PEERING INTO THE ABYSS

Abstract

The George W. Bush administration has successfully reoriented national policy and convinced the international community of the absolute necessity of denying weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups. In addition to utilizing the tools of existing export control regimes, Washington promulgated the Proliferation Security Initiative and helped push through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to expand the toolkit available to states to prevent the spread of dangerous technologies and weapons to terrorist groups. While these efforts are long overdue, they address only one aspect of the proliferation threat posed by non-state actors. Current efforts focus on the “demand” side of proliferation from terrorists but inexplicably leave unaddressed the role that a growing variety of non-state actors may play in shaping the supply side of an emerging 2016 proliferation market substructure. The proliferation supply network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan provides a precursor to a dangerous new proliferation environment dominated by transnational corporations, quasi-governmental entities, and individuals operating on the fringes of government control in weak or failing states that lack the will and the resources to implement effective export-control regimes. All states need to develop a more comprehensive and holistic view of the future role that a burgeoning plethora of non-state actors will play in nuclear proliferation by 2016.

Keywords:

• WMD proliferation
• Terrorism
• Globalization
• Non-state actors
• Proliferation market substructure

Notes

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5. UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, April 28, 2004, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf>.

6. Christopher Clary, “A.Q. Khan, Proliferation Networks, and the Nuclear Slippery Slope,” in James A. Russell, ed., Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), pp. 93–114. Also see David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The A.Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Network and Implications for Nonproliferation Efforts,” Strategic Insights 5 (July 2006), <www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Jul/albrightJul06.asp>.

7. Kim Reimann, “A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs,” International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006), pp. 45–67.

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9. United Nations Conference on Trade and Disarmament, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services (Geneva and New York: UN, 2004), <www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3235&lang=1>.

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11. See details in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, Sept. 30, 2004, particularly Annex 1, <www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/>.

12. Details in Sara Kuepfer, “The Shady Side of Nuclear,” International Relations and Security Network, Aug. 23, 2006, <www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16564>.

13. Stephen Burgess, “South Africa From the Perspective of WMD Supply Networks,” presentation to the conference on “Terrorism, Transnational Networks, and WMD Proliferation,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 25–27, 2006. Cited with author's permission.

14. Ronald C. Moe and Kevin R. Kosar, “The Quasi Government: Hybrid Organizations with Both Government and Private Sector Legal Characteristics,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, May 18, 2005, p. 2, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30533.pdf>.

15. Jonathan Koppell, The Politics of Quasi Government: Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

16. CIA, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor, annex 1.

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18. Troy Thomas, Stephen Kiser, and William Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actor (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), p. 2.

19. James Rosensau, “New Dimensions of Security: The Interaction of Localizing and Globalizing Dynamics,” Security Dialogue 25 (1994), pp. 255–81. On the impact of globalization on international security, also see Philip Cerny, “Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma, Naval War College Review 58 (2005), pp. 10–33.

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22. Like many of these terms, there is no generally accepted definition of transnational criminal organizations. The only common ground between various definitions is that the crimes are perpetrated by organized networks in a variety of different countries. John Wagley, “Transnational Organized Crime: Principal Threats and U.S. Responses,” Congressional Research Report for Congress, Library of Congress, Washington DC, March 20, 2006.

23. Louise Shelley, “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption and Terrorism,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 11 (2005), pp. 101–11. Also see Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security,” in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), pp. 315–37.

24. IAEA, “Illicit Trafficking and Other Unauthorized Activities Involving Nuclear and Radioactive Materials,” Aug. 21, 2006, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/PDF/fact_figures2005.pdf>.

25. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, “Al Qaeda's WMD Activities [chart],” updated May 13, 2005, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm_cht.htm>.

26. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, “Al Qaeda's WMD Activities [chart],” updated May 13, 2005, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm_cht.htm>.

27. Chris Axtman, “The Terror Threat at Home, Often Overlooked,” Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 29, 2003, <www.csmonitor.com/2003/1229/p02s01-usju.html>; Michael Reynolds, “Homegrown Terror,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60 (Nov./Dec. 2004), pp. 48–57, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04reynolds>.