![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Long-range conventional precision strike (LRS) has become a capability that even small, non-allied, but militarily advanced states such as Finland and Sweden can develop. The reasons for developing LRS are myriad, and, while they help solve some tactical and operational challenges brought on by developments in military technology, the capability also has implications for security policy and deterrence. In Finland’s case, LRS contributes to its national deterrence-by-denial approach and enables it to hold military targets deep in adversary territory at risk. An understanding of why Sweden—not a NATO member but equally concerned with capabilities developed by Russia—is only now developing LRS provides some insight into how LRS can contribute to a small state’s defense capabilities and deterrence.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Tom Plant, Miles Pomper, and Rhianna Tyson Kreger for introducing me to the project and for their helpful comments and patience in ensuring the article stayed on track and met expectations. While conclusions are the responsibility of the author, the article has benefitted greatly from insights and comments provided by Swedish and US civil servants and officers, as well as Finnish airpower experts and officers.
Notes
1 For example, see Nora Vanaga and Toms Rostoks, eds., Deterring Russia in Europe: Defence Strategies for Neighbouring States (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019); Juha Pyykönen and Stefan Forss, “Deterrence in the Nordic–Baltic Region: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together with the U.S. Army,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2019, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1415>; Svein Efjestad, “Security in Northern Europe: Deterrence, Defence and Dialogue,” Whitehall Paper, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2018, <https://rusi.org/publication/whitehall-papers/security-northern-europe-deterrence-defence-and-dialogue>; Karsten Friis, ed., NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century: An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit (London: Routledge, 2017).
2 Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund, and Michael Jonsson, “Bursting the Bubble: Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications,” FOI, March 2019, <www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4651--SE>.
3 Mikael Holmström, Den Dolda Alliansen: Sveriges Hemliga NATO-Förbindelser (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2015).
4 Charly Salonius-Pasternak, The Defence of Finland and Sweden: Continuity and Variance in Strategy and Public Opinion (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2018), <www.fiia.fi/julkaisu/the-defence-of-finland-and-sweden>.
5 Ibid.; Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Ambiguity and Stability in the Baltic Sea Region: Defence Cooperation between Finland and Sweden Increases Both (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2018).
6 Juha Pyykönen, Nordic Partners of NATO: How Similar Are Finland and Sweden within NATO Cooperation? (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016), <www.fiia.fi/julkaisu/nordic-partners-of-nato>.
7 Svein Efjestad, NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence (Abingdon, UK: RUSI, 2017), p. 28.
8 Government of Finland, “Laki kansainvälisen avun antamista ja pyytämistä koskevasta päätöksenteosta 418/2017,” Pub. L. No. 418/2017 (2017), <www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2017/20170418>.
9 For the purpose of this article, tactical depth is measured in tens of kilometers, operational depth in hundreds, and strategic in thousands of kilometers. Yet, strategic assets (including nuclear ones) can be located within operational or even tactical depth. For example, a command-and-control unit can be located at operational depth but command tactical, operational, and strategic assets.
10 The Finns did participate in an attack against one strategic target, the Murmansk railway, in autumn 1941, against which they also launched a commando raid in early 1942, disrupting it for a few days. They refrained from making a serious push against it, mainly for political reasons: the United States had sent three letters to the Finnish military leader Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, warning him that disrupting the Lend Lease transfers would significantly damage US–Finland relations, even after the war. Richard Lorentz, Iskuja Ilmaan (Tampere: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 2014); Juho Talvitie, ”Viipurinlahden taistelu 1944 joint-operaation näkökulmasta tarkasteltuna,” Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu [National Defence University], May 2011, pp. 42–44, <www.doria.fi/handle/10024/74486>; Tuomas Markkinen, “Ilmatoiminnan johtaminen Karjalan kannaksen torjuntataisteluissa kesällä 1944,” Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, May 2011, pp. 16–19, 32, <www.doria.fi/handle/10024/74462>.
