India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.

KEYWORDS:

• India
• deterrence
• no-first-use
• nuclear revolution
• flexible response
• South Asia

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Sumit Ganguly for organizing this special issue, and David Cooper, Timothy Hoyt, S. Paul Kapur, Rhianna Kreger, and the anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments in improving draft versions of this article.

ORCID

Frank O’Donnell http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7832-1697

Notes

1 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 45.

2 The 1969 Sino-Soviet border war formed the first example. See Michael S. Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969 (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010). The existing scholarship does recognize that the 1999 Kargil War and the 1969 Sino-Russian War were qualitatively different from other crises/incidents between nuclear-armed rivals. See, for example, Abhijnan Rej, “S(c)helling in Kashmir: Bargaining under the Nuclear Shadow,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2019), p. 179; Sumit Ganguly, “Why the India–Pakistan Crisis Isn’t Likely to Turn Nuclear: History Shows Escalation Isn’t Inevitable,” Foreign Affairs, March 5, 2019, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-03-05/why-india-pakistan-crisis-isnt-likely-turn-nuclear>; Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, p. 4.

3 Moeed W. Yusuf, “The Pulwama Crisis: Flirting with War in a Nuclear Environment,” Arms Control Today, May 2019, <www.armscontrol.org/print/10553>.

4 Rej, “S(c)helling in Kashmir,” pp. 163–64; V.P. Malik, India’s Military Conflicts and Diplomacy: An Inside View of Decision Making (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2015), Kindle LOC 1723–98; Jaswant Singh, In Service of Emergent India: A Call to Honor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), pp. 172, 194.

5 Gaurav Kampani, “Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes? Data, Interpretation, and Fact,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, Nos. 3–4 (2014), p. 389; Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), pp. 94–96.

6 Vishnu Som, “India Deployed Nuclear Missile-Armed Submarine During Standoff with Pak,” NDTV, March 18, 2019, <www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-deployed-nuclear-missile-armed-submarine-during-standoff-with-pakistan-2009178>. For Indian SSBN readiness protocols, see Yogesh Joshi, “Angles and Dangles: Arihant and the Dilemmas of India’s Undersea Nuclear Weapons,” War on the Rocks, January 14, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/angles-and-dangles-arihant-and-the-dilemma-of-indias-undersea-nuclear-weapons/>.

7 Vipin Narang, “Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2013), pp. 148–49.

8 Ankit Panda, “Pakistan Conducts Second Test of Babur-3 Nuclear-Capable Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile,” The Diplomat, April 1, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/pakistan-conducts-second-test-of-babur-3-nuclear-capable-submarine-launched-cruise-missile/>.

9 Ajit K. Dubey, “Post-Balakot, Indian Navy Hunted for Pakistani Submarine for 21 Days,” LiveMint, June 23, 2019, <www.livemint.com/news/india/post-balakot-indian-navy-hunted-for-pakistani-submarine-for-21-days-1561290682819.html>.

10 For the classic study developing and exploring this model of escalation, see Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

11 Shishir Gupta, “India, Pakistan Came Close to Firing Missiles at Each Other on February 27,” Hindustan Times, March 23, 2019, <www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-pakistan-came-close-to-firing-missiles-at-each-other-on-february-27/story-rVsBjZ5qmxXMprktzDNqcM.html>.

12 Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter, and Roger Cliff, Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), p. xiii.

13 Gupta, “India, Pakistan Came Close to Firing Missiles.”

14 These prominently include the 2001–02 “Twin Peaks” crisis, 2008 Mumbai attacks, and 2016 Uri attack/surgical-strike episode. For background on these incidents, see Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016); Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India–Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015).

15 Karthika Sasikumar, “India's Emergence as a ‘Responsible’ Nuclear Power,” International Journal, Vol. 62, No. 4 (2007), p. 829.

