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Abstract
In January 2004 U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), a bilateral initiative to expand cooperation in the areas of civilian space activities, civilian nuclear programs, and high-technology trade and to expand discussions on missile defense. Today, India and the United States view the NSSP initiative as a tool to transfer high-technology items to India without compromising U.S. nonproliferation goals. The success of this proposal depends on U.S. efforts to modify its nonproliferation regulations and India's efforts to implement stringent regulations to control the flow of sensitive technologies within its borders. This report examines the Indo-U.S. NSSP initiative and associated agreements, discusses the set of reciprocal steps agreed upon by India and the United States, reviews the extent of technology transfer permissible under existing U.S. nonproliferation regulations, and presents some preliminary conclusions on the NSSP agreement.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Gaurav Kampani for his comments and advice.
Notes
1. Brazil has a rudimentary space launch capability to place satellites in Low Earth Orbits (LEO). Brazil launched the first rocket, Brazilian Exploration Vehicle (VSB-30), into space on October 24, 2004, which placed a satellite to carry out experiments at a height of 250 kilometers (km) above the earth. See Tom Gibb, “Brazil Launches Rocket into Space,” BBC News, October 24, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3948531.stm>.
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7. Gopal Raj, Reach for the Stars: The Evolution of India's Rocket Programme (New Delhi: Viking, 2000).
8. A. Baskaran, “Competence Building in Complex Systems in the Developing Countries: The Case of Satellite Building in India,” Technovation 21 (2001), pp. 109–121.
9. A. Baskaran, “Technology Accumulation in the Ground Systems of India's Space Program: The Contribution of Foreign and Indigenous Inputs,” Technology In Society 23 (2001), pp. 195–216.
10. Baskaran, “Export Control Regimes,” p. 213.
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12. Baskaran, “The Impact of Export Controls on Indigenous Technology Development in India's Space Program,” pp. 159–161.
13. Baskaran, “The Impact of Export Controls on Indigenous Technology Development in India's Space Program,” pp. 163–164.
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19. Michael Weisskopf and Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. to Offer Advanced Arms, Technology to India,” Washington Post, June 13, 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, June 13, 1985, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
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22. Weisskopf and Oberdorfer, “U.S. to Offer Advanced Arms, Technology to India.”
23. Limaye, “Defense Cooperation in U.S.-Indian Relations,” pp. 210–211; “India's Missile Chronology: 1986–1990,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Web site, "<http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Missile/1931_2022.html>. The Cray XMP-14 model supercomputer possessed less capacity than the Cray XMP-24 model supercomputer originally requested by India. Despite this setback, India accepted the offer. Quoted in Dennis Kux and Daniel P. Moynihan, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991 (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), pp.410–411.
24. Richard D. Cupitt and Seema Gahlaut, “Non-Proliferation Export Controls: U.S. and Indian Perspectives,” in Bertsch, et al., eds., Engaging India, p. 171.
25. Brahma Chellaney, “Missile Technology Control Regime: Its Challenges and Rigors for India,” in Francine R. Frankel, ed., Bridging the Nonproliferation Divide: The United States and India (New York: University Press of America, 1995), pp. 192–193; Limaye, “Defense Cooperation in U.S.-Indian Relations,” pp. 200–209; and K. Santhanam and Rahul Singh, “Confidence Restoring Measures for Indo-U.S. Commerce in Controlled Commodities,” in Frankel, ed., Bridging the Nonproliferation Divide, pp. 293–294.
26. Cupitt and Gahlaut, “Non-Proliferation Export Controls,” p. 173. The data is for FY 1996–1997.
27. Wyn Q. Bowen, “U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR's First Decade (1987–1997),” Nonproliferation Review 5 (Fall 1997), pp. 21–28.
28. Baskaran, “Export Control Regimes and India's Space and Missile Programmes”; Chellaney, “Missile Technology Control Regime,” pp. 198–206.
29. Baskaran, “Export Control Regimes and India's Space and Missile Programmes,” p. 216.
30. Baskaran, “The Impact of Export Controls on Indigenous Technology Development in India's Space Program,” p. 159.
31. Baskaran, “The Impact of Export Controls on Indigenous Technology Development in India's Space Program,” p. 164.
32. Baskaran, “The Impact of Export Controls on Indigenous Technology Development in India's Space Program,” pp. 168–169; see Table 3. It must be emphasized that export controls regarding ground systems were not totally absent. Item 12 under Category II in the MTCR Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex addresses ground systems.
