Chinese views of the nuclear endgame in North Korea

ABSTRACT

This article examines Chinese views of North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program during the Donald J. Trump administration. It shows that China has portrayed itself as a responsible country that promotes regional stability, unlike the United States, which has engaged in military brinkmanship with North Korea. Some Chinese foreign-policy experts have asserted that Beijing should back Pyongyang in the event of war because of their shared history of humiliation by great powers, while others have favored working with other regional partners. Another theme in Chinese discourse about North Korea is that Pyongyang is an impetuous, ungrateful regime that impedes Beijing’s ability to attain its core interests of regional stability, economic development, and heightened global influence. This negative assessment of North Korea drove Beijing’s endorsement of stricter UN sanctions in 2017. While Beijing has punished Pyongyang for its wayward policies, China responded favorably to North Korea’s decision in April 2018 to stop nuclear tests and partake in international dialogue. Beijing seeks to help Pyongyang gradually disarm and develop its economy within a Chinese-led East Asian order. The article concludes by explaining how Beijing’s recent, more positive view of Pyongyang is likely to affect its support for American efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program.

KEYWORDS:

• Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
• China
• United States
• regional stability
• East Asia
• alliances
• sanctions
• nuclear proliferation

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Clay Moltz and Chris Twomey for their comments and suggestions. This article was made possible by a grant from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. This article does not reflect the views of the US Department of Navy or the Department of Defense.

ORCID

Covell Meyskens http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1282-8169

Notes

1 “Trump Rips China after North Korea Missile Test,” CNN, July 30, 2017, <www.cnn.com/2017/07/29/politics/trump-china-north-korea-tweet/index.html>.

2 For an overview of this viewpoint, see Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, “The Korea Crisis,” Foreign Policy, No. 136 (2003), pp. 20–24, 26, 28; James Reilly, “China’s Market Influence in North Korea,” Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 5 (2014), pp. 894–917; Doug Bandow, “The China Option: Progress in Pyongyang Must Go Through Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2016, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-11-01/china-option>.

3 I have not included the names of Chinese interviewees because they requested anonymity.

4 All translations of Chinese sources are the author’s. “Yuyan Chaoxian bengkui, keneng wei shishang zao” [Predicting North Korea’s collapse: maybe it is too early], Renmin ribao: Xia ke dao, February 18, 2017, <http://news.youth.cn/gj/201702/t20170219_9137335.htm>.

5 “China Proposes ‘Double Suspension’ to Defuse Korean Peninsula Crisis,” Xinhua, March 8, 2017, <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/08/c_136112435.htm>.

6 “A Tillerson Slip Offers a Peek into Secret Planning on North Korea,” New York Times, December 17, 2017, <www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/us/politics/tillerson-north-korea-china.html>

7 “China reportedly Sent 150,000 troops to North Korea’s Border—Here’s How They Could Stop North Korea,” Business Insider, April 12, 2017, <www.businessinsider.com/china-150000-troops-north-korea-xi-trump-2017-4>; “Fearing the Worst, China Plans Refugee Camps on North Korean Border,” New York Times, December 11, 2017, <www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/world/asia/china-north-korea-border.html>.

8 For the Ministry of National Defense’s denial, see “Guofang bu: Zhongguo wang Zhong Chao bianjing zengbin 15 wan shuofa chun shu nie zao” [Talk of China deploying 150,000 troops along the border is a complete fabrication], <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0413/c1011-29207437.html>. The original Global Times article has been removed from the newspaper’s website. For the People’s Daily’s discussion of China sending troops to the border, see “Miandui Chaoxian bandao jushi, fanzhan ye xu beizhan” [Given the situation on the Korean Peninsula: war preparations must also be made], Renmin ribao, March 21, 2017, <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0321/c1011-29158448.html>. On South Korean media and the Global Times article, see “North Korea Tensions: Reports of Chinese Troops on Border,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 11, 2017, <www.smh.com.au/world/north-korea-tensions-reports-of-chinese-troops-on-border-20170411-gviljw.html>. On the possibility of Sino-American contingency planning, see “Pingchang dongyun heping chuangkou yi kaiqi, ‘dongyun waijiao’ wailai you san ge keneng zuoxiang” [A peace window has opened: there are three possible directions for the future of “Winter Olympics diplomacy], Peng Pai, February 13, 2018, <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1592257565045759349&wfr=spider&for=pc>.

