Chemical-weapon use in Syria: atrocities, attribution, and accountability

ABSTRACT

International efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished.

KEYWORDS:

• Syria
• chemical weapons
• Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
• Chemical Weapons Convention
• accountability

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the helpful feedback provided by Tom Cooper, Stefano Costanzi, Carlos Fraga, Steve Kostas, and Fritz Streiff.

Notes

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3 Rebecca K.C. Hersman and William Pitinos, Restoring Restraint: Enforcing Accountability for Users of Chemical Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).

4 UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” <www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/secretary-general-mechanism/>; UN General Assembly, “Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons,” Resolution A/RES/42/37, November 30, 1987, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/42/37&Lang=E>; UN Security Council Resolution 620, August 26, 1988, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/541/47/IMG/NR054147.pdf?OpenElement>.

5 UN Secretary-General, “Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013,” A/67/997–S/2013/553, September 16, 2013, <https://undocs.org/S/2013/553>; UN Secretary-General, “United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic: Final report,” S/2013/735 A/68/663, December 13, 2013, <https://undocs.org/S/2013/735>.

6 CWC, January 13, 1993, Article II, <www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-ii-definitions-and-criteria>.

7 Executive Council, “Decision: Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” EC-M-48/DEC.1, February 4, 2015, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/EC/M-48/ecm48dec01_e_.pdf>.

8 OPCW, “Note by the Technical Secretariat: Summary Report of the Work of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Covering the Period From 3 to 31 May 2014,” S/1191/2014, June 16, 2014, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2014/en/s-1191-2014_e_.pdf>.

9 Adam Entous, “U.S. Sees Possible Pattern in ISIS Chemical Attacks,” Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2015, <www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sees-pattern-in-isis-chemical-attacks-1439595807>; Raja Abdulrahim, “Islamic State Accused of New Chemical Attacks in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2015, <www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-accused-of-using-chemical-weapons-in-syria-1440353562>.

10 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/25/65, February 12, 2014, p. 19.

11 Ibid.

12 UN Security Council Resolution 2235 (2015), August 7, 2015, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2235>.

13 “Third Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” S/2016/738, August 24, 2016, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/738>; “Seventh Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” S/2017/904, October 26, 2017, <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_904.pdf>.

14 Anton Utkin, “The End of OPCW-UN Mechanism: What Stands Behind the Russian ‘No’?” Russian International Affairs Council, June 20, 2018, <https://russiancouncil.ru/en/amp/analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-end-of-opcw-un-mechanism-what-stands-behind-the-russian-no/>; “In Hindsight: The Demise of the JIM,” Security Council Reporter, December 28, 2017, <www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-01/in_hindsight_the_demise_of_the_jim.php>.

15 Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, “Chemical Weapons Attacks Documented by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” September 6, 2017, <www.ohchr.org/SiteCollectionImages/Bodies/HRCouncil/IICISyria/COISyria_ChemicalWeapons.jpg>.

16 Hannah Ellis-Petersen and Benjamin Haas, “How North Korea Got Away with the Assassination of Kim Jong-nam,” The Guardian, April 1, 2019, <www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/01/how-north-korea-got-away-with-the-assassination-of-kim-jong-nam>; Mark Urban, The Skripal Files: The Life and Near Death of a Russian Spy (New York: Henry Holt, 2018).

17 Columb Strack, “The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 10, No. 9 (2017), pp. 19–23.

18 Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “OPCW Granted Mandate to Place Blame,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2018, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-07/news/opcw-granted-mandate-place-blame>.

19 OPCW, “Addressing the Threat From Chemical Weapons Use,” C-SS-4/DEC.3, June 27, 2018, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CSP/C-SS-4/en/css4dec3_e_.doc.pdf>.

20 Ibid.

21 Jonathan Saul, “Russia Steps up Military Lifeline to Syria’s Assad—Sources,” Reuters, January 17, 2014, <www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-russia-arms/exclusive-russia-steps-up-military-lifeline-to-syrias-assad-sources-idUSBREA0G0MN20140117>; Michael R. Gordon, David E. Sanger, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Scolds Russia as It Weighs Options on Syrian War,” New York Times, February 17, 2014, <www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/world/middleeast/russia-is-scolded-as-us-weighs-syria-options.html?hpw&rref=world>; Guy Faulconbridge and Jonathan Saul, “Russian Tankers Defy EU Ban to Smuggle Jet Fuel to Syria—Sources,” Reuters, November 22, 2016, <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-fuel-exclusive/exclusive-russian-tankers-defy-eu-ban-to-smuggle-jet-fuel-to-syria-sources-idUSKBN13H1T8>; Ian Talley, “U.S. Sanctions Russian Firm for Alleged Fuel Sales to Syria,” Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2019, <www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sanctions-russian-firm-for-alleged-fuel-sales-to-syria-11569508934>; Tom Cooper, Moscow’s Game of Poker: Russian Military Intervention in Syria, 2015–2017 (Warwick, United Kingdom: Helion, 2018), p. 28.

