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ABSTRACT
In 2019, the geostrategic landscape of South Asia significantly changed. A crisis between India and Pakistan involved air strikes across international boundaries for the first time since the 1971 war. Pakistan came close to economic collapse, while India re-elected hawkish Narendra Modi as prime minister in a landslide. These developments, alongside the United States’ efforts to strike a deal to leave Afghanistan and rapidly improving US-India relations, portend new challenges for Pakistan’s security managers—challenges that nuclear weapons are ill-suited to address. Despite the shifting security and political situation in the region, however, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine seem unlikely to change. This article explores the roots of Pakistan’s reliance on the traditional predictions of the nuclear revolution, most notably the notion that nuclear-armed states will not go to war with one another, and argues that this reliance on nuclear deterrence is a response both to Pakistan’s security environment and to serious constraints on moving away from nuclear weapons toward an improved conventional force posture. Pakistan’s central problems remain the same as when it first contemplated nuclear weapons: the threat from India, the absence of true allies, a weak state and a weaker economy, and few friends in the international system. While 2019 may have been a turning point for other states in the region, Pakistan is likely to stay the course.
Notes
1 Irish Examiner, “Pakistan Planning Fleet with Nuclear Weapons: India Vows to Match Submarine Deployment,” February 22, 2001, <www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/world/pakistan-threatens-to-deploy-nuclear-missiles-in-submarines-4795.html>; Muhammad Azam Khan, “S-2: Options for the Pakistan Navy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2010), pp. 85–104.
2 Walter C. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2008), pp. 158–90; Ryan W. French, “Deterrence Adrift? Mapping Conflict and Escalation in South Asia,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2016, pp. 106–37; Feroz Hassan Khan and Diana B. Wueger, “Escalation Management and Crisis De-escalation in South Asia” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015).
3 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “‘No First Use’ Nuke Policy Isn’t Dead, but Losing Sanctity,” Hindustan Times, August 17, 2019, <www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/no-first-use-isn-t-dead-but-it-s-now-meaningless/story-Hyq9Uo78OmqpLqN7iP1zEJ.html>.
4 C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); French, “Deterrence Adrift?" pp. 114–16; Anam Zakaria, 1971: A People’s History from Bangladesh, Pakistan and India (New Delhi: Penguin Random House India, 2019).
5 Article 370 of the Indian constitution allowed Jammu and Kashmir a degree of autonomy from the Indian state, including a separate constitution and freedom to make state-wide laws related to matters of residency and property ownership. The Indian government claims that removing Article 370 will integrate Kashmir more thoroughly into India and bring greater economic development by simplifying legal matters and allowing non-Kashmiris to buy land in the region. BBC News, “Article 370: What Happened with Kashmir and Why It Matters,” August 6, 2019, <www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708>.
6 Imran Khan, “The World Can’t Ignore Kashmir. We Are All in Danger,” New York Times, August 30, 2019, <www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/opinion/imran-khan-kashmir-pakistan.html>.
7 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
9 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). See also Frank O’Donnell’s article in this issue for an in-depth discussion of the theory of the nuclear revolution. Frank O’Donnell, “India’s Nuclear Revolution: New Delhi’s Nuclear Learning and the Future of Deterrence,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 26, Nos. 5–6 (2019), pp. 407–426.
10 Peter R. Lavoy, “Introduction: The Importance of the Kargil Conflict,” in Peter R. Lavoy, ed., Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 30.
11 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
12 See, inter alia: Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005); S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Peter R. Lavoy, ed., Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Zachary S. Davis, ed., The India-Pakistan Military Standoff: Crisis and Escalation in South Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Rudra Chaudhuri, “Indian ‘Strategic Restraint’ Revisited: The Case of the 1965 India-Pakistan War,” India Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2018), pp. 55–75; Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland, Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018); Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, “How Dangerous Was Kargil? Nuclear Crises in Comparative Perspective,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2019), pp. 135–48.
13 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
14 The Line of Control marks the divide between Indian-controlled and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. While it is not a formal international border, it is often treated as such when escalation potential is considered.
15 Arzan Tarapore, “Balakot, Deterrence, and Risk: How This India-Pakistan Crisis Will Shape the Next,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/balakot-deterrence-and-risk/>.
16 Firstpost, “What Is National Command Authority: Imran Khan Convenes Meeting of Pakistan’s Apex Nuclear Body after Balakot Air Strikes,” February 27, 2019, <www.firstpost.com/world/what-is-the-national-command-authority-imran-khan-convenes-meeting-of-pakistans-apex-nuclear-body-after-balakot-airstrikes-6160131.html>.
17 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, p. 78.
18 Ibid.
19 Fair, Fighting to the End, pp. 172–74.
20 The author thanks a keen-eyed reviewer for pointing out that China has pressed Pakistan to resolve the status of the region of Gilgit-Baltistan, through which the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes. India has contested the legality of the CPEC passing through disputed territory. Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, “Gilgit-Baltistan: Pakistan’s Geopolitical Loophole,” The Diplomat, February 19, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/gilgit-baltistan-pakistans-geopolitical-loophole/>.
21 Fair, Fighting to the End, pp. 172–73.
22 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 329.
23 Tad Szulc, “Enterprise Is Flagship,” New York Times, December 16, 1971, p. 1.
24 Charles Mohr, “Dacca Captured,” New York Times, December 17, 1971, p. 1.
25 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
26 Patrick Keatley, “The Brown Bomb,” The Guardian, March 11, 1965, p. 10, <www.newspapers.com/clip/24520434/the_guardian/>.