16 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia: Implications on Strategic Stability,” in Feroz Hassan Khan, Ryan Jacobs, and Emily Burke, eds., Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade (Monterey, CA: US Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), p. 130, <https://my.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/Nuclear+Learning+in+South+Asia_June2014.pdf>. See also Happymon Jacob, “The Concept of Nuclear Learning: A Study of the Indian Experience,” in Feroz Hassan Khan, Ryan Jacobs, and Emily Burke, eds., Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade (Monterey, CA: US Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), pp. 24, 33–34. S. Paul Kapur has usefully adopted a similarly value-neutral definition of “nuclear learning,” positing that “Nuclear learning has taken place, and it has had an important impact on India and Pakistan’s strategic calculations. However, it is not responsible for recent improvements in the regional security environment.” See S. Paul Kapur, “Revisionist Ambitions, Conventional Capabilities, and Nuclear Instability: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like Cold War Europe,” in Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 184–218.

17 Michael Tkacik, “India Nuclear Weapons: No First Use or No Full Disclosure?” Defence Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2017), pp. 85, 103–04; Kampani, “India’s Post-1998 Evolution,” pp. 1–4. See also Balraj Nagal, “India’s Nuclear Strategy to Deter: Massive Retaliation to Cause Unacceptable Damage,” CLAWS Journal, Winter 2015, pp. 1–20, <https://archive.claws.in/images/journals_doc/440323975_balrajnagal.pdf>; Frank O’Donnell and Debalina Ghoshal, “Managing Indian Deterrence: Pressures on Credible Minimum Deterrence and Nuclear Policy Options,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 26, Nos. 1–2 (2019), pp. 1–18.

18 Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” Orbis, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2003), pp. 399–413; Paul Bracken, “The Second Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (2000), pp. 146–56; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), pp. 95–124.

19 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), pp. 6–7; Jervis, Nuclear Revolution, pp. 1–45.

20 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 115.

21 Peter R. Lavoy, “Introduction: The Importance of the Kargil Conflict,” in Peter R. Lavoy, ed., Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 30. In articulating these core predictions, Lavoy significantly draws upon Jervis, Nuclear Revolution, pp. 1–45.

22 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 94–95.

23 National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Government of India, “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” Paragraph 1.5, August 17, 1999, <www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine>.

24 NSAB, “Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” Paragraphs 8.4–8.5.

25 Sumita Kumar, “Indo-Pak Bus Diplomacy,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1999), p. 168.

26 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “The Lahore Declaration,” February 2, 1999, <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999>.

27 Although China, India, and Pakistan all have a fairly open-ended nuclear-force development, China has not generated new military fissile materials since around 1990, whereas India and Pakistan continue military fissile-material production. See International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Countries: China,” February 12, 2018, <www.fissilematerials.org/countries/china.htm>; Evan Braden Montgomery and Eric S. Edelman, “Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2 (2015), pp. 159–82. Recent research has also highlighted that Indian decision makers have demonstrated their agency to decide to view incidents as crises, or “select into” crises, and adopt following diplomatically coercive and/or militarized responses. For example, of the spectacular Pakistan-sponsored militant attacks in Mumbai in 2006 and 2008, each generating a high casualty toll, Indian decision makers “selected into” treating only the 2008 attack as a crisis with Pakistan and acting accordingly. See Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland, “Anatomy of a Crisis: Explaining Crisis Onset in India–Pakistan Relations,” in Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland, eds., Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018), pp. 23–24.

28 T. Negeen Pegahi, “The New India versus the Nuclear Revolution: The Future of Crises among Nuclear Powers,” War on the Rocks, June 12, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-new-india-versus-the-nuclear-revolution-the-future-of-crises-among-nuclear-powers/>; Press Trust of India, “PM Narendra Modi Says He Called Pak’s Nuclear Bluff because India has Nuclear Bombs,” Economic Times, April 17, 2019, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-narendra-modi-says-he-called-paks-nuclear-bluff-because-india-is-n-power/articleshow/68926584.cms>; Gupta, “India, Pakistan Came Close to Firing Missiles.”

