NUCLEAR U-TURNS

Abstract

The decisions to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Taiwan represent two of the most important cases of nuclear rollback during the Cold War. The cases differ in significant ways: While Taiwan's rollback emphasized capability reductions, South Korea's nuclear rollback mainly reflected changes in intent. One similarity was that despite their precarious security environment, both reversed their nuclear programs in the face of tremendous U.S. pressure. The United States is likely to remain central to these states’ future nuclear narratives to ensure that they do not restart their programs. Changes in the threat environment, shifts in relations with the United States, or the belief that no one is watching could produce worrisome policy shifts in Seoul and Taipei. Several key questions for examination include: Why did they suspend their nuclear weapons programs? What specific pressures influenced rollback? How important was Washington in the process? How significant were the reversals? What could induce them to restart the programs? Understanding Seoul's and Taipei's decision-making is crucial to understanding rollback writ large. Failure to do so may invite an era in which the long-feared “nuclear dominoes” may fall.

Keywords:

• Nuclear rollback
• South Korea
• Taiwan

Notes

1. This article is based on Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons from Experience, a forthcoming U.S. National Defense University publication by Rebecca K. C. Hersman and Robert Peters. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Dept. of Defense or any other U.S. agency.

2. “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea,” Oct. 1, 1953, TIAS no. 3097, Treaties in Force, State Dept.

3. Mitchell B. Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 83.

4. Statement by President Richard Nixon, July 25, 1969, in Guam. For further discussion on South Korea's rollback, see Joseph A. Yager, “Nuclear Supplies and the Policies of South Korea and Taiwan toward Nuclear Weapons,” in Rodney W. Jones, Cesare Merlini, Joseph F. Pilat, and William C. Potter, eds., The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985); “South Korea Profile: Nuclear,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site, <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/index.html>; “Nuclear Power in South Korea: Sept. 2006,” World Nuclear Association Web Site, <www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.htm>. In particular, see Reiss, Without the Bomb; Jonathan D. Pollack and Mitchell B. Reiss, “South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 254–292; Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korea's Nuclear Experiments,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies Web Site <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/041109.htm>; Michael J. Englehardt, “Rewarding Nonproliferation: The South and North Korean Cases,” Nonproliferation Review 3 (Spring–Summer 1996); Peter Hayes, “The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue,” in Andrew Mack, ed., Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1993); and Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Richard Tanter, “South Korea's Nuclear Surprise,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (Jan./Feb. 2005), pp. 40–49, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=jf05kang>.

5. Hayes, “The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue,” p. 52.

6. Pollack and Reiss, “South Korea,” pp. 261–262.

7. Reiss, Without the Bomb, p. 81.

8. Pollack and Reiss, “South Korea,”, p. 262.

9. Reiss, Without the Bomb, p. 89.

10. Reiss, Without the Bomb, p. 93.

11. Pollack and Reiss, “South Korea,” p. 262.

12. Hayes, “The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue,” p. 52.

13. Englehardt, “Rewarding Nonproliferation,” p. 32.

14. Reiss, Without the Bomb, p. 99.

15. Pollack and Reiss, “South Korea,” p. 263.

16. Reiss, Without the Bomb, p. 84.

17. Reiss, Without the Bomb, p. 84.

18. Englehardt, “Rewarding Nonproliferation,” p. 32.

19. Englehardt, “Rewarding Nonproliferation,” p. 32.

20. Kang et al., “South Korea's Nuclear Surprise.”

21. Kang et al., Mark Hibbs, “77% U-235 Was Peak Enrichment Reported to IAEA by South Korea,” Nuclear Fuel 29 (Sept. 27, 2005), p. 1, cited in Pinkston, South Korea's Nuclear Experiments.

22. World Nuclear Association, “Asia's Nuclear Energy Growth,” <www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf47.htm>.

23. “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China,” Dec. 2, 1954, terminated by the United States in 1980.

