Russia’s novel weapons systems: military innovation in the post-Soviet period

ABSTRACT

This article identifies the principal drivers of Russian military innovation involving five novel nuclear, conventional, or dual-capable delivery systems—Avangard, Burevestnik, Poseidon, Kinzhal, and Tsirkon—and analyzes the interplay between these drivers over the course of the innovation process. It does so by means of a structured, focused comparison of the five systems and their progression to date, distinguishing “innovation” from concepts like “invention” and “diffusion,” and defining the stages of an innovation life cycle. The article also distills prior research on Soviet weapons innovation and investigates its continued validity. The analysis finds external factors to be central in driving innovation, specifically Russian threat perceptions around (1) US missile-defense development and (2) the development of Western conventional warfighting capabilities. It also discusses the roles of a range of internal factors, including industry and high-level political support for specific systems, the availability of Soviet-legacy research and engineering initiatives, and the appeal of anticipated industrial and ancillary benefits from the development of specific systems. Cooperation between design bureaus and other industry players is also examined, as is the role of status considerations in driving innovation. Finally, the relative importance of individual factors in explaining innovation is shown to differ across the systems. The structured comparison identifies the continued validity of certain aspects of past studies on Soviet military innovation, while also bringing to light new insights about contemporary Russian weapons innovation.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• military innovation
• research and development
• nuclear weapons
• missiles

Notes

1 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957>. Tsirkon was unveiled in February 2019. Although the Sarmat heavy ICBM was one of the strategic weapons discussed in Putin’s March 2018 speech, it is not covered in this article, as heavy ICBMs are not, in themselves, novel.

2 The approach is most closely associated with Alexander George. See, in particular, Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 48–68.

3 These distinctions are developed further in Samuel Meyer, Sarah Bidgood, and William C. Potter, “Death Dust: The Little-Known Story of U.S. and Soviet Pursuit of Radiological Weapons,” International Security, Fall 2020, pp. 59–60. See also Andrew Aldrin, “Innovation, the Scientists and the State: Programmatic Innovation and the Creation of the Soviet Space Program,” PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1996, pp. 57–70.

4 Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequence for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

5 Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints,” Security Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2016), pp. 50–84.

6 Peter Almquist, Red Forge: Soviet Military Industry since 1995 (New York: Columbia University Press); Harley D. Balzer, Soviet Science on the Edge of Reform (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, Volume 1: An Analytical Comparison of U.S.–Soviet Assessments during the Cold War (McLean, VA: BDM Federal, 1995).

7 Aldrin, “Innovation, the Scientists and the State.”

8 Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

9 Ibid., p. 52. The five corresponding stages in the US weapons innovation process are identified as: “technocratic initiative,” “consensus building,” “promotion,” “open windows,” and “high-level endorsement.”

10 Ibid.

11 See ibid., pp. 28–49. While Evangelista’s observation generally is sound, the Soviet system had the functional equivalent of “slack” in the form of funds for long-term research that could be requested by research institutes and design bureaus for projects such as new propulsion technologies and the development of new materials relevant to weapons systems. As we will demonstrate, some of that research is being utilized by the Russian defense industry today. The origins of the concept of organizational slack and its relationship to innovation can be traced to James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1958).

12 Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race; Hines, Soviet Intentions, pp. 71–74.

13 Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race; Hines, Soviet Intentions, pp. 73 ff.

14 Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race; Aldrin, Innovation, the Scientists and the State, pp. 73 ff.

15 Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race, pp. 29–49; Balzer, Soviet Science on the Edge of Reform, pp. 140, 152 ff.

16 Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization: Past and Future (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

17 In Table 1, we draw upon the missile taxonomy recently proposed by Steven Dunham and Robert Wilson. Dunham and Wilson’s taxonomy categorizes missile systems on the basis of three specific characteristics: the type of booster system and weaponized payload, the ability of the payload to maneuver aerodynamically, and the ability of the payload to be independently powered. Steven T. Dunham and Robert S. Wilson, “The Missile Threat: A Taxonomy for Moving Beyond Ballistic,” Center for Space Policy and Strategy, Aerospace Corporation, August 2020.