33. For a detailed listing of various sanctions and the entities involved, see “India and Pakistan Sanctions and Other Measures,” Federal Register 63 (November 19, 1998), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, November 19, 1998, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>. The licensing policy adopted a presumption of denial for all items controlled for nuclear proliferation and missile technology reasons, except for items intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and commercial passenger aircraft. The licensing policy for such items was to review the applications on a case-by-case basis.
34. Michael M. Phillips, “U.S. is Wrestling Over Limits on High-Tech Exports to India,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1998, p. 1.
35. K.K. Katyal, “Gaps Unbridged at Indo-U.S. Talks,” Hindu (Chennai), July 22, 1998, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, July 29, 1998, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
36. K.K. Katyal, “India-Talbott's New Package Evokes Interest,” Hindu (Chennai), January 27, 1999, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, January 27, 1999, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
37. “We are for a Qualitatively Better Relationship with India,” Hindu (Chennai), January 14, 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, September 7, 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
38. C. Raja Mohan, “India, U.S., and Non-Proliferation,” Hindu (Chennai), September 25, 2003, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, September 25, 2003, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>. The nuclear benchmarks set by the Clinton administration were: (1) joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (2) supporting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, (3) strengthening export controls related to sensitive technologies, (4) adopting a strategic restraint regime, and (5) improving relations with Pakistan. See Ibid.
39. U.S. Embassy (New Delhi), “Overview: A Shared Vision,” <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/wwwfpppover.pdf>.
40. “India and Pakistan: Listing of Sanctions, Removal of India and Pakistani Entities, and Revision in License Review Policy,” Federal Register 66 (October 1, 2001), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, October 1, 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
41. Jane Perlez, “U.S. Ready to End Sanctions on India to Build Alliance,” New York Times, Section A, Column 6, Foreign Desk, p. 1, August 27, 2001, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, August 27, 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>. Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Ca) and Senator Joseph Biden (D-De), then-Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supported the removal of sanctions on India. Sen. Biden and Rep. Lantos wrote to President Bush urging the removal of sanctions on India while expressing concern over removing sanctions on Pakistan. Senator Biden later withdrew his opposition to removing sanctions on Pakistan after Pakistan expressed its support for the War on Terror. Initially, Pakistan's “poorer” proliferation record was cited as a reason for keeping some sanctions. In fact, the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan's National Defense Complex and China's China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation on September 1, 2001, for the transfer of missile technology. See “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Pakistani, Chinese Entities,” Press Trust of India, September 1, 2001, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, September 2, 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com > ; “U.S. Congressman Urges Lifting Economic Sanctions on India,” Press Trust of India, August 29, 2001, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, August 29, 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com > ; “U.S. Lifts Sanctions Against India, Pak,” Hindu (Chennai), September 24, 2001, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, September 24, 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com > ; Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Sanctions Against India have Outlived their Usefulness,” Hindu (Chennai), August 30, 2001, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, September 4, 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
42. The Indian Embassy (Washington DC), Press Release, November 9, 2001, “Text of the India-U.S. Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Official Working Visit of the Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, to Washington DC,” <http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/2001/ind_us_js_nov_9_01.htm>.
43. “India, U.S. for ‘New Strategic Framework Dialogue,’” Hindu (Chennai), November 11, 2001, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, November 14, 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
44. The Indian Embassy (Washington DC), Press Release, November 13, 2002, “India-U.S. Joint Statement on High Technology Commerce,” < http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2002/nov/8.htm > ; “Indo-U.S. Group Set Up to Expedite High-Tech Trade,” Financial Express (New Delhi), November, 13, 2002, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 November 2002, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
45. The Indian Embassy (Washington DC), Press Release, February 5, 2003, “India-U.S. High Technology Cooperation,” <http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2003/feb/05_2.htm>.
46. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Statement of Principles for U.S.-India High Technology Commerce,” February 5, 2003, <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/InternationalPrograms/StatementPrinciplesIndia.htm>.