9 Tucker Huggins, “Here Are All the Twists and Turns in Trump’s North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy,” CNBC, June 1, 2018; “Full Text of Trump–Kim Signed Statement,” CNN, June 12, 2018, <www.cnn.com/2018/06/12/politics/read-full-text-of-trump-kim-signed-statement/index.html>.

10 “Xinjiapo lishi xing huiwu, liuxia zhe si ge lishi xing de xuannian” [The historic Singapore meeting: these four points of historic concern remain], Xinhua: Niu tan qin, June 13, 2018, <http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20180613/16366793_0.shtml>.

11 As nuclear expert Jeffrey Lewis has noted, the term “denuclearize” is a fuzzy, ill-defined term understood differently by the United States and the DPRK. I use it in this article because “denuclearize” (无核化 or wu he hua) is the term used in Chinese sources. Jeffrey Lewis, “The Word that Could Help the World Avoid Nuclear War,” New York Times, April 4, 2018, <www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/opinion/avoid-nuclear-war-denuclearization.html>.

12 Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2013), pp. 50–51.

13 On Soviet assistance with North Korea’s nuclear program, see Georgiy Kaurov, “A Technical History of Soviet–North Korean Nuclear Relations” and Valery Denisov, “Nuclear Institutions and Organizations in North Korea,” in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 15–26; Balázs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko, “North Korea’s Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper 53, August 2006, p. 29.

14 Jae Ho Chung and Myung-hae Choi, “Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors?: Making Sense of China–North Korea Relations, 1949–2010,” Pacific Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2013), p. 254. For Deng’s broader efforts to promote regional stability, see John W. Garver. China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 286–314, 349–82, 401–60.

15 Chung and Choi, “Uncertain Allies,” pp. 254–55.

16 Che-po Chan and Brian Bridges, “Divergence and Diversity: Changing Chinese Perceptions of North Korea under Kim Jong-un,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 27, No. 109 (2018), p. 26.

17 Hochul Lee, “China in the North Korean Nuclear Crises: ‘Interest’ and ‘Identity’ in Foreign Behavior,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, No. 80 (2013), p. 321; “The U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 21, 1994, <http://media.nti.org/pdfs/aptagframe.pdf>.

18 Hochul Lee, “China in the North Korean Nuclear Crises: ‘Interest’ and ‘Identity’ in Foreign Behavior,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, No. 80 (2013), p. 321.

19 Michele Acuto, “Not Quite the Dragon: A ‘Chinese’ View on the Six Party Talks, 2002–8,” International History Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2012), pp. 3–4; George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” White House, 2002, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

20 Zhu Feng, “Flawed Mediation and a Compelling Mission: Chinese Diplomacy in the Six-Party Talks to Denuclearise North Korea,” East Asia, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2011), pp. 192, 200.

21 Acuto, “Not Quite the Dragon,” 4.

22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” Beijing, September 19, 2005, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm>.

23 US Department of Treasury, “Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act,” September 15, 2005, </www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2720.aspx>; Lee, “China in the North Korean Nuclear Crises,” pp. 321–22.

24 Leif-Eric Easley and In Young Park, “China’s Norms in Its Near Abroad: Understanding Beijing’s North Korea Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, No. 101 (2016), p. 661.

25 The quote is from this source: “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” February 13 2007, US Department of State Archive, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm>. Also see Joshua Pollack, “Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Reviewing the Precedents,” June 10, 2018, Arms Control Wonk, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1205354/denuclearization-of-the-korean-peninsula-reviewing-the-precedents/>.

26 Cheng Qian and Xiaohui Wu, “The Art of China’s Mediation during the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2009), p. 83.