11 Pekka Visuri, Mannerheimin Ja Rytin Vaikeat Valinnat: Suomen Johdon Ratkaisut Jatkosodan Käännekohdassa (Jyväskylä: Docendo, 2013), pp. 66–70; Oula Silvennoinen, Speech delivered at Presidenttifoorumi, November 19, 2008, <www.presidentti.fi/halonen/public/Oula_Silvennoinene1a9.pdf?ID=48114&GUID=%7B11857177-1a5a-4464-b07f-1216be045fbd%7D>; Tuomas Mustonen, “SOROKKA-SUUNNITELMA: TIEDUSTELUTIETOJEN MERKITYS OPERAATION VALMISTELUSSA TAMMI—MAALISKUUSSA 1942,” 2011, pp. 72–77, <www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/74464/SM660.pdf?sequence=1>.
12 Under the treaty, if the West were to attack the Soviet Union via Finland, and Finland was unable to repel the attack on its own, the Soviet Union would “defend forward” by seeking to invade Finland.
13 Government of Finland, Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004 (Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office, 2004).
14 Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Not Just Another Arms Deal: The Security Policy Implications of the United States Selling Advanced Missiles to Finland (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2012), <www.fiia.fi/fi/publication/279/not_just_another_arms_deal/>.
15 Kim Jäämeri, “Ilmavoimat 2015,” Pilven Veikko, April 2015, p. 12; Combat Camera Unit, “Ilmaoperaatioharjoitus Ruska 17—Air Operations Exercise Ruska 17, 2017,” Finnish Defence Forces, <www.youtube.com/channel/UCM8qGnJrcCGQXCZuGenvrOQ>.
16 Forrest E. Morgan, Crisis Stability and Long-Range Strike (Washington, DC, RAND, 2013) <www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1258.html>.
17 Ministry of Defence, “Suomi hankkii pitkän kantaman ilmasta-maahan ohjusjärjestelmän,” March 1, 2012, <www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/2012/suomi_hankkii_pitkan_kantaman_ilmasta-maahan_ohjusjarjestelman.4906.news>.
18 “Ilmaoperaatioharjoitus Ruska 17.”
19 Salonius-Pasternak, Not Just Another Arms Deal.
20 Prime Ministers’s Office, “Government’s Defence Report,” 2017, <www.defmin.fi/files/3688/J07_2017_Governments_Defence_Report_Eng_PLM_160217.pdf>.
21 Charly Salonius-Pasternak, “Är tre bättre än två? De trilaterala samarbete mellan Sverige, Finland och USA,” in Katarina Tracz, ed., Säkerhetspolitik för en ny regering (Stockholm: Frivärld, 2019), pp. 61–77; “Trilateral Statement of Intent among the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministery of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden,” May 8, 2018, <www.defmin.fi/files/4231/Trilateral_Statement_of_Intent.pdf>.
22 Mirja Kivimäki, “Niinistö vaati suoraa keskustelua EU:n turvatakuista—'Mitä se artikla todella tarkoittaa?',” mtvuutiset.fi, September 5, 2019, <www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/niinisto-vaati-suoraa-keskustelua-eu-n-turvatakuista-mita-se-artikla-todella-tarkoittaa/7537976>; Teppo Ovaskainen, “Sauli Niinistö iloitsee: 'Artikla 42.7:n arvoitus' viimein ratkeamassa Euroopassa,” Uusi Suomi, September 17, 2018, <www.uusisuomi.fi/uutiset/sauli-niinisto-iloitsee-artikla-427n-arvoitus-viimein-ratkeamassa-euroopassa/253a5998-15fd-308a-ae0b-50e8c65655f3>.
