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Abstract
Skeptics of the Bush administration have castigated its strong aversion to formal international agreements in responding to the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), citing unilateral actions as the default alternative. Yet this critique misses the growing emergence of a conscious framework guiding the administration's actions: an emphasis on the exercise of national sovereignty and the corollary principle of sovereign responsibility. Rejecting the paradigm of arms control as the answer to WMD proliferation, the current administration instead advocates a toolkit of alternative mechanisms based on the full exercise by individual nation, states of their domestic authorities and rights under international law, acting in their capacities as responsible citizens of the global community. This paper will examine that philosophical approach and its concrete application through the following policies: (1) the Proliferation Security Initiative; (2) enforcement of national laws and regulations as exemplified by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the U.S. proposals for consideration by Biological Weapons Convention signatories; and (3) preemptive warfare to disarm the WMD programs of a threatening state.
Notes
1. Peter J. Spiro, “The New Sovereignists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets,” Foreign Affairs 79/6 (Nov./Dec. 2000).
2. Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology to Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July to 31 December 2003,” Nov. 2004.
3. Baker Spring, “Harnessing the Power of Nations for Arms Control: The Proliferation Security Initiative and Coalitions of the Willing,” Backgrounder No. 1737, March 18, 2004, p. 9.
4. Paula A. DeSutter, “Are Our Old Concepts of Verification Obsolete?” remarks to the Congressional Defense and Foreign Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., Jan. 28, 2005.
5. President George W. Bush, “New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” remarks at Fort Lesley J. McNair, National Defense University, Feb. 11, 2004.
6. Miles A. Pomper, “IAEA Envoy Nomination Held over CTBT,” Arms Control Today 34/7 (Sept. 2004).
7. Spring, “Harnessing the Power of Nations for Arms Control,” pp. 2 and 6.
8. John R. Bolton, “An All-Out War on Proliferation,” Financial Times, Sept. 7, 2004.
9. Jofi Joseph, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?” Arms Control Today 34/5 (June 2004).
10. U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Statement at the Fifth Meeting,” Palacia Foz, Lisbon, Portugal, March 4–5, 2004.
11. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on “Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” April 28, 2004.
12. Andrew Semmel, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540: The U.S. Perspective,” remarks at Conference on Global Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, Chatham House, London, England, Oct. 12, 2004.
13. “Note by the President of the Security Council,” UNSC S23500, Jan. 31, 1992.
14. Kerry Boyd, “BWC Review Conference Meets, Avoids Verification Issues,” Arms Control Today 32/10 (Dec. 2002).
15. Although the president and senior administration officials use the term preemptive strike to describe military actions taken to prevent a rogue state from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the more proper term for this action is preventive action. As traditionally understood under international law, all states retain the inherent sovereign right to undertake self-defense to stop and/or blunt an imminent military strike, i.e. one does not have to wait to be struck before taking action. But such action is only legitimate when there are credible grounds to recognize that the adversary is planning an imminent strike. Preventive actions or warfare, on the other hand, are undertaken to prevent an adversary from eventually acquiring the capability to launch an attack. International law has frowned upon preventive warfare because an unfettered right for all states would constitute a recipe for chaos and instability; it is difficult to predict that a particular state will pose an explicit threat down the road.
16. The White House “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Sept. 17, 2002.
17. This issue played out in May 2002, when Undersecretary of State John Bolton made a speech before the Heritage Foundation accusing Cuba of engaging in biological weapons-related research and development. Without an effective mechanism for assessing Cuba's compliance under the BWC, including the stationing of observers, Mr. Bolton had no way of proving his charges.