U.S. Strategic War Planning After 9/11

Abstract

The U.S. Department of Defense is implementing the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review's requirement to create a “New Triad” of offensive and defensive capabilities. Advocates assert the new posture is necessary to change U.S. deterrence posture from a “one-size-fits-all” plan focused on the Soviet Union to a global posture designed to better deter or defeat all sizes and types of adversaries. This article describes how new policy guidance is reshaping U.S. strategic planning, converting the top-heavy Cold War Single Integrated Operational Plan into a “family” of smaller, flexible plans designed to threaten potential adversaries anywhere on earth and explores how the responses of these adversaries may help to undermine the nonproliferation regime.

Keywords:

• United States
• Strategic war planning
• Global Strike
• Nuclear policy
• Tailored deterrence

Notes

1. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, September 19, 2005, p. 1. On October 10, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: “The president has said and, in fact, the joint statement which we signed with the other parties, the six parties, on September 19 of last year tells the North Koreans that there is no intention to invade or attack them. So they have that guarantee.” Department of State, “Interview with Wolf Blitzer of CNN,” October 10, 2006, <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/73805.htm>.

2. On October 18, 2006, Rice stated that “the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range—and I underscore full range—of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan” (emphasis added). Department of State, “Remarks With Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso After Their Meeting,” October 18, 2006.

3. Since the early 1990s, North Korea has agreed four times to halt and ultimately eliminate its nuclear weapons program: the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; the 1994 Agreed Framework; the 2005 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks; and the 2007 Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement. Two of these agreements were made before the 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and the formulation of the preemption doctrine and Global Strike mission. The other two agreements were made after these initiatives created new requirements for deterring and dissuading countries like North Korea.

4. The other three new missions are: missile defense; information operations; and global command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). On March 1, 2005, the Unified Command Plan 2004 added the mission of coordinating the Pentagon's efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction. As a result, Strategic Command (STRATCOM) now has eight primary missions, including the three older missions: global deterrence; global support from space-based operations; and global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Gen. James E. Cartwright, commander, U.S. Strategic Command, “Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Weapons Issues in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2006,” April 4, 2005, p. 3.

5. The Bush administration's preemption doctrine is described in the National Security Strategy and NSPD 17, published by the White House in September and December 2002, respectively. For the New Triad and tailored deterrence, see: Department of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense Review, February 6, 2006, pp. vi, 27, 49; DOD, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” January 8, 2002 (submitted to Congress December 31, 2001), p. 53; Memorandum, Peter Pace, General, USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Joint Requirements Oversight Council, “Strategic Deterrence Requirements 2020 Study,” JROCM 132-03, June 17, 2003, Enclosure, pp. 2–3. Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

6. Concept Plan 8022 was first described publicly in William M. Arkin, “Not Just A Last Resort,” Washington Post, May 15, 2005, p. B1.

7. According to STRATCOM, execution of the Global Strike mission may utilize any appropriate weapon in the arsenal, including submarine-launched or intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched or submarine-launched cruise missiles, and fighter-bombers. U.S. Strategic Command, Public Affairs, e-mail to Hans M. Kristensen, March 2, 2005.

8. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, D.C., February 1992, p. 59.

9. In a letter to the author in April 1995, Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter claimed that the United States was not expanding the role of nuclear weapons and complained that to say so shortly before a UN vote on the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) “only can diminish the chances for a successful outcome.” Personal correspondence, letter to the author from Ashton B. Carter, not dated (received April 28, 1995). After the NPT was “unconditionally” extended, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation Policy Mitchel B. Wallerstein echoed Carter in an October 1995 interview with Air Force Magazine, “I want to strongly emphasize that counterproliferation is fundamentally about finding non-nuclear solutions to these problems. … The United States is not looking to retarget our nuclear weapons.” See James Kitfield, “Counterproliferation,” Air Force Magazine, October 1995, p. 58.

10. Memorandum, Gen. George L. Butler, U.S. Air Force, Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command (CINCSTRAT), to the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Renaming the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP),” September 2, 1992, obtained FOIA. An internal STRATCOM document preceding Butler's memorandum explained that the SIOP was “changing to reflect changes in our security challenges, target base, and weapons inventory. It is evolving into a more flexible, situation specific, ‘family of plans’ with an increasing emphasis on adaptive planning.” STRATCOM Action Processing Form, Maj. Alex Ivanchishin, U.S. Air Force, to CINCSTRAT through Deputy CINCSTRAT, “CINCSTRAT Memo to CJCS Regarding Renaming the SIOP,” August 2, 1992. Obtained under FOIA.

11. Letter, A.F. Kremer, STRATCOM FOIA manager, to Hans M. Kristensen, December 12, 1997.

12. Gen. George Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force, Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” April 22, 1993, p. 3.

13. Memorandum, Adm. J.O. Ellis, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “USSTRATCOM Request to Change the Name of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) to Operations Plan 8044,” January 3, 2003. Obtained under FOIA.

14. Memorandum, Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to STRATCOM commander, “USSTRATCOM Request to Change the Name of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) to Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8044,” CM-757-03, February 8, 2003. Despite the formal name change, some old habits are hard to break. On June 15, 2006, for example, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs published an update to Instruction 3231.01B that was entitled, “Safeguarding the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP).”

15. Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Written Posture Statement to SAC-D,” Washington, D.C., April 27, 2005.