18 Originally, Russian sources reported plans to deploy the HGV on the Yars ICBM. See, for example, Aleksei Mikhailov and Dimtry Balburov, “Rossiya Ispytaet Strategicheskuyu Raketu ‘Avangard’” [Russia tests strategic missile “Avangard”], Izvestia, December 7, 2012. If such plans existed, it is possible they were changed because the Avangard warhead was judged too heavy and bulky for a medium-sized Yars.

19 Pavel Podvig, “Document Details Soviet Response to the Star Wars Missile Defense Program,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Blog, March 21, 2018, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/03/document_details_soviet_respon.shtml>.

20 “Project 4202 Test Record,” <http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/04/project_4202_test_record.shtml>.

21 Interview conducted by one of the authors with a high-level representative of the Russian defense industry on condition of anonymity in 1999.

22 Ibid.; Nikolai Sokov, “The Future Shape of Russia’s ICBM Force Clarified,” CNS, November 9, 2005 <www.nonproliferation.org/the-future-of-russias-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-icbm-force-clarified/>.

23 Pavel Podvig, “Avangard System Is Tested, Said to Be Fully Ready for Deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Blog, December 26, 2018, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml>.

24 Ibid.

25 Yuri Borisov in interview with Krasnaya Zvezda, March 12, 2018 (in Russian), <http://archive.redstar.ru/index.php/component/k2/item/36438-v-obojme-sarmat-kinzhal-avangard?attempt=1>.

26 Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”

27 See, for instance, Hines, Soviet Intentions, p. 49. Also see Aldrin, “Innovation, the Scientists and the State,” especially pp. 52–53. Peter Almquist provides an excellent, more generic discussion of the role of the weapons scientist and designer in Soviet military decisionmaking. See Almquist, Red Forge, pp. 66–91. See also Vitaly Leonidovich Katayev, A Memoir of the Missile Age (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2015).

28 In 1998, a program for the creation of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) was transferred from the Makeyev Design Bureau, which had many decades of experience with SLBMs and was working (albeit with limited success) on an SLBM for the next-generation submarine, to MITT (which was known for its land-based missiles). The new project came to be known as Bulava. That decision was at the time widely ascribed to the close relationship between Solomonov and Sergeev.

29 For details on these events see Nikolai Sokov, “The Nuclear Debate of Summer 2000,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 1, 2001, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/nuclear-debate-summer-2000/>.

30 Series of private conversations of one of the authors with Russian defense officials in Moscow, 2003–04.

31 Vladimir Putin, “Conversation with Gerbert Yefremov,” The Kremlin, September 19, 2020, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64058>.

32 Sergey Ketonov, “Burevestnik na Zaklanie” [Burevestnik to the slaughter], Voyenno-Promyshlenyi Kurier, February 7, 2021, <www.vpk-news.ru/articles/59856>.

33 Ibid.

34 Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”

35 See Nikolai Alexandrov, “Istoriiya atomnogo samolyeta v kratkom izlozheniya” [The history of nuclear aircraft in summary], Dvigatel, Vol. 30, No. 6 (2003), pp. 22-25, <http://engine.aviaport.ru/issues/30/page22.html>.; Yevgeniy Erokhin, “Rakety ot Bondaryuka” [Rockets from Bondaryuk], Kryl’ya Rodiny [Wings of the motherland], No. 11 (1993), pp. 33-37, <http://epizodyspace.ru/bibl/k-r/1993/11-rak.html>.

36 Yu.S. Nekhoroshev, V.K. Popov, Yu.N. Smirnov, and M.E. Khalizeva, eds., Igor' Vasil'evich Kurchatov v vospominaniyakh i dokumentakh [Igor Vasilevich Kurchatov in recollections and documents], 2nd ed. (Moscow: IzdAT, 2004), pp. 468–69, <www.elib.biblioatom.ru/text/kurchatov-v-vospominaniyah-i-dokumentah_2004/go,520/>.

