Abstract
If progress is to be made toward eventual nuclear disarmament (or even very low numbers), greater coordination among the Permanent Five (P-5) states will be needed. To date, considerable progress has been made, but much of it is reversible. Equally problematic is that reductions are now increasingly unverified and unilateral. These trends hamper efforts to bring in other parties and build the stronger nonproliferation norms necessary for further cuts in global arsenals (and the prevention of new ones). Studying P-5 nuclear plans 10 years out is important for beginning to chart possibilities (and problems) for increased coordination of international nuclear policies. Moreover, the P-5 states need to replace Cold War “zero-sum” thinking about nuclear weapons with new “positive-sum” approaches to collective security.
Sixteen years after the formal end of the Cold War, the Permanent Five (P-5) members of the UN Security Council—the only officially recognized nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—still possess a total of nearly 27,000 nuclear weapons. While all have also made progress in the direction of their NPT Article VI commitments for eventual nuclear disarmament (compared to the size of their Cold War arsenals), they have done so without great conviction or publicity and, since 2002, without any sustained coordination. Post–Cold War nuclear disarmament has turned from what many hoped would be a speedy, orderly, and negotiated process into a challenge somewhat akin to herding unfriendly cats. Unfortunately, while some officials in the P-5 states reject the connection, the lack of sustained progress toward disarmament may have further encouraged recent nuclear proliferants, while also weakening international pressure on these countries.
During the 1990s, the P-5 states together actually made considerable progress toward strengthening nonproliferation norms and encouraging disarmament. They finally achieved universality within the NPT, with the accession of China and France to the treaty soon after the end of the Cold War. The first U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty offered a clear framework for cooperative, structured, and verified nuclear reductions by the two largest nuclear states. In addition, coordinated P-5 policies helped bring about the denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and smoothed the process of bringing South Africa into the treaty, outcomes that greatly strengthened international nonproliferation norms.
By the late 1990s, however, this momentum had been lost. The nuclear tests in South Asia and the rise of other national security concerns—such as international terrorism—caused the P-5 states to subordinate nuclear reductions and nonproliferation to other national priorities. Instead, in the pursuit of both economic and self-interested security needs, they began to make exceptions for states that either failed to comply with their NPT obligations (Russia regarding Iran) or that remained outside the treaty altogether (Russia, France, and the United States regarding India, and China regarding Pakistan). In the realm of arms control, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty) explicitly rejected progress toward disarmament by failing to require any warhead elimination and completely exempting thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. The decision to allow the Agreed Framework to dissolve in the fall and winter of 2002 over limited evidence of North Korean cheating also set back collective approaches to nonproliferation, while giving Pyongyang the opportunity to access its nuclear material and conduct a nuclear test in the fall of 2006. Finally, national nuclear policy documents, like the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, undercut any emphasis on reduced nuclear reliance by promoting new nuclear weapons (including possible “bunker-buster” bombs) and by reasserting the right of the United States to use nuclear weapons against states armed with chemical or biological weapons, lowering the threshold to nuclear use. France made similar statements, and Russia moved away from its prior no-first-use pledge and developed a new nuclear doctrine citing the possible role of nuclear weapons in ending “regional wars.” These dismal trends suggested that early post–Cold War progress by the P-5 toward nuclear reductions and disarmament was unlikely to continue.
At the same time, however, it would be inaccurate to say that no progress was being made. The United Kingdom engaged in a vigorous debate in 2006 about the need for nuclear weapons, becoming the first P-5 state to have such a serious and sustained domestic discussion. While its recent decision to move forward with next-generation nuclear submarines (albeit with slightly fewer warheads) marks a failure to take its Article VI commitment seriously, the United Kingdom—with fewer than 200 operational warheads—remains in the realm of minimal deterrence compared to others. Even in the United States, some progress continued despite the above-mentioned setbacks. The Bush administration pledged itself to continue unilateral reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to below 5,000 total warheads, despite the lack of such requirements under the Moscow Treaty. Indeed, the trend for the U.S. stockpile has continued inexorably downward, primarily because there is less military “demand” for these systems, which are viewed as expensive to maintain and operate and virtually impossible to use (for political reasons), short of a major state attack on the United States. Part of the reason for this view has been military assessments that modern, conventionally armed precision-guided munitions (PGMs) can accomplish almost all foreseeable missions, even for strategic targets.Footnote1 Moreover, the U.S. Congress, while still under Republican control, refused to provide funding for the administration's planned bunker-buster nuclear weapons. Russia and France have also continued slow reductions, while China has failed to match predictions of a major nuclear modernization, opting for a limited and slow one instead. Thus, while the disarmament glass may not be half full, it is not empty either.
Yet evidence is lacking of sustained and coordinated P-5 policies toward nuclear postures that might foster stronger nonproliferation norms (such as minimal deterrence by all) and indicate unstoppable progress toward nuclear reductions. Unfortunately, current trends are “mixed” at best. These patterns suggest that the global nuclear future after 2012 may be even more complicated than today, with the P-5 moving off in different directions and failing to offer evidence to the non-nuclear weapon states of serious efforts to disarm. If continued, such policies are highly unlikely to convince other countries to halt nuclear weapons programs and may cause those states that have long renounced such weapons to revisit those decisions. Thus, if the P-5 are serious about nonproliferation, more will need to be done in the future to coordinate their nuclear policies and—as was done by Washington and Moscow during the Cold War—to “organize” nuclear reductions, particularly by setting a better example, uniting in support of strong enforcement of NPT norms, and improving regional security to reduce state incentives to proliferate.