23 Sauli Niinistö, “Tasavallan presidentti Sauli Niinistön puhe 227. maanpuolustuskurssin avajaisissa,” May 11, 2018, <www.presidentti.fi/puheet/tasavallan-presidentti-sauli-niiniston-puhe-227-maanpuolustuskurssin-avajaisissa-5-11-2018/>; Niilo Simojoki, “Naton päätöksentekoharjoitus rakentuu kuvitteellisen kriisin ympärille—Suomi osallistuu jälleen CMX-harjoitukseen,” Demokraatti, May 9, 2019, <https://demokraatti.fi/naton-paatoksentekoharjoitus-rakentuu-kuvitteellisen-kriisin-ymparille-suomi-osallistuu-jalleen-cmx-harjoitukseen/>.
24 Ilmavoimat, “Trident Juncture 18 kehittää ilmavoimien kansainvälistä yhteistoimintakykyä—Artikkeli—Ilmavoimat,” October 12, 2018, <https://ilmavoimat.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/trident-juncture-18-tuo-rovaniemelle-lento-osastot-yhdysvalloista-ja-belgiasta>.
25 Finnish Defence Forces, “Bold Quest 19.1: The Finnish Defence Forces,” <https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/boldquest/en>.
26 Mats Eriksson, “Regeringen vill ha kryssningsrobotar på nya Gripen,” Sveriges Radio, April 24, 2014, <https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=5844253>.
27 Carl Bergqvist, “En Dag Full Av Kryssningsrobotar,” Wiseman’s Wisdoms, April 24, 2014, <http://wisemanswisdoms.blogspot.com/2014/04/mer-om-kryssningsrobotar.html>; Johan Wiktorin, “Svenska kryssningsrobotar—Ett djävulens påfund?” KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIEN, April 24, 2014, <https://kkrva.se/svenska-kryssningsrobotar-ett-djavulens-pafund/>.
28 Karlis Neretnieks, “Ska Sverige Ha Kryssningsrobotar?” <http://karlisn.blogspot.com/2015/04/ska-sverige-ha-kryssningsrobotar.html>; Wiseman, “Dags Att Höja Tröskeln—Del 1,” Wiseman’s Wisdoms, <http://wisemanswisdoms.blogspot.com/2014/02/dags-att-hoja-troskeln-del-1.html>; Wiseman, “Dags Att Höja Tröskeln—Del 3 Luftburen Offensiv Förmåga,” Wiseman’s Wisdoms, <http://wisemanswisdoms.blogspot.com/2014/04/dags-att-hoja-troskeln-del-3-luftburen.html>; Wiseman, “Dags Att Höja Tröskeln Del 4—Ubåtsbaserad Andraslagsförmåga,” Wiseman’s Wisdoms, a<http://wisemanswisdoms.blogspot.com/2015/04/dags-att-hoja-troskeln-del-4.html>; Bergqvist, “En Dag Full Av Kryssningsrobotar”.
29 Krister Andrén, Krigsavhållande tröskelförmåga: Det svenska försvarets glömda huvuduppgift? (Stockholm: FOI, 2014), p. 5, <www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--3852--SE>.
30 Ibid., pp. 6, 12.
31 Ibid., pp. 55–57.
32 Robert Dalsjö, Fem dimensioner av tröskelförsvar (Stockholm: FOI, 2017), <www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4458--SE>.
33 Försvarsdepartmentet, Slutredovisning Av Försvarsmaktens Perspektivstudie 2016–2018—Tillväxt För Ett Starkare Försvar (Stockholm, 2018), <www.forsvarsmakten.se/siteassets/4-om-myndigheten/dokumentfiler/perspektivplan/slutlig-redovisning-av-perspektivstudien-2016-2018.pdf>. See also Robert Dalsjö, “Sweden and Its Deterrence Deficit: Quick to React, yet Slow to Act,” in Nora Vanaga and Toms Rostoks, eds., Deterring Russia in Europe: Defence Strategies for Neighbouring States (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019), pp. 98–100.