37 See, for instance, History of Rosatom, “Personnel: Feoktiskova Ekaterina Alekseevna: 1915–1987,” <www.biblioatom.ru/founders/feoktistova_ekaterina_alekseevna/>.

38 Missiles.ru, “Russia’s Ramjet Design Facility Has Closed,” February 2005, <www.missiles.ru/plamja_e.htm>.

39 Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”

40 Michael Duitsman and Jeffrey Lewis, “Burevestnik Testing to Resume,” Arms Control Wonk, October 20, 2020, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1210186/burevestnik-testing-to-resume/>.

41 The Soviet Union pursued several programs on nuclear engines for heavy bombers as well as a separate program on a nuclear engine for cruise missiles. See Nesterenko, “Application of Atomic Engines in Aviation,” p. 3; Missiles.ru, “Istoriya OKB-670 i NPVO Plamya,” <www.missiles.ru/pvrd.htm>; Tass, “Yadernye Dvigateli v Krylatykh Raketakh. Dossie,” July 19, 2018, <https://tass.ru/info/5386826>.

42 See, for instance, the translation of G.N. Nesterenko et al., “Application of Atomic Engines in Aviation,” (Moscow: Military Press of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1957), <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01043r002100060011-6>.

43 See Barton Hacker, “Who Ever Heard of Nuclear Ramjets? Project Pluto, 1957–1964,” Icon, Vol. 1 (1995), p. 85. See also Cooper, “Russia’s Invincible Weapons.”

44 Nesterenko, “Application of Atomic Engines in Aviation,” p. 3.

45 See “US Quietly Kills Its Atom Missile; Project Pluto Canceled after Outlay of $200 Million,” New York Times, July 13, 1964, <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/13/archives/us-quietly-kills-its-atom-missile-project-pluto-canceled-after.html>.

46 Julian Cooper, “Russia’s Invincible Weapons: Today, Tomorrow, Sometime, Never?” Changing Character of War Centre, Pembroke College, University of Oxford, May 2018, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55faab67e4b0914105347194/t/5b0eb1b203ce644a398267ef/1527689654381/Russia%27s±Invincible±Weapons.pdf>.

47 Izvestia, “Opublikovany kadry krylatoi rakety neogranichennoi dal'nosti ‘Burevestnik’” [Footage released of the unlimited-range cruise missile “Burevestnik”], July 19, 2018, <www.iz.ru/768533/2018-07-19/opublikovany-kadry-krylatoi-rakety-neogranichennoi-dalnosti-burevestnik>.

48 According to Igor Korotchenko, the Security Council approved three decrees at this meeting to revitalize Russia’s nuclear-weapons program. These related to the development of tactical nuclear weapons, provisions for conducting hydronuclear experiments, and the pursuit of supercomputing technology. See Nezavizimaya gazeta, “Otechestvennyj yadernyj kompleks razvalivaetsya” [The domestic nuclear complex is falling apart], April 30, 1999, <www.ng.ru/events/1999-04-30/2yaderny.html>; Igor Khripunov also details these three decrees in “Russia’s MINATOM Struggles for Survival: Implications for US–Russia Relations,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2000), p. 57.

49 Khripunov indicates, for instance, that Russia’s 1999-fiscal-year draft budget covered only half of the funds necessary to sustain MINATOM’s defense programs (“Russia’s MINATOM Struggles for Survival,” p. 56).

50 In the 1960s, the Soviet Union developed a version of a heavy R-36 ICBM designated R-39orb, which was intended to reach US territory from the southern hemisphere. The program was canceled after the conclusion of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which banned deployment of nuclear weapons in space (R-36orb was a fractional orbital system [FOBS], which was supposed to remain in earth orbit for a period of time).

