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ABSTRACT
Conventional long-range strike weapons of US allies may exacerbate Chinese concerns about the survivability of its small nuclear arsenal against a precision pre-emptive strike from the US-led coalition, although the degree of the new threat depends on various factors including the numbers and types of such weapons to be deployed. Conventional hypersonic missiles, in particular, may generate acute threat perception, as they can play the role of “door kicker” against China’s so-called anti-access, area-denial capabilities and pave the way for subsequent massive strikes with more traditional weapons. The development of conventional long-range-strike weapons by US allies also affects the risk of conventional conflicts escalating inadvertently to the nuclear level. Such risks are particularly salient in the Asia–Pacific region because of at least two factors: the ambiguous role of Chinese theater nuclear weapons and significant entanglement of conventional and nuclear capabilities at the theater level. Such conventional capabilities of US allies also help shape the region’s overall military balance—something China treats as part of its broader understanding of the term “strategic stability.” Regional players, however, have competing visions about what constitutes a stable military balance. They also have conflicting interpretations of why other parties are pursuing conventional long-range-strike weapons. The development of such capabilities will pose growing challenges to regional strategic stability in the future.
Notes
1 Chinese experts have written extensively on how US allies migh help undermine China’s nuclear second-strike capabilities. See, for example, Wang Yifeng and Ye Jing, “Cong zhongri heqianting Shijian kan wo heqianting de tufang” [Lessons for China’s nuclear submarine penetration from the Sino-Japanese nuclear submarine incident], Jianzai wuqi [Shipboard Weapon], No. 3 (2005), pp. 45–51; Liu Chong, “Meiguo yunniang zaihan bushu ‘sade’ xitong wenti bianxi” [Analysis of US plan to deploy Thaad system in South Korea], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 5 (2015), pp. 13–22. All Chinese translations by the author.
2 Permanent Mission of The People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, “Statement by Ambassador Fu Cong on Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons at the Informal Meetings of the Conference on Disarmament,” <www.china-un.ch/eng/hom/t1274921.htm>; Yao Yunzhu. “China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy,” China–US Focus, April 22, 2013, <www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-will-not-change-its-no-first-use-policy>.
3 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Counterforce Strike: An Option for Damage Limitation in Conflicts with Nuclear-Armed Adversaries?” Science & Global Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), pp. 195–222, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2011.616146>
4 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 5 (2016), pp. 31–4.
5 Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review’s New Missions,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2005), pp. 84–126.
6 Joshua H. Pollack, “Boost-Glide Weapons and US–China Strategic Stability,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2015), pp. 155–64.
7 Mei Yong and Lv Linmei, “Guowai jingquezhidaodanyao fazhan dui zhongyao junshisheshi de weixie” [Threat to major military installations imposed by the development of foreign precision-guided munitions], Zhanshudaodan jishu [Tactical Missile Technology], No. 3 (2018), pp. 12–18.
8 Riqiang Wu, “China’s Calculus after the Inf Treaty,” East Asia Forum, May 8, 2019, <www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/05/08/chinas-calculus-after-the-inf-treaty/>.
9 Wang Hongguang, “Ruhe yingdui mei zai yatai bushu zhongdao” [How to respond to the US deployment of intermediate range missiles in the Asia–Pacific], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], August 9, 2019, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKm4SW>.
10 Jacob Cohn, Timothy A. Walton, Adam Lemon, and Toshi Yoshihara, “Leveling the Playing Field: Reintroducing U.S. Theater-Range Missiles in a Post-Inf World,” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019), <https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Leveling_the_Playing_Field_web_Final_1.pdf>.
11 Mike Yeo, “Japan Unveils Its Hypersonic Weapons Plans,” Defense News, <www.defensenews.com/industry/techwatch/2020/03/13/japan-unveils-its-hypersonic-weapons-plans/>.
12 Ministry of Defense, “Defense of Japan 2019,” 2019, pp. 57–86.
13 Japan Times, “Japan Weighs Acquiring Cruise Missiles amid Ongoing North Korean Provocations,” May 6, 2017, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/05/06/national/politics-diplomacy/pacifist-japan-might-acquire-cruise-missiles-strike-north-korea-source/>.
14 Yang Jinlong and Lin Xubin, “Riben gaosu/gaochaoshengsu daodan jihua fenxi” [Analysis of Japan’s supersonic and hypersonic missile plans], Feihang daodan [Cruise Missile], No. 1 (2019), pp. 27–30.
15 Sugio Takahashi, Rebuilding Deterrence: Post-2015 Defense Guidelines Challenges Facing the U.S.–Japan Alliance (Washington DC: Project 2049 Institute, 2015), p. 5, <https://project2049.net/2015/05/21/rebuilding-deterrence-post-2015-defense-guidelines-challenges-facing-the-u-s-japan-alliance/>.
