EFFECTIVE, RELIABLE, AND CREDIBLE:

Abstract

Chinese nuclear doctrine is guided by the no-first-use (NFU) principle and strives to maintain an effective reliable and deterrent. For Beijing, the concept of deterrence has more of a qualitative rather than quantitative connotation. Labels such as minimum or limited deterrence do not capture the essence of Chinese doctrine, which is not defined by any numerical threshold, but by the level of sufficiency that guarantees a survivable, credible, and effective counter-deterrence and second-strike capabilities. Accordingly, China continues to regard nuclear weapons as largely political and psychological instruments, rather than for actual war fighting. The foundation of Chinese nuclear doctrine is increasingly being challenged, however, by growing U.S. nuclear primacy, the U.S. commanding lead in conventional weapons, especially precision-guided munitions, and the deployment of ballistic missile defenses. These developments threaten China's limited nuclear deterrence capabilities and raise questions about the viability of the NFU principle. How Beijing responds to such challenges will determine the future of its nuclear force modernization, the role of its nuclear weapons, and the prospects for nuclear disarmament.

Keywords:

• China
• Nuclear weapons
• No-first-use policy
• Proliferation
• Nuclear primacy

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Bonnie Glaser for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article and Liu Fei for his research assistance.

Notes

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86. Some reports claims that the JL-2 is capable of carrying up to six warheads in a multiple reentry vehicle mode[0], which could increase China's overall SLBM capability to as many as 576 warheads if six Type 094 SSBNs are deployed. The primary source for these reports is Tung Yi, “Range of Nuclear Warheads Can Cover Europe and America,” Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong Kong), January 1, 2001, FBIS-CPP20010106000009. However, this report also claims that China already has five Type 092 Xia SSBNs deployed, which greatly weakens its credibility. Due to restrictions on thrust and payload, the JL-2 is unlikely to carry multiple warheads.

87. China's recent purchase of eight additional Russian Kilo-class submarines suggests that other Chinese submarine programs, such as efforts to develop the indigenous Song-class diesel attack submarine, are also encountering serious technical problems. Charles Hutzler, “Deal Shows Weakness of China's Arms Industry—Buying 8 Russian Subs, Beijing Tries to Redress Some of Sector's Failures,” Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2002, p. A11.

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90. 0. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002, December 2002, <www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/whpandef_2002.htm>. This omission may indicate that the air force no longer has a nuclear role, or it may reflect China's unwillingness to acknowledge the possession of tactical nuclear weapons.

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97. Saunders and Yuan, “Strategic Force Modernization.”

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