51 Aleksey Zavkasin and Elizaveta Komarova, “Nikakikh prepyatstviy po dosyagaemosti: kak prodvigaetsya perevooruzhenie RVSN raketami ‘Sarmat’” [No obstacles regarding reach: how the re-equipping of the Strategic Rocket Forces with Sarmat missiles is progressing], RT, August 19, 2020, <https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/775217-sarmat-raketa-rvsn-perevooruzhenie>.

52 The only possible exception is the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile program, which experienced multiple failures and delays but was nonetheless carried through. In the case of Bulava, however, the obvious motivation was the absence of any reasonable alternatives as well as the bureaucratic and political influence of its proponents in the defense industry and the military.

53 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Russia Vows to Make New Weapons amid U.S. Suspicion of Blast that Killed Five Scientists,” August 13, 2019, <www.rferl.org/a/five-russian-nuclear-scientists-buried-after-rocket-explosion/30106121.html>.

54 See, for instance, Gary L. Bennett, “A Look at the Soviet Space Nuclear Power Program,” NASA Propulsion, Power and Energy Division, paper presented at the 24th Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference “International Forum on Energy Engineering,” August 6–11, 1989, <https://fas.org/nuke/space/sovspace.pdf>.

55 Bellona, “Russia Is Building a Nuclear-Powered Spaceship. Yes, You Heard That Right,” November 21, 2018, <https://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2018-11-russia-is-building-a-nuclear-powered-spaceship-yes-you-heard-that-right>. Also: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, “K Marsu na atomnom yadre” [To Mars on an atomic nucleus], November 13, 2018, <https://rg.ru/2018/11/13/na-kakih-dvigateliah-budut-letat-novye-rossijskie-rakety.html>.

56 Bellona, “Russia Is Building a Nuclear-Powered Spaceship”; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, “To Mars on an atomic nucleus.”

57 Aldrin, “Innovation, the Scientists and the State,” pp. 57–79.

58 Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. ix.

59 For additional details on the applicability of miniaturized nuclear reactors in space and defense, see <http://atomicexpert.com/spacenuclear_technologies>.

60 Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”

61 Ibid.

62 Izvestia, “Yadernyj bespilotnik ‘Poseidon’ razognali pod vodoi do 200 km/ch” [They dispersed the nuclear drone Poseidon under water up to 200 km/h], February 6, 2019, <https://iz.ru/842518/2019-02-06/iadernyi-bespilotnik-poseidon-razognali-pod-vodoi-do-200-kmch>.

63 Steve Hall, “The Russian Poseidon Nuclear AUV,” SUT public webinar, July 13, 2020, <www.youtube.com/watch?v=nr2KIsBeCGU&t=2717s>.

64 Vzglyad, “V Rossii nachalas' razrabotka robotov dlya podlodok pyatogo pokoleniya” [The development of robots for fifth-generation submarines began in Russia], March 18, 2016, <https://vz.ru/news/2016/3/18/800377.html>.

65 Cooper, “Russia’s Invincible Weapons,” citing sources in Vedomosti.

66 Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”

67 VPK News, “Glubochayshaya tayna Rossii” [Russia’s deepest secret], August 10, 2015, <https://vpk-news.ru/articles/26504>.

68 MilitaryRussia, “Kompleks 2M39 Poseidon / OKR Skif—KANYON” [Complex 2M39 Poseidon / OKR Skif—CANYON], February 23, 2019. <www.militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-746.html>.

69 Anton Lavrov and Aleksei Ramm, “Poseidon v Lodke: Submarinu Gotovyat k Ispytaniyam Yadernykh Robotov” [Poseidon in a boat: a submarine is readied for test of nuclear robots], Izvestiya, February 11, 2021, <https://iz.ru/1123160/anton-lavrov-aleksei-ramm/poseidon-v-lodke-submarinu-gotoviat-k-ispytaniiam-iadernykh-robotov>; “Novyi Oboronnyi Zakaz: Strategii,” “Strategicheskii Kompleks s Samokhodnym Podvodnym Apparatom” [A strategic complex with a self-propelled underwater drone], June 3, 2019, <https://dfnc.ru/katalog-vooruzhenij/torpedy-i-miny/2m39-posejdon/>; H.I. Sutton, “Sarov Class Submarine Demystified,” February 22, 2019, <www.hisutton.com/SAROV-Class_Submarine.html>.

