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ABSTRACT
South Korea’s sustained pursuit of conventional precision-strike capabilities and greater autonomy in military decision making is reshaping strategic-stability dynamics between its nuclear-armed ally, the United States, and its nuclear-armed adversary, North Korea. For the last decade, advances in conventional, precision-strike missiles in both Koreas have accompanied reciprocal threats of pre-emption and attacks on leaders, creating a new pathway for a crisis to escalate into a war. Given US security guarantees to South Korea, and North Korea’s development of a nuclear arsenal to deter the United States, any large-scale armed conflict in Korea is liable to involve the use of nuclear weapons. The traditional concern of the alliance with the quality of extended deterrence should be broadened to reflect an understanding of this triangular stability dynamic.
Notes
1 This article draws in part upon two working papers previously published online: Joshua H. Pollack, “The Emergence of an American/Korean Strategic Triangle,” Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Cornell University, May 1, 2016, <https://web.archive.org/web/20160617153915/https://pacs.einaudi.cornell.edu/sites/pacs/files/Pollack.Revised%20US%20Korean%20strategic%20stability.final_.pdf>; Joshua H. Pollack, “Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat,” Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland, College Park, January 2, 2017, <https://spp.umd.edu/sites/default/files/2019-07/Paper%204%20-%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Defense%20in%20South%20Korea.pdf>.
2 This article’s account of South Korean and American views is based on multiple conversations with current and former officials from both countries over the past decade’s time.
3 Lee Dong-kwan, Dojeonui naldeul seonggonghan daetonglyeong mandeulgi (2007–2013): Lee Dong-kwan hoegolog [Days of challenges to make a great president (2007–2013): Lee Dong-kwan’s memoir], (Paju: Nanam Publishing House Corp., 2015), pp. 212–14. See also: “Ex-President Lee ordered all-out retaliation after North’s Yeonpyeong bombardment in 2010,” Yonhap News, December 13, 2015, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20151213000900315>.
4 Joint Communiqué of the 38th US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, Washington, DC, October 20, 2006, para. 9.
5 For a critical portrayal of how nationalism in South Korea shaped the initial OPCON transfer decision, see: Taewoo Kim, “The Korean Position on Alliance Formation and the Change of Public Trust between Korea and the United States: The Cheonan Incident and the OPCON Issue,” International Journal of Korean Studies (Fall 2010), Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 147–59. For additional background, see also: Clint Work, “The Long History of South Korea’s OPCON Debate,” The Diplomat, November 1, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/the-long-history-of-south-koreas-opcon-debate/>.
6 Address by President Moon Jae-in on the 69th Armed Forces Day, September 28, 2017, <www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=149818&pageIndex=1>. The original Korean-language text appears at: <www1.president.go.kr/articles/1162>.
7 For an overview of problems in Japan-ROK relations surrounding the GSOMIA stumble, see: Seongho Sheen and Jina Kim, “What Went Wrong with the ROK-Japan Military Pact?” Asia Pacific Bulletin, July 31, 2012, No. 176, <www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/what-went-wrong-the-rok-japan-military-pact>.
8 Reiji Yoshida and Satoshi Sugiyama, “GSOMIA survives as South Korea reverses decision to exit intel pact with Japan,” Japan Times, November 22, 2019, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/22/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-south-korea-gsomia-talks/#.XkQpURNKh-U>.
9 Richard Weitz, “South Korea’s Defense Industry: Increasing Domestic Capabilities and Global Opportunities,” in Nicholas Hamisevicz, ed., On Korea 2014: Academic Paper Series, Vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2014), pp. 43–60.
10 Zhong Sheng [Voice of China], “China will never compromise its security interests in THAAD deployment,” People’s Daily, August 4, 2016, <http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0804/c98649-9095345.html>.
11 Sunggul Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” in Byungkook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 483–512.
12 Nicholas Seltzer, “Baekgom: The development of South Korea’s first ballistic missile,” Nonproliferation Review, No. 26, Vol 3-4 (2019), pp. 289–327.