29 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear Learning and U.S.–Soviet Security Regimes,” International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (1987), pp. 371–402.

30 Nye, “Nuclear Learning,” pp. 389–90.

31 Ibid.

32 Jaspal, “The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia,” p. 130; Rajesh Basrur, “The Lessons of Kargil as Learned by India,” in Peter R. Lavoy, ed., Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 330.

33 Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” Security Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2017), pp. 606–41.

34 Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2 (2015), pp. 38–73. This trend is likely to also extend to the contemporary South Asian context. Chinese Indian Ocean activities are likely to include efforts to track the Indian Arihant SSBN in future, and the Indian Navy successfully located potential nuclear-capable Pakistani naval platforms during the 2019 Pulwama crisis. See Diana Wueger, “India’s Nuclear-Armed Submarines: Deterrence or Danger?," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2016), pp. 85, 87–88; Dubey, “Post-Balakot, Indian Navy Hunted for Pakistani Submarine.”

35 I further discuss this development, because it is being expressed through India learning distinct nuclear lessons from its own experiences, in O’Donnell and Ghoshal, “Managing Indian Deterrence,” pp. 10–13.

36 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2017), pp. 9–49.

37 Vojtech Mastny, “How Able Was ‘Able Archer’? Nuclear Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2009), p. 108. For additional background on the 1983 Able Archer crisis, see Nate Jones, ed., Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise that Almost Triggered Nuclear War (New York: New Press, 2016); Gordon Barrass, “Able Archer 83: What Were the Soviets Thinking?” Survival, Vol. 58, No. 6 (2016–17), pp. 7–30.

38 Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Concept of Nuclear Learning,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2012), pp. 84–85.

39 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1994), p. 291.

40 Harsh V. Pant, “Indian Foreign and Security Policy: Beyond Nuclear Weapons,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2009), p. 225.

41 Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), pp. 126–27.

42 See, for example, K. Subrahmanyam, “Educate India in Nuclear Strategy,” Times of India, May 22, 1998, p. 12; Jasjit Singh, “The New Challenges,” Frontline, June 5, 1998, pp. 19–21.

43 “Showing the Way (Editorial),” Times of India, June 22, 1998, p. 12.

44 Stimson Center, South Asia Program, “Event Transcript: India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers,” January 17, 2019, p. 12, <www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/EventTranscript_1_17_IndiaNuclearAsia.pdf>

45 “Punitive” entails greater flexibility in magnitude of response than “massive.” See Shashank Joshi, “India’s Nuclear Anxieties: The Debate over Doctrine,” Arms Control Today, May 2015, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2015-05/features/india%E2%80%99s-nuclear-anxieties-debate-over-doctrine>.

46 Scott D. Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in in Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 250.

47 Nagal argues that the main distinction between the Indian and US versions of massive retaliation is, of course, India’s NFU policy. See Balraj Nagal, “India’s Nuclear Strategy to Deter: Massive Retaliation to Cause Unacceptable Damage,” CLAWS Journal, Winter 2015, pp. 1–20, <https://archive.claws.in/images/journals_doc/440323975_balrajnagal.pdf>.

48 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” January 4, 2003, <www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/The+Cabinet+Committee+on+Security+Reviews+perationalization+of+Indias+Nuclear+Doctrine>; Shyam Saran, “Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” speech delivered to India Habitat Center, April 24, 2013, p. 16, <http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf>; Amit Sharma, “Assessing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” National Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2019), pp. 23–24, <www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/national-security-vol-2-issue-1-essay-asharma.pdf>.

49 See, for example, B.S. Nagal, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy,” in A.K. Singh and B.S. Nagal, eds., Military Strategy for India in the 21st Century (New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2019), pp. 195–224; Arun Kumar Sahni, “Development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons by Pakistan and Implications for India,” Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 146, No. 604 (2016), <http://usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Journal&pubno=604&ano=2874>; Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria, eds., Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Conflict Redux (New Delhi: KW, 2014).

