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ABSTRACT
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) faces challenges in fulfilling its safeguards mandate as a result of an expanding safeguards burden and a relatively static budget. This dilemma has been exacerbated by the additional burdens of implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Iran, but would not go away if implementation of the JCPOA were to end. There are three main areas of opportunity for the Agency: (1) budgetary expansion tied to changes in staffing policies, (2) changes in safeguards approaches, and (3) technological innovation. Barriers and limitations are associated with each approach, and advancing any of them will face a difficult political environment in Vienna.
Notes
1 Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953, <www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech>.
2 For the debate on the effectiveness of safeguards and the relevance of this question to Israel’s decision, see Shai Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq—Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1982), <www.jstor.org/stable/2538435>; Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), <www.jstor.org/stable/41289690>.
3 Trevor Findlay, “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2012, <www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05248>.
4 Laura Rockwood, “Evaluation of the Impact of the Model Additional Protocol on Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements,” Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, January 2018, <https://vcdnp.org/vcdnp-report-on-the-impact-of-the-model-additional-protocol-from-a-state-perspective/>.
5 Laura Rockwood, Noah Mayhew, Artem Lazarev, and Mara Pfneisl, “IAEA Safeguards: Staying Ahead of the Game”, Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, 2019, <www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/contentassets/dbd8127f5cc44dadba96d4f20f6e530f/201914-iaea-safeguards-staying-ahead-of-the-game>.
6 Zero-real-growth budgets, i.e., ones that increase from year to year to account for inflation, but not for any other additional costs, have been the norm for the IAEA’s safeguards budget for decades. This budget practice has forced the IAEA to stay relatively compact in proportion to its mandate and has also had a negative impact on its ability to employ modern management and technical tools, as well as its overall infrastructure. For more information, see Trevor Findlay, “What Price Nuclear Governance? Funding the International Atomic Energy IAEA,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
7 IAEA, “Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols,” March 6, 2019, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/status-sg-agreements-comprehensive.pdf>.
8 India’s, Pakistan’s, and Israel’s agreements, based on INFCIRC/66, cover only the items specified in their respective agreements. See IAEA, “The Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968) (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2),”<www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1965/infcirc66r2.pdf>.
9 IAEA, “The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)),” <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1972/infcirc153.pdf>.
10 IAEA, “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected),” <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc540.pdf>.
11 For more information, see INFCIRC/193, the agreement between EU member states, Euratom, and the IAEA on the application of safeguards by Euratom: <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1973/infcirc193a30.pdf>.
12 See IAEA, “Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols,” <www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/svs22_web.pdf>.
13 INFCIRC/153-type agreements remain in force so long as the state concerned is a party to the NPT. As NPT states parties have not yet come to consensus on whether or not the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) followed the proper procedures in 2003 to withdraw from the treaty, its agreement with the IAEA is considered to be in force. Were NPT states parties to determine that the DPRK had successfully withdrawn from the treaty, its old item-specific safeguards agreements would once again take take legal effect.
14 The IAEA’s role in verifying the JCPOA goes over and above its standard safeguards mandate as set out in UNSCR 2231, UN Security Council, New York, July 20, 2015, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2231>.
15 For states in which only a CSA is in force, the IAEA is only able to determine whether or not there is indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material. For those states, and for those with APs in force whose evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material are ongoing, the IAEA is only able to conclude that all declared nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities.
16 This formulation is the formulation used by the IAEA in its safeguards conclusions.
17 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2003,” <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/es2003.pdf>.
18 IAEA, “IAEA Annual Report 2010, Safeguards,” IAEA, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/safeguards.pdf>.
19 Although a state’s broader conclusion must, as a matter of policy, be renewed each year, former diplomats in Vienna have indicated that, as a practical matter, once a broader conclusion is granted, it is unlikely to be revoked. For more information, see K. Davenport, “IAEA Safeguards Agreements at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtoco>.
20 Yukiya Amano, “Challenges in Nuclear Verification,” statement delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, April 5, 2019, <www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/challenges-in-nuclear-verification>.
21 Data extracted from annual IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report Summaries, IAEA Annual Reports, 2010–17, <www.iaea.org/publications/reports>, and from the annual IAEA Safeguards Implementation Reports that were available in the public domain. As a statutory matter, inspections must be financed through the regular budget, not through voluntary contributions. This is meant to ensure the objective nature of safeguards activities.
22 IAEA, “International Status and Prospects for Nuclear Power 2017,” <www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC61/GC61InfDocuments/English/gc61inf-8_en.pdf>.