13 Daniel Pinkston, “The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional Stability,” International Crisis Group, October 25, 2012, <www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/new-south-korean-missile-guidelines-and-future-prospects-regional-stability>; Jeffrey Lewis, “ROK Missile Rationale Roulette,” Arms Control Wonk, October 9, 2012, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205771/rok-missile-rationale-roulette/>.
14 Byun Duk-kun, “Moon, Trump agree to build up deterrence, urge N. Korea to give up nukes,” Yonhap News, November 7, 2017, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20171107012553315>.
15 Pinkston, “The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional Stability.”
16 South Korea’s MND began to release launch videos periodically in April 2012. See: <www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL5RrE-NNoZa0Laiqpl0x8T8O5rkKH75Sy>. For photographs of the 2013 parade, see: “South Korea’s biggest military parade for 10 years,” Daily Telegraph, October 1, 2013 (slideshow), <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/10346381/South-Koreas-biggest-military-parade-for-10-years.html?frame=2688622>.
17 Daniel Pinkston, “South Korean Response to North Korean July Missile Exercise Includes Unveiling of New Cruise Missile,” WMD Insights, October 2006, pp. 24–27.
18 “Seoul Deploys Home-Grown Cruise Missiles,” Chosun Ilbo, July 19, 2010, <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/07/19/2010071900309.html>.
19 “Gugbanggaehyeog 307gyehoeg beuliping” [Briefing of Defense Reform Plan 307], Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea, March 9, 2011, <www.korea.kr/news/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=155726992>; “(LEAD) Defense chief unveils plans to reform military, enhance interoperability,” Yonhap News, March 8, 2011, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20110308011300315>.
20 Hong Kyu-dok, “The ROK Announces its Defense Reform Basic Plan 2012-2030,” Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, ROK Angle: Korea’s Defense Policy, Issue 74, October 4, 2012, p. 2.
21 Kyle Mizokami, “Why North Korea Is so Scared of South Korea's Mighty Air Force,” National Interest, September 2017 (republished February 10, 2020), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-north-korea-so-scared-south-koreas-mighty-air-force-121941>.
22 Kim Dae-young, “[Dandog] KFX jangchagyong janggeoli gongdaeji misail tamsaeggaebal LIGnegseuwon seonjeong” [[Exclusive] LIGNex1 chosen for development of long-range air-to-surface missile to be carried by KFX], Biz Hankook, January 22, 2019, <www.bizhankook.com/bk/article/17036?fb_comment_id=2035234016592170_2036036146511957>.
23 “S. Korea’s new missile guideline big step forward in deterring N. Korea: analysts,” Yonhap News, October 7, 2012, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20121007002700315>.
24 Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea, U.S. agree to set N. Korean nuclear deterrence policy by 2014,” Yonhap News, October 25, 2012, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20121024006651315>.
25 “Who Has His Finger on the Nuclear Button in N.Korea?” Chosun Ilbo, February 23, 2012, <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/02/23/2012022301441.html>; “N.Korea Appoints New Head of Missile Force,” Chosun Ilbo, June 15, 2012, <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/06/15/2012061500978.html>.
26 “Rep. of Korea Ballistic, Cruise Missile,” Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, April 19, 2012, <https://youtu.be/OCqdArVLFoY>; “Gun, bug-jeonyeog tagyeog ganeung keulujeumisail gaebal baechi” [Military deploys cruise missiles capable of reaching all parts of North Korea], Yonhap News, April 19, 2012, <www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20120419064300043>.
27 Jeong Yong-soo and Ser Myo-ja, “South, U.S. upgrade joint war plan to repel North,” Joongang Ilbo, August 26, 2015, <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3008407>.
28 Park Byong-su, “S. Korean and US militaries draw up a new operation plan,” Hankyoreh, August 28, 2015, <http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/706442.html>.
29 “S. Korea unveils plan to raze Pyongyang in case of signs of nuclear attack,” Yonhap News, September 11, 2016, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20160911000500315>.
30 2016 Defense White Paper, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2017, pp. 69–70.
31 Ibid., pp. 71–72. The November 2017 agreement between Seoul and Washington to remove all payload limits from South Korea’s missile forces could be related to the development of these “large-capacity, high-performance” warheads. See: Yeo Jun-suk, “Seoul seeks to develop ‘Frankenmissile’ targeting North Korea: sources,” Korea Herald, September 5, 2017, <www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170905000841>.
