmann and Tkach, “Almost Nuclear.”

86 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2014).

87 Witold J Henisz, “The institutional environment for infrastructure investment,” Industrial and Corporate Change 11, No. 2 (2002).

88 Freedom of the Press: Scores and Status 1980–2015 (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2015).

89 “Committee-Approved Matrices,” 1540 Committee, <un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/1540-matrix/committee-approved-matrices.shtml>.

90 Robert M. O’Brien, “A Caution Regarding Rules of Thumb for Variance Inflation Factors,” Quality & Quantity, Vol. 41, No. 5 (2007), pp. 673–90.

91 Jee-Min Ha, Man-Sung Yim, and Hyeon Seok Park, “Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation,” paper delivered at the 56th Annual Meeting of the INMM, Indian Wells, CA, 2015.

92 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2013,” November 9, 2016, <iaea.org/sites/default/files/statement_for_sir_2013_gov_2014_27.pdf>.

93 Viet Phuong Nguyen and Man-Sung Yim, “Post-Cold War Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and Implications for Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 93 (2016), pp. 246–59.

94 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2013.”

95 Taiwan also had a very low transparency score according to the assessment in this study, but that is mostly because this island is not a member of any major nonproliferation-related agreement due to its political status. In fact, since its democratization during the 1980s, Taiwan has been assessed to have a robust nonproliferation infrastructure, thanks to trilateral cooperation between Taiwan, the United States, and the IAEA. Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers, pp. 127–60.

96 Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers.

97 Ibid., pp. 17–64.

98 Cheon, Toward Greater Transparency in Non-nuclear Policy.

99 Ogilvie-White, “The Defiant States.”

100 Geert Hofstede and Michael H. Bond, “Hofstede's Culture Dimensions: An Independent Validation Using Rokeach’s Value Survey,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1984), pp. 417–33.

101 Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade.”

102 Roger G. Johnston, Morten Bremer Maerli, Edward G. Bitzer III, and James David Ballard, “Two Simple Models of Nuclear Transparency,” International Journal of Social Inquiry, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2008), pp. 201–35.

103 Mitchell, “Transparency for Governance.”