“The major prize”: apartheid South Africa’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1988–91

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the final years of South Africa’s nuclear-weapon program, particularly on the decision-making process leading up to the signature of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the South African government in 1991. In August 1988, after two decades of defiance, negotiations between the apartheid government and the NPT depository powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) ensued at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Despite South Africa being the only state to give up its indigenously developed nuclear weapons and subsequently join the nonproliferation regime, little is known about how the national position on NPT accession and IAEA safeguards evolved. Research carried out in multiple archives using hitherto untapped primary sources and interviews with key actors from several countries show how domestic and regional political dynamics influenced Pretoria’s position on entering the nonproliferation regime. In the process, the F.W. de Klerk government managed to skillfully exploit international proliferation fears to advance its own agenda, thereby connecting South African NPT accession with that of the neighboring Frontline States coalition of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

KEYWORDS:

• South Africa
• nonproliferation
• apartheid
• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• International Atomic Energy Agency
• safeguards

Acknowledgements

The research for this paper greatly benefitted from funding provided by the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project and the O’Donnell Grant of the Bush School of Government & Public Service at Texas A&M University. The author also wishes to thank the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation in Berlin for its continous support throughout this PhD project. In addition, I am indebted to John Siko, Nemata Blyden, and James Hershberg for detailed comments on an earlier draft, as well as to the participants of the 14th International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War in May 2019, hosted by the Elliot School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. Lastly, I wish to extend my gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers and my supervisors Anna-Mart van Wyk (Johannesburg) and Ulf Engel (Leipzig) for a helpful balance of encouragement and freedom.

Notes

1 In the documents consulted for this article as well as in the interviews conducted, “signature” and “accession” to the NPT were used interchangeably.

2 Notable scholars in this regard are Anna-Mart van Wyk, Ori Rabinowitz, and Jo-Ansie van Wyk, whose works will be referred to throughout this paper.

3 Jo-Ansie van Wyk, “Atoms, Apartheid, and the Agency: South Africa’s Relations with the IAEA, 1957–1995,” Cold War History, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2014), pp. 409–10.

4 The governments of the remaining FLS were not lobbied—Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho—because they had already signed the NPT in the late 1960s or early 1970s after the treaty opened for signature.

5 A.R. Newby-Fraser, Chain Reaction: Twenty Years of Nuclear Research and Development in South Africa (Pretoria: Atomic Energy Board, 1979), pp. 20–29; Robert Jaster, “Politics and the ‘Afrikaner Bomb’,” Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1984), pp. 826–27.

6 Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (1995–96), p. 3.

7 Ibid., p. 6.

8 The South Africans had drilled two test shafts with depths of 216 and 385 meters, respectively, at a site called Vastrap near Upington, with the aim of testing a nuclear device in August 1977. However, because at that point the Y-Plant at Valindaba had not produced enough weapons-grade material, the scientists decided to conduct a “cold test” with an identical explosive device. Instead of an HEU core, depleted or natural uranium was used. Frank V. Pabian, “The South African Denuclearization Exemplar,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2015), p. 36.

9 Van Wyk, “Atoms, Apartheid, and the Agency,” pp. 400, 405.

10 Papers from the Carter presidency show that South African officials repeatedly stressed that they first needed to learn more about the technicalities of IAEA safeguards before they could be applied at the Y-Plant, whereas their US counterparts emphasized that NPT signature as well as IAEA safeguards were a sine qua non for any future mutual nuclear cooperation. See, e.g., Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa and the White House, September 13, 1977, FRUS: 1977–80, 16:307; Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State, February 21, 1978, FRUS, 1977-1980, 16:332; Memorandum from the Ambassador at Large (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), July 7, 1978, FRUS 1977–80, 16:344.

11 In 1981, South African Foreign Minister R.F. “Pik” Botha reassured US President Ronald Reagan that South Africa would inform the United States in advance of any nuclear-weapon test. See Or Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and Its Cold War Deals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 120–22.

12 “Overview of Discussions with the IAEA on International Nuclear Safeguards on the Semi-commercial Enrichment Plant,” November 13, 1985, PV203, File: PS 6/13/3, Archive of Contemporary Affairs, Bloemfontein (hereafter, “ARCA”).

13 Herbert Beukes, South African Ambassador to the US (1985–87), interview with author, February 27, 2018.

14 Jaster, “Politics and the ‘Afrikaner Bomb’,” p. 829.

15 “Overview of Discussions with the IAEA on International Nuclear Safeguards on the Semi-Commercial Enrichment Plant,” November 13, 1985, PV203, File: PS 6/13/3, ARCA. The documents consulted did not mention any South African concerns that IAEA inspectors might discover a stockpile of HEU, which was produced in the Y-Plant. They had no intention to allow safeguards at this enrichment plant in the mid-1980s, and talks to this end with the IAEA hardly took place at that time.