32 “8th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue,” <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Press_Statement_8th_KIDD_Sep24_OSD_FINAL.pdf>.
33 2018 Defense White Paper, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2019, pp. 68–69.
34 Lee Myeong-jo, “Bughan jangsajeong misailgaebal wihyeob” [North Korea’s threat of long-range artillery development], Yonhap News, December 15, 1994, <https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=001&aid=0003833517>; Heo Yong-beom, “Bug nodongilho naenyeonbaechi ganeungseong” [North Korea’s Nodong-1 possibly to be deployed next year], Chosun Ilbo, November 12, 1996, <https://newslibrary.chosun.com/view/article_view.html?id=2353919961112m1016&set_date=19961112&page_no=1>.
35 Kim Hee-seob, “Seoulsanggong jeonche bangeo 5gae podae 320bal pilyo” [5 batteries and 320 missiles are required to cover the whole airspace of Seoul], Chosun Ilbo, April 13, 1994, <https://newslibrary.chosun.com/view/article_view.html?id=2265719940413m1057&set_date=19940413&page_no=5>.
36 You Yong-won, “Paeteulieoteu 97nyeon doib” [To introduce Patriot in 1997], Chosun Ilbo, February 21, 1996, <https://newslibrary.chosun.com/view/article_view.html?id=2260919940221m10110&set_date=19940221&page_no=1>.
37 You Yong-won, “Leoje misail doibgeomto” [Examining Russian missiles to purchase], Chosun Ilbo, February 21, 1996, <https://newslibrary.chosun.com/view/article_view.html?id=2329119960221m1012&set_date=19960221&page_no=1>; Kim Do-hyeong, “Mugigumae allyeog saegugmyeon” [A new phase of discords over arms purchase], Hankyoreh, May 12, 1997, p 2.
38 Koo Seong-jae, “Mileo gamjeongdaelib” [US·Russian confrontation of feelings], Chosun Ilbo, April 11, 1997, <https://newslibrary.chosun.com/view/article_view.html?id=2367919970411m1028&set_date=19970411&page_no=2>.
39 You Yong-won, “Chasedae misailsaeob ppalli chujin” [To push forward SAM-X as soon as possible], Chosun Ilbo, December 8, 1998, <https://newslibrary.chosun.com/view/article_view.html?id=2423419981208m1021&set_date=19981208&page_no=2>; “Korea likely to scrap or delay missile procurement project,” Korea Herald, April 27, 2002, <https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=108&oid=044&aid=0000029582> ; Yun Sang-ho, “Chagiyudomugisaeob 3wolbuteo jaechujin” [SAM-X to re-start from March], Donga Ilbo, January 24, 2003, <https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=020&aid=0000175339>.
40 An overview and discussion appear in: Rex R. Kiziah, “US-Led Cooperative Theater Missile Defense in Northeast Asia,” U.S. Air War College, Maxwell Paper No. 21, July 2000, <www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep13744.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A84dd04e0d9a6845fd6d96e96d66c99b>.
41 Nam Mun-hui, “Hangug, PAC3 misail guibhae TMD gyehoegchamyeo?” [Will the ROK Participate in the Theater Missile Defense Plan with the Purchase of PAC-3 Missiles?], Sisa Journal, August 26, 1999, <www.sisajournal.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=88116>.
42 “‘Hangughyeong misail bangeochegye’ bongyeog chujin” [S.Korea Plans Affordable Missile Defense Shield], Chosun Ilbo, December 21, 2006, <https://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2006/12/21/2006122100162.html>.
43 Jung Sung-ki, “Seoul Begins Deploying Patriot Missile Interceptors,” Korea Times, September 16, 2008, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/09/205_31122.html>; Jung Sung-ki, “Seoul Takes Over 1st Batch of German Patriot Missiles,” Korea Times, November 28, 2008, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/11/117_35268.html>.
44 Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korea Opposes Joining US Missile Defense System,” Korea Times, January 3, 2008, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/01/205_16642.html>.