27 UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,” Arms Control Association, January 2018, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

28 “2017 nian 9 yue 27 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Lu Kang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang held a routine press briefing on September 27, 2017], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, September 27, 2017, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1497487.shtml>.

29 “Ganggang, Chaoxian qiaoqiaogengxin le yi pian pilun Zhongguo de wenzhang” [Just now, North Korea quietly updated an article criticizing China], Xinhua, May 3, 2017, <http://src.kunlunce.com/ssjj/guojipinglun/2017-05-07/115744.html>.

30 “Pingchang dongyun heping chuangkou yi kaiqi, ‘dongyun waijiao’ wailai you san ge keneng zuoxiang.”

31 “Miandui Chaoxian bandao jushi, fanzhan ye xu beizhan.”

32 “Sheping: Zhongguo shi bandai pangbian de dashan, er fei daocao duo” [Editorial: China is a mountain next to the peninsula, not a straw raft], Huanqiu shibao, May 2, 2018, <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2018-05/11958863.html?agt=15422>.

33 Chan and Bridges, “Divergence and Diversity,” p. 18.

34 “Meiguo rang Chaoxian fuzhi yuenan moshi keneng ma?” [Is it possible that the United States will let North Korea replicate the Vietnamese model?” Renmin ribao, July 9, 2018, <http://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1605530195218011460&wfr=spider&for=pc>.

35 Renmin ribao qiangguo luntan [The People's Daily Great Power Forum], September 28, 2017, <http://bbs1.people.com.cn/>.

36 Chris Buckley, “Excerpts from a Chinese Historian’s Speech on North Korea,” New York Times, April 18, 2017, <www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/asia/north-korea-south-china-shen-zhihua.html>.

37 “Sensitive Words: Fatty Kim Jong Un visits Beijing,” China Digital Times, March 28, 2018, <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/03/sensitive-words-fatty-kim-jong-un-visits-beijing/>.

38 Author’s interviews in China, June 13 and 18, 2018.

39 Author’s interviews in China, June 13, 15, and 18, 2018.

40 Deng Yuwen, “Guanyu Chaoxian de wu ge cuowu kanfa” [Five wrong views about North Korea], FT Zhongwen Wang, June 20, 2017, <www.ftchinese.com/story/001073077?full=y&archive>.

41 Renmin ribao qiangguo luntan [The People's Daily Great Power Forum].

42 United Nations, “Security Council Tightens Sanctions on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2397,” December 22, 2017, <www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13141.doc.htm>.

43 “Yuyan Chaoxian bengkui, keneng wei shishang zao” [Predicting North Korea’s collapse: maybe it is too early], Renmin ribao, February 18, 2017, <http://news.youth.cn/gj/201702/t20170219_9137335.htm>.

44 Author’s interview in China, June 13, 2018. The quote from Secretary of State Tillerson is from this source: “China Welcomes U.S. Seeking Dialogue with North Korea,” August 2, 2017, Reuters, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-northkorea-missiles-china-idUKKBN1AJ0JS>.

45 For a short statement of Xi Jinping’s views on the correct path for Chinese foreign policy, see “Xi Jinping: Nuli kaichuang nuli Zhongguo tese daguo waijiao xin jumian” [Make great efforts to create a new phase of great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics], Xinhua, June 23, 2018, <www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-06/23/c_1123025806.htm>. For a longer statement, read Xi Jinping, On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2019).

46 “Mei Chao shounao yueding huimian: Zhongguo zenme kan?” [American and North Korean leaders agree to meet: what does China think?] Nanfang Chuang, May 23, 2018, <www.nfcmag.com/article/8095.html>.

47 The quotes are from “Chaoxian xuanbu zhongzhi hedao shiyan: bandao jushi zhuanyuan zai tianjia hao” [North Korea announces the suspension of nuclear missile testing: the situation on the Korean peninsula has changed for the better], Chongqing ribao, April 21, 2018, <http://news.ifeng.com/a/20180422/57778613_0.shtml>. “Chaoxian xuanbu “wanshan guojia he liliang de lishi daye jintian wancheng” [North Korea announces that it has “realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force”], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, November 29, 2017, <http://news.cyol.com/content/2017-11/29/content_16732307.htm>. Author’s interviews in China, June 13, 15, and 18, 2018.

