Proliferation and threats of reconnaissance-strike systems: a Russian perspective

ABSTRACT

Russian military officials, scholars, and politicians have long been aware of reconnaissance-strike systems, and have developed a sophisticated set of military countermeasures, as well as a number of weapons with roughly the same traits. Russia monitors the ongoing proliferation of such weapons in Europe and sometimes uses it for political purposes, but general planning remains focused on the capabilities of the United States and NATO. Arms-control measures within this domain seem to be hardly possible right now, although there are several options that policy makers might consider useful, including unilateral transparency measures. The prospect of rapid development and massive deployment of new intermediate-range missiles in Europe in the mode of yet another conventional precision weapon must drive the search for advanced security-architecture ideas. Most of all, communication, including military to military, is essential for avoiding misperceptions and eventual incidents that could easily spark an all-out conflict.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• United States
• NATO
• precision-strike
• arms control
• intermediate-range ballistic missiles
• hypersonic missiles
• reconnaissance-strike systems
• strategic balance

Notes

1 When, in the 1970s, the United States opted to field more advanced weaponry as a way to offset the superior Soviet conventional capability. The older term for this strategy, or one of them, was “follow-on forces attack,” meaning the development of capabilities to hit enemy reinforcements (“follow-on forces”) before they reached the forward edge of battle. See, e.g., Robert Tomes, “The Cold War Offset Strategy: Assault Breaker and the Beginning of the RSTA Revolution,” War on the Rocks, November 20, 2014, <https://warontherocks.com/2014/11/the-cold-war-offset-strategy-assault-breaker-and-the-beginning-of-the-rsta-revolution/>.

2 Jeffrey Collins and Andrew Futter, “Reflecting on the Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for the Use of Force Today,” Valdai Paper #41, January 12, 2016 <http://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/reflecting-on-the-revolution-in-military-affairs-implications-for-the-use-of-force/>.

3 Sergey Shoygu, “Armiya Rossii kardinal’no obnovlena” [Russian army dramatically revamped], transcript the speech at an expanded meeting of the Committee on Defense of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, March 11, 2019, <http://redstar.ru/armiya-rossii-kardinalno-obnovlena/>

4 Andrew F. Krepinevich and Jacob Cohn, “Rethinking Armageddon,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), March 1, 2016, pp. 5–6.

5 See Dennis M. Gormley, “The Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions: Dealing with American Conventional Superiority,” Proliferation Papers, Fall 2009, <www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp29gormley1.pdf>.

6 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda. “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, May 2019, <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>.

7 Mark Gunzinger and Bryan Clark, “Sustaining America’s Precision Strike Advantage,” June 23, 2015, CSBA, p. 9.

8 Eugene Miasnikov, “Long-Range Precision-Guided Conventional Weapons: Implications for Strategic Balance, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation, ” in Anatoli S. Diakov, Timur T. Kadyshev, and Eugene V. Miasnikov, eds., Further Reduction of Nuclear Weapons (Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, 2010), <www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/em090918.pdf>.

9 Reporting on a joint Russian–Chinese briefing on missile-defense issues held on the sidelines of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, October 30, 2017; Sputnik News, “US Global Missile Defenses Provoke New Spiral of Arms Race—Russian MoD,” December 10, 2017, <https://sputniknews.com/world/201710131058186800-usa-global-missile-defences-arms-race/>.

10 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2018/19), pp. 7–52.

11 <http://dictionary.mil.ru/dictionary>.

12 NATO, “Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance”, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111830.htm>; NATO, “Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)”, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48892.htm>.

13 South China Morning Post, “The Space Erase: US Military Goes Back to Basics as It Prepares for War without GPS or Other Satellite Technology,” December 19, 2017, <www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/2124922/space-erase-us-military-goes-back-basics-it-prepares>.