34 TT, “Vill ha kryssningsrobotar på nya Jas,” Ny Teknik, April 24, 2014, <www.nyteknik.se/fordon/vill-ha-kryssningsrobotar-pa-nya-jas-6399652>.
35 Henrik Hedberg, “FMV Orders New Armed Forces Joint Anti-ship Missile,” April 3, 2017, <www.fmv.se/en/News-and-media/In-focus/The-Swedish-Defence-Material-Administration-FMV-orders-new-armed-forces-joint-anti-ship-missile/>.
36 Lars Wilderäng, “Försvaret Får Ny Kryssningsrobot Och Sjömålsrobot,” Cornucopia?, April 1, 2017, <http://cornucopia.cornubot.se/2017/04/forsvaret-far-ny-kryssningsrobot-och.html>.
37 Neretnieks, “Ska Sverige ha kryssningsrobotar?" <http://karlisn.blogspot.com/2015/04/ska-sverige-ha-kryssningsrobotar.html>.
38 Dalsjö et al., “Bursting the Bubble,” p. 67.
39 Dalsjö, “Sweden and Its Deterrence Deficit," p. 93.
40 Remarks by Secretary Mattis and Minister Hultqvist at the Pentagon, US Department of Defense, May 18, 2017, <www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1186980/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-and-minister-hultqvist-at-the-pentagon/>.
41 Jonas Olsson, “Regeringsbeslut i dag: Sverige köper Patriot,” SVT Nyheter, August 2, 2018, sec. Inrikes, <www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/regeringsbeslut-i-dag-sverige-koper-patriot>.
42 Aftonbladet, “Nato får flyga genom svensk luftrum,” April 30, 2014, <www.aftonbladet.se/a/VR5K3p>.
43 Ewen MacAskill and James Ball, “Portrait of the NSA: No Detail Too Small in Quest for Total Surveillance,” The Guardian, November 2, 2013, <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/02/nsa-portrait-total-surveillance>. The 14 eyes consists of the “five eyes” of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, plus those of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
44 Riksdagsförvaltningen, “Fortsatt svenskt deltagande i den internationella militära insatsen i Libyen Proposition 2011/12:5—Riksdagen,” September 15, 2011, <www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/proposition/fortsatt-svenskt-deltagande-i-den-internationella_GZ035>.
45 Jonas Melzer, “Bildt om Libyeninsats: 'Gripens bilder överlägsna',” Affärsvärlden, May 25, 2011, <www.affarsvarlden.se/bors-ekonominyheter/bildt-om-libyeninsats-gripens-bilder-overlagsna-6680969>; Ann-Sofie Dahl, NATO: Historien Om En Försvarsallians i Förändring (Lund, Sweden: Historiska Media, 2019), p. 195.
46 Karlis Neretnieks, “Arméövning Northern Wind 2019—Storstrategi, Inte Bara Svenskt Egenintresse,” Karlis N, March 12, 2019, <http://karlisn.blogspot.com/2019/03/armeovning-northern-wind-2019.html>.
47 Riksdagen, “Yes to Memorandum of Understanding with NATO on Host Nation Support,” May 2016, <www.riksdagen.se/en/news/2016/maj/27/yes-to-memorandum-of-understanding-with-nato-on-host-nation-support-ufou4/>.
48 Dalsjö et al., “Bursting the Bubble,” pp. 73–77.
49 Jan Angstrom and Magnus Petersson, “Weak Party Escalation: An Underestimated Strategy for Small States?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 282–300.
50 Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (New York: PublicAffairs, 2017), p. 93.
51 Source: study of Finnish parliamentarians in November 2019 conducted by the author. Fifty-seven percent of parliamentarians who responded said it would be acceptable for Finnish forces as a part of defending the country to strike militarily relevant targets on adversary territory. Twenty-four percent were not sure, and 20 percent did not think it was acceptable. A description of the methodology is available in the Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper “Eduskunnassa yhtenäinen rintama: Kansanedustajilla laaja konsensus Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikasta” (2020).