THE ORIGINS OF AND PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Abstract

This article explores Russia's increasing reliance on nuclear weapons from three perspectives. First, it seeks to demonstrate that the phenomenon is not exclusively limited to Russia and represents a broader trend, which is ultimately rooted in the nature of the contemporary international system or, more precisely, the uncertainties of the transitional period between the Cold War system and a new emerging one. Second, it analyzes the role assigned to nuclear weapons in Russia's doctrinal documents, in particular the emergence of a new mission—limited-use of nuclear weapons to deter or, if deterrence fails, to de-escalate large-scale conventional conflicts. Discussions of the new doctrine, which have begun recently, suggest that this new mission will likely remain unchanged. Finally, this article looks at the apparent discrepancy between Russia's nuclear modernization programs and the roles assigned to nuclear weapons in the military doctrine, as well as the causes of that discrepancy.

Keywords:

• Russia
• Nuclear doctrine
• Nuclear posture
• National security
• Nuclear weapons

Notes

1. “Kontseptsiya Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (National Security Concept of the Russian Federation), January 10, 2000; “Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), April 21, 2000.

2. “Aktualnyye Zadachi Razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil RF” (Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), October 2, 2003.

3. “Osnovnye Polozheniya Voennoi Doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), Izvestiya, November 18, 1993, pp. 1, 4.

4. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations, October 26, 2001, <www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5762.htm>.

5. Two documents illustrate the differences between the U.S. and Soviet approaches to the use of nuclear weapons in conflict: “A Study of the Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union, prepared by the Staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council,” November 15, 1963, Top Secret (declassified in 1997), National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of Policy Planning Council, 1963–64, Box 280, File “War Aims”; and “Material on the Development of Military Art under Conditions of Conducting a Missile-Nuclear War According to Contemporary Views,” a letter from Petr Ivashutin to Mikhail Zakharov, August 28, 1964, No. 1689c, Top Secret, available from the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Zurich, <www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=16248&navinfo=15365>. Both documents allow for the possibility of a “victory” in a nuclear war—a view characteristic for the 1960s.

6. This point was developed by Thomas Schelling in the context of the Korean War. Thomas Schelling, Nuclear Weapons and Limited War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1959). A similar point was made in a 1960s study of possible use of nuclear weapons during the war in Vietnam: F.J. Dyson, R. Gomer, S. Weinberg, S.C. Wright, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia,” Study S-266, Jason Division, Institute of Defense Analyses, contract DAHC15 67 C 0011, published March 1967, released to Nautilus Institute on December 4, 2003, <nautilus.org/VietnamFOIA/report/report.html>.

7. For an example of that view, see “The History of NATO TNF Policy: The Role of Studies, Analysis, and Exercises Conference Proceedings,” Vol. 3, Papers by Gen. Robert C. Richardson III (Ret.), Sandia Report, SAND91-8010/3, UC-700, October 1996.

8. Contrary to the claims of both the U.S. and Russian governments, START I verification tools are poorly suited to verification of the Moscow Treaty (the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty). See Nikolai Sokov, “The Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT,” Arms Control Today 33 (April 2003), <www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/sokov_apr03.asp>; and Nikolai Sokov, “Recent Developments in Nuclear Weapons Verification,” in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., Verification Yearbook (London: VERTIC, 2002).

9. For details of this meeting see Nikolai Sokov, “The April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting On Nuclear Weapons,” NIS Nuclear Profiles Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 1999, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/rfsecmtg.htm>.

10. National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, January 2000, and Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, April 2000.

11. “Aktualnyye Zadachi Razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil RF” (Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), October 2, 1003.

12. Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Academy of Military Sciences Debates Role of Nuclear Weapons in Conference on New Military Doctrine,” WMD Insights, March 2007, <www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_R2_RussianAcademy.htm>.

13. Yuri Baluevski, Speech at the Academy of Military Sciences, January 2007. The full text of Baluevski's speech was published about two weeks after the conference and can be found at the official site of the Ministry of Defense (in Russian), <www.mil.ru/847/852/1153/1342/20922/index.shtml>. See also Vadim Solovyov, “Voennaya Reforma Obyavlena Bessrochnoi” (Military Reform Has Been Declared Unending), Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, January 26, 2007.

14. V. Prozorov, Yadernoe Sderzhivanie v Teorii Primeneniya RVSN (Nuclear Deterrence in the Theory of Use of the SRF) (Moscow: Pyotr Veliki Military Academy, 1999), p. 19.

15. A. Khryapin, V. Afanasiev, “Kontseptualnye Osnovy Strategicheskogo Sderzhivaniya” (Conceptual Foundations of Strategic Deterrence), Voyennaya Mysl, January 2005.

16. “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security—A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950,” April 14, 1950, available at the Federation of American Scientists Web Site, <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.

17. For an elaboration of this argument, see Nikolai Sokov, “Strengthening the 1991 Declarations: Verification and Transparency Components,” in Taina Susiluoto, ed., Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Time for Control, UNIDIR, 2002, Publication No. UNIDIR/2002/11.

18. For an overview of the aspects of major military exercises relevant to the analysis of nuclear doctrine, see Nikolai Sokov, “Significant Military Maneuvers,” Part V of “Issue Brief: Russia's Nuclear Doctrine,” August 2004, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_55a.html>.