14 V. Saperov and A. Maltsev, “Analiz informatsionnogo obespecheniya primeneniya visokotochnogo oruzhiya bol’shoy dal’nosti vooruzhennykh sil SShA” [Analysis of the information support for the use of high-precision long-range weapons of the US armed forces], Vestnik AVN [Bulletin of Academy of Military Sciences], Vol. 3, No. 24 (2008), pp. 56–59, author’s translation.

15 Ibid.

16 Dan Gettinger and Arthur Holland Michel, “Loitering Munitions,” Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, 2017, <https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2017/02/CSD-Loitering-Munitions.pdf>.

17 Scott Crino and Andy Dreby, “Drone Technology Proliferation in Small Wars,” Small Wars Journal, February 10, 2019, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drone-technology-proliferation-small-wars>.

18 <www.iai.co.il/p/harop>.

19 <https://tactical_terms.academic.ru/1267/%D0%A1%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%82-%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8F%D0%B4>.

20 Roman Kretsul and Alexei Ramm, “Bespilotnyy nalyot: voiska nauchat otrazhat’ massoviye ataki dronov” [Unmanned raid: forces will be educated to repel massive drone attacks], Izvestia, November 12, 2018, <https://iz.ru/805317/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/bespilotnyi-nalet-voiska-nauchatsia-otrazhat-massovye-ataki-dronov>.

21 Andrey Kartopolov, speech at Moscow Conference on International Security, organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense, April 16–17, 2015, <http://mil.ru/pubart.htm?id=12016311@cmsArticle>.

22 Alexander Grushko, comments after Russia–NATO council meeting, December 26, 2016, <https://missiontonato.mid.ru/news/-/asset_publisher/gdqAUFFm9oOL/content/videomost-mia-rossia-segodna-s-ucastiem-postpreda-rossii-pri-nato-aleksandr-grusko-26-dekabra-2016-g->.

23 Kyle Rempfer, “Air Force MQ-9 Reaper Drones Based in Poland Are Now Fully Operational,” Air Force Times, March 5, 2019, < www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/03/05/air-force-mq-9-reaper-drones-based-in-poland-are-now-fully-operational/>.

24 Voyenno-promyshlennyy kur’yer [Military-Industrial Courier], “Finlyandiya mozhet zakupit’ rossiyskiye OTRK” [Finland may buy Russian missile systems], April 8, 2014, <https://vpk-news.ru/news/19861>.

25 Vladimir Kornyushin, “Zdravyy smysl po-finski” [Finnish common sense], Kul’tura, September 1, 2014, <http://portal-kultura.ru/articles/world/58632-zdravyy-smysl-po-finski/>.

26 MFA Briefing, October 25, 2018, <www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-/asset_publisher/D2wHaWMCU6Od/content/id/3383326>.

27 US Department of Defense (DoD), “Contracts for June 24, 2019,” <www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/1885753/>.

28 Yuri Zverev, “‘Povodok dlya Varshavy’: SShA privyazivayut Pol’shu k svoyemu oruzhiyu” [“A leash for Warsaw”: the US ties Poland to its weapons], Eurasia.Expert, March 3, 2019, <https://eurasia.expert/ssha-privyazyvayut-polshu-k-svoemu-oruzhiyu/>.

29 Reuters, “Russia Asks U.S. for Missile Moratorium as Nuclear Pact Ends,” August 2, 2019, <www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-arms-moratorium/russia-asks-u-s-for-missile-moratorium-as-nuclear-pact-ends-idUSKCN1US13M>.

30 Valery Gerasimov, at the Russian Defence Ministry’s board session, November 7, 2017, <http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12149743@egNews>.

31 TASS, “Corvette Gremyashchiy to Carry Tsirkon Hypersonic Missiles, Says Putin,” October 31, 2019, <https://tass.com/defense/1086428>.

32 Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, “Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu,” February 2, 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59763>.

33 Krasnaya Zvezda, “Zaschitniki neba uverenno smotryat v buduscheye” [Defenders of the sky look into the future with confidence], interview with Colonel Yuri Muravkin, deputy head of surface-to-air-missile forces of the Aerospace Forces, July 8, 2019, <http://redstar.ru/zashhitniki-neba-uverenno-smotryat-v-budushhee/>.