70 See, for instance, Rossiiskiy Dialog, “Kitayskie SMI voskhishhayutsja rossiiskim ‘Posejdonom’” [Chinese media admire Russia’s Poseidon], April 27, 2019, <www.rusdialog.ru/war/175981_1556382272/amp>.

71 Tass, “Minoborony nachalo ispytaniya bespilotnogo podvodnogo apparata ‘Poseidon’” [Ministry of Defense began testing the Poseidon UUV], July 19, 2018, <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5386307>; RIA Novosti, “Istochnik rasskazal, kogda proidet pervyi pusk ‘Poseidona’” [A source revealed when the first launch of Poseidon will take place], May 26, 2020, <https://ria.ru/20200526/1571983448.html>.

72 Hall, “The Russian Poseidon Nuclear AUV.”

73 H.I. Sutton, “Russia’s Newest Submarine, Khabarovsk, Could Redefine Underwater Warfare,” Forbes, June 9, 2020, <www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/06/09/russias-newest-submarine-khabarovsk-could-redefine-underwater-warfare/#3221923d4d4b≥; Tass, “Vrotuyu Lodku-Nositel Poseidonov Planiruyut Spustit’ na Vodu Vesnoi-Letom 2021 goda,” November 7, 2020, <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/9936435>.

74 Tass, “Istochnik: Tretii Nositel Yadernykh Supertorped ‘Poseidon’ Peredadut Flotu v 2027 gody” [The third carrier of “Poseidon” nuclear supertorpedoes will be commissioned in 2027], January 15, 2021, <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/10465325>.

75 See Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), p. 221.

76 Ibid.

77 MilitaryRussia, “Kompleks 2M39 Poseidon.”.

78 See, for instance, Jeffrey Lewis, “Putin’s Doomsday Machine,” Foreign Policy, November 12, 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/putins-doomsday-machine-nuclear-weapon-us-russia/>.

79 Michael Kofman, “Status-6,” Russia Military Analysis Blog, March 6, 2018, <https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/tag/status-6/>.

80 Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”

81 Tass, “Minoborony nachalo ispytaniya bespilotnogo podvodnogo apparata ‘Poseidon’.”

82 Vzglyad, “V Rossii Nachalas’ Razrabotka Robotov dlya Podlodok Pyatogo Pokoleniya,” March 18, 2016.

83 VPK News, “Glubochayshaya tayna Rossii.”

84 See the priorities articulated in Russia’s “Osnovy gosudarstvennoy politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii v oblasti voenno-morskoy deyatel’nosti na period do 2030 goda” [Foundations of the Russian Federation’s naval policy until the year 2030], July 20, 2017, <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201707200015.pdf>.

85 Hall, “The Russian Poseidon Nuclear AUV”; Kofman, “Status-6.”

86 Hruby, “Russia’s New Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems.”

87 Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”

88 Gazeta.ru, “‘Sovershenno drugoe’: v Rossii ispytali giperzvukovuyu raketu” [“Completely different”: a hypersonic missile was tested in Russia], May 11, 2020, <www.gazeta.ru/army/2020/05/11/13079035.shtml>.

89 Tass, “Istochnik: Dalnost Primeneniya ‘Kinzhala’ Uvelichitsya na 1000 km s Bombardirovshchikom Tu-22M3,” July 18, 2018, <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5383655>.

90 MilitaryRussia, “Kompleks 9-A-7660 Kinzhal, raketa 9-S-7760 / izdelie 292” [Complex 9-A-7660 Dagger, missile 9-C-7760 / product 292], May 28, 2020, <http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-896.html>.