19. Address by Vladimir Putin, Moscow, Kremlin, September 4, 2004, <president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/09/04/1958_type82912_76332.shtml>.

20. Interview with Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov, Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 29, 2004.

21. Baluevski, Speech at the Academy of Military Sciences, January 2007.

22. Baluevski, Speech at the Academy of Military Sciences, January 2007.

23. Mahmoud Gareev, “Struktura I Osnovnoe Soderzhanie Novoi Voennoi Doktriny” (The Structure and the Main Contents of a New Military Doctrine), Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, January 24, 2007.

24. On Sergei Ivanov's statement at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, see “Sergey Ivanov: Terrorizm Iskhodit ot Nesostoyavshikhsya Gosudarstv” (Sergey Ivanov: Failed States are the Source of Terrorism), Strana.ru Information Service, July 13, 2004. Khryapin and Afanasiev, “Conceptual Foundations of Strategic Deterrence.”

25. Aleksandr Rukshin, “Ot Strategicheskikh do Kontrterroristicheskikh Operatsii” (From Strategic and Counterterrorist Operations), Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 2, 2007.

26. “Rossiya Perenapravit Rakety” (Russia Will Retarget Missiles), Vzglyad, February 19, 2007.

27. For example, during the Cold War U.S. analysis perceived the deployment of a large number of heavy ICBMs and a reliance on ICBMs in general, which constituted about 60–65 percent of the Soviet strategic arsenal, as evidence of preparation for a first strike. Soviet military, however, saw ICBMs as a more reliable element of the strategic triad and assigned heavy ICBMs a key role in the strike-on-warning scenario.

28. For details of the Bulava program see Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Strategic Forces Meet Success, Setbacks at Year End,” WMD Insights, February 2007 at <www.wmdinsights.com/I12/I12_R3_RussianStrategicForces.htm>.

29. For details see Nikolai Sokov, “Russia to Deploy Defense-Penetrating ICBM,” WMD Insights, December 2005/January 2006, <www.wmdinsights.com/I1/R1_RussiatoDeploy.htm>.

30. According to Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Nikolai Solovtsov, liquid-fuel SS-18 ICBMs will remain in force until 2014–2016. See Aleksandr Babakin, “Sekvestr Yadernykh Arsenalov” (The Sequestration of Nuclear Arsenals), Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, May 13, 2005. Some ICBMs, like the SS-19s recently purchased from Ukraine, as well as a number of SS-18s, could conceivably serve longer, but their share in the overall arsenal is relatively small (only 30 SS-19s were purchased from Ukraine; they might serve as long as 20–30 years).

31. Budget constraints are a function of the size of the gross domestic product (GDP) rather than a political choice. Defense spending has remained about 3–3.5 percent of GDP. In 2006, although defense spending increased 10 percent (adjusted for inflation), its share of GDP decreased from 3.5 to 2.7 percent; that is, the growth was less than the overall economic growth and the growth of budget appropriations. This policy could be attributed to the reluctance of the government to expend all additional revenue generated by high oil prices out of fear of inflation. The bulk of spending increases in 2006 came from social programs and salaries for federal and the local government employees (including teachers, social workers, police, etc.). The conservative attitude toward defense spending appears justified in terms of economic policy.

32. On the declining number of patrols by Russian strategic submarines, see “Russian Nuclear Submarines Patrol,” a brief of the Federation of American Scientists, February 24, 2006, <www.nukestrat.com/russia/subpatrols.htm>.

33. For details of the 2000 debate and the meetings of the Security Council, see Nikolai Sokov, “‘Denuclearization’ of Russia's Defense Policy?” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 17, 2000, <cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke.htm>; Nikolai Sokov, “The Fate of Russian Nuclear Weapons: An Anticlimax on August 11,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, August 14, 2000, <cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke2.htm>; and Nikolai Sokov, “The Nuclear Debate of Summer 2000,” Part III, “Issue Brief: Russian Nuclear Doctrine,” <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_55a.html>.

34. For details of Topol-M production rates, see Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization: Past and Future (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 130–131.

35. In 2003 the Votkinsk plant reportedly produced two missiles using its own money—profit generated by civilian production—and then spent months trying to resolve a conflict with tax services.

36. See Nikolai Sokov, “New Details on Russian Strategic Subs Emerge, as Keel for Third Borey Class Boat is Laid,” WMD Insights, April 2006, <www.wmdinsights.com/temp/I4/R_NewDetails.htm>; Sokov, “Russian Strategic Forces Meet Success, Setbacks.”

37. Viktor Mikhailov and Aleksandr Chernyshov, “NATO's Expansion and Russia's Security,” Vek, September 20, 1996, p. 5.

38. Varfolomei Korobshin, “Garantirovanno Unichtozhit Lybogo Agressora” (To Guarantee Elimination of Any Aggressor), Voyenno-Promshlennyi Kurier, March 21–27, 2007 (in Russian), <www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.177.articles.army_02>; see also Sokov, “Russian Academy of Military Sciences Debates Role.”

39. Vladimir Putin, Closing Statement (in Russian) at a meeting in Sarov, July 31, 2003, <president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/07/49738.shtml>.