23 IEA, “Nuclear Power,” <www.iea.org/tcep/power/nuclearpower/>.
24 IAEA, “Power Reactor Information System,” <https://pris.iaea.org/pris/>.
25 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2018,” <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/06/statement-sir-2018.pdf>.
26 China has an AP in force, but the provisions of its AP apply almost exclusively to its trade with NNWS. See INFCIRC/369/Add.1, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1989/infcirc369a1.pdf>; L. Gil, “How China Has Become the World’s Fastest Expanding Nuclear Power Producer,” IAEA, October 25, 2017, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/how-china-has-become-the-worlds-fastest-expanding-nuclear-power-producer>.
27 Yukiya Amano, “Challenges in Nuclear Verification,” IAEA/Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 5, 2018, <www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/challenges-in-nuclear-verification>.
28 Trevor Findlay, “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA,” Centre for International Governance, January 1, 2012, <www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05248>.
29 For example, on its website, the IAEA states, “Regular fixed-term appointments are typically made for an initial three-year period. Based on programme requirements and work performance, the Agency may offer an extension for a period of two years, bringing the total service to five years. As a rule, five years constitute the normal period a staff member can expect to be employed by the IAEA.” IAEA, “Professional Staff,” <www.iaea.org/about/employment/professional-staff>.
30 The Protocol to the Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Safeguards in the United States (Treaty Doc 107-7), US Senate, 108th Congress, p. 46, <www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-108erpt12/html/CRPT-108erpt12.htm>.
31 While the budget had a real increase of 2.7 percent (not including the increase for inflation), Director General ElBaradei originally sought an 11 per cent increase. See P. Crail, “IAEA Budget Gets Modest Boost,” Arms Control Association, September 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_09/IAEAbudget>.
32 Statement of the Group of 77 and China during the IAEA Programme and Budget Committee Meeting, starting on May 6, 2019, delivered by HE Ambassador H.E. Omar Amer Youssef, Permanent Representative of Egypt, “Agenda Item 4: The Agency’s Draft Programme and Budget 2020–2021,” <www.g77.org/vienna/IAEAPBCMAY19.html>.
33 EU Statement on the Programme and Budget Committee, Statement on the occasion of the IAEA Board of Governors Vienna, June 12–16, 2017, <Agenda Item 4: Report of the Programme and Budget Committee,” <https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_statement_on_the_programme_and_budget_committee.pdf>.
34 Thomas Shea, “Financing IAEA Verification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2018), pp. 323–35, <www.npolicy.org/books/Falling_Behind/Ch11_Shea.pdf>.
35 IAEA, “Report to the Director General on the Forty-Fifth Series of SAGSI Meetings, 10–14 November 1997,” <https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/29/028/29028252.pdf?r=1&r=1>.
36 GC(46)/RES/12, <www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC46/GC46Resolutions/English/gc46res-12_en.pdf>.
37 Victor Bragin, John Carlson, and Russel Leslie, “Integrated Safeguards: Status and Trends,” Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700108436854≥.
38 Complementary access is a tool introduced in INFCIRC/540 and greatly expands the IAEA’s ability to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material or to resolve questions about the information provided by the state.
39 J. Cooley, “IAEA Development of Integrated Safeguards,” Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 2000.
40 J. Cooley, “Integrated Safeguards—Current Status of Development and Plans for Implementation,” IAEA-SM-36/3/01, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20files/Session%203/Paper%203-01.pdf>.
41 P. Barretto, “IAEA Technical Co-operation: Strengthening Technology Transfer,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1995), p. 12, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/vol37_1.pdf>.
42 For example, Hibbs notes, “In most cases, it takes the IAEA between four and ten years to reach a broader conclusion after a state concludes its AP.” M. Hibbs, “Arriving at an IAEA Broader Conclusion for Iran.” September 22, 2016, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/09/22/arriving-at-iaea-broader-conclusion-for-iran-pub-64665>.
43 The first “State-level integrated safeguards approach for a member state with an additional protocol in force” was prepared by 2000 and went into force in 2001. For more information, see <www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-board-reviews-record-safeguards-implementation>.
44 Laura Rockwood, “The IAEA’s State-Level Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences,” Arms Control Today, August 28, 2014, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_09/Features/The-IAEAs-State-Level-Concept-and-the-Law-of-Unintended-Consequences>.
