DECONTAMINATION AND REMEDIATION AFTER A DIRTY BOMB ATTACK

Abstract

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet.

Keywords:

• Terrorism preparedness
• Dirty bomb attack
• Radiological weapon
• Emergency response
• Urban decontamination
• Radiation remediation
• National response planning

The author gratefully acknowledges the time and assistance given by interview subjects at various local, state, and federal government agencies. Special thanks go to John Cardarelli, Ashton Carter, Craig Conklin, Debra McBaugh, John MacKinney, Barbara Reichmuth, Joseph Ring, and two perceptive anonymous reviewers, who all read drafts of this paper and provided detailed comments and invaluable insights. This report originated from the preliminary work of the Radiological Weapons Working Group at the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Notes

1. See, for example, Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS), "National Response Plan, Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex," Dec. 2004, <http://hps.org/documents/NRPNuclearAnnex.pdf#search=%22RDD%20response%20plan%22>.

2. Unless otherwise noted, most information regarding the likely effects of a dirty bomb, as well as government response plans and capabilities, was provided by government officials and experts from the Dept. of Homeland Security, White House Homeland Security Council, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Dept. of Energy (DOE), EPA National Decontamination Team, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), EPA Radiation Control Program, Massachusetts Fire Dept., Massachusetts Dept. of Environmental Protection, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety, Massachusetts Dept. of Public Health, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in a series of interviews (for which anonymity was granted) spanning 2005 and 2006.

3. Homeland Security Council, "Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries. Created for Use in National, Federal, State, and Local Homeland Security Preparedness Activities," July 2004, <www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2004/hsc-planning-scenarios-jul04.htm>.

4. Peter D. Zimmerman with Cheryl Loeb, "Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited," Defense Horizons, No. 38, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Jan. 2004, <http://hps.org/documents/RDD_report.pdf>.

5. Decontamination and radiation experts at the DOE and EPA provided descriptions of likely effects of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) incident, in interviews with author, June and July 2005, July 2006.

6. Homeland Security Council, "Planning Scenarios."

7. Decontamination and radiation experts at the DOE and EPA, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

8. Homeland Security Council, "Planning Scenarios."

9. DOE, EPA, and DHS officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

10. Government officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005. These issues were also addressed in the TOPOFF2 simulation, a U.S. terrorism response exercise, in 2003.

11. Homeland Security Council, "Planning Scenarios."

12. DOE, EPA, and DHS officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

13. Homeland Security Council, "Planning Scenarios."

14. Potential ranges of contamination and damage done to the area surrounding the site of the RDD explosion were presented by DOE and EPA officials, interviews with the author, June and July 2005.

15. Homeland Security Council, "Planning Scenarios."

16. Zimmerman and Loeb, "Dirty Bombs."

17. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

18. Jan Beyea, Ed Lyman, and Frank von Hippel, "Damages from a Major Release of 137Cs into the Atmosphere of the United States," Science and Global Security 12 (2004), pp. 125-136.

19. DOE, "Performance Management Plan for the Accelerated Cleanup of the Hanford Site," DOE/RL-2002-47 Rev. D, Aug. 2002, <www.hanford.gov/rl/uploadfiles/Perf_Mang_rl-2002-47.pdf>.

20. DOE, "Performance Management Plan for the Accelerated Cleanup of the Hanford Site," DOE/RL-2002-47 Rev. D, Aug. 2002, <www.hanford.gov/rl/uploadfiles/Perf_Mang_rl-2002-47.pdf>.

21. Interpretation of the Hanford cleanup process provided by an official at a DOE national laboratory, interview with author, Aug. 2006.

