Models of scientific and technological review for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

ABSTRACT

Science and technology (S&T) review is key to anticipating developments in the life sciences that may benefit or run contrary to the aims of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. It serves as a mechanism for both preparing against novel biological threats and identifying the best opportunities for developing and sharing the life sciences to the fullest extent. In the age of rapidly advancing biotechnology, S&T review needs to be wide ranging, involve a diverse set of inputs, and be transparent about its methods and data. This viewpoint considers four models of S&T review and their capacity to respond to the challenge of the life sciences: standing advisory boards; ad hoc working groups; peer review; and wikis. It then identifies a hybrid model that is suitably broad, diverse, and transparent.

KEYWORDS:

• biological weapons
• science and technology review
• dual use
• nonproliferation
• transparency

Acknowledgement

This work was funded by the Greenwall Foundation President’s Fund, “Neurotechnological Candidates for Consideration in Periodic Revisions of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.” Many thanks to Christopher Park, Jo Husbands, James Revill, Daniel Feakes, Robert Mikulak, Malcolm Dando, Vladimir Ladanov, John Walker, Lorna Miller, Suzanne Jorgenson, and others at the margins of the Second Preparatory Committee to Eighth Review Conference for their comments on this work. Any mistakes or missteps in this document do not reflect these individuals or their organizations and are the sole responsibility of the author.

Notes

1 Nicholas Greig Evans, “Contrasting Dual-Use Issues in Biology and Nuclear Science,” in Michael J. Selgelid and Brian Rappert, eds., On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics (Canberra: Australian National University ePress, 2013), pp. 255–73; Seumas Miller and Michael J. Selgelid, Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-Use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008).

2 James Revill, Kai Ilchmann, Caitríona McLeish, and Paul Nightingale, “Proposals for Changing the S&T Reviews,” 2011.

3 Secretariat to the BWC, “Background Paper on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,” Geneva, October 26, 2001.

4 “Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting,” UN Offices in Geneva, March 12, 1980.

5 Valery Loshchinin, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Valery Loshchinin, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, at the Meeting of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” Biologial and Toxins Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, December 1, 2008.

6 James Revill and Caitríona McLeish, “So You Want to Do ‘Something’ on Science and Technology Reviews in the Biological Weapons Convention?” 33rd Workshop Pugwash Study Group on Implementation of the CBW Conventions, Geneva, December 3–4, 2011, <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/39589/>; Revill et al., “Proposals for Changing the S&T Reviews.”

7 For the sake of brevity, only document codes are listed in this and subsequent references to UN Offices in Geneva documents, found at <http://unog.ch>. BWC Implementation Support Unit—BWC/MSP/2012/MX/INF.3; BWC/MSP/2013/MX/INF.1/Rev.1; BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.3 and BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.3/Corr.1; United Kingdom—BWC/MSP/2012/MX/WP.1; BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.8; BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.4; Russian Federation—BWC/MSP/2012/MX/WP.10; United States—BWC/MSP/2012/MX/WP.6; BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.5; BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.2; BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.5; People’s Republic of China—BWC/MSP/2012/MX/WP.14; European Union—BWC/MSP/2012/MX/WP.12; Australia—BWC/MSP/2012/MX/WP.16; South Africa—BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.11; Switzerland—BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.8; Islamic Republic of Iran—BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.15.

8 Jenifer Mackby, “Disputes Mire BWC Review Conference,” Arms Control Association, January 11, 2017, <www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2017_01/News/Disputes-Mire-BWC-Review-Conference>.

9 Evans, “Contrasting Dual-Use Issues in Biology and Nuclear Science.”

10 Ronald J. Jackson, Alistair J. Ramsay, Carina D. Christensen, Sandra Beaton, Diana F. Hall, and Ian A. Ramshaw, “Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox,” Journal of Virology, Vol. 75, No. 3 (2001), pp. 1205–10.

11 Michael J. Selgelid and Lorna Weir, “The Mousepox Experience,” EMBO Reports, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2010), pp. 18–24.

12 Nancy Connell, “Immunological Modulation,” in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Innovation, Dual Use, and Security: Managing the Risks of Emerging Biological and Chemical Technologies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), pp. 191–92.

