SPACE WEAPONS AND PROLIFERATION

Abstract

The prospect for an arms race figures prominently in the arguments of boosters and detractors of space warfare. However, the most likely outcome of U.S. plans to place weapons in space is not an arms race, but a further degradation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and an increase in weapons proliferation. Both China and Russia are likely to respond to any U.S. space weapons with inexpensive space weapons and a cessation of cooperative nonproliferation programs. During the Cold War, space warfare was avoided because of the detrimental effects such weapons would have on the physical and political environment. Today, these same effects can be seen through the prism of proliferation.

Keywords:

• Space warfare
• Space weapons
• Proliferation
• Space arms race
• Anti-satellite weapons
• Space dominance

The authors would like to thank Ellen Laipson, James Clay Moltz, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments.

Notes

1. Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath, “No Weapons in Space,” Baltimore Sun, May 19, 2005.

2. Edward Epstein, “Debate Intensifies Over Weapons in Space,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 21, 2005. Also see Mike Moore, “Space Cops,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59 (Nov./Dec. 2003), pp. 46–56, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn = nd03moore>.

3. Leonard David, “Weapons in Space: Dawn of a New Era,” Space.com, June 17, 2005, <www.space.com/news/050617_space_warfare.html>.

4. Baker Spring, “Slipping the Surly Bonds of the Real World: The Unworkable Effort to Prevent the Weaponization of Space,” Heritage Foundation Lecture #877, May 10, 2005, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl877.cfm>.

5. U.S. Air Force, Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2.2-1, Aug. 2, 2004, <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf>.

6. For more on space weapon initiatives in the U.S. Fiscal Year 2006 budget, see Theresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hyman, Jeffrey Lewis and Victoria Samson, “Space Weapons Spending in the Fiscal Year 2006 President's Request: A Preliminary Assessment,” Center for Defense Information, Feb. 10, 2005, <www.cdi.org/PDFs/FY06-1.pdf>.

7. For the argument that space has already been weaponized, see Spring, “Slipping the Surly Bonds of the Real World,” and Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), pp. 257–60.

8. For more on the distinction between the militarization and weaponization of space, see Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), pp. 29–36.

9. Herman Hoerlin, “United States High-Altitude Test Experiences,” Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, monograph LA-6404, Oct. 1976, <www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/docs1/00322994.pdf>.

10. Paul Stares, The Militarization of Space (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 261–62, and Laura Grego, “A History of U.S. and Soviet ASAT Programs,” Global Security Backgrounder, Union of Concerned Scientists website, April 9, 2003, <www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/page.cfm?pageID = 1151>.

11. National Resources Defense Council, “Table of Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide: 1945-69/1970-96,” Nuclear Weapons and Waste, Archive of Nuclear Data, NRDC website, Nov. 25, 2002, <www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab15.asp>.

12. Arjun Tan, Gautam D. Badhwart, Firooz A. Allahdadi and David F. Medina, “Analysis of the Solwind Fragmentation Event Using Theory and Computations,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 33 (Jan./Feb. 1996), p. 79.

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14. U.S. Air Force, “Space Track Space Surveillance System,” Space-Track website, <www.space-track.org>. The status of Solwind debris was checked on May 23, 2005.

15. Awareness of how debris can kill indiscriminately in space was greatly increased following the loss of the space shuttle Columbia and its crew of seven during reentry. The cause of this catastrophic loss was a piece of debris that hit the wing of the Columbia during launch, the impact of which was felt during re-entry. The foam debris that struck the shuttle during lift-off was traveling at 530 mph. Debris in low-earth orbit travels almost 40 times that velocity. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, The CAIB Report, CAIB website, Aug. 2003, <www.caib.us>.

16. John Kelly, “Debris is Shuttle's Biggest Threat,” Florida Today (Melbourne, FL), March 5, 2005.

17. National Research Council, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, Protecting the Space Station from Meteoroids and Orbital Debris (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1997), p. 16.

18. NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Orbital Debris Quarterly News 9, Johnson Space Center, Texas, April 2005, p. 10.

19. Theresa Hitchens, Future Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Approach (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, Sept. 2004), p. 26.

20. U.S. Dept. of Defense, “Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization” (Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense, 2001), p. 100.

21. U.S. Dept. of Defense, “National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” March 2005, p. 9, <www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf>.

22. U.S. Air Force, Counterspace Operations.

23. For other options besides victimization or shooting first and starting an ill-advised space war, see Krepon, Space Assurance or Space Dominance?, Chapters 3 and 4. Also see Philip Baines, “Prospects for ‘Non-Offensive’ Defenses in Space,” in Clay Moltz, ed., New Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security, Occasional Paper No. 12 (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2003), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op12/index.htm>.

24. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2005, Appendix 8A.

25. Natural Resources Defense Council, “Nuclear Data—Table of USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads,” Nuclear Weapons and Waste, Archive of Nuclear Data, NRDC website, Nov. 25, 2002, <www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab10.asp>, and Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Russian Strategic Forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61 (March/April 2005), pp. 70–72.

26. Natural Resources Defense Council, “Nuclear Data—Table of USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads,” Nuclear Weapons and Waste, Archive of Nuclear Data, NRDC website, Nov. 25, 2002, <www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab10.asp>, and Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Russian Strategic Forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61 (March/April 2005), pp. 70–72.

