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ABSTRACT
The US government initiated a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative to address the concern that, in the post-Cold War years, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons would be widespread and create a significant challenge to the US military’s combat operations. In particular, non-nuclear states might use chemical or biological warfare agents against US forces with the belief that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in retaliation. Following the events of September 11, 2001, defense strategy and policy shifted to a wider view of the threat of adversarial use of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and the term “counterproliferation” was replaced by “combating” or “countering WMD.” Over time, the Defense Department increasingly moved away from counterproliferation principles with the detrimental effect of losing capabilities that US forces still need for contemporary adversaries. This shift has been aggravated by other US government agencies’ use of “counterproliferation” in lieu of what would have been termed “nonproliferation” activities in the 1990s. The loss of clarity within the US government on these terms has led to the inability to focus the “whole of government” on this significant national security challenge. To alleviate this challenge, the US government needs a top-down initiative to refocus policy on the distinctly different aspects of WMD with respect to military combat operations, combating terrorism, and homeland security.
Notes
1 “This Day in History: Bush Announces the Launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” History Channel, November 16, 2009, <www.history.com/this-day-in-history/bush-announces-the-launch-of-operation-iraqi-freedom>.
2 DOD, Memorandum Issued in the Name of the Chairman (MCM) 0026-01, subject: Counterproliferation Strategy, February 22, 2001, pp. 19–20, <www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/ocjcs_counterproliferation_Strategy.pdf>.
3 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, speech to the National Academy of Sciences on the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, December 7, 1993, <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd18.htm>.
4 For example, see Government Accounting Office (GAO), “Chemical and Biological Defense: US Forces Are Not Adequately Equipped to Detect All Threats,” NSIAD-93-2: January 26, 1993, <www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-93-2>; and GAO, “OPERATION DESERT STORM: Evaluation of the Air War,” PEMD-96-10, July 2, 1996, <www.gao.gov/products/PEMD-96-10>.
5 Barry Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation: US Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), pp. 48–51. Also see Chris Williams, “DOD’s Counterproliferation Initiative: A Critical Assessment,” in Henry Sokoloski, ed., Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1996).
6 DOD, DOD Strategy for Countering WMD, Washington, DC, 2014, p. 3.
7 DOD, National Defense Strategy, Washington, DC, 2018, p. 4.
8 This framework is taken from Charles Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1984), pp. 30–32.
9 DOD, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 3–4.
10 Ibid., pp. 36–41.
11 DOD, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), p. i.
12 Paul Kerr, “Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) (Washington, DC: CRS, 2008); Amy Woolf, “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union,” (Washington, DC: CRS, 2012).
13 DOD, “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” p. 61.
14 Hidemi Yuki, Lloyd Hough, Marc Sageman, Richard Danzig, Rui Kotani, and Terrance Leighton, Aum Shinrikyo: Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapon (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2011), <http://files.cnas.org.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_Danzig_1.pdf>.
15 Enacted as part of Public Law 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996.
16 In no small part, this development of a strategy and later a joint publication for counterproliferation operations was prompted by a GAO report critical of the DOD’s talk without action. GAO, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: DoD’s Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused,” NSIAD-00-97, May 26, 2000, <www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-97>.
17 Angus McColl discusses the pros and cons of the argument in his Naval Postgraduate School thesis titled “Is Counterproliferation Compatible with Nonproliferation? Rethinking the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative,” 1995, <www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA302729>.
18 The office of the deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for chemical and biological defense attempted, for some years after 2000, to use the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program and the DOD Directive 5160.5 as the basis for creating a joint counterproliferation and later a joint combating WMD program. Both initiatives were rejected by the services’ leadership and not advanced to fruition.
19 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: DOD Reform Initiative Directive #35, dated May 5, 1998, <http://archive.defense.gov/dodreform/drids/drid35.html>.
20 The Counterproliferation Review Committee was created by an act of Congress under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.
21 See the final “Counterproliferation Operational Architecture,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2002, <www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/J5_NCD_Counterproliferation_Operational_Architecture.pdf>.
22 The term “CBRN” for “chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear” had come into vogue in 1998 to discuss the potential threat of terrorists using these materials (see the 1999 “Gilmore Commission report”: “First Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: I. Assessing the Threat,” December 15, 1999 <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf>). The generalization of the term “WMD” to include radiological weapons set in after the 9/11 incident. The 1990s term “NBC terrorism” became “CBRN terrorism” and then “WMD terrorism.”
23 White House, National Strategy to Combat WMD, December 2002, <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-17.html>.
24 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Strategic Plan, “Securing Our Homeland,” 2004, p. 16, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/cipdigitalarchive/files/415_Securing%20the%20Homeland.%20DHS%20Strategic%20Plan%202004.pdf>.
25 Dana Shea and Sara Lister, “The BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism,” CRS, November 2003; GAO, “Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities,” GAO-09-257, January 29, 2009, <www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257>.
26 GAO, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Developed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain,” GAO-11-869T, July 26, 2011, <www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-869T>.; GAO, “Biosurveillance: Observations on the Cancellation of BioWatch Gen 3 and Future Considerations for the Program,” GAO-14-267T, June 10, 2014, <www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-267T>.
27 Congress called for seventeen more teams in 1999, five more in 2000, twelve more in 2004, eleven more in 2005, and two more in 2009, totaling fifty-seven civil support teams today.