50 Indrani Bagchi, “Even a Midget Nuke Strike Will Lead to Massive Retaliation, India Warns Pak,” Times of India, April 30, 2013, <www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/19793847.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst>; Shyam Saran, “Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” speech delivered to India Habitat Centre, April 24, 2013, p. 16, <www.krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf>.

51 Frank O’Donnell and Harsh V. Pant, “Evolution of India’s Agni-V Missile: Bureaucratic Politics and Nuclear Ambiguity,” Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2014), p. 606.

52 V.K. Singh, Anish Dayal Singh, V.C. Wankhade, P.W.B. Jayasundara, and E.O. Akinbayo, “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine: An Appraisal,” National Defence College Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2014), p. 83. At the time of publication, coauthors V.K. Singh and Anish Dayal Singh were, respectively, a former army chief and serving joint director of the Intelligence Bureau. The 2017 Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces confirms that the Executive Council is chaired by the national security advisor, and includes the three military service chiefs. See Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces (Second Version),” April 2017, p. 37, <https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf>. While the remaining Executive Council membership has not been officially publicized, multiple sources have concluded that it “almost certainly includes … the commander of the SFC; the principal scientific adviser; and the heads of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), DRDO, and the intelligence agencies.” For the source of this quotation, see Gaurav Kampani, “India’s Evolving Civil–Military Institutions in an Operational Nuclear Context,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-evolving-civil-military-institutions-in-operational-nuclear-context-pub-63910>. See also Verghese Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 101–2. While Anish Dayal Singh, at the time of publication, was not of the rank to sit on the Executive Council, he nevertheless would have had to familiarize himself with India’s nuclear preparedness, including conversing with former Executive Council member V.K. Singh, for the purposes of this article.

53 Singh et al., “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” p. 84.

54 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Prime Minister’s Statement in Parliament on ‘Bilateral Talks with United States,’” December 15, 1998, <www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/33ind.htm>.

55 “Abandon No-First-Use Policy, Security Board Tells Govt,” Rediff, January 9, 2003, <www.rediff.com/news/special/ia/20030109.htm>.

56 NSAB, “Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” Paragraph 2.4.

57 See, for example, Manpreet Sethi, “Perceptions of India’s Nuclear Capability Buildup: Ghost Hunting and a Reality Check,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/perceptions-of-indias-nuclear-capability-buildup-ghost-hunting-and-a-reality-check/>.

58 Indian Parliament Lok Sabha Standing Committee on External Affairs, “Sixteenth Report: Ministry of External Affairs: Indo-Pak Relations,” August 2017, p. 55, <http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/External%20Affairs/16_External_Affairs_16.pdf>.

59 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Why Bind Ourselves to ‘No First Use Policy’, says Manohar Parrikar on India’s Nuke Doctrine,” Economic Times, July 12, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/why-bind-ourselves-to-no-first-use-policy-says-parrikar-on-indias-nuke-doctrine/articleshow/55357808.cms>.

60 Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: An Alternative Blueprint,” March 2012, p. 6, <https://web.archive.org/web/20171031152955/www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/uploads/publications/Indias_Nuclear_Doctrine.pdf>.

61 Singh et al., “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” pp. 78–84; Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” p. 6.

62 Sharma, “Assessing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” p. 24.

63 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh Pays Homage to Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Pokhran on his First Death Anniversary,” August 16, 2019, <www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1582158>.

64 BJP, “Election Manifesto 2014,” p. 39, <www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf>

65 Sanjeev Miglani and John Chalmers, “BJP Puts ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy in Doubt,” Reuters, April 7, 2014, <https://in.reuters.com/article/india-election-bjp-manifesto/bjp-puts-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-in-doubt-idINDEEA3605820140407>.

66 Douglas Busvine, “India’s Modi Says Committed to No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Reuters, April 16, 2014, <www.reuters.com/article/us-india-election-nuclear-idUSBREA3F15H20140416>.