16. For a chronology of official descriptions of Global Strike, see Hans M. Kristensen, Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon's New Offensive Strike Plan, Federation of American Scientists, March 2006, <www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/GSchron.htm>.

17. Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin Awarded Strategic War Planning Contract,” Press Release, May 20, 2003.

18. The disassembly of the SIOP into a “family” of smaller strike options should not be misunderstood to imply that OPLAN 8044 Revision (FY) no longer contains large strike options. Because nuclear planning is fixated on target destruction, the large number of Russian and Chinese targets probably requires planners to maintain at least a couple of major attack options, each involving many hundreds of nuclear warheads. Rather, the name change means that the prominence of large attack options within the plan has lessened and that limited attack options and increasingly tailored deterrence options make up a greater portion of the plan than previously.

19. U.S. Air Force, Fiscal Year 2008/2009 Budget Estimates, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Descriptive Summaries, Vol. III, Budget Activity 7, February 7, 2007, p. 1351; U.S. Air Force, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Estimates, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Descriptive Summaries, Vol. III, Budget Activity 7, February 2004 (Revised), p. 1229.

20. Peter C.W. Flory, assistant secretary of defense, international security policy, “Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing Regarding Global Strike Issues,” pp. 10–11. Despite the rhetoric about replacing Cold War one-size-fits-all deterrence with tailored deterrence capabilities, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the United States has always tailored its targeting doctrine, employment policy, and force structure in an effort to maintain a credible deterrent. See Amy F. Woolf, “Strategic Deterrence, Tailored Deterrence, and Implications for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force,” High Frontier 2 (August 2006), pp. 16–20.

21. Memorandum, Gen. Peter Pace, U.S. Marine Corps, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Joint Requirements Oversight Council, “Strategic Deterrence Requirements 2020 Study,” JROCM 132-03, June 17, 2003, Enclosure, p. 2. Obtained under FOIA.

22. Department of Energy, Office of Defense Programs, “Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan: First Annual Update,” October 1997, p. 1–14. Partially declassified and released under FOIA.

23. Rear Adm. George P. Nanos, U.S. Navy, director, U.S. Strategic Systems Program, “Strategic Systems Update,” Submarine Review, April 1997, pp. 12–17.

24. See Hans M. Kristensen, “Small Fuze, Big Effect,” Federation of American Scientists Strategic Security Blog, March 14, 2007, <www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/03/small_fuze_big_effect_1.php>.

25. Hans M. Kristensen, personal communication with U.S. Navy official, 2005.

26. Elaine M. Grossman, “DOD Defends New Sub-Launched Missile,” Inside Defense, March 10, 2006.

27. Michael Sirak, “Air Force Envisions Mid-Term, Prompt Global Strike Missile,” Defense Daily, July 7, 2006.

28. DOD, “Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0,” December 2006, p. 13.

29. For a thoughtful analysis of the challenges of tailoring deterrence, see: M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” National Defense University, Institute of National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, No. 225, January 2007, <www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF225/SF225.pdf>.

30. DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 6, 2006, p. 49.

31. “Listing, Group 5—Relationship Between U.S. Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy, Formal STRATCOM Answers as of 22 November 1993,” p. 13. Secret. Partially declassified and released under FOIA.

32. DOD, “Nuclear Weapons and Transformation: Moving Beyond Old Debate to New Debates—and Action,” Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, December 2004, p. 21. Obtained under FOIA.

33. Linton F. Brooks, National Nuclear Security Administration, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Programs,” presented to the Heritage Foundation conference: U.S. Strategic Command: Beyond the War on Terrorism, May 12, 2004, p. 7.

34. For a chronology of statements relating to the capabilities and purpose of Global Strike, see: Hans M. Kristensen, Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon's New Offensive Strike Plan, Federation of American Scientists, March 15, 2006, <www.fas.org/ssp/docs/GlobalStrikeReport.pdf>.

35. “Pyongyang Condemns U.S. ‘CONPLAN 8022-02,’” People's Korea, May 28, 2005; “U.S.-Touted ‘Diplomatic Solution’ Dismissed as Hypocritical,” Korean Central News Agency of DPRK via Korea New Service (KNS), May 25, 2005.

36. Atul Aneja, “Nuclear Issue and Iran's Domestic Debate,” Iran Daily, February 25, 2006, p. 7.

37. See: Walter Pincus, “Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan,” Washington Post, September 11, 2005, p. A1, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/10/AR2005091001053.html>; Hans M. Kristensen, “The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge,” Arms Control Today, September 2005, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/Kristensen.asp>. “Russia Warns U.S. against New Nuclear Doctrine,” Reuters, September 14, 2005.

38. Lewis A. Dunn, et al., Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insight, Issues and Implications, U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, December 12, 2006, pp. 2, 3. Emphasis in original, <www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/ForeignPerspectivesUSNuclearPolicyCompleteReport.pdf>.

39. See for example: William M. Arkin, “Taking Preemptive Action Against North Korea,” Washington Post, Early Warning Blog, October 27, 2006, <blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/10/taking_preemptive_action_again.html > ; and Jung Sung-ki, “USFK Chief Rules Out Preemptive Strike on NK,” Korea Times, October 30, 2006, <search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term = b.b.+bell + +&path = hankooki3/times/lpage/nation/200610/kt2006103017215211990.htm&media = kt>.