THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

Abstract

The 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) failed to produce any agreed action plan for addressing nuclear disarmament or proliferation. Detailed discussions and negotiations on such a plan were much curtailed because of procedural wrangles. This article describes the evolution of the conference and argues that changes in the international political environment and problems inherent in the revised NPT review process agreed at its 1995 Extension Conference contributed to the meager outcome. The main issues raised by delegations in their plenary statements, working papers, and the limited time available for interactive discussion are summarized, and three perspectives are offered on the reasons for the lack of any substantive product. Finally, the implications of that failure for the NPT, its review process, the wider regime for international nuclear governance, and nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy are examined.

Keywords:

• Nuclear nonproliferation
• NPT review process
• 2005 NPT Review Conference
• Nuclear disarmament

Notes

1. The Final Document, adopted by the conference on May 27, 2005, consists of three parts: Final Document, Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference, NPT/CONF.2005/57 (Part I); Final Document, Part II: Documents Issued at the Conference, NPT/CONF.2005/57 (Part II); and Final Document, Part III: Summary of Records and List of Participants, NPT/CONF.2005/57 (Part III). See <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/390/07/PDF/N0539007.pdf?OpenElement > .

2. For the detailed list of participants, including NGO representatives, attending the 2005 RevCon, see “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/CONF.2005/Misc.1, May 4, 2005, < www.un.org/events/npt2005/npt-conf2005-misc1.pdf > .

3. For the text of the speech by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, see the Secretary General, “Address to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,” May 2, 2005, < www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt02sg.pdf > . For the text of the speech by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, see “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2005 Review Conference,” < www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt02iaea.pdf > .

4. In the 1960s, the most likely proliferators were some of the European allies of the United States. The United States faced a difficult challenge in persuading them to sign away their inherent right to acquire nuclear weapons for self-defense against a perceived USSR nuclear threat, as well as accepting onerous international monitoring of their developing nuclear power programs. Some of these states wanted wording in the evolving treaty text giving them the right to withdraw without explanation after five years. What they eventually gained was the wording in Articles X.1 and VIII.3 of the NPT, which gave them the possibility of acquiring that right after 25 years, and the opportunity to review the situation every five years.

5. This was compounded by initial review conferences being held in Geneva, with delegations drawn from members of national delegations to the Conference on Disarmament who were seeking in vain and often in fractious circumstances to advance negotiations on related issues, such as a CTBT.

6. Carl Stoiber, “The Evolution of NPT Review Conference Final Documents, 1975–2000,” Nonproliferation Review 10 (Fall–Winter 2003), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol10/103/103stoi.pdf > ; Ibid; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “The Second NPT Review Conference,” in World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1981 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1981), pp. 297–338; Jozef Goldblat, “The Third Review of the NPT Treaty,” in World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1986 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1986), pp. 469–80; David Fischer and Harald Muller, “The Fourth Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” in World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1991 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1991), pp. 555–84; John Simpson, “The 1990 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Pointer to the Future or Diplomatic Accident,” Round Table (April 1991), pp. 139–54; Jayantha Dhanapala with Randy Rydell, Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account (Geneva: UNIDIR/United Nations Publication, 2005), pp. 8–10; John Simpson, “The 1995 NPT Review Conference: Procedural and Substantive Issues,” in Theodore A. Couloumbis and Thanos P. Dokos, eds., Arms Control and Security in the Middle East and the CIS Republics (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1995); Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, “After the NPT's Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime,” Nonproliferation Review 3 (Fall 1995), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol03/31/raufjo31.pdf > .

7. Thomas Graham, Jr., “Surviving the Storm: The NPT Regime after the 2000 Review Conference,” Disarmament Diplomacy (May 2000), < www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd46/46storm.htm > ; Tariq Rauf, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference,” Nonproliferation Review 7 (Spring 2000), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol07/71/rauf71.pdf > ; Tariq Rauf, “Ambassador Abdallah Baali on the 2000 NPT Review Conference,” (interview), Nonproliferation Review 7 (Fall–Winter 2000), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol07/73/baal73.pdf > ; John Simpson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference,” in Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 487–511.

8. These were indefinite extension, extension for a series of fixed periods (the arrangements that some of the Europeans had sought in the treaty negotiations), or extension for a single fixed period.

9. 2005 NPT Review Conference document NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.3, Dec. 3, 2005. The document was presented to the conference as NPT/CONF.1995/L.6.