91 BMPD Live Journal, “Ispytaniya novoi giperzvukovoi aviatsionnoi rakety s bombardirovshhika Tu-22M3” [Tests of new hypersonic aircraft missile from Tu-22M3 bomber], May 12, 2020, <https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4022285.html>.

92 Bastion Parpenko, “Aviatsionnyi Raketnyi Kompleks s Giperzvukovoi Raketoi” [Aviation missile system with hypersonic missile], May 11, 2020, <http://bastion-karpenko.ru/avraketa-giperzvuk-rf/>.

93 Novyi Oboronnyi Zakaz, “Aviatsionnyi Raketnyi Kompleks ‘Vozdukh-Zemlya’ s Aeroballisticheskoi Raketoi” [Airborne “air-to-surface” missile complex with an aeroballistic missile], February 21, 2019, <https://dfnc.ru/katalog-vooruzhenij/aviatsionnye-rakety-i-bomby/9-a-7660-kinzhal/>; MilitaryRussia, “Kompleks 9-A-7660 Kinzhal, Raketa 9-S-7760 / Izdelie 292” [Complex 9-A-7660, missile 9-S-7760 / item 292], March 10, 2018 <http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/index-1148.html>.

94 testpilot.ru, “Kh-90/GELA (AS-19 Koala,” n.d., <testpilot.ru/russia/raduga/gela/>.

95 Kommersant, “Genshtab VS RF soobshhil ob ispytanii «Kinzhala» v Arktike i Su-57 v Sirii” [The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces announced the testing of Kinzhal in the Arctic and the Su-57 in Syria], December 18, 2019, <www.kommersant.ru/doc/4197988>.

96 Roman Kretsul and Bogdan Stepovoy, “Kinzhalnaya Vataga: V Sibiri Poyavitsya Polk s Giperzvukovymi Raketami” [The Kinzhal fellowship: a regiment with hypersonic missiles will be deployed in Siberia], Izvestiya, May 10, 2020, <https://iz.ru/986304/roman-kretcul-bogdan-stepovoi/kinzhalnaia-vataga-v-sibiri-poiavitsia-polk-s-giperzvukovymi-raketami>.

97 Roman Kretsul, Bogdan Stepovoy, and Andrei Fedorov, “K Raketnomu Barieru: Flotskie MIG-31 s ‘Kinzhalami’ Zakroyut Berega Rossii” [The missile barrier: naval MIG-31 with Kinzhals will guard the shores of Russia], Izvestiya, December 19, 2020 <https://iz.ru/953322/roman-kretcul-bogdan-stepovoi/k-raketnomu-bareru-flotskie-mig-31-s-kinzhalami-zakroiut-berega-rossii>.

98 Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office, “U.S. Bombers Arrive in Norway for the First Time, Demonstrating Transatlantic Link,” NATO, February 23, 2021, <https://ac.nato.int/archive/2021/BTF-21-NOR>.

99 Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s Top General Indirectly Confirms Arctic Deployment of Unstoppable Kinzhal Missile,” Barents Observer, December 19, 2020 <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/12/russias-top-general-indirectly-confirms-arctic-deployment-unstoppable-missile>.

100 MilitaryRussia, “Gyperzvukovaya Raketa KTRV/GZUR (proekt)” [Hypersonic missile KRTV/GZUR (project)], May 17, 2020, <militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-562.html>.

101 See analysis of the 2003 White Paper and Sergey Ivanov’s speech in Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine—Introduction,” August 1, 2004, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russias-nuclear-doctrine/>.

102 Department of Information and Mass Communication of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Ministr Oborony Rossii Otkryl Operativno-Mobilizatsionnyi Sbor s Rukovodyashchim Sostavom Vooruzhennykh Sil” [The minister of defense of Russia has opened an operational-mobilization conference of the leadership of the armed forces], February 9, 2021, <https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12343091@egNews>.