48 “Chaoxian zuigao lingdaoren Jin Zheng’en huijian Wang Yi” [ North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un met with Wang Yi], Xinhua, May 3, 2018 <www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-05/03/c_1122779585.htm>.

49 “Chaoxian, xia yi ge touzi retu?” [Is North Korea the next investment hotspot?], Jiefang ribao, June 12, 2018, <www.jfdaily.com/news/detail?id=92805>.

50 “Xi Jinping tong Jin Zheng’en juxing huitan” [Xi Jinping held talks with Kim Jong Un], Xinhua, March 29, 2018, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2018/0329/c64094-29895168.html>.

51 The quote is from “Xin Jinping tong Chaoxian laodong dang weiyuanzhang Jin Zheng’en zai Dalian juxing huiwu” [Xi Jinping met with the Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong Un], Renmin ribao, May 9, 2018, <www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2018-05/08/c_1122802575.htm>. On Kim’s other visits to Beijing, see Chinese Foreign Ministry, “Waijiaobu jiu Jin Zheng’en dui Zhongguo jinxing fangwen deng da jizhe wen” [The Foreign Ministry answered questions about Kim Jong Un’s visit to China], June 19, 2018, <www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-06/19/content_5299749.htm>; James Griffith and Yong Xiong, “China Hosts Surprise Visit by Kim Jong Un amid US Tensions,” CNN, January 8, 2019, <www.cnn.com/2019/01/07/china/kim-jong-un-visit-china-intl/index.html>.

52 “As Kim Ends Beijing Visit, China and North Korea Craft New Messages,” New York Times, June 20, 2018, <www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/world/asia/china-north-korea-kim-visit.html>.

53 Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences,” International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 1, (1984), pp. 8–16.

54 On the century of humiliation, see Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). On Xi Jinping’s advocacy of China as a supporter of Asian peace and prosperity, see Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu, Xin Jinping xin shidai Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang xuexi gangyao [A study outline of Xi Jinping’s thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era] (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 2019), pp. 208–21.

55 “Mei dui Chao ‘shuangchong zitai’ yin guoji piping zhuanjia: shifang shanyi, Meiguo xianran zou de by gou” [American “double standards” towards North Korea have elicited international criticism from experts: show good will. The United States is clearly not doing enough], Huanqiu shibao, June 25, 2018, <http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2018-06/12336472.html>. Lu Chao is widely cited in China as an expert on North Korean affairs. He regularly consults for the Liaoning provincial government about North Korean issues and often speaks to police and troop deployments in China’s northeast.

56 The China Institute of Contemporary International Relations is under the authority of the Ministry of State Security. “2017 nian 5 yue 18 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Lu Kang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang held a press briefing on May 18, 2017], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, May 18, 2018, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1560574.shtml>.

57 “Telangpu chengnuo bu zai chaoxian fuzhi ‘libiya moshi’” [Trump promises to not duplicate the “Libya model” in North Korea],” Xin Beijing bao, May 19, 2018, <http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20180519/16294911_0.shtml>.

58 Author’s interviews in China, June 11–18, 2018; Fei Su, “China’s Potential Role as Security Guarantor for North Korea,” 38 North, <www.38north.org/2018/10/fsu102418/>.

59 Author’s interviews in China, June 11–18, 2018.

60 “Shen Dingli: Bu renwei Chaoxian you qihe keneng” [Shen Dingli doesn’t think North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons], Xinlang junshi, December 16, 2017, <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2017-12-16/doc-ifyptfcn1146035.shtml>. Shen Dingli is a prominent Chinese scholar of international relations who is frequently cited by the Chinese press.