16 Gregory Kulacki, “Nuclear Hawks Take the Reins in Tokyo,” All Things Nuclear, February 16, 2018, <https://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/nuclear-hawks-take-the-reins-in-tokyo>.
17 Wu Riqiang, “Meiguo yatai fandaoxitong dui zhongguo anquan de yingxiang ji zhongguo de duice” [US Asia–Pacific missile defense systems’ impact on China’s security and China’s countermeasures], in Wang Jisi, ed., Zhongguo guoji zhanlue pinglun 2014 [China International Strategy Review 2014] (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), pp. 333–43.
18 Ibid., p. 332.
19 Chen Li and Xue Hui, “Luji zhousidun xitong fandao nengli yanjiu” [Analysis of the anti-missile capabilities of land-based Aegis system], Feihang daodan [Aerodynamic Missile Journal], No. 12 (2018), pp. 73–77. Even if such interceptors have a theoretical capability to hit longer-range targets, they may still face other technical challenges, including the discrimination problem.
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21 Souhu Junshi [Sohu Military], “Guochan hangmu rengwei huayue qifei: zhuyao renwu shi yanhu heqianting chuhai” [Domestically made aircraft carrier will still use ski-jump take-off: main mission is to cover nuclear submarine at sea], April 25, 2015, <http://mt.sohu.com/20150425/n411878233.shtml>.
22 Wang Dake, “Zhongguo hezhengce yu hexinliyi” [China’s nuclear policy and core interests], Dongfang zaobao [Oriental Morning Post], January 17, 2013, <www.china.org.cn/chinese/2013-01/18/content_27725872.htm>; Wang Hongguang, “Ruhe yingdui mei zai yatai bushu zhongdao” [How to respond to the US deployment of intermediate range missiles in Asia–Pacific], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], August 9, 2019, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKm4SW>.
23 There is uncertainty about whether China’s short-range ballistic missiles such as the DF-15 are conventional only or also nuclear capable. See, for example, Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 4 (2019), p. 172, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511>.
24 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, “Report of China on the Implementation of NPT, for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” <www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/chinaandun/disarmament_armscontrol/npt/t196288.htm>.
25 Kristin Huang, “China’s Hypersonic Df-17 Missile Threatens Regional Stability, Analyst Warns,” South China Morning Post, August 23, 2019, <www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3023972/chinas-hypersonic-df-17-missile-threatens-regional-stability>.
26 Ankit Panda, “Introducing the Df-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” The Diplomat, December 28, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/>.
27 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” May 2, 2019, pp. 44, 117, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf>; David Lague and Benjamin Kang Lim, “New Missile Gap Leaves U.S. Scrambling to Counter China,” Reuters, April 25, 2019, <www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-rockets/>.
28 For an in-depth discussion on the issue of conventional–nuclear entanglement, see, for example, James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2018), pp. 56–99, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320>; James M. Acton, Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, Petr Topychkanov, Tong Zhao, and Li Bin, Entanglement: Chinese and Russian Perspectives on Non-nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/11/08/entanglement-chinese-and-russian-perspectives-on-non-nuclear-weapons-and-nuclear-risks-pub-73162>.
29 Wang Changqin and Fang Guangming, “Women weishenme yao fazhan Dongfeng-26 dandaodaodan” [Why we need to develop DF-26 ballistic missiles], Zhongguo qingnianbao [China Youth Daily], November 23, 2015, <www.chinamil.com.cn/jskj/2015-11/24/content_6790616_2.htm>; Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 4 (2019), p. 174, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511>.
30 Takeshi Iwayaa, Japan’s National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2019), <www.csis.org/analysis/japans-national-defense-strategy>; Alina Ragge, Japan: Plans for Electronic-Warfare and Hypersonic Capabilities (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), <www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/12/japan-plans-hypersonic-capabilities>.
31 Private conversations with senior Australian experts, August 2019.
32 Ralph Jennings, “Taiwan Improves Missiles to Counter China Military Expansion,” Associated Press, August 18, 2018, <https://apnews.com/be60ca810d63406d87e410dd5103ab6b/Taiwan-improves-missiles-to-counter-China-military-expansion>; Denny Roy, “Taiwan Perilously Ponders Its Strategic Missile Force,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 6, 2006, <https://jamestown.org/program/taiwan-perilously-ponders-its-strategic-missile-force/>.
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34 Shou Xiaosong, Zhanlue xue [The science of military strategy] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 2013), pp. 70, 113.
35 Kenneth P. Ekman, “Applying Cost Imposition Strategies against China,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2015, pp. 26–59, <www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-09_Issue-1/ekman.pdf>.
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