16 Documents consulted for this research did not discuss these secret channels, which exceed this article’s scope. However, additional documents obtained by the author will be analyzed in future research.

17 Nic von Wielligh and Lydia von Wielligh-Steyn, The Bomb: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme (Pretoria: Litera, 2015), pp. 174, pp. 480–83.

18 Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow, “The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976–1990,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 240–41.

19 Hannes Steyn and Richardt van der Walt with Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network, 2003), pp. 97–99.

20 Roger Pfister, Apartheid South Africa and African States: From Pariah to Middle Power, 1961–1994 (London: Tauris, 2005), pp. 15, 108, 146.

21 For a detailed discussion of the rise and fall of the securocrats under P.W. Botha, see Chris Alden, Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1996).

22 Statement issued by the South African State President to the General Conference of the IAEA, GC (XXXI)/819, September 23, 1987. See also van Wyk, “Sunset over Atomic Apartheid.”

23 Anna-Mart van Wyk, “Sunset over Atomic Apartheid: United States-South African Nuclear Relations, 1981–1993,” Cold War History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2010), pp. 62–63.

24 “Non-Proliferation Treaty: Talks between Depositary Powers and South Africa,” August 13, 1988, Telno 131 (FCO to Pretoria), File: MNP 083/9 Part A, Foreign & Commonwealth Archive, London (hereafter, “FCO”).

25 “South Africa and the NPT,” June 17, 1988, Teleletter (Pretoria to FCO), File: MNP 083/9 Part A, FCO.

26 “A Balanced Approach to the NPT: ARMSCOR/AEC Concerns Viewed from a DFA Standpoint,” September 1, 1988, Department of International Relations and Cooperation Archive, Pretoria (hereafter, “DIRCO”), obtained by Anna-Mart van Wyk.

27 “Basic Working Document for Discussion with Outside Parties,” August 29, 1988, File 137/18, DIRCO.

28 Ambassador Dr Piet Koornhof to Errol de Montille, senior official in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Multilateral Division, “Discussion with Crocker on the NPT,” September 22, 1988, File: 137/18, DIRCO.

29 “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” October 28, 1988, PV 203 (unindexed collection), ARCA.

30 Roland Timerbaev played a crucial role in the process of getting the South Africans back into negotiations. Despite the absence of direct diplomatic relations between Moscow and Pretoria during that time, he invited the South Africans to the Soviet Mission in Vienna for the first time (Roland Timerbaev, Soviet representative to the IAEA, interview with author, April 3, 2017).

31 “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” October 28, 1988, PV 203 (unindexed collection), ARCA.

32 Herman Giliomee, The Last Afrikaner Leaders: A Supreme Test of Power (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2012), p. 280; Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotzé, “De Klerk: A Political Leadership Study,” Politikon, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1991), p. 37.

33 “South Africa and the NPT,” February 28, 1989, Telno 95 (Cape Town to FCO), File: SEE 083/1 Part A, FCO.

34 “South Africa and the NPT,” June 12, 1989, Telno 1620 (Washington to FCO), File: SEE 083/1 Part B, FCO.

35 Errol de Montille, senior official in the South African DFA (Multilateral Division), interview with author, January 29, 2017.

36 “South Africa and the NPT,” June 5, 1989, Telno 351 (Cape Town to FCO), File: SEE 083/1 Part B, FCO.

37 R.F. “Pik” Botha, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, interview with Sue Onslow (Commonwealth Oral History Project), December 13, 2012.

38 F.W. De Klerk, The Last Trek—a New Beginning: The Autobiography (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 274.

39 F.W. de Klerk, South African president (1989–94), interview with author, February 20, 2017.

40 David Albright, Report: South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons (Washington: Institute for Science and International Security, 1994). The Z-Plant still continued to operate and was needed for the production of fuel for the Koeberg reactors until March 1995, when it was closed down (von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn, “The Bomb,” p. 204).

41 “Main Points Arising from Luncheon on 14 November 1989 with Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC),” November 17, 1989, DIRCO, obtained by Anna-Mart van Wyk.

42 Ibid.

43 Saunders and Onslow, “The Cold War and Southern Africa,” p. 241.

44 Van Wyk, “Atoms, Apartheid, and the Agency,” p. 409.

45 “Record of a Meeting between South Africa and the NPT Depositary Powers,” December 11, 1989, File: See 083/1 Part D, FCO.

46 Ibid.

47 “South Africa and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” January 23, 1990, Telno 10 (Cape Town to FCO), File: See 083/1 Part A, FCO.

48 “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: South Africa,” Letter from Mr. Goulden to Mr. Waldegrave, December 13, 1989, File: JSS 083/1 Part D, FCO.

49 The South African Cabinet at that time consisted only of NP politicians.

50 Geldenhuys and Kotzé, “De Klerk,” pp. 28, 33.

51 Ibid., pp. 26–27.

52 Giliomee, The Last Afrikaner Leaders, pp. 268, 295.

53 Ibid., pp. 287–88.

54 Geldenhuys and Kotzé, “De Klerk,” pp. 28, 39; also: Koos van der Merwe, leading member of the CP, interview with author, July 4, 2019.

