THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

Abstract

The Asia-Pacific is emerging as a critical region in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an aggressive global strategy designed to interdict the transport of these weapons and associated technologies. However, some observers have suggested that the Asia-Pacific has given the PSI a less than enthusiastic reception. The authors posit a more sanguine view. They caution against taking such a holistic approach to the region. Asia does not speak with one voice when it comes to security, and opposition to the PSI is not as widespread nor deep-rooted as may have been anticipated. In addition, the PSI's informal structure encourages flexibility, enabling states to participate in certain activities while eschewing others that may be technically or politically untenable.

Keywords:

• Weapons of mass destruction
• Proliferation
• PSI
• Asia-Pacific
• USA
• Sovereignty
• Security
• Terrorism

Notes

1. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 31, 2003, “Remarks by the President to the People of Poland,” Wawel Royal Castle, Krakow, Poland, <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html>.

2. Wade Boese, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton,” Arms Control Today 33 (Dec. 2003), p. 37; U.S. Dept. of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Conclusions at the 4th Meeting,” London, Oct. 10, 2003, <www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/25373pf.htm>; U.S. Dept. of Defense official (name withheld by request), interview by one author, Washington, D.C., March 9, 2004.

3. Participating members are: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Those that have negotiated ship-boarding agreements are: Liberia, Panama, and the Marshall Islands. Australian Government, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” <www.dfat.gov.au/globalissues/psi/index.html>.

4. Chung-In Moon and Chaesung Chun, “Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian Concept and Implications for Regional Security” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 112.

5. Graham Allison, Ashton Carter, Steven Miller, and Philip Zelikow, eds., Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,1993), pp. 13–14; Andrew Newman, “Cooperative Threat Reduction: ‘Locking In’ Tomorrow's Security,” Contemporary Security Policy 22 (April 2001), p. 91.

6. For Pakistan, this was public confirmation of its membership in the nuclear club. India had already conducted a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974.

7. The six parties to these talks are China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.

8. James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), p. 316; The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 2002), p. 14.

9. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Jan. 29, 2002, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

10. John Bolton, “The International Aspects of Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, remarks to the Second Global Conference on Nuclear, Bio/Chem Terrorism: Mitigation and Response, Washington, D.C., Nov. 1 2002, <http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/2002/1101/epf502.htm>.

11. The White House, National Security Strategy, p. 14.

12. All information is taken from The White House, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD: Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” delivered at Fort Lesley J. McNair, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., Feb. 11, 2004, <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html>.

13. Ian Traynor, “Nuclear chief tells of black market in bomb equipment,” Guardian online edition, Jan. 26, 2004, <www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1130956,00.html>.

14. The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Dec. 2002), pp. 3–5.

15. For an analysis of the difficulties in applying the PSI to North Korea see Michael Levi, “Uncontainable: North Korea's Loose Nukes,” New Republic, May 26, 2003, <www.brook.edu/views/articles/fellows/levi20030526.htm>.

16. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interdiction Strategy,” Strategic Comments 9 (Aug. 2003), <www.iiss.org/stratcomfree.php?scID = 282>.

17. “U.S. lets Scud ship sail to Yemen,” CNN, Dec. 12, 2002, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/11/us.missile.ship/>; Robert Marquand, “Ship's seizure sends warning to N. Korea,” Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 12, 2003, <www.csmonitor.com/2003/0812/p06s02-woap.htm>; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Proliferation Security Initiative.”

18. Boese, “The Proliferation Security Initiative,” p. 37.

19. Marquand, “Ship's seizure sends warning to N. Korea.”

20. The White House, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD”; Sharon Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RS21823, April 22, 2004, p. 3. For a discussion of why the interception might not be attributable to PSI efforts, see Michael Roston, “Polishing Up the Story on the PSI,” In the National Interest, June 9, 2004, <www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue23/Vol3Issue23RostonPFV.html>.

21. John Bolton, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Vision Becomes Reality,” remarks to the First Anniversary Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Krakow, Poland, May 31, 2004, <www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33046pf.htm>.

22. Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 66.

23. The White House, The National Security Strategy, p. 14 and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 2.

24. The White House, The National Security Strategy, p. 14 and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 2.

25. U.S. Dept. of Defense official (name withheld by request), interview by one author, Washington, DC, March 9, 2004.

26. Ralph Cossa, “Putting a Lid on Proliferation,” Japan Times, Oct. 23, 2003, <www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20031023rc.htm>.

27. Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 14, 2003, p. 3.