22 Maksymilian Czuperski, Faysal Itani, Ben Nimmo, Eliot Higgins, and Emma Beals, “Breaking Aleppo,” Atlantic Council, February 2017, <www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingaleppo/>; Lukas Andriukaitis, Emma Beals, Graham Brookie, Eliot Higgins, Faysal Itani, Ben Nimmo, Michael Sheldon, Elizabeth Tsurkov, and Nick Waters, “Breaking Ghouta,” Atlantic Council, September 2018, <www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingghouta/>; Tim Ripley, Operation Aleppo: Russia’s War in Syria (Lancaster, United Kingdom: Telic-Herrick, 2018), pp. 110–11, 127–30, 188.

23 Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper, and Michael D. Shear, “Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria,” New York Times, April 6, 2017, <www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-chemical-attack.html>; Mike Giglio, Mitch Prothero, and Nancy A. Youseff, “Russia and Syria Worked Side by Side at the Air Base that Launched a Chemical Attack,” Buzzfeed News, April 7, 2017, <www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegiglio/russia-and-syria-worked-side-by-side-at-the-air-base-that>; White House, “Background Press Briefing on Syria,” April 11, 2017, <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/background-press-briefing-syria/>.

24 Santiago Oñate Laborde, Legal Adviser, OPCW, <http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Laborde_bio.pdf>.

25 OPCW, “Note by the Technical Secretariat: Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018),” EC-91/S/3, June 28, 2019, p. 1, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/07/ec91s03%28e%29.pdf>.

26 “Third Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” pp. 15, 42; “Fourth Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” S/2016/888, October 21, 2016, pp. 5–7, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/888>.

27 OPCW, “Note by the Technical Secretariat: Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018),” p. 1.

28 “Fourth report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” p. 9.

29 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” A/HRC/39/CRP.2, September 17, 2018, <www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_64.docx>.

30 OPCW, “Note by the Technical Secretariat Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018),” p. 5.

31 OPCW, “Summary Update of the Activities Carried out by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria,” S/1677/2018, October 10, 2018, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/10/s-1677-2018%28e%29.pdf>.

32 Tobias Schneider and Theresa Lütkefend, “Nowhere to Hide: The Logic of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria,” Global Public Policy Institute, February 2019, pp. 5, 12, <www.gppi.net/media/GPPi_Schneider_Luetkefend_2019_Nowhere_to_Hide_Web.pdf>.

33 Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Accountability Remains Absent on the Sixth Anniversary of the World’s Largest Chemical Weapons Attack since the Chemical Weapons Convention,” August 21, 2019, <http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Accounting_remains_absent_on_the_sixth_anniversary_of_the_worlds_largest_chemical_weapons_attack_after_the_Chemical_Weapons_Convention_en.pdf>.

34 OPCW, “Summary Report of the Work of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Covering the Period from 3 to 31 May 2014,” S/1191/2014, June 16, 2014, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2014/en/s-1191-2014_e_.pdf>; OPCW, “Third Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria,” S/1230/2014, December 18, 2014, pp. 50, 80, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/Fact_Finding_Mission/s-1230-2014_e_.pdf>; “First Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” S/2016/142, February 12, 2016, pp. 10–12.

35 “Third Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism.”

36 OPCW, “Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged Incidents in Marea, Syrian Arab Republic August 2015,” S/1320/2015, October 29, 2015, p. 13, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/11/s-1320-2015_e_.pdf>.

37 OPCW, “Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged Incidents in Marea, Syrian Arab Republic August 2015,” S/1320/2015, October 29, 2015, p. 3.

38 “Third Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” pp. 14–15.