103 Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 31.

104 Dunham and Wilson, “The Missile Threat,” p 10.

105 Tass, “Istochnik: giperzvukovuyu raketu ‘Tsirkon’ vpervye ispytali s korablya” [Source: Tsirkon hypersonic missile first tested from ship], February 27, 2020, <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/7847853>.

106 Cooper, “Russia’s Invincible Weapons.”

107 MilitaryRussia, “Kompleks 3K-22 Tsirkon/Tsirkon S, Raketa 3M-22–SS-NX-33.” [Complex 3K-22 Tsirkon/Tsirkon-S, missile 3M-22—SS-NX-22], <http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/index-967.html>; Novyi Oboronnyi Zakaz, “Protivokorabelnaya Giperzvukovaya Raketa” [Anti-ship hypersonic missile], July 2, 2016, <https://dfnc.ru/katalog-vooruzhenij/morskie-raketnye-kompleksy/3k-22-tsirkon/>.

108 Tass, “Shojgu soobshhil ob uvelichenii chisla korablei-nositelei giperzvukovykh raket ‘Tsirkon’” [Shoigu announced an increase in the number of carriers for Tsirkon hypersonic missiles], December 9, 2019, <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/7297789>.

109 MilitaryRussia, “Kompleks 3K-22 Tsirkon.”

110 Vzglyad, “Sverkhsekretnyj ‘Tsirkon’ vyshel na final'nyi etap ispytanii” [Top secret “Tsirkon” entered the final stage of testing], February 27, 2020, <https://vz.ru/society/2020/2/27/1026074.html>. Another test launch from the frigate, reportedly a success, was carried out in October 2020. See, for instance, Moscow Times, “Russia Successfully Test-Launches ‘Tsirkon’ Hypersonic Missile,” October 7, 2020, <www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/10/07/russia-successfully-test-launches-tsirkon-hypersonic-missile-a71684>.

111 Radio Sputnik, “Podtverdili unikal'nost'. Minoborony ob ispytaniyakh rakety ‘Tsirkon’” [“Uniqueness confirmed”. Ministry of Defense on tests of the Tsirkon missile], July 26, 2020, <https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20200726/1574935855.html>.

112 Thomas Nilsen, “Northern Fleet Makes Ready for Long-Range Test of Tsirkon Hypersonic Missile,”Barents Observer, November 2, 2020, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/11/northern-fleet-makes-ready-long-rangetest-tsirkon-hypersonic-missile>.

113 RIA Novosti, “V Minoborony soobshhili sroki prinyatiya ‘Tsirkona’ na vooruzhenie” [The Ministry of Defense announced the timing of the adoption of “Tsirkon” into service], May 8, 2020, <https://ria.ru/20200508/1571131854.html>.

114 Tass, “Istochniki: Rossiya uskorit ispytaniya rakety ‘Tsirkon’” [Sources: Russia will accelerate testing of the Tsirkon missile], March 15, 2020, <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/8069471>.

115 Tass, “Istochnik soobshhil, chto Rossija provedet eshhe okolo 10 ispytatel'nykh strel'b ‘Tsirkonom’” [A source said that Russia will conduct about 10 more test firings of ‘Tsirkon’], April 23, 2020, <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/8311351>.

116 Radio Sputnik, “Zadachu Uslozhnyat. V RF Provedut Zalpovyi Pusk Giperzvukovykh Raket Tsirkon” [The task is made more complex. A salvo launch of hypersonic missiles Tsirkon will be held in RF], January 4, 2021, <https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20210104/giperzvuk-1591943229.html>.

117 RIA Novosti, “Istochnik Soobshchil o Planiruemom Puske Tsirkonov s Podlodki Severodvinsk” [A source has reported about planned launches of Tsirkons from Severodvinsk submarine], February 21, 2021, <https://ria.ru/20210226/tsirkon-1599031178.html>.

