ENERGY FOR SECURITY:

Abstract

Though North Korea agreed to partial denuclearization in February 2007, achieving that goal is at best a long way off. A natural gas pipeline linking all of Northeast Asia and promising energy and economic help could help convince the isolated nation to step away from its nuclear programs entirely; it could also provide the nonproliferation and energy security benefits that have eluded the region for so long. These economic benefits could motivate the other nations involved in the six-party talks to deal with North Korea more than if only nuclear reactors were offered.

Keywords:

• North Korea
• Natural gas
• Pipeline
• Energy resources
• Northeast Asia

Acknowledgements

The author is indebted to Keun-Wook Paik and to his wife, Megan Bowman, for their assistance with this article.

Notes

1. On the Joint Statement, see Department of State (DOS), “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” Beijing, September 19, 2005; on the February 2007 deal, see DOS, Media Note, “North Korea—Denuclearization Action Plan,” February 13, 2007, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm>.

2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head Mohamed ElBaradei said the DPRK “was very clear they are ready to implement the February 13 agreement once the other parties implement their part of the deal.” Staff Report, “IAEA Director General Concludes Trip to the DPRK,” IAEA Press Release, March 20, 2007, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2007/dg_dprk_concludes.html>.

3. Steve Weisman, “U.S. Treasury Official to Help Free Up North Korean Funds,” New York Times, March 24, 2007, p. A5.

4. Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill said that North Korean officials “made it very clear that they have begun their tasks for the purpose of denuclearization.” Joseph Kahn, “U.S. and North Korea Are Said to End Frozen Funds Impasse,” New York Times, March 19, 2007, p. A5.

5. Siegfried S. Hecker, “Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,” Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online, 06-97A, November 15, 2006, <www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0697Hecker.html#sect2>.

6. See, generally, David E. Sanger, “Sensing Shift in Bush Policy, Another Hawk Leaves,” New York Times, March 21, 2007, p. A1.

7. See James Clay Moltz, “Future Nuclear Proliferation Scenarios in Northeast Asia,” Nonproliferation Review 13 (November 2006), pp. 591–604. Others such as Christopher Hughes acknowledge the potential for a “nuclear cascade” in Northeast Asia but argue it is unlikely for the time being. “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” Asia Policy, No. 3 (January 2007), pp. 75–104, <nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP3/AP3Hughes.pdf>.

8. Kenneth B. Pyle, “Abe Shinzo and Japan's Change of Course,” NBR Analysis 17 (October 2006), p. 20, <www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol17no4.pdf>.

9. Provided they were limited in number and for self-defense. Howard French, “Taboo Against Nuclear Arms Is Being Challenged in Japan,” New York Times, June 9, 2002, p. 1.

10. Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro's calls for debate on the country's prohibition against nuclear weapons led opposition parties to push for his resignation. “Japanese Opposition Parties Seek Aso's Ouster,” Global Security Newswire, November 9, 2006, <www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_11_8.html#7BE4AC70>. On the nuclear umbrella, see Pyle, “Abe Shinzo and Japan's Change of Course,” p. 20.

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24. David von Hippel and Timothy Savage, et al., “The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance And Suggested Approaches To Sectoral Redevelopment” (hereafter “Sectoral Redevelopment”), Report Prepared for the Korea Energy Economics Institute, Nautilus Institute (revised March 6, 2003), pp. 2, 9, <www.nautilus.org/energy/2005/beijingworkshop/datasets/DPRK_Energy_2000_revised.pdf>. P. 6.

25. David von Hippel and Timothy Savage, et al., “The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance And Suggested Approaches To Sectoral Redevelopment” (hereafter “Sectoral Redevelopment”), Report Prepared for the Korea Energy Economics Institute, Nautilus Institute (revised March 6, 2003), pp. 2, 9, <www.nautilus.org/energy/2005/beijingworkshop/datasets/DPRK_Energy_2000_revised.pdf>. p. 97.

26. David von Hippel and Timothy Savage, et al., “The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance And Suggested Approaches To Sectoral Redevelopment” (hereafter “Sectoral Redevelopment”), Report Prepared for the Korea Energy Economics Institute, Nautilus Institute (revised March 6, 2003), pp. 2, 9, <www.nautilus.org/energy/2005/beijingworkshop/datasets/DPRK_Energy_2000_revised.pdf>. P. 97.

27. David von Hippel and Timothy Savage, et al., “The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance And Suggested Approaches To Sectoral Redevelopment” (hereafter “Sectoral Redevelopment”), Report Prepared for the Korea Energy Economics Institute, Nautilus Institute (revised March 6, 2003), pp. 2, 9, <www.nautilus.org/energy/2005/beijingworkshop/datasets/DPRK_Energy_2000_revised.pdf>. p. 118.

28. On small demonstration power plants and local distribution, see ibid., p. 9.

29. “Kim Reportedly Promises Not to Conduct Another Nuclear Weapon Test,” Global Security Newswire, October 20, 2006, <www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_10_20.html#15E6CBE5>.

30. Von Hippel and Savage, et al., “Sectoral Redevelopment,” p. 37.

31. Von Hippel and Savage, et al., “Sectoral Redevelopment,” p. 36.

32. Peter Hayes, David von Hippel, et al., “South Korea's Power Play at the Six-Party Talks” (hereafter “South Korea's Power Play”), Nautilus Institute Report (see sections 6.2, “North Korean Energy Needs?”, and 6.3.3, “Redevelopment Priority”), July 21, 2005, <www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/2005/0560ROK_Energy_Aid.pdf>.