61 Author’s interviews in China, June 11, 13, 15, 18, 2018.

62 Author’s interview in China, June 15, 2018; “Telangpu he Jin Zheng’en jiang yao huiwu: Chaoxian qihe huo zui nan dacheng gongshi” [Trump and Kim Jong Un will meet: North Korea abandoning nuclear weapons will be the most difficult consensus to reach], Wangyi xinwen, June 11, 2018, <http://news.163.com/18/0611/08/DK0NKVQ20001875O.html>. Wang Fan is a well-known Chinese scholar of international relations. His institutional home—the Beijing Foreign Studies University—produces many graduates who go on to work in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

63 Author’s interview in China, June 15, 2018; “Jinte hui haowu zhangzhao xia turan jieshu you he jixing?” [The Kim–Trump meeting suddenly ended without warning. For what hidden reason?], Xinhua, March 5, 2019, <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1626756128190976219&wfr=spider&for=pc>.

64 Author’s interviews in China, June 13, 15, and 18, 2018.

65 “2018 nian 8 yue 20 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Lu Kang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang held a routine press briefing on August 20, 2018], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, August 22, 2018, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1587320.shtml>.

66 Author’s interviews in China, June 13, 14, 15, 2018. For an earlier statement of this view, see Zhu, “Flawed Mediation and a Compelling Mission,” p. 198.

67 “2018 nian 8 yue 20 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Geng Shuang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang held a routine press briefing on August 20, 2018], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, June 12, 2018. <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1568094.shtml>.

68 “San ge yue, zui gao lingdao ren san ci fanghua, zhe ge zhoujia zhede yao jubian le me? Chaoxian jingji xianzhuang, qushi, yiji kunnan” [In three months, the Supreme Leader had visited three times. Is this country really going to undergo a major change? North Korea’s economic conditions, current situation, and predicament], Pangoal, June 19, 2018, <http://m.sohu.com/a/236669721_117959>.

69 Ibid.

70 Author’s interview in China, June 13, 2018.

71 “Telangpu he Jin Zheng’en jiang yao huiwu.”

72 Author’s interviews in China, June 15, 2018.

73 Michael R. Gordon and Jessica Donati, “U.S. Seeks ‘Major Disarmament’ of North Korea During Trump’s Term,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2018, <www.wsj.com/articles/trump-suggests-singapore-summit-ended-north-korea-nuclear-threat-1528895717?mod=article_inline>.

74 “Trump Steps into North Korea and Agrees with Kim Jong-un to Resume Talks,” June 30, 2019, New York Times, <www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/world/asia/trump-north-korea-dmz.html>;“Di er ci ‘Jinte hui’ meiyou dacheng xieyi” [The second “Kim–Trump meeting” did not arrive at an agreement], Renmin ribao, February 28, 2019, <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1626711984912866260&wfr=spider&for=pc> .

75 The quotes are from “Meiguo zai chaoxian wenti shang zheme jiaozao shi zhen ji le ma?” [Is American impatience with the North Korean issue real or not?], Xinlang xinwen, August 29, 2018, <https://news.sina.com.cn/w/2018-08-29/doc-ihikcahf5046265.shtml>. For a similar viewpoint, see “Chaoxian qianze Meiguo ‘tiaoxin’ Mei Chao reng xu goujian huxin,” Xinhua, December 17, 2018, <www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-12/17/c_1123866457.htm>. The National Institute of International Strategy advises the CCP on policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

76 “2019 nian 3 yue 7 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Lu Kang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang held a routine press briefing on March 7, 2019], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, March 7, 2019, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1643678.shtml>.

77 “Meiguo zai chaoxian wenti shang zheme jiaozao shi zhen ji le ma?”

78 “2018 nian 8 yue 20 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Lu Kang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui [Foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang held a routine press briefing on August 20, 2018],” Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, August 20, 2018, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1586521.shtml>.

79 Li Gaozhe, “Chao Han shounao huiwu liangdian jiexi” [Analysis of the highlights of the DPRK–ROK summit], Zhongguo guofang bao, September 21, 2018, <www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2018-09/21/content_216377.htm>.