39 OPCW, “Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged Incidents in Ltamenah, the Syrian Arab Republic 24 and 25 March 2017,” S/1636/2018, June 13, 2018, pp. 7–12, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1636-2018_e_.pdf>; OPCW, “Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic Regarding an Alleged Incident in Lataminah, Syrian Arab Republic, 30 March 2017,” S/1548/2017, November 2, 2017, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2017/en/s-1548-2017_e_.pdf>.

40 OPCW, “Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic Regarding an Alleged Incident in Lataminah, Syrian Arab Republic, 30 March 2017,” p. 24.

41 OPCW, “Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic Regarding an Alleged Incident in Khan Shaykhun, Syrian Arab Republic April 2017,” S/1510/2017, June 29, 2017, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/Fact_Finding_Mission/s-1510-2017_e_.pdf>.

42 “Seventh Report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism.”

43 Although witnesses tend to describe all chlorine munitions dropped from helicopters as “barrel bombs,” by late 2016 the regime had stopped using chlorine barrel bombs in favor of standard industrial chlorine cylinders that were fitted with fins for aerodynamic purposes and other features to make them easier to handle. Schneider and Lütkefend, “Nowhere to Hide,” p. 18.

44 OPCW, “Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged Incidents in Lataminah, The Syrian Arab Republic 24 and 25 March 2017,” pp. 7–12.

45 OPCW, “Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding an Alleged Incident in Saraqib, Syrian Arab Republic on 4 February 2018,” S/1626/2018, May 15, 2018, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1626-2018_e_.pdf>.

46 Eliot Higgins, “Evidence of the February 4th 2018 Chlorine Attack on Saraqib, Idlib,” Bellingcat, February 14, 2018, <www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/02/14/evidence-february-4th-2018-chlorine-attack-saraqib-idlib/>; Christopher Kozak, “Russian Air Power Shapes Strategic Balance in Northern Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, February 14, 2018, <www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-air-power-shapes-strategic-balance-northern-syria>.

47 Ivan Nechepurenko, “Russian Military Helicopter Is Shot Down in Syria, Killing 5,” New York Times, August 1, 2016, <www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/world/middleeast/russia-syria-helicopter.html>.

48 UN Human Rights Council, “Human Rights Abuses and International Humanitarian Law Violations in the Syrian Arab Republic, 21 July 2016–28 February 2017,” A/HRC/34/CPR.3, March 10, 2017, p. 12, <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/A_HRC_34_CRP.3_E.docx>.

49 Bellingcat Investigation Team, “Open Source Survey of Alleged Chemical Attacks in Douma on 7th April 2018,” Bellingcat, April 11, 2018, <www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/04/11/open-source-survey-alleged-chemical-attacks-douma-7th-april-2018/>.

50 Andriukaitis et al., “Breaking Ghouta.”

51 OPCW, “Report of the Fact-Finding Mission Regarding the Incident of Alleged Use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon on Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018,” S/1731/2019, March 1, 2019, p. 25, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/03/s-1731-2019%28e%29.pdf>.

52 OPCW, “Note by the Technical Secretariat Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018).”

53 Ibid.

54 “Seventh Report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” pp. 10, 32–33.

55 Ibid.

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58 Chemical Forensics International Technical Working Group, “Second Report,” August 21–22, 2018, Boston.

59 Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) described in Ben Taub, “The Assad Files,” New Yorker, April 18, 2016, <www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/04/18/bashar-al-assads-war-crimes-exposed>; Syrian Archive, <https://syrianarchive.org/en>; Violations Documentation Center, <https://vdc-sy.net/en/>; Syrian Network for Human Rights, <http://sn4hr.org/>; Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, <https://syriaaccountability.org/>.

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63 <www.noimpunitychemicalweapons.org/-en-.html>.

64 Koblentz, “#NoImpunity.”

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66 Trial International, “Prosecuting International Crimes: A Matter of Willingness,” July 10, 2019, <https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/prosecuting-international-crimes-a-matter-of-willingness/>;  Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre, “SJAC Launches Universal Jurisdiction Guides,” September 5, 2019, <https://syriaaccountability.org/updates/2019/09/05/sjac-launches-universal-jurisdiction-guides/>.

67 Jörg Diehl, Christoph Reuter, and Fidelius Schmid, “Germany Takes Aim at Assad’s Torture Boss,” Spiegel Online, June 8, 2018, <www.spiegel.de/international/world/senior-assad-aid-charged-with-war-crimes-a-1211923.html>.