10. 2005 NPT Review Conference document NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1, Dec. 1, 2005. The document was presented to the conference as NPT/CONF.1995/L.4; 2005 NPT Review Conference document NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2, Dec. 2, 2005. The document was presented to the conference as NPT/CONF.1995/L.5.

11. Dhanapala and Rydell, Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT; Rauf and Johnson, “After the NPT's Indefinite Extension.”

12. Rebecca Johnson, “Reviewing the NPT: The 1997 PrepCom,” Disarmament Diplomacy (April 1997), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd14/14prep.htm > ; Tariq Rauf, “The April 1998 NPT PrepCom,” Nonproliferation Review 5 (Winter 1998), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/52/rauf52.pdf > ; John Simpson and Emily Bailey, “The 1998 PrepCom for the 2000 NPT Review Conference: Issues and Options,” PPNN Issue Review (April 1998), Mountbatten Centre for International Studies for the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, < www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/ir14.pdf > ; Tariq Rauf, “PrepCom Opinion: Farewell to the NPT's Strengthened Review Process?” Disarmament Diplomacy (May 1998), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd26/26tariq.htm > .

13. Rebecca Johnson, “The NPT Third PrepCom: What Happened and How,” Disarmament Diplomacy (May 1999), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd37/37npt.htm > ; Tariq Rauf and John Simpson, “The 1999 NPT PrepCom,” Nonproliferation Review 6 (Winter 1999), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/62/prep62.pdf > .

14. In 2000 the technical report (previously known as the Final Document) and the substantive report (previously known as the Final Declaration) were amalgamated under the heading of the Final Document.

15. 2000 NPT RevCon, Final Document, Volume I, Part I: Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, Article IX, para.7, p. 20, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/453/64/PDF/N0045364.pdf?OpenElement > .

16. William C. Potter, Mary Beth Nikitin, and Tariq Rauf, “Ambassador Henrik Salander on the 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee,” (interview) Nonproliferation Review 9 (Summer 2002), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/92/92sala.pdf > ; Jean DuPreez, “Interview with Laszlo Molnar, The Second NPT Preparatory Committee: Issues, Results, Implications for the 2005 Review Conference,” Nonproliferation Review 11 (Spring 2004),” <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol11/111/111molnar.pdf > ; Tanya Ogilvie-White and John Simpson, “The NPT and its 2003 PrepCom Session: A Regime in Need of Intensive Care,” Nonproliferation Review 10 (Spring 2003), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol10/101/101simps.pdf > ; DuPreez, “Interview with Laszlo Molnar.”

17. The main difference was that instead of three main committees, the PrepComs engaged in three “Cluster Discussions” on the same range of issues, with “special time” being allocated to certain subjects within them (i.e., in a manner similar to the subsidiary bodies).

18. Rebecca Johnson, “Report on the 2004 NPT PrepCom,” Disarmament Diplomacy (May/June 2004), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77npt.htm > ; John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, “Fiddling While Rome Burns? The 2004 NPT PrepCom,” Nonproliferation Review 11 (Summer 2004), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol11/112/112simpson.pdf > .

19. The chairman attached the text that he proposed as a factual summary as a working paper. See Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2005 PrepCom), “Chairman's Summary,” NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.27, May 10, 2004, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/344/47/PDF/N0434447.pdf?OpenElement > . The chairman also attached the issues that required further consideration, including line item amendments proposed to the text of the draft final report (listed by state party proposing the amendments) as a separate working paper. See 2005 PrepCom, “Chairman's Working Paper,” NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.30, May 21, 2004, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/362/72/PDF/N0436272.pdf?OpenElement > .

20. Coded-language debates are those in which parties to a debate use a related, more insignificant, or detailed issue as a substitute for debating directly about a major one, but most parties are aware that the debate is actually about the latter.

21. NPT/CONF.2000/28 Article VI, para. 15, 1–13, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/453/64/PDF/N0045364.pdf?OpenElement > .

22. Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan.

23. The standard agreement is known as INFCIRC/153 and the Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540.

24. The draft paragraph on the convention stated: ‘The Conferences (sic) stresses the need for rapid conclusion of the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,” NPT/Conf.2000/MCII/CRP.13/Rev. 1, para. 49, May 11, 2000.

25. On Jan. 10, 2003, the DPRK released a statement in which it announced “an automatic and immediate effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT.” For the text of the statement in its entirety, see KCNA News Agency, “Text of North Korea's Statement on NPT Withdrawal,” Jan. 10, 2003, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nptstate.htm > . The DPRK had previously announced its notice of withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993. It then suspended this on June 11, 1993, immediately before it became effective, following negotiations with the United States. On Feb. 10, 2005, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement in which it announced it possessed nuclear weapons. For the text of the statement in its entirety, see KCNA News Agency, “N. Korea's statement in full,” BBC News, Feb. 10, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4252515.stm > .