118 Ibid.

119 RIA Novosti, “Skorost’ rossiiskikh giperzvukovykh raket uvelichat do desiyati makhov” [The speed of Russian hypersonic missiles will increase to Mach 10], December 28, 2019, <https://ria.ru/20191228/1562971958.html>.

120 Among sources that believe KBM to be the lead organization responsible for Kinzhal, 2012 is considered to be the year in which the program began, while those who believe that Raduga is the lead organization note that work began prior to 2011. “X-90/GELA (AS-19 ‘Koala’),” Test Pilots, accessed July 11, 2021, <https://testpilot.ru/russia/raduga/gela/>; Valeriy Boval, “Razvitie Otechestvennogo Giperzvuka—Realnost,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, November 8, 2012, <https://vpk.name/news/78392_razvitie_otechestvennogo_giperzvuka_realnost.html>.

121 Edward Geist and Dana Massicot, “Understanding Putin’s Nuclear Superweapons,” SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2019), p. 109.

122 Balzer, Soviet Science on the Edge of Reform, p. 185.

123 Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power p. ix.

124 Hines, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, p. 49.

125 In 2003 Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov declared that enhanced reliance on nuclear weapons, which was introduced in the 2000 Military Doctrine, was a “temporary fix” until Russia developed conventional deterrence capabilities. In 2014 Russia’s new Military Doctrine formally introduced the notion of “non-nuclear deterrence,” signifying the achievement of initial long-range conventional capabilities (at that time, primarily Kh-101/102 air-launched cruise missiles and Kalibr SLCMs). Many of the programs explored in this article were part of that effort. For analysis of the 2003 statement by Sergey Ivanov, see Sokov, “Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 1, 2004, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russias-nuclear-doctrine/>. On the subsequent evolution of Russian military doctrine, including the introduction of conventional deterrence, see Nikolai Sokov, “Russia Clarifies Its Nuclear Deterrence Policy,” Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, June 3, 2020, <https://vcdnp.org/russia-clarifies-its-nuclear-deterrence-policy/>.

126 The trend observed by Evangelista, i.e., a Soviet propensity to develop systems similar to American peers, does not exhaustively capture all Soviet military innovation. Often, the Soviet Union sought to develop similar systems, yet with different technical characteristics and capabilities (an obvious example, in addition to Evangelista’s main case study of tactical nuclear weapons, is the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle [MIRV] or mobile ICBM). This trend remained pronounced only until the early 1980s, when the Soviet Union developed a propensity for asymmetric responses, in reaction to the US SDI.

127 The Kremlin, “Meeting with Senior Defence Ministry Officials, Heads of Federal Agencies and Defence Industry Executives,” press release, November 10, 2020, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64392>.

128 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Russia Vows to Make New Weapons.”

129 Interfax, “Minoborony uspeshno ispytalo giperzvukovuyu raketu ‘Tsirkon’” [The Ministry of Defense successfully tested the Tsirkon hypersonic missile], October 7, 2020, <www.interfax.ru/russia/730342>.

130 Nauka Tekhnika, “Giperzvukovaya raketa VVS SShA. ‘Kinzhal’, sroki, mnenie ekspertov” [US Air Force hypersonic missile. “Kinzhal,” terms, expert opinion], December 4, 2019, <https://naukatehnika.com/giperzvukovaya-raketa-vvs-ssha.html>.

131 Tass, “Putin Offered Trump Hypersonic Weapons from Russia to Purchase,” September 5, 2019, <https://tass.com/politics/1076704>.

132 For an analysis of possible interpretations of this statement, including Russian receptions of it, see Meduza, “‘He’s trying to say: Take us seriously. We’re not joking anymore’: Russian Political and Security Experts Interpret Putin’s State-of-the-Nation Speech,” March 1, 2018, <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/03/02/he-s-trying-to-say-take-us-seriously-we-re-not-joking-anymore>.

133 Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race, p. 48.

134 Missiles.ru, “Istoriya OKB-670 (i NPVO Plamya).”