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70 OPCW, “Report by the Director-General: Progress in the Implementation of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 on Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use,” EC-91/DG.20, July 1, 2019, 3, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/docuents/2019/07/ec91dg20%28e%29.pdf>.

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72 Utkin, “The End of OPCW-UN Mechanism;” “In Hindsight.”

73 Brian Whitaker, “Syria, Russia and the Politics of Chemical Weapons,” al-bab, July 12, 2019, <https://al-bab.com/blog/2019/07/syria-russia-and-politics-chemical-weapons>.

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75 Russian Federation, “Note Verbale No. 759 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Dated 26 April 2019,” EC-90/NAT.41, April 26, 2019, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/05/ec90nat41%28e%29.pdf>; OPCW, “Update on the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria,” S/1755/2019, May 21, 2019, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/05/s-1755-2019.pdf>; James Harkin, “What Happened in Douma? Searching for Facts in the Fog of Syria’s Propaganda War,” The Intercept, February 9 2019, <https://theintercept.com/2019/02/09/douma-chemical-attack-evidence-syria/>; Andriukaitis et al., “Breaking Ghouta,” pp. 56–74.

76 Daniel Boffey and Patrick Wintour, “Dutch Expelled Russians over Alleged Novichok Lab Hacking Plot,” The Guardian, September 14, 2018, <www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/14/dutch-expelled-russians-over-alleged-novichok-laboratory-hacking-plot>.

77 Thomas Knellwolf and Titus Plattner, “Russische Spione auf dem Weg ins Berner Oberland verhaftet,” Tages Anzeiger, September 19, 2018, <www.tagesanzeiger.ch/panorama/russische-spione-auf-dem-weg-ins-berner-oberland-verhaftet/story/27257777>.

78 Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Russia Blocks Consensus at CWC Conference,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2019, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-01/news/russia-blocks-consensus-cwc-conference>; “Russia Loses Bid to Block New Syria Chemical Weapons Probe,” AFP, November 28, 2019, ≤/www.france24.com/en/20191128-russia-loses-bid-to-block-new-syria-chemical-weapons-probe>.

79 OPCW, “Remarks of the Director-General at the Briefing for States Parties on Syrian Arab Republic: Update on IIT-FFM-SSRC-DAT,” May 28, 2019, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/06/Remarks%20of%20the%20Director-General%20Briefing%20for%20States%20Parties%20on%20Syrian%20Arab%20Republic%20Update%20on%20IIT-FFM-SSRC-DAT_1.pdf>.

80 OPCW, “Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme,” EC-93/DG.3, November 25, 2019, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/11/ec93dg03%28e%29.pdf>; OPCW, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Bassam Sabbagh, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, to the OPCW at the Ninety-Second Session of the Executive Council,” EC-92/NAT.28, October 9, 2019, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/11/ec92nat28%28e%29.pdf>.

81 Philipp C. Bleek and Nicholas J. Kramer, “Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Implications for Addressing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 23, Nos. 1–2 (2016), pp. 197–230, <www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2016.1196853>.

82 John Hart and Ralf Trapp, “Collateral Damage? The Chemical Weapons Convention in the Wake of the Syrian Civil War,” Arms Control Today, April 2018, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-04/features/collateral-damage-chemical-weapons-convention-wake-syrian-civil-war>.

83 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Syria's Chemical Kill Chain,” Foreign Policy, April 7, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/07/syrias-chemical-weapons-kill-chain-assad-sarin/>

84 Strack, “The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts.”

85 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Regime Security: A New Model for Understanding the Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2013), pp. 501–25.

86 White House, “U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013,” August 30, 2013, p. 2, <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/782080/u-s-government-assessment-on-syria.pdf>.

87 France, “National Executive Summary of Declassified Intelligence: Assessment of Syria’s Chemical Warfare Programme,” September 2, 2013, <www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/219128/2437985/file/National_executive_summary_of_declassified_intelligence.pdf>.

88 Koblentz, “Syria’s Chemical Kill Chain”; Pro-Justice, The Blacklist: Violations Committed by the Most Prominent Syrian Regime Figures and How to Bring Them to Justice (San Diego, 2019), pp. 162, 195, 245, 266–67.

89 Aron Lund, “A Voice from the Shadows: The Head of Syria’s Air Force Intelligence Directorate Says Bashar al-Assad Was Too Soft,” Diwan, November 25, 2016, <https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/66240>.