45 Ibid.
46 Quoted from an oral report of a meeting of the Committee of the Whole, the main committee of the General Conference. During this meeting, the Russian delegation also expressed the view that states were being “asked to accept measures not covered by the safeguards agreements to which they were parties or by their national legal frameworks.” GC(56)/COM.5/OR.4, <www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/GC56Com5Records/English/gc56com5or-4_en.pdf>.
47 According to an author interview with former diplomats and former IAEA staff who participated in discussions of the SLC in the Board of Governors in 2012.
48 GOV/2013/38; GOV/2014/41.
49 GOV/2018/20.
50 This is the authors’ impression based on interactions with many diplomats and officials in Vienna in recent years.
51 For more on this, see Mark Hibbs, “IAEA Safeguards Development and Russia's National Interest,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 22, 2014, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/11/22/iaea-safeguards-development-and-russia-s-national-interest-pub-57429>.
52 During the General Conference, member states negotiate and pass resolutions meant to direct the work of the IAEA in the coming year. One of those resulutions is always dedicated to the safeguards system and is traditionally tabled by the European Union. In 2018, Russia tabled a safeguards resolution nearly identical to the one tabled by the European Union. The primary difference was the operative paragraph that would suspend development of new SLAs, except in cases when the state explicitly requested such development. This language was not included in the final resolution.
53 GC(62)/COM.5/OR.2, <www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC62/GC62Com5Records/English/gc62com5or-2_en.pdf>.
54 GC(62)/RES/10, paragraph 30, <www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC62/GC62Resolutions/English/gc62res-10_en.pdf>.
55 Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Ambassador-at-Large, Grigory Berdennikov, at the Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People, October 20–24, 2014, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/berdennikov.pdf>.
56 Y. Amano, “Challenges in Nuclear Verification,” IAEA/Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 5, 2018, <www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/challenges-in-nuclear-verification>.
57 B. Netanyahu, “What Iran Hides, Israel Will Find,” Times of Israel, September 27, 2018, <www.timesofisrael.com/what-iran-hides-israel-will-find-full-text-of-netanyahus-un-speech/>.
58 The IAEA has undertaken a careful forensic examination of the material and at least one of the alleged sites. The agency has had to proceed with this analysis while also under intense diplomatic pressure from the United States and Israel to find Iran in non-compliance.
59 J. Cooley, “Environmental Sampling,” IAEA, <https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/30/050/30050977.pdf>.
60 The IAEA’s plans for this were described at a session of the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards in 2018.
61 Safeguards-relevant information is broadly defined as including “declarations and reports submitted by states, data generated from its own verification activities in the field and at Headquarters, and other safeguards-relevant information available to it.” See GC(62)/8, <www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC62/GC62Documents/English/gc62-8_en.pdf>.
62 IAEA, “The Modernization of Safeguards Information Technology: Completing the Picture,” 2016, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/01/mosaic.pdf>.
63 G. Dupuy, Y. Feldman, J. Reed, and Z. Gastelum. “Enhancing the Use of Multimedia Information for IAEA Safeguards Analysis,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, <https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/886580.pdf>.
64 The CAP platform was demonstrated at the IAEA 2018 safeguards symposium, which the authors attended. Background on the agency’s work on this topic can be found in J. Crowley, D. Gagne, D. Calle, J. Murray, R. Kirkgoeze, and F. Moser, “Computational Methods for Physical Model Information Management: Opening the Aperture,” <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/123a/7291a7de58b94e9a77fdc2a485b0313d30cb.pdf>. The physical model was developed during Programme 93+2 to “attempt to identify, describe and characterize various components of the nuclear fuel cycle, providing a technical tool to aid enhanced information analysis.” For more information, see “Development of the Phyical Model” <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20files/Session%2013/Paper%2013-07.pdf>.
65 OSIS 2.0 was demonstrated at the IAEA 2018 safeguards symposium, which one of the authors attended. Background on OSIS can be found in T. Skoeld, “OSIS 2.0: Optimising Analyst-Driven Automation of Open Source Information Collection and Processing for Safeguards State Evaluation.”
66 Thomas Skoeld, Fabrice Courbon, and Katie Spence, “OSIS 2.0: Optimizing Analyst-Driven Automation of Open Source Information Collection and Processing,” presentation delivered at “Building Future Safeguards Capabilities,” the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards November 6, 2018, <https://conferences.iaea.org/indico/event/150/contributions/5376/contribution.pdf>.
67 Authors’ interviews and discussions with IAEA officials.