67 BJP, “Sankalp Patra: Lok Sabha 2019,” <www.bjp.org/manifestoPDF/BJP-Election-english-2019.pdf>; Indian National Congress, “Manifesto: Lok Sabha Elections 2019,” <https://manifesto.inc.in/pdf/english.pdf>. The Congress Party also released a side report on national security reforms, which included nuclear language affirming the status quo policies of NFU, credible minimum deterrence, and continued development of nuclear delivery platforms, without any indications of limits in this latter regard. See Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd.), “India’s National Security Strategy,” pp. 39–40, <https://manifesto.inc.in/pdf/national_security_strategy_gen_hooda.pdf>. However, upon release of the report, a party spokesperson stated that it was meant to be informative and would not necessarily reflect party policy in government. See Press Trust of India, “Congress Unveils National Security Report by Surgical Strikes Hero Lt Gen Hooda,” India Today, April 21, 2019, <www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha-2019/story/congress-unveils-national-security-report-by-surgical-strikes-hero-lt-gen-hooda-1506908-2019-04-21>.

68 Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “After the Tests: India and Pakistan Update,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 5 (1998), pp. 69–71.

69 Vishal Thapar, “N-capable Agni-III Ready, but Aircraft Remain First Choice,” News18.com, May 8, 2008, <www.news18.com/videos/india/missile-288735.html>.

70 “India Test Fires Nuclear Capable Agni-5 Missile, 2nd Test in Six Months,” Economic Times, December 12, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-test-fires-nuclear-capable-agni-5-missile-2nd-test-in-six-months/articleshow/67023684.cms>; Nuclear Threat Initiative, “India Missile Chronology,” July 2011, <https://media.nti.org/pdfs/india_missile.pdf>.

71 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 6 (2018), pp. 362–64.

72 Sandeep Unnithan, “INS Arihant Returned Yesterday from 20-Day Deterrent Patrol,” India Today, November 5, 2018, <www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ins-arihant-returned-yesterday-from-20-day-deterrent-patrol-1383188-2018-11-05>.

73 Zafar Khan, Pakistan's Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 48–49; Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 30–31, 45–46; Rodney W. Jones, “Minimum Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview,” Policy Architects International, October 1, 2001, p. 23, <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2001/south_asia.pdf>; Yves Boyer, “Questioning Minimal Deterrence,” in Serge Sur, ed., Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the 1990’s (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1993), p. 103, <www.unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs/nuclear-deterrence-problems-and-perspectives-in-the-1990-s-en-60.pdf>; Michael Brown, “The Debate on Minimal Deterrence: Responses,” in Sur, ed., Nuclear Deterrence, p. 129; André Dumoulin, “The Debate on Minimal Deterrence: Responses,” in Sur, ed., Nuclear Deterrence, p. 132.

74 O’Donnell and Ghoshal, “Managing Indian Deterrence,” p. 15.

75 Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, p. 99.

76 Integrated Defence Staff, Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces, p. 37.

77 Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, p. 95.

78 Taylor cited in J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1983), p. 8, <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R2964.pdf>.

79 Vipin Narang, “Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2013), p. 149.

80 Joshi, “Angles and Dangles.”

81 Som, “India Deployed Nuclear Missile-Armed Submarine.”

82 Kampani, “India’s Post-1998 Evolution,” p. 10; Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, p. 99; Saran, “Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?,” p. 10.

83 Kampani, “India’s Post-1998 Evolution,” p. 10.

84 Press Information Bureau, “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine”; Saran, “Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?,” p. 11; Sharma, “Assessing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” p. 24.

85 Singh et al., “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine: An Appraisal,” pp. 82–83.

86 Press Information Bureau, “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh Pays Homage.”

87 Government of India, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 15th Series, Vol. 16, “Discussion on the Demand for Grant No. 31 under the Control of the Ministry of External Affairs,” Seventh Session, 2011/1932, March 15, 2011, p. 114, <www.eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/758532/1/z1503-Final_VII.pdf>; Press Information Bureau, “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh Pays Homage.”