90 Koblentz, “Syria’s Chemical Kill Chain”; René Backmann, “Revealed: Assad Regime’s Plan to Use Chemical Weapons against Opposition in 2009,” Mediapart, June 1, 2017, <www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/international/010617/revealed-assad-regimes-plan-use-chemical-weapons-against-opposition-2009?onglet=full>; René Backmann, “How Assad Regime Built Chemical Arsenal with Aid of Germany and Other Countries,” Mediapart, June 2, 2017, <www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/international/020617/how-assad-regime-built-chemical-arsenal-aid-germany-and-other-countries?_locale=en&onglet=full>; “Yellow Box: The Story of the Syrian Chemical Programme From Establishment to Handover,” Zaman al-Wasl, October 8, 2017, <https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/30250.html>; Pro-Justice, The Blacklist, pp. 157, 240, 331.

91 “Syrian Army Defector Tells of Dozens of Chemical Attacks,” The National, September 16, 2013, <www.thenational.ae/world/syrian-army-defector-tells-of-dozens-of-chemical-attacks-1.464207>; Malek Oqab, “Profile: Jayez Mousa, Assad’s Notorious Air Force General,” Zaman al-Wasl, May 10, 2016, <https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/15718.html>.

92 US Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Syrian Officials in Connection with OPCW-UN Findings of Regime’s Use of Chemical Weapons on Civilians,” January 12, 2017, <www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0701.aspx>; “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/480 of 20 March 2017 Implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Syria,” Official Journal of the European Union: Legislation, Vol. 60 (March 21, 2017), pp. 12–14, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2017:075:FULL&from=EN>; “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1327 of 17 July 2017 Implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Syria,” Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 60 (July 18, 2017), p. 21, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2017:185:FULL&from=EN>; Oqab, “Profile: Jayez Mousa”; Koblentz, “Syria’s Chemical Kill Chain”; Pro-Justice, The Blacklist, pp. 263, 287, 313, 316.

93 “Fourth Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” p. 8.

94 Bellingcat Investigation Team, “Open Source Survey of Alleged Chemical Attacks in Douma on 7th April 2018.”

95 Tom Cooper, “Syrian Arab Air Force: Air Power in Decline,” Air Forces Monthly (June 2017), p. 58; Pro-Justice, The Blacklist, p. 249.

96 Schneider and Lütkefend, “Nowhere to Hide,” pp. 20–22.

97 Eliot Higgins, “Evidence of the February 4th 2018 Chlorine Attack on Saraqib, Idlib,” Bellingcat, February 14, 2018, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/02/14/evidence-february-4th-2018-chlorine-attack-saraqib-idlib/>.

98 Ibid.; Gregory Waters, “The Tiger Forces: Pro-Assad Fighters Backed by Russia,” Policy Paper 2018-10 Middle East Institute, October 2018; US Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Syrian Officials in Connection with OPCW–UN Findings of Regime’s Use of Chemical Weapons on Civilians.”

99 Schneider and Lütkefend, “Nowhere to Hide,” pp. 22, 30–32.

100 Can Kasapoğlu, “Syria’s ‘Shogun’ in the Making: Russian-Backed General Suheil al-Hassan and the Future of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces,” Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, November 2018, <http://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/CAN_Tiger-Forces-Russia-Syria-report.pdf>; Waters, “The Tiger Forces.”

101 “Perpetrator of Second Largest Chemical Attack in Syria Identified,” Orient News, April 5, 2017, <http://orient-news.net/en/news_show/134606/Perpetrator-of-second-largest-chemical-attack-in-Syria-identified>; “Data of Assad’s Pilot who Conducted Khan Sheikhoun Chemical Attack,” Zaman al-Wasl, April 10, 2017, <https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/25122>.

102 “Seventh Report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,” p. 23.

103 “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1327 of 17 July 2017 Implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Syria,” p. 21.

104 Jonathan McLaughlin, “A Resilient Threat: SSRC’s Role in Syria’s Chemical Weapon Program,” Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, February 9, 2018, <www.wisconsinproject.org/a-resilient-threat-ssrcs-role-in-syrias-chemical-weapon-program/>.

105 Robin Hughes, “SSRC: Spectre at the Table,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 29, 2014, pp. 34–41, <www.janes360.com/images/assets/839/32839/syrian_chem_weapons.pdf>; Backmann, “Revealed.”