24. David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Jan./Feb. 1998), pp. 54-60; and Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, “Where They Were,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Nov./Dec. 1999), pp. 26–35, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd99norris_024>. For further discussion on the Taiwanese rollback, see: U.S. Dept. of State, “Memorandum from Burton Levin, Office of Republic of China Affairs, to Oscar Armstrong, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs: PRCLO Comment on Taiwan Nuclear Development,” Oct. 12, 1976; Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984); Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27 (Winter 2002/2003); “Taiwan Profile,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site, <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Taiwan/>; and “Asia's Nuclear Energy Growth: August, 2005,” World Nuclear Association Web Site, <www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf47.htm>. In particular, see the excellent article by Derek J. Mitchell, “Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment, and Honor,” in Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pp. 293–313.

25. Albright and Gay raise the possibility that Taiwan might have been interested in nuclear weapons as early as the 1950s. See “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” p. 55.

26. Mitchell, “Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program,” p. 298.

27. For a more in-depth discussion on this subject, see Mitchell, “Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program,” p. 297.

28. For a more in-depth discussion on this subject, see Mitchell, “Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program,” pp. 297–298.

29. Albright and Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” p. 57.

30. Albright and Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” p. 57.

31. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 343.

32. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 343.

33. Dept. of State, “PRCLO Comment on Taiwan Nuclear Development.”

34. Albright and Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” p. 59.

35. “Taiwan Relations Act,” Public Law 96-8, 96th Congress. Effective Jan. 1, 1979.

36. Mitchell, “Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program,” p. 300.

37. Mitchell, “Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program,” p. 300.

38. World Nuclear Association, “Asia's Nuclear Energy Growth.”

39. Mitchell, “Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program,” p. 303.

40. Seth Carus, Avner Cohen, David Cooper, Lewis Dunn, Torrey Froscher, Peter Lavoy, Charles Lutes, Daniel Poneman, Brad Roberts, Lawrence Scheinman, Steven Schleien, Paul Schulte, and Etel Solingen constituted the group of experts.

41. The expert group workshop reflected these different dynamics in its results. First, the experts evaluated fissile material access, weapons development, and missile delivery systems to produce a composite capability “score” at two points in time—the pre-rollback peak and the post-rollback low. Next, participants assessed the intent of both Taiwan and South Korea with regard to their nuclear activities by placing the countries in one of four categories: rejection, passive hedge, active hedge, and active pursuit. To help guide this assessment, the study team provided a list of potential indicators of intent, including: maintaining secret/parallel programs, a lack of programmatic transparency, violations of IAEA safeguards, military involvement in nuclear activities, degree and nature of governmental or public debate in the country about a nuclear arsenal, standing as NPT members, and the retention of capabilities lacking conventional or civilian applications. Finally, the experts scored each country's present-day intent and capability levels to give a 2006 snapshot of current nuclear weapons intent and capability. Using results from that workshop, the authors mapped the movement of the South Korean and Taiwanese capability and intent levels from the height of their program to their post-programmatic low.

42. During this literature review, the study team identified 15 major factors that influence a state's rollback decisionmaking: the cost; whether it is an impediment to foreign trade, investment, assistance, and internal development; a failure to progress; net loss of security; reassessment of threat; perceived lack of military utility; U.S. security guarantee; bureaucratic opposition; loss of military support; personal leadership; domestic acceptance of global nonproliferation norms; desire for international standing; strengthened inspection and verification; foreign pressure; and regime change. While many factors appeared in several different cases, the lack of uniform definitions and inconsistent application of these factors made it difficult to determine their relative importance across a wider set of cases. The study team developed and defined a uniform set of factors, encompassing most major factors identified from the literature. During the workshop, the study team asked the participants to evaluate the influence of each of 15 factors for each of the cases. Participants assessed each factor on a scale of zero (not influential at all) to five (overwhelmingly influential).

43. Levite, “Never Say Never Again,” p. 59.

44. 2004 Annual Report, International Atomic Energy Agency Web Site, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/index.html>.

45. International Atomic Energy Agency, Press Release, “IAEA Board Reviews Record of Safeguards Implementation,” <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2001/prn0114.shtml>.