27 Khan, Eating Grass, p. 8.
28 William Burr, “New Documents Spotlight Reagan-Era Tensions over Pakistani Nuclear Program,” Wilson Center, April 25, 2012, <www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/new-documents-spotlight-reagan-era-tensions-over-pakistani-nuclear-program>.
29 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Pakistan’s Sanction Waivers: A Summary,” October 29, 2001, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2001/10/29/pakistan-s-sanction-waivers-summary-pub-10778>.
30 The Pressler Amendment was included in the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985. The amendment “prohibits furnishing Pakistan with military equipment or technology unless the President certifies to the Congress during the fiscal year in which such assistance is furnished that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed U.S. aid program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess such a device.” Richard G. Lugar, “International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985,” Pub. L. No. 99–83 (1985), <www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/senate-bill/960>. For more on the ups and downs of the US–Pakistan relationship, see Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001).
31 Khan, Eating Grass, p. 326.
32 Paul Staniland, “America and Pakistan After 2014,” in C. Christine Fair and Sarah J. Watson, eds., Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), pp. 205–26.
33 Fair, Fighting to the End, pp. 172–73.
34 Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent.
35 S. Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security, and the Pakistani State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
36 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, p. 92.
37 Joshua T. White, “The Other Nuclear Threat,” The Atlantic, March 5, 2019, <www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/americas-role-india-pakistan-nuclear-flashpoint/584113/>.
38 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, p. 11.
39 Tim Craig, “Pakistan Tests Missile that Could Carry Nuclear Warhead to Every Part of India,” Washington Post, March 9, 2015, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistan-tests-missile-that-could-carry-nuclear-warhead-to-every-part-of-india/2015/03/09/920f4f42-c65c-11e4-bea5-b893e7ac3fb3_story.html>.
40 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 6 (2018), pp. 361–66; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Julia Diamond, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 5 (2018), pp. 348–58.
41 Ankit Panda, “Pakistan Tests Its Nasr Short-Range Ballistic Missile System, Improving Range,” The Diplomat, July 10, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/pakistan-tests-its-nasr-short-range-ballistic-missile-system-improving-range/>.
42 Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, “Balakot, Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence,” Pakistan Politico, April 5, 2019, <http://pakistanpolitico.com/balakot-nuclear-weapons-and-deterrence/>; French, “Deterrence Adrift?”
43 Feroz Hassan Khan and Emily Burke, Managing Strategic Crises in South Asia: A Crisis Simulation Tabletop Exercise (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, May 2014).
44 Business Standard India, “Pak Testfires Nasr Missile; Cold Water on India’s Cold Start, Claims Bajwa,” July 5, 2017, <www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/pak-testfires-nasr-missile-cold-water-on-india-s-cold-start-claims-bajwa-117070501225_1.html>.
45 Sadia Tasleem, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Capabilities and Prospects for Sea-Based Deterrence,” in Rory Medcalf, Katherine Mansted, Stephan Frühling, and James Goldrick, eds., The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey (Canberra: National Security College at the Australian National University, 2020), <https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/publication/16145/future-undersea-deterrent-global-survey>; Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Senate Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., March 6, 2018, <www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1457815/statement-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-assessment/>.
46 While Pakistan is spending more on defense as a percentage of gross domestic product, the immense size of the Indian economy means that, in real dollars, India is widening the gap considerably every year. World Bank and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, “Military Expenditure (Current USD)—Pakistan, India,” <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=PK-IN>.
47 Khan, Eating Grass, p. 10.
48 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2010), <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/8/>, p. 15.
49 Fizza Batool, “One Year In: The PTI’s Legislative Report Card,” South Asian Voices, September 6, 2019, <https://southasianvoices.org/one-year-in-the-ptis-legislative-report-card/>.
50 Rashid Amjad, “Where the Government’s Handling of the Economy Is Going Wrong,” Herald Magazine, April 17, 2019, <https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398861>; Salman Masood, “Pakistan to Accept $6 Billion Bailout from I.M.F.,” New York Times, May 12, 2019, <www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12/world/asia/pakistan-imf-bailout.html>.
51 Franz-Stefan Gady, “China to Supply Pakistan with 8 New Stealth Attack Submarines by 2028,” The Diplomat, August 30, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/china-to-supply-pakistan-with-8-new-stealth-attack-submarines-by-2028/>; Kiran Stacey, “Pakistan Shuns US for Chinese High-Tech Weapons,” Financial Times, April 18, 2018, <www.ft.com/content/8dbce0a0-3713-11e8-8b98-2f31af407cc8>; Krzysztof Iwanek, “Russia’s Looming Arms Sale to Pakistan Sets up a Dangerous Game,” The Diplomat, May 16, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/russias-looming-arms-sale-to-pakistan-sets-up-a-dangerous-game/>.
52 C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
53 For the stalemate argument, see Walter C. Ladwig, III, “Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5 (2015), pp. 729–72, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1014473>; Christopher Clary, “What Might an India-Pakistan War Look Like?” MIT Center for International Studies, Spring 2012, <http://cis.mit.edu/publications/newsletter/what-might-india-pakistan-war-look>. Former Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman presented evidence of a growing capability gap in air power which could undermine Pakistan's ability to hold its ground. Rao Qamar Suleman, “Regional Security Implications of South Asian Air Force Modernization Trends,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 25, 2016.
54 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Going Tactical: Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture and Implications for Stability,” Proliferation Papers, IFRI, Paris, September 2015, pp. 29–33.
55 Dawn, “All Wars Are Miscalculated, No One Knows Where They Lead: PM Khan,” February 27, 2019, <www.dawn.com/news/1466364>.