Identity Politics and Nuclear Disarmament

Abstract

Policy makers and scholars have drawn improper lessons from the Ukrainian case of disarmament. Employing a content analysis of Ukrainian and Russian news sources, as well as a series of interviews with Ukrainian officials conducted by the author, this paper argues that Ukraine did not surrender its nuclear arsenal because it received compensation or faced financial and technical hurdles in securing effective command and control over the weapons. Instead, Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons due to a lack of demand for them. The historical interactions between Ukrainians and Russians led the majority of Ukrainian leaders to reject a conception of the Ukrainian national identity that cognitively perceived Russia as a security threat. Only with a proper understanding of this case study can the international community understand how the nonproliferation norm succeeded.

Keywords:

• Ukraine
• nuclear disarmament
• nuclear weapons
• identity politics
• Russia

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Robert Art, F. Gregory Gause, James Forest, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

1. In 1991, Ukraine had approximately 2,500 tactical nuclear warheads and 1,500 warheads contained in ICBMs, including 130 SS-19s and 46 SS-24s. It also possessed approximately forty strategic bombers (TU-160 Blackjacks and TU-95 Bear Hs) capable of launching AS-15 Kent air-launched cruise missiles, of which Ukraine had more than 500. See William C. Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine,” Occasional Paper, no. 22, Henry L. Stimson Center, April 1995.

2. See Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation,” and Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995). See also Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, and Roy Sutter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” in Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, eds., The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 111–156; Steven G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51 (Summer 1997), pp. 445–477; and Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997).

3. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

4. See John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 50–66.

5. See John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993) See also John Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After: The Russian and Ukrainian Relationship,” International Affairs (London) 69 (October 1993), pp. 677–703, and Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 69. Bukkvoll asserts: “a considerable part of the political elite thought that nuclear arms would enhance Ukrainian security vis-à-vis Russia.” Yet, beyond quoting Dymtro Pavlychko, the chairman of the Rada's Foreign Affairs Committee, he offers no evidence to support the assertion.

6. See Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation”; Reiss, Bridled Ambition; Garnett, Keystone in the Arch; and Bernauer, Brem, and Sutter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine.”

7. I owe thanks to Sherman W. Garnett, who offered me contacts in Ukraine. Many scholars appreciate this alternative argument, but they do not test it. See Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, and Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation.” See also Sherman W. Garnett, “Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT,” Arms Control Today 25 (January/February, 1995), p. 8; Taras Kuzio, “National Identity and Foreign Policy: The East Slavic Conundrum,” in Taras Kuzio, ed., Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 221–244; and Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), pp. 99–100.

8. For examples, see Paul S. Pirie, “National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 48 (November 1996), pp. 1079–1104; Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); Arthur Takach, “In Search of Ukrainian National Identity: 1840–1921,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 19 (July 1996), pp. 640–659; and Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

9. For an example, see Ivo H. Daalder and Philip H. Gordon, “We Should Strike Iran, But Not With Bombs,” Washington Post, January 22, 2006, p. B3.

10. I conducted twenty personal interviews of Ukrainian decision makers, party officials, and government specialists in Kiev, Ukraine, between February and the end of May 1999. Decision makers included eight members of parliament, one from the Defense Ministry, and six from the Foreign Ministry. In addition, I interviewed two government specialists who either studied the nuclear disarmament issue for the government, participated in working sessions with government officials concerned with the negotiating process, or worked in the nuclear weapons industry in an important capacity; one independent scholar who had connections to the Foreign Ministry and the National Institute for Strategic Studies; and two active party officials who were not members of parliament immediately after Ukraine secured its independence but became members in the spring 1994 elections. All interviewees are referred to only by a description and the date of the interview to preserve the anonymity of the sources; their names are withheld by request. The author maintains a list of the officials interviewed and, in most cases, a recording of the interview.

11. See James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 169–195, and Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

12. James D. Fearon, “Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science: Exploring an Analogy Between Cellular Automata and Historical Processes,” in Tetlock and Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, pp. 39–67.

13. Ukrainian parliamentarians, and government officials, interviews with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, February–May 1999; especially an interview with a Communist Party deputy on April 1 and an accommodationist deputy on April 7.

14. Golos Ukrainy, June 15, 1993, pp. 3–4.

15. Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After,” p. 698, quoting Izvestia, April 29, 1993.

16. Golos Ukrainy, June 5, 1993, p. 4. Two nuclear disarmament experts at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, separate interviews with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999 (one expert), and April 28, 1999 (the other expert).

17. For the dependence argument, see Oles M. Smolansky, “Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor,” Europe-Asia Studies, 47/1 (January 1995), pp. 67–90. For the economic vulnerability factor, see Paul J. D'Anieri, Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

18. See Kataryna Wolczuk, The Molding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation (Budapest: Central European Press, 2001).