106 US Department of Treasury, “Treasury Designates Syrian Entity, Others Involved in Arms and Communications Procurement Networks and Identifies Blocked Iranian Aircraft,” September 12, 2012, <www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1714.aspx>; “Council Implementing Decision Implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures against Syria,” March 13, 2018, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6944-2018-INIT/en/pdf>; “Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/86 of 21 January 2019 Amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 Concerning Restrictive Measures against the Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapon,” Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 62 (January 21, 2019), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019D0086&from=EN>.

107 “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1327 of 17 July 2017 Implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Syria,” p. 21.

108 Basma Atassi, “Insider Sheds Light on Syria’s Chemical Arms,” Al Jazeera, May 23, 2013, <www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/2013523155639566436.html>; Adam Entous, Juliane E. Barnes, and Nour Malas, “Elite Syrian Unit Scatters Chemical Arms Stockpile Assad Regime Has Moved Weapons to as Many as 50 Sites,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2013, <www.wsj.com/articles/elite-syrian-unit-scatters-chemical-arms-stockpile-1379036397>; Backmann, “Assad Regime’s Plan to Use Chemical Weapons against Opposition in 2009.”

109 US Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Syrian Officials in Connection with OPCW-UN Findings of Regime’s Use of Chemical Weapons on Civilians”; “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1327 of 17 July 2017 Implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Syria,” p. 21; “Council Implementing Decision Implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures against Syria”; “Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/806 of 17 May 2019 Amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures against Syria,” Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 62 (May 20, 2019), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019D0806&from=EN>; “Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/86 of 21 January 2019 Amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 Concerning Restrictive Measures against the Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapons”; “Syrian Chemical Program: Production and Storage Locations—Special Report,” Zaman al-Wasl, October 8, 2017, <https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/30595.html>; Backmann, “Assad Regime’s Plan to Use Chemical Weapons against Opposition in 2009”; Pro-Justice, Blacklist, pp. 257–58.

110 Strack, “The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts.”

111 Kyle Orton, “Profiles of Islamic State Leaders,” Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism, 2016, pp. 11–14, 30.

112 Orton, “Profiles of Islamic State Leaders,” pp. 30, 38, 60; Michael C. Bender, Raja Abdulrahim, and Nancy A. Youssef, “Inside the Mission that Killed Islamic State Leader Baghdadi,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2019, <www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-mission-that-killed-islamic-state-leader-baghdadi-11572219049>.

113 Eric Schmitt, “ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report Says,” New York Times, November 21, 2016, <www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/middleeast/isis-chemical-weapons-syria-iraq-mosul.html>; Strack, “The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts.”

114 Strack, “The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts”; Robert J. Bunker, “Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State,” Strategic Studies Institute, 2019, p. 18.

115 Helene Cooper and Erich Schmitt, “ISIS Detainee Tells U.S. of Militants’ Plan to Use Mustard Gas,” New York Times, March 9, 2016, <www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/world/middleeast/isis-detainee-mustard-gas.html>; Joby Warrick, “Iraqi Scientist Says He Helped ISIS Make Chemical Weapons,” Washington Post, January 21, 2019, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/exclusive-iraqi-scientist-says-he-helped-isis-make-chemical-weapons/2019/01/21/617cb8f0-0d35-11e9-831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html>.

116 Cheryl Pellerin, “Coalition Shapes Mosul Fight by Removing ISIL Leaders from Battlefield,” DOD News, September 29, 2016, <www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/959599/coalition-shapes-mosul-fight-by-removing-isil-leaders-from-battlefield/>.

117 US Department of State, “State Department Terrorist Designation of Joe Asperman,” March 22, 2018, <https://translations.state.gov/2018/03/22/state-department-terrorist-designation-of-joe-asperman>; “US Blacklists Mystery French Chemical Terrorist.” France24, March 22, 2018, <https://www.france24.com/en/20180322-us-blacklists-mystery-french-chemical-terrorist>.

118 US Department of Treasury, “Treasury Targets ISIS Leader Involved in Chemical Weapons Development,” June 12, 2017, <www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm103.aspx.>

119 US Department of State, “State Department Terrorist Designations of Marwan Ibrahim Hussayn Tah Al-Azawi and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia,” June 12, 2017, <www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-marwan-ibrahim-hussayn-tah-al-azawi-and-majelis-mujahidin-indonesia/>.