27. Natural Resources Defense Council, “Nuclear Data—Table of USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads,” Nuclear Weapons and Waste, Archive of Nuclear Data, NRDC website, Nov. 25, 2002, <www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab10.asp>, and Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Russian Strategic Forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61 (March/April 2005), pp. 70–72.

28. Pavel Podvig, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces in the Next Decade,” Aspen Institute Italia, News Analysis Series No. 3/05, Jan. 2005.

29. Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Memorandum: Military Forces along the Sino-Soviet Border,” SR IM 70-5, Jan. 1, 1970, p. 1; Central Intelligence Agency, Weekly Summary, Aug. 15, 1969, p. 10; and Central Intelligence Agency, “National Intelligence Estimate: The USSR and China,” NIE 11/13-69, Aug. 12, 1969, p. 5.

30. For more on nuclear forces estimates, see U.S. Dept. of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Defense, 2004), p. 37; U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, CIA National Intelligence Estimate of Foreign Missile Developments, Senate Hearing 107-467, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 2002, p. 32; National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, Aug. 2003, p.16; all cited in Jeffrey Lewis, “China's Arsenal, by the Numbers,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61 (May/June 2005), p. 55.

31. Dept. of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, p. 37.

32. Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 136, and Natural Resources Defense Council, “Table of US ICBM Forces,” Nuclear Weapons and Waste, Archive of Nuclear Data, NRDC website, Nov. 25, 2002, <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab3.asp>.

33. See Defense Dept., Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2002, p. 22, and Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59 (Nov./Dec. 2003), pp. 77–80.

34. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Defense Intelligence Agency, 107th Congress, 2nd session, March 19, 2002.

35. Federation of American Scientists, “Polaris A3,” WMD Around the World, FAS website, May 30, 1997, <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/a-3.htm>.

36. Podvig, Russian Nuclear Strategic Forces, p. 4.

37. See Central Intelligence Agency, “NIE 13-8-74 China's Strategic Attack Programs,” June 13, 1974, p. 14, and National Air Intelligence Center, “Foreign Missile Update,” NAIC-1030-098B-96, Nov. 1996, included as an appendix in Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000), pp. 253–54; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security 17 (Autumn 1992), pp. 5–40.

38. John C. Lonnquest and David F. Winkler, To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program, U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory Special Report 97/01, Dept. of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program, Nov. 1996, <www.cevp.com/docs/COLDWAR/1996-11-01952.pdf>.

39. For more on China's missile programs, see Lewis and Di, “China's Ballistic Missile Programs”; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); and Jeffrey Lewis, “The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age,” Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 2004.

40. For more on Chinese space warfare capabilities see Mark A. Stokes, “China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Sept. 1999; Phillip Saunders, “China's Future in Space: Implications for U.S. Security,” Ad Astra Magazine, National Space Society, May 2005; Joan Johnson Freese, “China's Manned Space Program: Sun Tzu or Apollo Redux?” Naval War College Review 56 (Summer 2003). Moscow has proposed a restraint regime for space weapons. See the Russian and Chinese statements at the Conference on Disarmament, Sessions for 2004, Statements to the Conference, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdindex.html>, and Chinese and Russian Delegations, “Definition Issues Regarding Legal Instruments on the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space,” A non-paper to the Conference on Disarmament, 2005 Session, June 9, 2005, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches05/June9ChinaRussianonpaper.pdf>.

41. See, for example, George Perkovich, “For Tehran, Nuclear Program is a Matter of National Pride,” Yale Global Online, < http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id = 5448 >, March 21, 2005; Peter Jones, “Iran's Threat Perceptions and Arms Control Policies,” Nonproliferation Review 6 (Fall 1998), pp. 39–55; Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996).

42. See Larry Niksch, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,” Congressional Research Service Report IB91141, May 23, 2005, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/46412.pdf>, and Daniel Pinkston and Phillip Saunders, “Seeing North Korea Clearly,” Survival 45 (Autumn 2003), pp. 79–102.

43. Kevin Orfall and Gaurav Kampani, with Michael Dutra, “The 31 August 1998 North Korean Satellite Launch: Factsheet,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/factsht.htm>.

44. Douglas Jehl and William Broad, “Doubts Persist on Iran Nuclear Arms Goals,” New York Times, Nov. 20, 2004; Agence France Presse, “Iran to Launch Satellite with Own Rocket within 18 Months,” Jan. 5, 2004; United Press International, “Iran to Launch First Homemade Satellite,” Oct. 7, 2004.

45. Dept. of Defense, “United States Central Command Operational Update Briefing,” Doha, Qatar, March 25, 2003, accessed through Lexis Nexis.

46. Anthony Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), p. 11.

47. For an elaboration of this case against space weapons see Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance?

48. For the Bush administration's national security, doctrinal, and supplementary policy statements related to space control, see U.S. Dept. of Defense, “National Defense Strategy of the United States of America”, pp. 12–15; Dept. of Defense, “Joint Doctrine for Space Operations,” Joint Publication 3-14, Aug. 9, 2004, <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3-14.pdf>; U.S. Air Force, “Counterspace Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2.2-1”; U.S. Air Force, “Transformation Flight Plan,” Nov. 2003, pp. 49–74.

49. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), p. 149.

50. This term was used by the government of India as part of its public defense for testing nuclear weapons. See, for example, Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs 77 (Sept./Oct. 1998), p. 47.

51. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 151.