33. For the 9.9 percent figure, see U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China Country Analysis Brief, updated August 2006, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/pdf.pdf>; for the 10.5 percent figure, see CIA, World Factbook, China profile, updated March 15, 2007, <https://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html>.

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36. “China Likely to Slow Down Progress in LNG Project, Lieberthal and Herberg, “China's Search for Energy Security,” p. 11.

37. Lieberthal and Herberg, “China's Search for Energy Security,” p. 11.

38. Bo Kong, “An Anatomy of China's Energy Insecurity and Its Strategies,” Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security, December 2005, p. 26, <pnwcgs.pnl.gov/Newsletter/otherdocs/anatchinaenergy.pdf>.

39. Bo Kong, “An Anatomy of China's Energy Insecurity and Its Strategies,” Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security, December 2005, p. 26, <pnwcgs.pnl.gov/Newsletter/otherdocs/anatchinaenergy.pdf>. footnote 61, “Hu Jintao Urges Breakthrough in ‘Malacca Dilemma.’”

40. James Tang, “With the Grain or Against the Grain? Energy Security And Chinese Foreign Policy in the Hu Jintao Era,” Brookings Institution, October 2006, p. 27.

41. EIA, China Country Analysis Brief, see “Pipelines and Shipping,” p. 5.

42. EIA, China Country Analysis Brief, see “Pipelines and Shipping,” p. 5.

43. EIA, China Country Analysis Brief, see “Pipelines and Shipping,” p. 5.

44. EIA, South Korea Country Analysis Brief, updated May 2006, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_Korea/pdf.pdf>.

45. EIA, South Korea Country Analysis Brief, updated May 2006, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_Korea/pdf.pdf>. p. 3.

46. EIA, South Korea Country Analysis Brief, updated May 2006, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_Korea/pdf.pdf>. p. 3.

47. EIA, South Korea Country Analysis Brief, updated May 2006, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_Korea/pdf.pdf>. p. 3.

48. EIA, Japan Country Analysis, updated November 2005, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Japan/Full.html>.

49. EIA, Japan Country Analysis, updated November 2005, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Japan/Full.html>.

50. EIA, Japan Country Analysis, updated November 2005, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Japan/Full.html>.

51. “Trends in Natural Gas: Outlook,” Japan Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, <www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/energy/lng/trends.html>.

52. “Trends in Natural Gas: Outlook,” Japan Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, <www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/energy/lng/trends.html>.

53. EIA, Russia Country Analysis Brief, updated January 2006, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Full.html>.

54. EIA, Russia Country Analysis Brief, updated January 2006, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Full.html>.

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56. EIA, Russia Country Analysis Brief, updated January 2006, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Full.html>.

57. For a discussion of pipeline and private sector dynamics, see Keun-Wook Paik, “Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula” (hereafter “Pipeline Gas”), Chatham House Report, January 2005, <www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/sdp/KPJan05.pdf>.

58. See the Introduction by Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, “What If? Economic Implications of a Fundamental Shift in North Korean Security Policy,” Asia Policy, No. 2 (July 2006), pp. 2–8, <www.nbr.org/announcements/pdf/AP2_NolandSpecial.pdf>.

59. See Selig Harrison, “Gas and Geopolitics in Northeast Asia Pipelines, Regional Stability, and the Korean Nuclear Crisis,” World Policy Journal, Winter 2002–2003, pp. 23-36, <www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj02-4/harrison.pdf>.

60. Hayes and von Hippel, et al., “South Korea's Power Play,” pp. 10–12.

61. Bradley O. Babson, “Visualizing a North Korean ‘Bold Switchover’: International Financial Institutions and Economic Development in the DPRK,” in Eberstadt and Ellings, “What If?”

62. Keun-Wook Paik and Kengo Asakura envisioned a circular natural gas pipeline system for Northeast Asia around the same time in 1999–2000. See Paik, “Pipeline Gas,” p. 41, footnote 73.

63. Gazprom is expected to respond positively this year to TNK-BP's offer, but there had been no official decision at the time of writing. “TNK-BP Offers Gazprom 51% of Shares in Kovykta Project, No Answer Received,” Press Release, March 15, 2006, <www.tnk-bp.com/press/media/2006/3/1757/>.

64. See Harrison, “Gas and Geopolitics,” p. 27.

65. On China's objections, see Paik, “Pipeline Gas,” p. 8. On perception of Mongolia, see Harrison, “Gas and Geopolitics,” p. 26.

66. Paik, “Pipeline Gas.”

67. Paik, “Pipeline Gas.” p. 12.

68. Paik, “Pipeline Gas.” p. 25.

69. Paik, “Pipeline Gas.” p. 12.

70. Paik, “Pipeline Gas.” p. 15.

71. Harrison, “Gas and Geopolitics,” p. 26.

72. Paik, “Pipeline Gas,” p. 18.

73. Paik, “Pipeline Gas,” p. 26.

74. Paik, “Pipeline Gas,” p. 34.

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80. Hayes and von Hippel, “South Korea's Power Play,” p. 17.

81. Hayes and von Hippel, “South Korea's Power Play,” p. 16.

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85. Babson, “Visualizing a North Korean ‘Bold Switchover,’” p. 18.