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ABSTRACT
Novel long-range missiles, sensor technologies, and directed-energy weapons are rapidly disrupting the balance between offense and defense in modern warfare. It will probably become significantly more difficult to hide aircraft, ships, and vehicles on the battlefield as sensors improve and the cost premium for effective stealth increases. Hypersonic missiles threaten to make it more difficult to defend key assets using traditional means. However, sensor advances will aid both sides, and, if directed-energy weapons can be effectively developed and deployed, the trend could shift the other way, toward effective point defenses limited only by power and cooling. With multiple, potentially contradictory trends, the outcome for strategic stability remains extremely difficult to discern.
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 “All-aspect stealth” refers to designs with a minimal radar signature when viewed from all angles, as opposed to designs where the main focus is on reducing radar signature when viewed from the frontal aspect. “Broadband stealth” refers to designs that are difficult to detect with sensors across the electromagnetic spectrum, rather than simply the X and Ku bands typically used by fire-control radars.
2 “Multistatic employment” refers to a technique whereby radars or other sensors are positioned in multiple locations but operated as one system, allowing them to view targets from multiple angles simultaneously. Multistatic sensors improve system resolution and triangulation, especially against difficult targets like stealth aircraft.
3 For more information see Justin Bronk, “Maximum Value from the F-35,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Occasional Paper, February 1, 2016, <https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160201_whp_maximum_value_from_the_f-35_web.pdf>.
4 Amy Butler and Bill Sweetman, “Secret New UAS Shows Stealth, Efficiency Advances,” Aviation Week, December 6, 2013, <https://aviationweek.com/defense/secret-new-uas-shows-stealth-efficiency-advances>.
5 For example, see Deagel.com, “55Zh6M Nebo-M,” February 8, 2019, <www.deagel.com/Sensor-Systems/55Zh6M-Nebo-M_a002724001.aspx>.
6 “Triangulation” refers to techniques using dispersed sensors to locate an object that emits or reflects signals. A more precise location can be found where multiple, independent detections intersect.
7 For more information, see Justin Bronk, “Modern Russian and Chinese Integrated Air Defences Systems,” RUSI Occasional Paper, November/December 2019.
8 Author interviews with senior US Air Force officers, Washington, DC, February and July 2019.
9 A “flying wing” is an airframe without a tail or extended nose section, such as the B-2 Spirit or RQ-170. A “cranked kite” is a trapezoidal aircraft shape, such as the Northrop Grumman X-47B.
10 For example, see details in Michael T. Klare, “An ‘Arms Race in Speed’: Hypersonic Weapons and the Changing Calculus of Battle,” Arms Control Today, June 2019, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-06/features/arms-race-speed-hypersonic-weapons-changing-calculus-battle>.
11 Gareth Jennings and William Lloyd, “RAF Sets out Hypersonic Weapons and Propulsion Plans,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 17, 2019, <www.janes.com/article/89919/raf-sets-out-hypersonic-weapons-and-propulsion-plans>.
12 Subsonic cruise at Mach 0.92 at sea level takes over thirty minutes to cover 400 km, according to the author’s calculations. For S-400 range and system data see “S-400 Triumph Air Defence Missile System,” Army Technology, <www.army-technology.com/projects/s-400-triumph-air-defence-missile-system>.
13 For example, see “9M730 Kinzhal—Dagger / Product 75 / Product 715,” GlobalSecurity.org, February 10, 2018, <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/9m730.htm>.
14 Eleven out of nineteen test shots under predictable conditions have been recorded as successful for GBI since 1999. This is significantly lower than for theater-based missile defense systems deployed by the United States. See Missile Defence Agency, “Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record,” September 2019, <www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/testrecord.pdf>.
15 The “kill chain” is a military term for the sequence of events required to guide a weapon to a target successfully. The target must be first detected, then identified, then tracked with sufficient resolution to guide a weapon either directly into it, or close enough for a terminally guided weapon to acquire it with a nose-mounted sensor. Any break in this chain of events—often handled by different systems, often on different platforms—is likely to prevent a successful kill.
16 For example, a stealth fighter that is very difficult to detect in the X and S bands of the radar spectrum is often much more visible in the Ku and L bands, as well as in IR and EO in some cases. “Sensor fusion” is the term often used to describe an approach where an aircraft or other platform has the ability to automatically cross-reference and compare the data from multiple sensors operating in different parts of the spectrum in real time to try and get the best out of each part while compensating for the drawbacks of relying on each individual sensor alone.
17 See details on NIFC-CA and Cooperative Engagement Capability in Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Carrier Group in Recent UFO Encounters Had New Air Defense Tech like Nimitz in 2004 Incident,” The Warzone, May 30, 2019, <www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/28305/carrier-group-in-recent-ufo-encounters-had-new-air-defense-tech-just-like-nimitz-in-2004-incident>.
18 For Divine Eagle, see Sean O’Connor, “Divine Eagle UAV Spotted at China’s Malan Airbase,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 14, 2018, <www.janes.com/article/84585/divine-eagle-uav-spotted-at-china-s-malan-airbase>.
19 Patrick Chisan Hew, “New Paths from Sensor to Shooter: How Digitization Can Change the Formability and Topology of Information Flows in Systems that Acquire and Prosecute Targets, Australian Government Department of Defence,” Rockingham, October 2017, <www.dst.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DST-Group-TR-3417.pdf>.
20 Such as those pursued as a core part of not only the US NIFC-CA, but also the US Air Force’s Airborne Battle Management System and US-Army-centric Multi-Domain Operations concepts. For more information see Justin Bronk, The Future of NATO Airpower (London: Routledge, 2020).
21 Author interviews with subject-matter experts in Washington, DC, July 2019.
22 John Tatum, “HPM DEWs and Their Effects on Electronic Targets,” DSIAC Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2017), <www.dsiac.org/resources/journals/dsiac/summer-2017-volume-4-number-3/hpm-dews-and-their-effects-electronic-targets>.
23 Sydney Freedberg, “Lasers, Hypersonics, & AI: Mike Griffin’s Killer Combo,” Breaking Defense, March 20, 2019, <https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/lasers-hypersonics-ai-mike-griffins-killer-combo/>.
24 Author interviews with SMEs in Washington DC, July 2019.
25 “High Powered Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP),” GlobalSecurity.org, April 14, 2018, <www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/champ.htm>.