28. Gavan McCormack, Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe (Sydney: Random House, 2004), p. 171. In addition, Japanese authorities have been monitoring attempts by trading houses set up by Chosoren Koreans in early 2003 to export high-tech items capable of being used for the development of WMD. In a move clearly directed at Pyongyang, the Japanese Diet also passed legislation in June 2004 enabling it to ban vessels from specific countries docking in Japanese ports for a certain period of time. “Nyūkō Kinshi-hō ga Seiritsu: Kitachōsen e no Seisai Dainidan,” Hokkaidō Shimbun, June 15, 2004, <www.hokkaido-np.co.jp/Php/kiji.php3?&d = 20040615&j = 0023&k = 200406157923>.

29. Suzuki Yūji, “Kakusan Anzen Hoshō Inishiatibu (PSI),” Kaigai Jijō 52 (Jan. 2004), p. 150. In April 2002 French authorities, acting on a German government tip-off, ordered a French ship suspected of carrying components for high-speed centrifuges to unload its cargo in an Egyptian port.

30. John Bolton, “Stopping the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific Region: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative,” address to Tokyo American Center, Field Program Design, Tokyo, Japan, Oct. 27, 2004, <www.state.gov/t/us/rm/37480.htm>; GlobalSecurity.org, Military, “Exercise Team Samurai,” <www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/team-samurai.htm>.

31. Australian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade official (name withheld by request), interview by authors, Canberra, April 15, 2004.

32. “Tairyō Hakai Heiki no Yushutsu Soshi: Ajia demo ‘Wakugumi,’” Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 22 2003, p. 2.

33. This paragraph draws from The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP),” Chairman's Summary, Tokyo, Nov. 13, 2003, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/astop/summary0311.html>.

34. Michael Richardson, “It's Full Steam Ahead in Hunt for Terror Arms Shipments,” Straits Times, Oct. 23, 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, Feb. 12, 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

35. “US War on Terror Goes to Water,” Australian, April 5, 2004, p. 13.

36. See for instance, “Liberia Lets US Search Ships,” China Daily, Feb. 14, 2004, <www.chinadaily.com.cn/English/doc/2004-02/14/content_306091.htm>.

37. Laureano C. Santiago, Minister and Consul General, Philippines Embassy, interview by the authors, Canberra, April 13, 2004.

38. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise ‘Team Samurai 04’ (Overview and Evaluation),” Oct. 28, 2004, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/psi/overview0410.html>.

39. “US War on Terror Goes to Water,” p. 13. The Philippines government withdrew its troops from Iraq in July 2004, one month ahead of schedule in response to demands by insurgents who had kidnapped and threatened to execute one of its nationals.

40. In March 2004, Philippine police arrested six suspected Abu Sayyaf militants and confiscated “readings on biological and chemical warfare.” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Global Security Newswire, “Philippine Police Find Chemical Weapons Information in Hands of Abu Sayyaf Militants,” May 24, 2004, <www.nti.org/d%5Fnewswire/issues/2004/5/24/10e00513%2D5955%2D4da2%2Dae85%2D9c9f4e06e294.html>.

41. Taipei Economic and Cultural Office official, Canberra (name withheld by request), e-mail correspondence with the authors, March 5, 2004.

42. Dr. Chen Jie, lecturer in the School of Social and Cultural Studies at the University of Western Australia, observed that when it considers joining international organizations, Taiwan is interested in the “symbolism and trappings of sovereignty, more often than not treating the substance of the organization as [a] secondary issue.” Any organization that does not force Taiwan to use the demeaning label “Taipei, China” is even more welcome. Chen Jie, e-mail correspondence with the authors, May 5, 2005. The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to their attention.

43. “KCNA Assails U.S.-led Multinational Naval Blockade Exercises,” Korean Central News Agency, Sept. 17, 2003, <www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>.

44. See Sharon A. Squassoni, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL31900, March 11, 2004, pp. 1–14. As North Korea does not participate in the MTCR, its missile sales to Pakistan and Yemen do not, strictly speaking, violate international law. Nevertheless, it has been sanctioned for such sales while Yemen has not.

45. Dafna Linzer, “U.S. Misled Allies about Nuclear Export,” Washington Post, March 20, 2005, p. A1.

46. Dafna Linzer, “U.S. Misled Allies about Nuclear Export,” Washington Post, March 20, 2005, p. A1.

47. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, “China joins the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” May 28, 2004, <www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t122871.htm#>, and Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures (Beijing: New Star Publishers, 2003), p. 23.

48. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson issued a statement to this effect following talks between Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui and U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John Bolton in Feb. 2004.

49. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures, pp. 3–4; Boese, “The Proliferation Security Initiative”; Australian Dept. of Defence official (name withheld by request), e-mail correspondence with the authors, May 31, 2004.

50. Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II, Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military Threat to America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999), p. 92.

51. Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II, Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military Threat to America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999), p. 98.

52. See for instance, “Liberia Lets US Search Ships,” China Daily, Feb. 14, 2004, <www.chinadaily.com.cn/English/doc/2004-02/14/content_306091.htm>.