34 Nikolay Portopopov, “Veyer raket: smozhet li novaya sistema PVO otpugnut’ ot Rossii aviatsiyu NATO” [Fan of missiles: will the new air-defense system be able to scare NATO aviation off Russia], Russian Information Agency (RIA), April 16, 2019, <https://ria.ru/20190416/1552709716.html>

35 Krasnaya Zvezda, “Zontik nad Rossiyei v krepkikh rukakh” [Umbrella over Russia is in the strong hands], interview with Major-General S.Babakov, head of surface-to-air-missile forces of the Aerospace Forces, July 8, 2020, <http://redstar.ru/zontik-nad-rossiej-v-krepkih-rukah/>.

36 S.A. Chizhov, V.V. Nemirovskiy, and I.A. Lipatnikov, “Strel’ba ZRS S-300V po nestrategicheskim ballisticheskim raketam” [S-300V surface-to-air missile system employment agains non-strategic ballistic missiles], Sovremennye problemy proektirovaniya, proizvodstva i ekspluatacii radiotekhnicheskih system [Current Issues of Design, Production and Operation of Radio Technical Systems], Vol. 10 (2016), pp. 112–13.

37 New Defence Order Strategy, “1L269 Krasukha-2,” <https://dfnc.ru/katalog-vooruzhenij/rls-sprn-i-pvo/1l269-krasuha-2/>.

38 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Spetsialisty RKhBZ VVO skryli krupnyy transportnyy uzel ot uslovnogo aviacionnogo udara v Amurskoy oblasti” [CBRN troops of the Eastern MD concealed major transport hub from provisional air strike in the Amur region], August 25, 2018, <https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12192638@egNews>.

39 Roman Kretsul and Alexei Ramm, “Plan ‘Perekhvat’: goroda poluchat protivoraketnuyu oboronu” [Intercept plan: cities will receive missile defense], Izvestia, October 3, 2018, <https://iz.ru/795323/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/plan-perekhvat-goroda-poluchat-protivoraketnuiu-oboronu>.

40 Anna Potekhina, “Zagorizontnyy ryvok Rossii” [Russian leap over horizon], Krasnaya Zvezda, December 4, 2013, <http://archive.redstar.ru/index.php/ami-2015/item/13117-zagorizontnyj-ryvok-rossii>.

41 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Konteiner Newest Over-the-Horizon Detection Radar to Take on Combat Alert Duty in 2019,” January 8, 2019, <http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12211157@egNews>.

42 RIA Novosti, “Kirill Makarov: obnaruzhim lyubuyu MBR, i agressora nastignet otvetnyy udar” [Kirill Makarov: We will detect any ICBM and the aggressor will receive a retaliatory strike], interview with the General Director of the Scientific and Research Institute for Long-Distance Radio Communications (NIIDAR), October 30, 2019, <https://ria.ru/20191030/1560349595.html>.

43 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Raschety RLS zagorizontnogo obnaruzheniya ‘Kontejner’ zastupili na boevoe dezhurstvo v 2019 godu” [The Konteiner over-the-horizon radar unit took up combat duty in 2019, December 1, 2019, <https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12264487@egNews>.

44 Valery Gerasimov, “Vektory razvitiya voyennoi stratyegii” [Military strategy development vectors], speech at the General Meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences, March 2, 2019, <http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/>.

45 Sergei Karaganov and Dmitry Suslov, “The New Understanding and Ways to Strengthen Multilateral Strategic Stability,” Higher School of Economics University, September 2019, <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/report_strategic-stability.pdf>.

46 Ibid.

47 Sergey Oznobishev and Konstantin Bogdanov, “Precise Long-Range Weapons in Europe: Problems of Limitation and Control,” World Economy and International Relations, Vol. 63, No. 9 (2019), pp. 5–13.