80 “Chuai dian renminbi dao Chaoxian jiu shi dakuan? Zhe xie shuju rang ni jingdai” [Is big money going to North Korea? These data will stupefy you], Xinlang xinwen zhongxin, September 19, 2018, <http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2018-09-19/doc-ihkhfqns8533279.shtml>.

81 Ibid.

82 Fudan University’s Korean Studies Center is financed by the Chinese and South Korean government along with private Chinese and South Korean foundations. It is known to be tasked with writing research reports for the CCP on Korean affairs.

83 Ibid.

84 “Zhongguo daibiao xiwang gefang xingcheng heli gongtong tuijin Chaoxian bandao heping jincheng” [The Chinese representative hopes that all parties will work together to advance the peace process on the Korean Peninsula], Xinhua, September 17, 2018, <www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-09/18/c_1123446789.htm>.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 “Jinte hui tang beng le? NO, ta liang dou shi gaoshou!” [Did the Kim–Trump meeting collapse? No, they are both master negotiators], Huanqiu shibao, February 28, 2019, <http://hqtime.huanqiu.com/article/a-XE2LSWCE06E281930A3672 >. The Northeast Asia Research Institute advises the Heilongjiang provincial government on affairs in Northeast Asia. Da Zhigang’s articles frequently appear in the Chinese press and offer commentary on recent events in Northeast Asia and provide policy suggestions to the Chinese government.

88 Ibid. For similar statements by Zheng Jiyong, see “Jinte hui haowu zhangzhao xia turan jieshu you he jixing?” For relevant Foreign Ministry statements, see “2019 nian 5 yue 20 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Lu Kang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang held a routine press briefing on May 20, 2019], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, May 20, 2019, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1664956.shtml>. “Waijiao bu: Chaoxian bandao wenti chuzai zhengzhi jiejue kuangjia zhi nei” [The Foreign Ministry: the Korean peninsula issue is still being resolved within a political framework], Fenghuang wang, June 12, 2019, <http://news.ifeng.com/c/7nS3XtuV8Qi>; “2019 nian 6 yue 18 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Lu Kang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang held a routine press briefing on June 18, 2019], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, June 18, 2019, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1673263.shtml>.

89 “Jinte hui tang beng le?”

90 Lee Jeong-ho, “Xi Jinping Calls for ‘Timely’ Easing of North Korea Sanctions after Trump–Kim MEETING,” South China Morning Post, July 2, 2019, <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3016981/beijing-reaffirms-support-gradual-easing-north-korea-sanctions>.

91 “Jinte hui tang beng le?” For the Foreign Ministry, see “2019 nian 5 yue 20 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Lu Kang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang Held a Routine Press Briefing on May 20, 2019], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, May 20, 2019, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1664956.shtml>.

92 “Xi Jinping tong Chaoxian laodong dang weiyuanzhang, guowu weiyuanzhang Jin Zheng’en huitan” [Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea and Chairman of the State Council], Xinhua, June 20, 2019, <www.xinhuanet.com/2019-06/20/c_1124650674.htm>.

93 Ibid.

94 “Waijiao bu jiu Xi Jinping dui Chaoxian jinxing guoshi fangwen deng dawen” [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Q&A on President Xi Jinping's State Visit to North Korea], Waijiao bu wang, June 18, 2019, <www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-06/18/content_5401390.htm>.

95 “A Tillerson Slip Offers a Peek into Secret Planning on North Korea,” New York Times, December 17, 2017, <www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/us/politics/tillerson-north-korea-china.html>; “Miandui Chaoxian bandao jushi, fanzhan ye xu beizhan”; “Pingchang dongyun heping chuangkou yi kaiqi, ‘dongyun waijiao’ wailai you san ge keneng zuoxiang.”

96 “2019 nian 5 yue 10 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Geng Shuang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang held a routine press briefing on May 10, 2019], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, May 10, 2019, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1662400.shtml>.