53. “Singapore, Japan Pledge to Work for Safer Straits,” Malaysian National News Agency, June 11, 2004, <www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/id = 72726>.

54. “Malaysia, US to Discuss Security in Melaka Straits Soon,” Malaysian National News Agency, June 6, 2004, <www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/id = 71715>.

55. Sian Powell, “Navies Unite to Fight Piracy in a Dire Strait,” Australian, July 21, 2004, p. 8. It should also be noted that problems related to the joint command of these patrols remain unresolved.

56. Australian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism: Co-chairs Statement,” Feb. 5, 2004, <www.dfat.gov.au/icat/2004_conference/cochair_statement.html>.

57. Prime Minister of Australia, Media Release, Dec. 15, 2004, “Strengthening Offshore Maritime Security,” <www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/media_Release1173.html>; Indonesian Embassy to the Royal Kingdom of Netherlands, Media Release, Dec. 24, 2004, “Indonesia Refuses Australian Maritime Information Zone,” <www.indonesia.nl/articles.php?rank = 21&art_cat_id = 27&status = archive>.

58. Mr. Cotan remarked that Indonesia would be happy to join the PSI if it was under UN control. Indonesian Ambassador Imron Cotan, interview by the authors, Canberra, April 13, 2004.

59. The undersecretary's comments were made in an address to a conference entitled “Challenges to Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Norms in East Asia,” South Korea, Dec. 3, 2003, <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/speech/03dec2003.htm>. In any event, the Bush administration's disdain toward the United Nations in general makes any such eventuality unlikely at best.

60. South Korean Embassy official, Canberra (name withheld by request), e-mail correspondence with the authors, Canberra, May 5, 2004.

61. U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, statement of Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, March 27, 2001, p.5, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2001/010327ts.pdf>.

62. “N Korean Threats Follow Release of Defense Paper,” Taipei Times, Feb. 5, 2005, <www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/02/05/2003222301>; Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), p. 66.

63. South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,” Sept. 29, 2003, <www.mofat.go.kr/en/for/e_for_view.mof>.

64. Former South Korean Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun is reported to have expressed caution over pressuring North Korea through the PSI during a speech he delivered in New York in Oct. 2003. Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 2, 2003, p. 2.

65. Purnendra Jain, “Australia, Japan and the United States: A Bilaterally Networked Trilateral Alliance,” paper delivered to the Symposium on Regional Security and Australia-Japan Cooperation, sponsored by the Monash University Japanese Studies Centre and the Consulate General of Japan, Clayton, Victoria, Australia, Feb. 27, 2004.

66. ASEAN's decision is more significant in light of the criticism that involvement in the war in Iraq had inflicted mortal damage to Australia's standing in the region. See Paul Kelly, “A Door Opens in Asia,” Weekend Australian, April 24–25, 2004, p. 30.

67. Australian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Media Transcript, Sept. 15, 2003, “Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, Doorstop Interview, Perth,” <www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2003/030915_doorstop_perth.html>.

68. U.S. Dept. of State, “Press Conference on U.S.-China Security Dialogue,” July 28, 2003, <www.state.gov/t/us/rm/22917pf.htm>.

69. Undersecretary Bolton's role in the broader effort to denuclearize the Korean peninsula has been somewhat more confrontational. Bolton, who prior to his appointment served as senior vice president of the conservative American Enterprise Institute, was foist upon Secretary of State Colin Powell by the vice president's office, and his political outlook is aligned more closely with senior members of the Pentagon and White House than with his then-ostensible boss. On a visit to South Korea and Japan in mid-2003, Bolton “got out in front” of his State Department colleagues, who had been instructed to push for negotiations, and took a hard line with Pyongyang. The North Korean Foreign Ministry was apoplectic, reportedly calling Bolton “human scum” and a “bloodsucker.” “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Slams U.S. Mandarin's Invective,” Korean Central News Agency, Aug. 4, 2003, <www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>.

70. Australian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade official (name withheld by request), interview by authors, Canberra, April 15, 2004.

71. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Sept. 4, 2003, “Statement on Proliferation Security Initiative,” <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030904-10.html>.

72. Australian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Proliferation Security Initiative.”

73. 3. Muthiah Alagappa, “Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conceptions and Issues,” in Alagappa, Asian Security Order, pp. 86–7.

74. Chung-In Moon and Chaesung Chun, “Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian Concept and Implications for Regional Security,” in Alagappa, Asian Security Order, p. 112.

75. David Wright-Neville, “US counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia: problems on the horizon,” in Marika Vicziany, David Wright-Neville, and Pete Lentini, eds., Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific: 9/11 and After (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 62.

76. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 30.

77. The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to their attention.