26. For details on the proposals on the nuclear fuel cycle by the Bush administration, see Thomas L. Neff, “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and The Bush Nonproliferation Initiative,” paper for World Nuclear Fuel Cycle 2004, World Nuclear Association/Nuclear Energy Institute, Madrid, April 1, 2004, <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/FuelCycle/neff.pdf > ; Jon B. Wolfsthal, Assessing Proposals on the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) Report No. 11, June 2004, < www.wmdcommission.org/files/No11.pdf > ; Jon B. Wolfsthal, “The Nuclear Third Rail: Can Fuel Cycle Capabilities Be Limited?” Arms Control Today 34 (Dec. 2004), < www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Wolfsthal.asp > . For details on proposals on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, see Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report Submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA INFCIRC/640, Feb. 22, 2005, < www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc640.pdf > ; Tariq Rauf and Fiona Simpson, “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Is It Time for a Multilateral Approach?” Arms Control Today 34 (Dec. 2004), < www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Rauf.asp > .

27. The White House, Press Release, Feb. 11, 2004, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD: Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” National Defense University, Washington, DC, Feb. 11 2004, < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/print/20040211-4.html > .

28. NPT/CONF.2005/Misc.1. The three consisted of two senior alternate representatives and one junior official, with the latter the only one present most of the time.

29. UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/59/76, Dec. 2004.

30. 2005 RevCon, “List of non-governmental organizations,” April 29, 2005, NPT/CONF.2005/INF.2

31. For the transcript/text of these speeches, see the 2005 NPT Review Conference website, < www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements02may.html > .

32. Rebecca Johnson, “Rogues and Rhetoric: The 2003 NPT PrepCom Slides Backwards,” Disarmament Diplomacy (June/July 2003), p. 4, < www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd71/71npt.htm > .

33. For details and transcript/text of these statements, see 2005 NPT RevCon website, <http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements.html > .

34. For details and for the transcript/text of the statements delivered by the NGOs, see Ibid., < www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements11may.html > .

35. These were the Western and Others Group (WEOG), the Group of Eastern States (Eastern Group), and the Group of Non-Aligned States (NAM).

36. Rebecca Johnson, “‘The Miserable Failure of the NPT to Contain the Nuclear Spectre?’ NPT Review Conference Day 3 (May 4),” The NPT Review Conference 2005: Acronym Special Coverage, The Acronym Institute, May 5, 2005, < www.acronym.org.uk/npt/05rep02.htm > ; Rebecca Johnson, “‘Decisions, Resolution and Outcomes: Frustration as Agenda is Thwarted,’ NPT Review Conference entering Week 2 (May 9),” The NPT Review Conference 2005: Acronym Special Coverage, The Acronym Institute, May 7, 2005,< www.acronym.org.uk/npt/05rep03.htm > .

37. 2005 RevCon documents NPT/CONF2005/31 and 32, respectively.

38. Johnson, “Decisions, Resolution and Outcomes.”

39. The General Committee for NPT Review Conferences consists of the officers of the conference (including the vice-chairs of committees) and the chairs of the regional groups. France and the United Kingdom were automatic members of it as they held one of these positions, but China, Russia, and the United States did not. Thus, although this appears to have been regarded by the president as a mechanism to engage in consultation with a representative group of about one-quarter of the States Parties, three members of the Permanent Five, including two of the depositaries, were not members of the committee and could not in theory participate in its proceedings. In practice, however, both China and the United States were present at its meetings.

40. The decision on the creation and allocation of chairman, procedure and, more importantly, issues for discussion in the subsidiary bodies of the three Main Committees was adopted at the 19th Plenary Meeting of the RevCon on May 18, 2005. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.2, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/350/03/PDF/N0535003.pdf?OpenElement > .

41. For the allocations of time and schedule for the Main Committee sessions, see 2005 RevCon document, “Proposed Programme of Work (19 to 27 May 2005),” NPT/CONF.2005/INF.5, May 19, 2005, < www.un.org/events/npt2005/npt-conf2005-inf5.pdf > .

42. 2005 RevCon document, “Report of Main Committee II,” NPT/CONF.2005/MC.II/1, May 25, 2005, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/360/01/PDF/N0536001.pdf?OpenElement > .