In an effort to start this process, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies began a project in early 2006—with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York—to examine P-5 nuclear trends and analyze prospects for nuclear coordination. This task raised a number of linked questions: 1) How did each state view the future role of its nuclear arsenal? 2) Did it plan to increase or decrease (or otherwise change) its arsenal in the coming 10-15 years? and 3) How did each state view the chances for (and the desirability of) nuclear disarmament?
To set a basis for future analysis, CNS put together a team consisting of top experts on the nuclear policies of the P-5 countries: the United States (Dennis Gormley), Russia (Nikolai Sokov), the United Kingdom (John Simpson), France (Bruno Tertrais), and China (Jing-dong Yuan). After a yearlong process of discussions to help focus the studies on common themes and a shared format, CNS organized a workshop on February 8, 2007, in Washington, DC, to release the researchers’ preliminary findings. This event, attended by some 60 experts from the Washington policy community, allowed the authors to test their arguments and to receive feedback.Footnote2 Their final papers have incorporated these comments and now stand as definitive current analyses of nuclear policies in the P-5 countries looking out 10 years or more.
The findings of this research were not altogether encouraging. Dennis Gormley noted the great potential for a devoted U.S. policy of reduced nuclear reliance, thanks to the development of highly effective PGMs. What is lacking currently is the political will to move in that direction, something that may (or may not) change after 2008. Nikolai Sokov's study on Russia notes that Moscow's increasingly nationalistic leadership is looking to nuclear weapons to shore up gaps in its conventional forces, as well as to restore its international military prestige. Commentator David Mosher, however, noted that despite Russia's apparent commitment to nuclear modernization, Russia's nuclear readiness has declined significantly since the Cold War and is likely to remain low. John Simpson argued that the United Kingdom's debate has revealed the modest aims of the nuclear program, and yet had eventually reaffirmed its commitment to it. But the likely overall number of British nuclear weapons will drop by another 20 percent under the current plan. Bruno Tertrais emphasized the lack of debate in France about nuclear weapons and even nuclear modernization, given the strong national commitment to maintaining independence in security affairs. At the same time, however, he noted France's membership in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the possibility that issues in future pan-European relations might at some point cause France to consider contributing its forces to a joint deterrent with the United Kingdom or NATO as a means of showing progress toward collective security and disarmament. Jing-dong Yuan focused on the gap between China's potential and its current nuclear modernization, which remains considerable. China's slowness to modernize and its apparent reduction in overall force levels since the Cold War suggest that the predicted nuclear buildup may not materialize. Yet commentator Bonnie Glaser noted that “sufficiency” and “effectiveness” are terms that dominate the Chinese nuclear debate, rather than concepts such as “minimal deterrence,” suggesting that China's behavior will be affected by how Beijing sees its future forces in relation to those particularly of the other P-5 countries (and especially the United States).
On the basis of this research, what remains is for students, experts, and policymakers to study these reports and then begin a dialogue on future cooperation. Part of this effort would need to include new strategies for allaying remaining security fears between the P-5 and to build cooperative frameworks for bringing in other states that affect their behavior. Looking ahead, there is a logic for conducting similar studies on a number of other countries with regard to their future security concerns and nuclear policies (or propensities), including India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel, as well as perhaps Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Japan.
Achieving the NPT's ultimate objective of total nuclear disarmament remains a distant goal. However, this objective is neither a fruitless goal, nor one that can be ignored if states seek to further global nonproliferation objectives. Instead, it requires more serious effort, beginning with the leading states in the nuclear field. CNS hopes this set of studies and the intellectual impetus for a collaborative P-5 approach will stimulate future work in this important area. While autarkic nuclear policies may seem to be the current trend among the P-5, recent events suggest that such narrowly self-interested approaches to disarmament and nonproliferation may not be the best way for states to further their own national security interests over the long run.
Fortunately, there are at least two reasons to think that progress might be achieved in the coming years, especially among the P-5. First, the evolution and slow spread of highly effective PGMs make nuclear weapons less and less relevant to the security needs of modern states. While they currently remain unevenly developed among the P-5, the coming expansion of satellite-based global positioning systems may cause even Russia and China to reorient their defenses and help provide the rationale for sustained nuclear reductions. Second, while the cost and crisis stability arguments may have supported the case for nuclear disarmament during the Cold War, there was no perceived operational liability associated with the maintenance of large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. However, the recent rise of global terrorist threats has begun to make the large-scale presence of nuclear weapons a much more serious security risk for all nuclear possessors. Eliminating these weapons and ensuring their secure storage has never been as high a priority as it is today. These two factors may begin to shift national trends into a common direction over the coming decade or more.
However, in the end, what also needs to take place is an intellectual shift from zero-sum, Cold War strategic thinking to positive-sum collective security approaches to nonproliferation. To date, that leap has not yet been made. Thus, the challenge for future P-5 leaders is to elaborate and then work to realize this objective, which arguably holds the best chance for success in solving regional security problems that foment proliferation and for establishing the norms and institutions necessary for effective nonproliferation efforts and, eventually, safe nuclear disarmament.
Notes
1. On these points, see, for example, I.C. Oelrich, “Sizing Post–Cold War Nuclear Forces,” Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper P-3650, October 2001; Dennis M. Gormley, “Securing Nuclear Obsolescence,” Survival 48 (Autumn 2006), pp. 127–148; and Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006).
2. Five specially selected experts provided comments on each of the papers: Jack Mendelsohn, former deputy director, Arms Control Association (commentator on the United States); David Mosher, senior policy analyst, RAND Corporation (Russia); Hans Kristensen, project director, Nuclear Information Project (United Kingdom); Dieter Dettke, executive director, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Washington, DC (France); and Bonnie Glaser, senior associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies (China).