47. “Gliding Along,” Financial Express (New Delhi), December 25, 2003, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, December 26, 2003,<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
48. Originally, the agreement was intended to be signed during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to the United States in September 2003, but the signing was postponed for a number of reasons, one of which was to avoid antagonizing Pakistan. See Daniel Horner, “India, U.S. May be Near-Agreement on Package that Includes Nuclear,” Nucleonics Week 44 (October 16, 2003), p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, November 6, 2003, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com > ; Amrit Dhillon, “U.S. Ban on Technology Sales to India Lifted: ‘Milestone Agreement Covers Nuclear Cooperation, Space, and Missile Defence,’” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), December 19, 2003, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, December 19, 2003, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
49. White House, Press Release, January 12, 2004, “Statement by the President on India: Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040112-1.html>.
50. EAR99 items are items subject to the export licensing jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, but not elsewhere specified on the Commerce Control List. XX999 items are a subset of formerly EAR99 items that were deemed to be potentially useful for nuclear proliferation activities in North Korea. These items have an Export Control Classification Number ending in 999. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Removal of Indian Entity and Revision in License Review Policy for Certain Indian Entities Questions and Answers,” <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/internationalprograms/IndianEntityQandA.htm > ; Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Press Release, September 17, 2004, “Announcement on U.S.-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership – September 2004,” <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/News/2004/US-IndiaNextStep.htm>.
51. EAR99 items are items subject to the export licensing jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, but not elsewhere specified on the Commerce Control List. XX999 items are a subset of formerly EAR99 items that were deemed to be potentially useful for nuclear proliferation activities in North Korea. These items have an Export Control Classification Number ending in 999. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Removal of Indian Entity and Revision in License Review Policy for Certain Indian Entities Questions and Answers,” <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/internationalprograms/IndianEntityQandA.htm > ; Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Press Release, September 17, 2004, “Announcement on U.S.-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership – September 2004,” <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/News/2004/US-IndiaNextStep.htm>.
52. EAR99 items are items subject to the export licensing jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, but not elsewhere specified on the Commerce Control List. XX999 items are a subset of formerly EAR99 items that were deemed to be potentially useful for nuclear proliferation activities in North Korea. These items have an Export Control Classification Number ending in 999. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Removal of Indian Entity and Revision in License Review Policy for Certain Indian Entities Questions and Answers,” <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/internationalprograms/IndianEntityQandA.htm > ; Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Press Release, September 17, 2004, “Announcement on U.S.-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership – September 2004,” <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/News/2004/US-IndiaNextStep.htm>.
53. Aziz Haniffa, “U.S., India Conclude High-Technology Deal,” September 18, 2004, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/sep/18aziz.htm>.
54. C. Raja Mohan, “Lowering the Barriers?” Hindu (Chennai), November 20, 2003.
55. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Statement of Principles for U.S.-India High Technology Commerce.”
56. “India and Pakistan: Listing of Sanctions, Removal of India and Pakistani Entities, and Revision in License Review Policy.”
57. The seven ISRO subsidiaries are: ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network; ISRO Inertial Systems Unit at Thiruvananthapuram; Liquid Propulsion Systems Center; Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant; Space Application Center at Ahmedabad; Sriharikota Space Center; and Vikram Sarabhai Space Center at Thiruvananthapuram. See “India: Removal of Indian Entity and Revision in License Review Policy for Certain Indian Entities; and a Clarification,” Federal Register 69 (September 22, 2004), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, September 22, 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
58. The seven ISRO subsidiaries are: ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network; ISRO Inertial Systems Unit at Thiruvananthapuram; Liquid Propulsion Systems Center; Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant; Space Application Center at Ahmedabad; Sriharikota Space Center; and Vikram Sarabhai Space Center at Thiruvananthapuram. See “India: Removal of Indian Entity and Revision in License Review Policy for Certain Indian Entities; and a Clarification,” Federal Register 69 (September 22, 2004), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, September 22, 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
59. “Statement of Principles for U.S.-India High Technology Commerce.”
60. “U.S. Lifts Curbs on Nuclear, Space Exports to India,” Reuters, September 18, 2004.