43. 2005 RevCon document, “Report of Main Committee I,” NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/1, May 25, 2005, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/359/89/PDF/N0535989.pdf?OpenElement > .

44. 2005 RevCon document, “Report of Main Committee III,” NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/1, May 25, 2005, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/359/95/PDF/N0535995.pdf?OpenElement > .

45. The Final Document, adopted by the conference on May 27, 2005, consists of three parts. See Footnote 1.

46. 2005 RevCon, “Closing Remarks by Amb. Paul Meyer, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament,” statement to the Final Plenary of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, May 27, 2005, < www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/canada27.doc > ; Rebecca Johnson, “Day 26: Spineless NPT Conference Papers Over Cracks and Ends with a Whimper,” The NPT Review Conference 2005: Acronym Special Coverage, The Acronym Institute, May 27, 2005, < www.acronym.org.uk/npt/05rep12.htm > ; 2005 RevCon, “Statement by Ambassador Alfredo Labbé, Alternate Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations to the final Plenary of the VII Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” May 27, 2005, < www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/chile2005.24.doc > .

47. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, para. 1–13, pp. 1–2.

48. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.34.

49. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.34, para. 6–19, pp. 2–3.

50. Delegates from the United Kingdom, “Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Final Report on Studies into the Verification of Nuclear Warheads and their Components: Working Paper submitted to the 2005 RevCon by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, April 18, 2005, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.1, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/312/81/PDF/N0531281.pdf?OpenElement > ; Delegates from China, “Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War: Working Paper submitted to the 2005 RevCon by China, April 26, 2005, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.2, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/323/46/PDF/N0532346.pdf?OpenElement > ; Delegates from Russia, “National Report on the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the Russian Federation,” submitted to the 2005 RevCon, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.29, May 11, 2005, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/340/74/PDF/N0534074.pdf?OpenElement > .

51. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, para. 1, p. 1.

52. Working paper submitted by Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden, “Combatting the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism by Reducing the Civilian Use of Highly Enriched Uranium,” Working Paper submitted to the 2005 RevCon, May 20, 2005, NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/WP.5, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/352/69/PDF/N0535269.pdf?OpenElement > .

53. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, para. 7, p. 2.

54. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, para. 7, p. 2.

55. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, para. 8, p. 2.

56. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, para. 10, p. 3.

57. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, para. 16, p. 4.

58. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.33, para. 4, p. 1.

59. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.33, para. 3, p. 1.

60. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.33, para. 9, p. 2, and para. 7, p. 2.

61. See 2005 RevCon document, “Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/339/76/PDF/N0533976.pdf?OpenElement > .

62. See 2005 RevCon document, “Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/339/76/PDF/N0533976.pdf?OpenElement >  para. II.3, pp. 1–2.

63. See 2005 RevCon document, “Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/339/76/PDF/N0533976.pdf?OpenElement > .

64. See 2005 RevCon document, “Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/339/76/PDF/N0533976.pdf?OpenElement > , para. III.4. (a), p. 2

65. See 2005 RevCon document, “Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/339/76/PDF/N0533976.pdf?OpenElement > , para. III.4. (b) (c), p. 2.

66. See 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.16, p. 2, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/327/03/PDF/N0532703.pdf?OpenElement > 

67. See NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32, para. IV.5. (a), p. 2, (c), p. 2, (d), p. 2, and (e), pp. 2–3.

68. See NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32, para. IV.5. (f), p. 3.

69. See NPT/CONF.2005/WP.16; 2005 RevCon document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.42, para. 27–29, p. 6, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/348/23/PDF/N0534823.pdf?OpenElement > .

70. See NPT/CONF.2005/WP.16, p. 1.

71. See NPT/CONF.2005/WP.42, para. 29, p. 6.

72. See Nuclear Suppliers Group, Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, INFCIRC/254/Rev.5/Part 1, 16 Jan. 2002, pp. L7-L11, <www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/site_resources/bb-volii-2005/sectionl.pdf > ; Communications Received from Member States Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material, INFCIRC/209/Rev.2, 9 March 2000, pp. L6–L7, <www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/site_resources/bb-volii-2005/sectionl.pdf>.

73. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), Article IX, para. 16, sub. para. 10, p. 18.

74. Dana Milbank and Dafna Linzer, “U.S., India May Share Nuclear Technology: Bush Move to Reverse Policy on Civilian Aid Needs Hill Approval,” Washington Post, July 19, 2005, p. A01, < www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/18/AR2005071801646_pf.html > .