55 “CIA Directorate of Intelligence: South Africa: De Klerk’s Negotiations with Black Leaders,” April 4, 1990, National Security Council, File: John M. Ordway, Bush Presidential Library, College Station (hereafter, “BPL”).

56 “Official Working Visit of South African President F.W. De Klerk,” September 20, 1990, Memorandum for the President from Secretary of State James Baker, File: South Africa 10255 September 1990, De Klerk Visit to the US, Incoming FOIA, FLS/SA, Box: No. 7, National Security Archive, Washington.

57 Nic von Wielligh, “A Brief Overview of the Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices in South Africa,” unpublished paper, 1993, pp. 6–7. This document was supplied by Dr. Johann Viljoen, February 19, 2018.

58 “Netherland Demarche: RSA Accession to NPT,” August 9, 1990 (Shardelow to Naude Steyn), File: 137/18, DIRCO.

59 “Non-Proliferation Treaty: Position of the South African Government on the Question of Accession to the NPT and Related Matters,” March 12, 1990 (Director-General to Ambassador Cécile Schmidt, Vienna), DIRCO.

60 “South Africa and the NPT,” March 14, 1990, Telno 590 (Washington to FCO), File: See 083/1 Part C, FCO; “South Africa and the NPT,” March 15, 1990, Telno 612 (Washington to FCO), File: See 083/1 Part D, FCO.

61 “South African Accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Mozambique Accession,” March 16, 1990, Telno 110 (FCO to Cape Town), File: JSS 083/1 Part A, FCO.

62 “South Africa and the NPT,” March 23, 1990, Telno 489 (Moscow to FCO), File: JSS 083/1 Part A, FCO.

63 “South Africa and the NPT,” March 27, 1990, Telno 235 (Cape Town to FCO). File: JSS 083/1 Part A, FCO.

64 “Depository Power Meeting with Representatives of the South African Government,” May 2 1990, File: See 083/1 Part F, FCO; see also Jo-Ansie van Wyk, “Apartheid South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme and Its Impact on Southern Africa,” Austral, Vol. 3, No. 6 (2014), pp. 134–35.

65 “Meeting between NPT Depositaries and South Africans,” May 3, 1990, Telno 88 (Geneva to FCO). File: See 083/1 Part C, FCO.

66 “Letter from the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia),” June 29, 1990, File: See 083/1 Part C, FCO.

67 David Albright and Tom Zamora, “South Africa Flirts with the NPT,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1991), p. 27.

68 A few years later, the South Africans acceded to the Missile Technology Control Regime following pressure from US officials. In the process, they had to terminate their ambitious research project on launching satellites into orbit, which members of the defense community regret to this day (Hannes Steyn, ARMSCOR senior manager responsible for the dismantlement programme of the nuclear weapons, interview with author, March 4, 2018).

69 Niel Barnard, former head of NIS, interview with author, February 21, 2017. Former Defence Minister Magnus Malan held similar views. See Magnus Malan, My Life with the SA Defence Force (Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2006), pp. 218–19.

70 Hannes Steyn, interview with author, March 4, 2018.

71 Chris Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004), pp. 64–84.

72 “From the Prime Minister to the President,” June 28, 1989, National Security Council, File: David Passage, BPL.

73 “Meeting with South African President De Klerk,” September 24, 1990, Memorandum to the President on the De Klerk visit from Davidoff to Secretary Baker, File: South Africa 10255 September 1990, De Klerk Visit to the US, Incoming FOIA, FLS/SA, Box: No. 7, National Security Archive.

74 “South Africa’s Position with Regard to: (a) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and (b) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),” February 22, 1991 (prepared by Naude Steyn), File: 137/18, DIRCO. Although Angolan President dos Santos had earlier signalled an openness to NPT signature, he did not at this time indicate that his government would sign in the near future.

75 “Prime Minister’s Working Dinner for President De Klerk,” April 22, 1991, File: NPF 083/1 Part A, FCO.

76 “South Africa and the NPT,” Telno 77, June 12, 1991 (Vienna to FCO), File: NPF 083/1 Part B, FCO.

77 “South Africa and the NPT,” June 27, 1991, Telno 097 (Pretoria to FCO), File: NPF 083/1 Part B, FCO; Anna-Mart van Wyk, “Apartheid Atomic Bombs: Cold War Perspectives,” South African Historical Journal, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2010), p. 117.

78 “Statement by State President FW De Klerk: RSA Accession to NPT,” June 27, 1991, File: 137/18, DIRCO.

79 “South Africa and the NPT,” July 17, 1989, Teleletter (Pretoria to FCO), File: No. SEE 083/1 Part B, FCO.