45 Jung Sung-ki, “Israeli Radar to Track N. Korean Missiles,” Korea Times, February 15, 2009, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/02/113_39599.html>; “Israeli Radar Chosen for Missile Defense,” Korea Times, September 17, 2009, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/06/113_52006.html>.
46 Joint Communiqué of the 44th US–ROK Security Consultative Meeting, Washington, DC, October 24, 2012, pp. 2–3; Joint Communiqué of 45th US–ROK Security Consultative Meeting, October 2, 2013, Seoul, para. 7; Joint Communiqué of the 46th US–ROK Security Consultative Meeting, October 23, 2014, Washington, DC, para. 7; Joint Communiqué of the 47th US–ROK Security Consultative Meeting, November 1, 2015, Seoul, para. 7.
47 “Interoperable missile defense architecture: official,” Yonhap News, February 21, 2015, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20150221000300315>.
48 “Patriot Missiles Useless as Radar Out of Order,” Chosun Ilbo, September 19, 2011, <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/09/19/2011091901021.html>; Yun Sang-ho, “‘Bug tandomisaile apeulo 10nyeongan sogsumuchaeg’ ilaneunde wae? [ROK is Reportedly Helpless Before North Korea's Ballistic Missiles Over the Next 10 Years, why?],” Donga Ilbo, October 3, 2011, <www.donga.com/news/article/all/20111003/40780069/1.
49 “S. Korea moves to upgrade Patriot defense system,” Yonhap News, October 18, 2012, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20121028000800315>.
50 Yun Sang-ho, “‘Bug tandomisaile apeulo 10nyeongan sogsumuchaeg’ ilaneunde wae?”
51 “ROK-U.S. Joint Announcement,” US Forces Korea, February 7, 2016.
52 “[Analysis] THAAD decision setting of a series of rancorous debates,” Hankyoreh, February 15, 2016, <www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/730404.html>; “S. Korea faces tough decision on THAAD,” Korea Herald, November 6, 2014, <www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20141106001119>.
53 “U.S. Pacific Command Deploys THAAD to Korean Peninsula,” US Pacific Command Public Affairs, March 6, 2017, <www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1104300/us-pacific-command-deploys-thaad-to-korean-peninsula/>.
54 “(4th LD) THAAD system deployment completed: S. Korea,” Yonhap News, September 7, 2017, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170907000355320>; Lee Tae-hoon and James Griffiths, “South Korea suspends THAAD deployment,” CNN, June 8, 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/07/asia/south-korea-thaad-suspended/index.html>; “Chronology of events leading to THAAD deployment,” Yonhap News, September 6, 2017, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170906009800315>.
55 Bob Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019), pp. 94–95.
56 “‘Kilchein’ deung 3chugchegye yongeo byeongyeong gun ‘jeonlyeogguchug jeongsang chujin’” [Three-axis system including ‘Kill Chain’ renamed: Military says ‘force improvement continues’], News One, January 10, 2019, <http://news1.kr/articles/?3521771>.
57 Kim Joo-hwan, “Gongsejeog daebug eogjejeonlyag bangan yeongu” [A study of offensive deterrence for coping with North Korea’s nuclear shadow strategy], Jeonlyagyeongu [Journal of Strategic Studies], Vol. 24, No. 1 (2017), pp. 179–209.
58 “Gun, geullobeolhokeu, F-35A deung sogsog doib” [Military continues to receive Global hawk, F-35A, and more], Donga Ilbo, December 4, 2019, <www.donga.com/news/article/all/20191204/98657390/1>.
59 “Army launches new ground command,” Korea Times, January 9, 2019, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/01/113_261734.html>.
60 Joint Communiqué of the 50th US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, Washington, DC, October 31, 2018, para. 9.
61 Lee Min-hyung, “Seoul, Washington to carry out drill led by ROK forces,” Korea Times, May 28, 2019, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/05/205_269636.html>; Oh Seok-min, “(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S. kick off combined military exercise despite N.K. warnings,” Yonhap News, August 5, 2019, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190805005951325>.
62 Alan J. Vick, Richard M. Moore, Bruce R. Pirnie, and John Stillion, Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets, MR-1398-AF, RAND Corporation, 2001; Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 62–74.