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62. Between January and September 2004, U.S. officials indicated that India must undertake some major steps to tighten its export control system in order to harmonize it with the U.S. export control system. For example, U.S. officials, in January 2004, and former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in March 2004, indicated that India has to cover a lot of ground in order to provide assurance to the United States. “Press Briefing En Route to India,” FDCH Federal Department and Agency Documents, March 15, 2004, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, March 16, 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com > ; Peter Slevin, “U.S. to Send India Nuclear, Space Technology; New Delhi Pledges to Pursue Peaceful Purposes and Help Block Spread of Weapons,” Washington Post, January 13, 2004, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, January 13, 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com > ; Sridhar Krishnaswami, “U.S. Wants India to Address Concerns on Export Control,” Hindu (Chennai), January 14, 2004, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, January 14, 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>. A U.S. official remarked that “We've seen them attempting to take steps…but in many cases they can't finish the job.” Similarly, former Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked that “They've started to put in place some controls. There's more that they have to do.”
63. Anil Padmanabhan, “Work in Progress,” India Today, February 2, 2004, Diplomacy, Indo-U.S. Ties, p. 54, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, February 5, 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
64. “U.S., India to Boost Hi-Tech Trade,” The Press Trust of India, February 6, 2003, Nationwide International News, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, February 6, 2003, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com > ; “India Looking for Headway on Dual-Use Items,” Indian Express, February 2, 2003, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, February 3, 2003, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com > ; “High-Tech's High Hopes After 10-Yr Drought,” Indian Express, November 11, 2002, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 November 2002, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
65. Siddharth Varadarajan, “India-U.S. Negotiations Entering Crucial Stage,” Hindu (Chennai), October 18, 2004, National, <http://www.hindu.com/2004/10/18/stories/2004101806281100.htm>.
66. Limaye, “Defense Cooperation in U.S.-Indian Relations,” p. 201.
67. Limaye, “Defense Cooperation in U.S.-Indian Relations,” p. 203.
68. Limaye, “Defense Cooperation in U.S.-Indian Relations,” pp. 203-204.
69. L.K. Sharma, “High Technology Co-operation,” Deccan Herald, December 1, 2003, <http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/dec01/top.asp > ; Varadarajan, “India-U.S. Negotiations Entering Crucial Stage.”
70. Amit Baruah, “Drop Trade Barriers, U.S. Tells India,” Hindu (Chennai), November 21, 2003, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, November 21, 2003, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
71. Varadarajan, “India-U.S. Negotiations Entering Crucial Stage.”
72. Harbaksh Singh Nanda, “India, U.S. Defense Honeymoon Continues,” United Press International, October 11, 2004, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, October 12, 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
73. “U.S. to Post Commerce Dept Official to Coordinate Hi-Tech Trade,” Press Trust of India, Nationwide International News, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, October 11, 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
74. Varadarajan, “India-U.S. Negotiations Entering Crucial Stage.”
75. U.S. Department of State, “Vision Statement: India-United States Conference on Space Science, Applications and Commerce – Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation,” June 25, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/2004/33917.htm>.
76. U.S. Department of State, “Unleashing the Potential of U.S.-India Civil Space Cooperation.”
77. R. Ramachandran, “Constrained Cooperation,” Frontline 21 (July 17-30, 2004), <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2115/stories/20040730004610500.htm>.
78. Export Administration Regulations, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Part 744 – Control Policy: End-User and End-Use Based,” p. 5, <http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744.pdf>.
79. “The Country Group D list identifies countries where the U.S. has national security or proliferation concerns based on activities including but not limited to nuclear proliferation, missile technology development, and chemical and biological weapons development.” See Ingram Micro, “Export Regulations and Information,” <http://www.ingram.be/Terms/exporten.html>.
80. Baskaran, “Export Controls on Indigenous Technology Development in India's Space Program,” and Baskaran, “The Impact of Export Controls on Indigenous Technology Development in India's Space Program.”
81. Ramachandran, “Constrained Cooperation.”
82. U.S. Department of State, “Category XV – Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment: The United States Munitions List,” pp. 441-443, <http://pmdtc.org/docs/ITAR/2004/22cfr121_Part_121.pdf>.
83. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Export Controls: Better Interagency Coordination Needed on Satellite Exports” GAO/NSIAD-99-182, September 1999, p. 8.
84. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Export Controls: Better Interagency Coordination Needed on Satellite Exports” GAO/NSIAD-99-182, September 1999, p. 10.
85. White House, Press Release, January 12, 2004, “Statement by the President on India: Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India.”
86. Ashley J. Tellis, “Lost Tango in Washington,” Indian Express, November 15, 2005, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa = view&id = 16152>.
87. High Commission of India, London, “India-UK: Towards a New and Dynamic Partnership-A Joint Declaration,” September 9, 2004, <http://hcilondon.net/hciserv/StatementIndex?source = statementdetails&STCode = 15>.
88. “Germany, India Pledge to Double Trade, Focus on Technology,” Agence-France Presse, October 7, 2004.
89. Siddharth Varadarajan, “Galileo, Fusion Energy Propel India, EU ‘Strategic Partnership,’” Hindu (Chennai), November 9, 2004.
90. Nanda, “India, U.S. Defense Honeymoon Continues.”
91. “U.S. to Post Commerce Dept Official to Coordinate Hi-Tech Trade.”
92. “India and U.S. Set Framework for Strategic Partnership Dialogue,” Daily Times (Lahore), October 22, 2004, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page = story_22-10-2004_pg4_18>.
93. Peter Slevin, “U.S. to Send India Nuclear, Space Technology; New Delhi Pledges to Pursue Peaceful Purposes and Help Block Spread of Weapons,” Washington Post, January 13, 2004.
94. Chidanand Rajghatta, “Indian Cos Helped Iraq with Weapons Programme,” Times of India (Mumbai), October 7, 2004, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/877221.cms>.
95. Christopher Marquis, “U.S. May Widen Technology Contacts With India,” New York Times, January 13, 2004.
96. Indrani Bagichi, “Prove our Scientists had N-Links: India to U.S.,” Times of India (Mumbai), October 24, 2004, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/897532.cms>. U.S. officials point to the recent imposition of penalties on two Indian scientists for assisting Iran in its nuclear program. India has denied the involvement of the two scientists and requested the United States to withdraw the penalties. See Carol Giacomo, “Nuclear Sanctions Jar Improving U.S.-India Ties,” Reuters, October 3, 2004; Ibid.
97. Export Administration Regulations, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Part 744 – Control Policy: End-User and End-Use Based.”
98. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Category XV – Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment,’’ p. 440.
99. . National Intelligence Council, ‘‘Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threats Through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate,’’ December 2001, p. 13, <http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat-2015.htm >
100. Bagichi, ‘‘Prove our Scientists had N-Links: India to U.S.’’
101. Dinshaw Mistry, ‘‘The Geostrategic Implications of India's Space Program,’’ Asian Survey 41 (November/December 2001), pp. 1023–1043; recently India began to initiate steps to set up an Aerospace Command. The initiative is at a conceptual and exploratory phase. The Indian Air Force plans to use the space assets for ballistic missile defense systems, obtaining real-time situational awareness using space sensors and space communication, and also to link communication networks across the country. See Rajat Pandit, ‘‘Groundwork Begins for Aerospace Command,’’ Times of India (Mumbai), April 26, 2003, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, April 26, 2003, </http://web.lexis-nexis.com > ; Bulbul Singh, ‘‘India Begins Setting Up Aerospace Command,’’ Aerospace Daily 206 (May 6, 2003), p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, May 9, 2003, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
102. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘U.S.-India Relations and High-Technology Trade,’’ remarks by Kenneth I. Juster, Under Secretary of Commerce, November 20, 2003, <http://www. state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/26476.htm>.
103. . Annual Trade Data, </http://ese.export.gov/ITA2003_STATES/ITA_MapInfo_portal_page.htm > /.
104. . R. Ramachandran, ‘‘Raising Hopes on High-Tech Trade,’’ Frontline 20 (December 30, 2003_/January 2, 2004), </http://www.flonnet.com/fl2026/stories/20040102001308700.htm > /.
105. Ramachandran, ‘‘India, U.S. & Trade in Technology.’’