28 Al Mauroni, Where Are the WMDs? The Reality of Chem-Bio Threats on the Home Front and the Battlefield (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. 133–52.
29 Raymond Van Pelt, “JTF–WMD Elimination: An Operational Architecture for Future Contingencies,” ICAF Study, NDU, 2004, pp. 7–17, <www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a436471.pdf>.
30 Ashton Carter, “How to Counter WMD,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5 (2004), pp.72–85. In addition to being a primary architect for the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, Carter was the only assistant secretary of defense for nuclear security and counterproliferation, a position that lasted only one year.
31 “Proliferation Security Initiative,” State Department, n.d., <www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>.
32 Lauren Johnston, “Kay: We Were Almost All Wrong,” CBS/AP, January 29, 2004, <www.cbsnews.com/news/kay-we-were-almost-all-wrong/>.
33 “The WMD Commission Report,” Federation of American Scientists, n.d., <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmdcomm.html>.
34 “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” April 28, 2004, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/20040430.html>.
35 DOD, Joint Publication 3-40, “Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 2004 <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_40.pdf>.
36 Jeffrey Lewis, “STRATCOM to Lead DOD WMD Efforts,” Arms Control Wonk, February 5, 2005, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/200425/stratcom-to-lead-dod-wmd-efforts/>.
37 The 2006 “National Military Strategy to Combat WMD” was held up in staffing in part due to discussions within the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as to DOD’s role in combating WMD and the increase in its homeland security responsibilities. It was still criticized as being too focused on counterproliferation and not enough on homeland security.
38 Daniel Martinez, “Stand up of SJFHQ-E Enhances CWMD Mission,” US Strategic Command Public Affairs, February 6, 2012 <www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/983496/stand-up-of-sjfhq-e-enhances-cwmd-mission/>.
39 Al Mauroni, Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF CUWS, 2017).
40 The Obama administration emphasized nonproliferation over counterproliferation initiatives, which was an anticipated result of the change of administrations, but the definition of countering WMD was not articulated until the release of the 2014 DoD Strategy for Countering WMD.
41 White House, National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-releases-national-strategy-countering-biological-threats>.
42 Cheryl Pellerin, “US, EU Lead Global Nonproliferation, Biosurveillance Efforts,” American Forces Press Service, May 8, 2013, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120158>. Also see the 2013 DOD Annual Report to Congress on Chemical and Biological Defense, <www.hsdl.org/?view&did=740744>.
43 John Donnelly, “The Other North Korean Threat: Chemical and Biological Weapons,” Roll Call, June 12, 2018, <www.rollcall.com/news/politics/the-other-north-korean-threat-chemical-and-biological-weapons>.
44 Much of this work is conducted by DTRA in its many arms-control and proliferation-prevention programs, which are executed by DOD civilians and military personnel in support of State Department initiatives. See “Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,” DTRA, not dated, <www.dtra.mil/Mission/Partnering/Cooperative-Threat-Reduction-Program/>.
45 Dan Lamothe, “Special Operations Command Takes a Lead Role in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Washington Post, December 23, 2016, <www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/23/special-operations-command-takes-a-new-lead-role-countering-weapons-of-mass-destruction/?utm_term=.6a99819c727e>.
46 Congress added DHS and the State Department as members of the CPRC in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, and also made the report a biennial, rather than annual, submission, with the CPRC’s termination date extended from 2008 to 2013. Also see GAO, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Actions Needed to Track Budget Execution for Counterproliferation Programs and Better Align Resources with Combating WMD Strategy,” September 28, 2010.
47 Sandra Erwin, “Can Artificial Intelligence Help US SOCOM Track Weapons of Mass Destruction?” Space News, April 24, 2018 <https://spacenews.com/can-artificial-intelligence-help-u-s-socom-track-weapons-of-mass-destruction/>.
48 DOD, National Defense Strategy, January 2018, pp. 2–3, 7.
49 United Nations, “Russian Operatives Carried out Salisbury Chemical Attack Alleges UK; Accusations Part of ‘Post-truth World’ Asserts Moscow,” UN News, September 6, 2018, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1018641>
50 DOD, Nuclear Posture Review Report, February 2018, p. 7.
51 DOD, Joint Operational Access Concept, 2012, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf>, p. 3.
52 Lt. Col. Elena O’Bryan, “Jordan’s security Boosted amid Serious Threats,” US Army, June 29, 2018, <www.army.mil/article/207921/jordans_security_boosted_amid_serious_threats>.
53 Oliver Holmes and Tom Phillips, “Kim Jong-nam Killed by VX Nerve Agent, Say Malaysian Police,” The Guardian, February 24, 2017, <www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/24/kim-jong-nam-north-korea-killed-chemical-weapon-nerve-agent-mass-destruction-malaysian-police>.
54 For example, the Restoration of Operations (RestOps) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration examined this problem in 2001, but there has not been a similar examination since.
55 Quanesha Deloach, “US and Republic of Korea Train for WMD Elimination Operations,” Cdr., US Seventh Fleet, March 18, 2016, <www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/698417/us-and-republic-of-korea-train-for-wmd-elimination-operations/>.
56 John Caves and Seth Carus, The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030 (Fort McNair, DC: National Defense University, 2014), pp. 43–45.