63 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea could soon take control of its own wartime operations from the US,” Defense News, November 1, 2018; Daniel Pinkston, “U.S.-ROK Alliance Management: OPCON Transition and ISR,” International Crisis Group, June 18, 2014, <www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/us-rok-alliance-management-opcon-transition-and-isr>.
64 “South Korea’s first Global Hawk spy plane arrives,” Korea Times, December 23, 2019, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/12/205_280771.html>; Jeff Jeong, “4 questions about South Korea’s weapons wish list,” Defense News, June 2, 2019; “S. Korea to begin spy satellite project this year,” Korea Herald, January 19, 2015, <www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150119001150>.
65 Jeong Chung-sin, “Geullobeolhokeu doibhaessjiman gamsijeongchaljasan yeojeonhi bujog” [Global Hawk arrived … but ISR assets still insufficient], Munhwa Ilbo, June 3, 2019, <www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2020060301070330114001>.
66 “[Dandog] jeonjaggwon jogijeonhwan handaneunde, 2025nyeonkkasji mi jeongchale uijon” [[Exclusive] despite the planned OPCON transition at early date, to rely on the US ISR until 2025], Maeil Kyeongje, April 2, 2019, <www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/view/2019/04/200760/>.
67 “S. Korea’s 2020 defense budget rises 7.4 pct to over 50 tln won,” Yonhap News, December 11, 2019.
68 Kim Kwangwoo, “Jeonmungabunseog: daehanmingug gugbangyesanui munjejeom” [Expert analysis: Problems of Republic of Korea’s military expenditure], Monthly Chosun, November 2015, <http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?ctcd=G&nNewsNumb=201511100021&page=9>; “Social Expenditure - Aggregated data,” Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG>.
69 “Military expenditure (% of GDP) – Korea, Rep.,” World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2018&locations=KR&most_recent_year_desc=false&start=2000>; “GDP growth (annual %)-Korea, Rep.,” World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2018&start=2010>; “Economic Outlook No 106-November 2019, Economic Projections,” OECD, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=61360>.
70 “KPA Supreme Command Warns Lee Myung Bak Group of Quick Action,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), April 23, 2012, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1451900300-881077744/kpa-supreme-command-warns-lee-myung-bak-group-of-quick-action/?t=1595629326173>.
71 The US Department of Defense currently defines close-range ballistic missiles as having a range of up to 300 km, and short-range ballistic missiles as having a range from 300 km to up to 1,000 km. See: National Air and Space Intelligence Center and Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, 2017 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, NASIC-1031-0985-17, June 2017, p. 9.
72 “DPRK’s Tactical Guided Missiles Will Continue to Be Launched: Spokesman for KPA Strategic Force,” KCNA, July 3, 2014, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1546466342-178538683/dprks-tactical-guided-missiles-will-continue-to-be-launched-spokesman-for-kpa-strategic-force/>.
73 “Crucial Statement of KPA Supreme Command,” KCNA, February 23, 2016, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1546391221-126346126/crucial-statement-of-kpa-supreme-command/>.
74 “KPA General Staff Warns U.S., S. Korean Forces of ‘Special Operation’,” KCNA, March 26, 2017, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1490511855-837037932/kpa-general-staff-warns-u-s-s-korean-forces-of-special-operation/?t=1594838857341>.
75 “U.S. War Hysteria Will Only Bring Miserable End of American Empire: Spokesman for KPA General Staff,” KCNA, August 9, 2017, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/278481/u-s-war-hysteria-will-only-bring-miserable-end-of-american-empire-spokesman-for-kpa-general-staff/>.
76 Joshua H. Pollack, “The limits of Kim’s patience: will North Korea test another missile soon?” NK Pro, May 31, 2019, <www.nknews.org/pro/the-limits-of-kims-patience-will-north-korea-test-another-missile-soon/>.
77 For an analytically serious portrayal of these risks in fiction, see: Jeffrey Lewis, The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States: A Speculative Novel (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018).
78 “Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018,” September 19, 2018, <www.ncnk.org/node/1633>; “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” September 19, 2018, <www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/agreement-implementation-historic-panmunjom-declaration-military-domain.pdf>.