13 William C. DeLoache, Zachary N. Russ, Lauren Narcross, Andrew M. Gonzalez, Vincent J.J. Martin, and John E. Dueber, “An Enzyme-Coupled Biosensor Enables (S)-Reticuline Production in Yeast from Glucose,” Nature Chemical Biology, Vol. 11, No. 7 (2015), pp. 465–71; Elena Fossati, Lauren Narcross, Andrew Ekins, Jean-Pierre Falgueyret, Vincent J.J. Martin, “Synthesis of Morphinan Alkaloids in Saccharomyces Cerevisiae,” PLoS ONE, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2015).

14 Nicholas Greig Evans and Michael J. Selgelid, “Biosecurity and Open-Source Biology: The Promise and Peril of Distributed Synthetic Biological Technologies,” Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2014), pp. 1065–83; Robert H. Carlson, Biology Is Technology: The Promise, Peril, and New Business of Engineering Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

15 James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 9, 2016, <www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf>.

16 Malcolm Dando, Neuroscience and the Future of Chemical–Biological Weapons (Dordecht, NE: Springer, 2015); National Research Council, Emerging and Readily Available Technologies and National Security (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2014).

17 Mark Wheelis, “The Use and Misuse of LSD by the U.S. Army and CIA,” in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Innovation, Dual Use, and Security: Managing the Risks of Emerging Biological and Chemical Technologies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), pp. 289–302.

18 Dando, Neuroscience and the Future of Chemical–Biological Weapons.

19 Nicholas Greig Evans, Marc Lipsitch, and Meira Levinson, “The Ethics of Biosafety Considerations in Gain-of-Function Research Resulting in the Creation of Potential Pandemic Pathogens,” Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 41, No. 11 (2015), pp. 901–08.

20 Nicholas Greig Evans, “Dual-Use Decision Making: Relational and Positional Issues,” Monash Bioethics Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2015), pp. 268–83.

21 Ibid., pp. 270–71.

22 VERTIC, A New Strategy: Strengthening the Biological Weapons Regime through Modular Mechanisms (London: VERTIC, n.d.), <www.vertic.org/media/assets/Publications/VM6.pdf>.

23 As noted by Ljupčo Jivan Gjorgjinski, chair of the 2018 MSP. See, e.g., BWC/MSP/2018/5.

24 Catherine Rhodes and Malcolm R. Dando, “Options for a Scientific Advisory Panel for the Biological Weapons Convention,” in Brian Rappert and Caitríona McLeish, eds., A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research (London: CRC Press, 2014), pp. 95–115.

25 Russian Federation, “Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Proposal for the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee," BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.2/Rev.2, July 4, 2016, <www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/49B8741C96902E9CC1257FF000359BBB/$file/BWCCONF.VIIIPC2.Wp2.Rev.2.pdf>.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Revill and McLeish, “So You Want to Do ‘Something’ on Science and Technology Reviews in the Biological Weapons Convention?”

29 NSABB Chater 2018, <https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018-NSABB-Charter.pdf>.

30 James Revill and Caitríona McLeish, “Estimating the Costs of Compliance Options for the BWC,” Trust & Verify, No. 151 (2015), <www.vertic.org/media/assets/TV/TV151.pdf>.

31 Graham S. Pearson, “Time for Structural Changes to Make the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention More Effective,” Global Security: Health, Science and Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016), pp. 23–38.

32 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Peer Review: An OECD Tool for Co-operation and Change (Paris, 2003).

33 Gryphon Scientific, Risk and Benefit Analysis of Gain of Function Research (Washington, DC: Gryphon Scientific, 2015).

34 Jez Littlewood, “On Your Marks: Thinking about Preparing for the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in 2011," 29th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention, Moving Towards the Seventh BWC Review Conference, Pugwash Meeting No. 344, Geneva, November 29–30, 2008.

35 Caitríona McLeish and Ralf Trapp, “The Life Sciences Revolution and the BWC,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2011), pp. 527–43.

36 Nicholas Greig Evans, “Great Expectations: Ethics, Avian Flu and the Value of Progress,” Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2013), pp. 209–13.

37 VERTIC, A New Strategy.

38 For example, Piers Millet and Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity” Health Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2017), pp. 373–83.

39 Russian Federation, “Proposal for the Establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee.”

40 Revill and McLeish, “Estimating the Costs of Compliance Options;” Revill, Ilchmann, McLeish, and Nightingale, “Proposals for Changing the S&T Reviews.”