88 For background on the growing interest of the IAF in counterforce missions, including pre-emptive operations, see O’Donnell and Ghoshal, “Managing Indian Deterrence,” pp. 10–13.

89 Ramesh Thakur, “India Should Aim for ‘Escalation Dominance’ over Pakistan,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 28, 2019, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-should-aim-for-escalation-dominance-over-pakistan/>.

90 O’Donnell and Ghoshal, “Managing Indian Deterrence,” pp. 10–13.

91 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s New Nuclear Thinking: Counterforce, Crises, and Consequences,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, May 24, 2019, <www.belfercenter.org/publication/indias-new-nuclear-thinking-counterforce-crises-and-consequences>.

92 Joshi and O’Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia, pp. 204–6.

93 George Fernandes, “Inaugural Address by Raksha Mantri at a National Seminar Organised by IDSA on ‘The Challenges of Limited War: Parameters and Options’,” India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, January 5, 2000, <www.idsa-india.org/defmin5-2000.html>.

94 V.P. Malik, “Closing Address by Chief of Army Staff and Chairman Chief of Staff Committee at a National Seminar Organised by IDSA on ‘The Challenges of Limited War: Parameters and Options’,” India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, January 6, 2000, <www.idsa-india.org/chief6-2000.html>.

95 See, for example, Arka Biswas, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deconstructing India’s Doctrinal Response,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 39, No. 6 (2015), pp. 683–95; Nagal, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy”; Sahni, “Development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons by Pakistan”; Kanwal and Chansoria, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons.

96 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2018–19), pp. 7–52.

97 Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, pp. 94–96.

98 Kampani, “India’s Post-1998 Evolution,” p. 10.

99 For assessments that nuclear bombers assigned nuclear missions are hosted at Gwalior Air Base, see Sandeep Unnithan, “It’s Not the Age, It’s the Mileage: Why 35-year-old Mirage Was India’s Best Bet against Pakistan,” India Today, February 26, 2019, <www.indiatoday.in/india/story/mirage-2000-jets-iaf-airstrike-all-you-need-to-know-1465322-2019-02-26>; International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Princeton, NJ, 2009), p. 133, <www.fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr09.pdf>; Kristensen and Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2018,” p. 362.

100 Sandeep Unnithan, “Does This Mean War?” India Today, March 1, 2019, <www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/20190311-does-this-mean-war-1467071-2019-03-01>; Michael Sheldon, “Surgical Strike in Pakistan a Botched Operation?” Digital Forensic Research Lab, Atlantic Council, February 28, 2019, <https://medium.com/dfrlab/surgical-strike-in-pakistan-a-botched-operation-7f6cda834b24>.

101 Sandeep Unnithan, “Can Rajnath Singh Bite the Bullet?” India Today, June 28, 2019, <www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20190708-can-rajnath-singh-bite-the-bullet-1557063-2019-06-28>.

102 Dubey, “Post-Balakot, Indian Navy Hunted for Pakistani Submarine.”

103 Lieber and Press, “The New Era of Counterforce.” For analysis of how the new counterforce dynamics described by Lieber and Press could apply to the Indian context, see Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, “Emerging Technologies and India’s Nuclear Deterrent,” Observer Research Foundation, February 5, 2019, <www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/emerging-technologies-india-nuclear-deterrent-47812/>.

104 Unnithan, “Can Rajnath Singh Bite the Bullet?”

105 See Diana Wueger's article, “Pakistan's Nuclear Non-Revolution: The Once and Future asymmetric escalation doctrine.” in this Nonproliferation Review special issue.

106 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, February 2018, p. 32, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>.

107 Julian Borger, “Nuclear Weapons: Experts Alarmed by New Pentagon ‘War-Fighting’ Doctrine,” The Guardian, June 19, 2019, <www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/19/nuclear-weapons-pentagon-us-military-doctrine>.

108 Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.–China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015); M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2010), p. 80.

109 Katarzyna Zysk, “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 163, No. 2 (2018), pp. 4–15.