22. DOE, "Performance Management Plan."

23. DOE, "Performance Management Plan."

24. DOE's "Performance Management Plan," Rev. D, summarizes the progress through the first 10 years of cleanup as follows: "We are making substantial progress toward reducing risk and achieving these cleanup outcomes. We have resolved major underground radioactive tank waste safety issues and all tanks have been removed from the Congressional Watch List. We have also accomplished interim stabilization of the single-shell tanks by removing the pumpable liquids from 131 of the 149 tanks. The Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant (PUREX) and B-Plant chemical processing plants were the first in the DOE complex to be deactivated to a low-cost maintenance state. Spent nuclear fuel is being taken out of wet storage and moved away from the Columbia River to safe, dry storage on the Central Plateau. Plutonium is being stabilized and packaged for safe, secure, long-term storage and disposition. Construction of the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) for tank waste treatment and immobilization has begun. We are actively dealing with contaminated groundwater plumes. We are dismantling reactor complexes and 'cocooning' reactor cores for interim safe storage. We have stopped all unpermitted discharges to the soil. We have moved more than three million tons of contaminated soil away from the Columbia River shoreline and into the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) near the center of the Hanford Site. We have removed over a million curies of radioactivity from contaminated facilities near the City of Richland, and moved nearly a thousand metric tons of excess uranium offsite. We have sent nearly 400 drums of transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. And we have made all of this progress while transforming the site safety environment to be among the best in the DOE complex. We can rightfully claim we have transitioned from just managing risks to actually reducing them." (DOE, "Performance Management Plan," p. 4.)

25. See critical analysis of the Hanford cleanup project at the Hanford Watch Web Site, <www.hanfordwatch.org/>.

26. DOE, "Performance Management Plan," p. 15.

27. DOE, "Performance Management Plan," pp. ii, 2, 14, 15.

28. Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council (ITRC), "Determining Cleanup Goals at Radioactively Contaminated Sites: Case Studies," July 2002, p. 60.

29. For a critical analysis of the Rocky Flats cleanup process, see LeRoy Moore, "Rocky Flats: The Bait-and-Switch Cleanup," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61 (Jan./Feb. 2005), pp. 50-57, <http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/5032048620348088/fulltext.pdf>.

30. ITRC, "Determining Cleanup Goals," p. 61.

31. ITRC, "Determining Cleanup Goals," p. 62.

32. Ann Imse, "Disputed Plan May Bring Early Demise to Weapons Plant," Rocky Mountain News, May 15, 2004.

33. DOE, "Rocky Flats Closure Project," updated Oct. 7, 2005.

34. Moore, "Rocky Flats."

35. Capitol Reports, "Kaiser-Hill Announces Physical Completion of Rocky Flats Cleanup," Oct. 14, 2005; DOE, "DOE Certifies Rocky Flats Cleanup 'Complete,'" DOE press release, Dec. 8, 2005.

36. Capitol Reports, "Kaiser-Hill Announces."

37. Rosner, "At the Foot of the Rockies."

38. DOE, "Rocky Flats Closure Project."

39. DOE, "Rocky Flats Closure Project."

40. Rosner, "At the Foot of the Rockies."

41. National Research Council, Commission on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, Long-Term Institutional Management of U.S. Dept. of Energy Legacy Waste Sites (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 2000), <http://darwin.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9949&page=3>.

42. EPA Office of Inspector General, "EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement," Evaluation Report No. 2003-P-00012, Aug. 21, 2003, p. 58, <www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2003/WTC_report_20030821.pdf>.

43. EPA Office of Inspector General, "EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement," Evaluation Report No. 2003-P-00012, Aug. 21, 2003, p. 58, <www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2003/WTC_report_20030821.pdf>.

44. he EPA's offices in New York were closed, but nearby branches in New Jersey provided workspace for an interagency task force assembled to monitor, assess, and plan to mitigate environmental concerns.

45. EPA Office of Inspector General, "EPA's Response," p. 66.

46. Christina DiMartino, "Waste Industry, Others Help with Cleanup at World Trade Center Site," Nov. 1, 2001, <www.wasteage.com/mag/waste_waste_industry_others/>.

47. Yucca Mountain has applied for a license to store high-level radioactive waste.

48. For a discussion of the Nuclear Incident Response Team, see: Keith Bea, et al., "Emergency Preparedness and the Response Directorate of the Dept. of Homeland Security," CRS Report for Congress, June 25, 2003, p. 5, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21367.pdf>. For more information on the EPA's Environmental Response Teams, see EPA, "ERT Overview," <www.ert.org/mainContent.asp?section=About&subsection=Overview>.

49. EPA Office of Inspector General, "EPA's Response," p. 60.

50. Zimmerman and Loeb, "Dirty Bombs," p. 7.

51. White House, Katrina Lessons Learned Review Group, "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned," Feb. 2006, p. 8, <www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf>.

52. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," pp. 16, 45.

53. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 52.

54. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," pp. 129, 69.

55. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 134.

56. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 139.

57. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 139.

58. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 142.

59. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 62.

60. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 70.

61. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 38.

62. IAEA, "The Radiological Accident at Goiania," STI/PUB/815, 1988, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub815_web.pdf>.

63. IAEA, "The Radiological Accident at Goiania," STI/PUB/815, 1988, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub815_web.pdf>.

64. Zimmerman and Loeb, "Dirty Bombs," p. 4.

65. Friedrich Steinhausler, "International Knowledge Base for Cleanup and Site Restoration," Abstract for National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Conference on "Advances in Consequence Management for Radiological Terrorism Events," 2004; and J. Roed et al., "Mechanical Decontamination Tests in Areas Affected by the Chernobyl Accident," Riso National Laboratory, Roskilde, Denmark, and Federal Radiological Centre, St. Petersburg, Russia, Riso-R-1029(EN), Aug. 1998, <www.risoe.dk/rispubl/NUK/nukpdf/ris-r-1029.pdf>.

66. Roed et al., "Mechanical Decontamination Tests."

67. DHS officials, interviews with author, July 2005.

68. EPA, "National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan," 40 CFR Ch. I (7-1-03 edition), 2003, <www.epa.gov/oilspill/pdfs/40cfr300.pdf>.

69. First responders and local officials must be trained to conduct search and rescue in contaminated environments and must have appropriate personal protective clothing and equipment (PPE). While PPE is necessary to protect the first responders, it also complicates the response process, as the anti-contamination clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus make movement and communication more difficult.

70. Estimates of likely effects and implications of a dirty bomb explosion provided by EPA, DOE, and DHS officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

71. EPA and DHS officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

72. EPA and DHS officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

73. Note that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also has guidelines in place to govern response to a radiological incident at an NRC-operated or -licensed facility. In April 2005, the NRC issued a report detailing the NRC's plans: NRC, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response Plan, "Incident Response Plan," NUREG-0728, Rev. 4, April 2005, <www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/respond-to-emerg/m1050970236.pdf>.

74. If the event is an incident of national significance, the DHS secretary will appoint a Principal Federal Official to support the Federal Coordinating Officer, who will coordinate federal response activities. Though the EPA or DOE may have the lead technical roles in the cleanup process, they most likely would not be the lead agency for the entire event.

75. DHS, "National Response Plan."

76. Steinhausler, "International Knowledge Base."

77. The "working group" strategy was discussed in detail with DHS and EPA officials, interviews with author, July 2006. Additional information on establishing cleanup strategies and standards is available in DHS, "Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents," Jan. 3, 2006, <www.ostp.gov/html/RDDIND1-3-06.pdf>.

78. EPA, DOE, NRC, and DHS officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

79. DHS, "National Incident Management System," March 1, 2004, <www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/nims_doc_full.pdf>.

80. DOE, EPA, FEMA, Massachusetts Fire Dept., Massachusetts Dept. of Environmental Protection, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety, and Massachusetts Dept. of Public Health officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

81. For more information on TOPOFF2, see DHS, "Top Officials (TOPOFF) Exercise Series: TOPOFF2; After Action Summary Report for Public Release," Dec. 19, 2003.

82. Jaime Yassif, "U.S. Unprepared for Dirty Bomb Aftermath," Defense News, April 28, 2003, <www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030428-defnews.htm>.

83. DHS, "Top Officials (TOPOFF)"; and Yassif, "U.S. Unprepared."

84. EPA, "Homeland Security Strategy," Oct. 5, 2004, <www.epa.gov/homelandsecurity/pdfs/EPA-HS-Strategy.pdf>.

85. EPA, "Homeland Security Strategy," Oct. 5, 2004, <www.epa.gov/homelandsecurity/pdfs/EPA-HS-Strategy.pdf>.; EPA officials, interviews with author.

86. EPA officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005, July 2006.

87. EPA, "Chapter II: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery," Homeland Security Strategy, Oct. 5, 2004, <www.epa.gov/homelandsecurity/pdfs/EPA-HS-Strategy-Objective-2.pdf>.

88. Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD), <www.crcpd.org>.

89. CRCPD, "Homeland Security," last updated Nov. 9, 2005, <www.crcpd.org/Homeland_Security.asp>.

90. Massachusetts EPA and DOE officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005. For more information on regional health cooperation, see Council of State Governments, "Health: Interstate Compacts," <www.csg.org/policy/health/compacts.aspx>; or Priscilla B. Fox, "Cross-Border Assistance in Emergencies: The New England/East Canadian Model," New England Journal of International and Comparative Law 10 (2004), <www.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol11/fox.pdf>.

91. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 53.

92. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina," p. 112.

93. Anthony DePalma, "Debate Revives as 9/11 Dust is Called Fatal," New York Times, April 14, 2006,<www.nytimes.com/2006/04/14/nyregion/14dust.html>.

94. See, for example, reports by Deborah Elcock and Elizabeth Eraker, which summarize and assess the variety of agency plans and regulations that might be applied to an RDD cleanup effort. Deborah Elcock, Gladys A. Klemic, and A.L. Taboas, "Establishing Remediation Levels in Response to a Radiological Dispersal Event (or 'Dirty Bomb')," Environmental Science and Technology 38 (2004), pp. 2505-2512; Elizabeth Eraker, "Cleanup After a Radiological Attack," Nonproliferation Review 11 (Fall-Winter 2004), pp. 167-185.

95. These concerns, likely obstacles, and recommendations for future action were raised by EPA and DHS officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

96. DHS, "Preparedness Directorate: Protective."

97. Assessment of guidelines provided by current DOE and EPA officials, interviews with author, Spring 2006.

98. DHS, DOE, and EPA decontamination experts, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

99. NRC guidelines for cleanup of nuclear power plants and other radiologically contaminated sites have provided valuable guidance to the DOE and the EPA as they have designed agency-specific decontamination strategies for their own facilities. Through continued cleanup of former weapons productions sites, the DOE has developed decontamination protocol under the Superfund programs, according to guidance provided in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and new DOE research is focused on transforming past cleanup experience to that which first responders might use following an RDD incident. These efforts are a significant step in the right direction, but this information must be in a form that permits it to be readily shared with other agencies, first responders, and private contractors throughout the cleanup process.

100. Henry Kelly, "Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes: The Terrorist Nuclear Threat," testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 6, 2002, <www.fas.org/ssp/docs/kelly_testimony_030602.pdf>.

101. Government decontamination experts, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

102. Assessment of existing decontamination techniques provided by DOE and EPA radiation experts, interviews with author, June and July 2005, June 2006.

103. President George W. Bush, "Biodefense for the 21^st Century," Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10, April 28, 2004, <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-10.html>.

104. DOE and EPA officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

105. DOE and EPA officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

106. DOE and EPA officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

107. Zimmerman and Loeb, "Dirty Bombs," p. 9.

108. DOE and EPA officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

109. See, for example, Sandia National Laboratories, "Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Project," <www.nwer.sandia.gov/wlp/factsheets/wipp.pdf>; and DOE, "Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Project," <www.wipp.energy.gov/>.

110. DOE and EPA officials, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

111. DHS, EPA, and DOE decontamination experts, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

112. One prediction of the cost of a radiological or nuclear event can be found in: Barbara Reichmuth, Steve Short, Tom Wood, Fred Rutz, Debbie Schwartz, "Economic Consequences of a Radiological/Nuclear Attack: Cleanup Standards Significantly Affect Cost," Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 2005.

113. Hurricane Katrina further highlighted the need for improved communication capabilities between first responders, government officials, and citizens in the aftermath of a disaster. While a dirty bomb is unlikely to result in the same type of widespread infrastructure damage caused by Katrina, lack of accurate and timely communication and a coordinated response would compromise safety and create additional obstacles to effective treatment of individuals, decontamination, and remediation efforts.

114. EPA Office of Inspector General, "EPA's Response," pp. iii-iv.

115. EPA Office of Inspector General, "EPA's Response," p. 59.

116. Predictions provided by government experts, interviews with author, June and July 2005.

117. Government officials, interviews with author, summer 2005.