19. Golos Ukrainy, May 18, 1993, p. 3; and Ukrainian People's Deputy and disarmament expert with government connections, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 24, 1999.

20. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999.

21. On Tarasiuk's remark: Borys Klymenko, “Ukraine Not a Nuclear Bogeyman,” Ukrainian Weekly, January 17, 1993. On Ukraine dismantling the SS-19s, see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 107.

22. Nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 28, 1999.

23. On the lack of launch controls: high-ranking officer in Soviet Armed Forces and official advisor to Ukrainian defense minister, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 15, 1999. On the lack of a test site: nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 11, 1999; former officer in Soviet Armed Forces and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 12, 1999.

24. Disarmament expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 23, 1999; disarmament expert formerly at National Institute for Strategic Studies, interviews with the author, May 1999.

25. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” pp. 62–63, and Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 105.

26. Nuclear weapons expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 27, 1999. The danger posed by the liquid rocket fuel was noted in only two interviews I conducted: high-ranking officer in Soviet Armed Forces and official advisor to Ukrainian Defense Minister, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 15, 1999; and nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999.

27. This was invariably acknowledged in each interview I conducted (Kiev, Ukraine, February–May 1992). For examples of Russian charges, see Moskovskie Novosti, April 11, 1993, and Izvestia, June 26, 1993, pp. 1–2. For examples of Ukrainian denials, see Kievskie Vedomosti, February 6, 1993, p. 3.

28. John W.R. Lepingwell, “The Trilateral Agreement on Nuclear Weapons,” RFE/RL Research Report, January 28, 1994, pp. 12–20. See also Golos Ukrainy, February 8, 1994, p. 3.

29. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999.

30. This claim was confirmed in the following interviews, in Kiev, Ukraine: high-ranking officer in Soviet Armed Forces and official advisor to Ukrainian Defense Minister, March 15, 1999 and May 20, 1999; disarmament expert and People's Deputy, March 23, 1999; nuclear weapons expert and People's Deputy, April 27, 1999; former People's Deputy and disarmament expert, May 7, 1999; former officer in Soviet Armed Forces and People's Deputy, May 12, 1999; People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, May 14, 1999; former senior official at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and People's Deputy (at time of interview), May 17, 1999; and nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, May 18, 1999.

31. This factor was discussed in the following interviews with the author, in Kiev, Ukraine: People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, April 1, 1999; former senior diplomat at Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and People's Deputy (at time of interview), April 26, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, May 11, 1999; and People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, May 14, 1999.

32. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996), pp. 54–86.

33. People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 14, 1999. This is the only deputy who mentioned that some colleagues supported disarmament to appease the world's antinuclear sentiments, but this was not his personal position.

34. Limited time during interviews forced me to restrict the number of counterfactuals that I asked.

35. For an alternative examination of Ukraine's identity perspectives, see Stephen Shulman, “Sources of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Ukraine,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 18 (December 2002), pp. 1–30, and Andrew Wilson, “Elements of a Theory of Ukrainian Ethno-National Identities,” Nations and Nationalism 8 (January 2002), pp. 31–54.

36. This scheme's application is based on the work of Sherman W. Garnett. See, “The Sources and Conduct of Ukrainian Nuclear Policy: November 1992 to January 1994,” in George Quester, ed., Nuclear Challenges for Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 128–132, and Keystone in the Arch, pp. 52–55.

37. See Dmitry Vydrin, “Ukraine on the Nuclear See-Saw,” Political Thought (Kiev), No. 2, p. 195, and Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation,” p. 47.

38. See Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” in Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 157–188.

39. See Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After,” and Ilya Prizel, “Nation-Building and Foreign Policy,” in Sharon L. Wolchik, and Volodymyr Zviglyanich, eds., Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), pp. 11–29.

40. Disarmament expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 23, 1999.

41. People's Deputy and disarmament expert with government connections, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 24, 1999; nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999.

42. People's Deputy (at the time of debate) and disarmament expert, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 7, 1999.

43. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999. See also Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, p. 23; The Dnipropetrovsk Family, 2d ed. (Kiev, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, 1997); and Oleksandr Derhachov, “Insecurity as an Attribute of Statehood,” Political Thought (Kiev, Ukraine), no.1 (1997), p. 96.

44. Garnett, “The Sources and Conduct of Ukrainian Nuclear Policy,” p. 127, quoting Golos Ukrainy, January 20, 1993. See also Golos Ukrainy, May 18, 1993, p. 3.

45. People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 7, 1999; former officer in the Soviet Armed Forces and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 12, 1999.

46. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999. The deputy insisted that the president leaned heavily on leftist forces and the old nomenclature for support and had an instinct to compromise. This was supported by People's Deputy (at the time of the debate) and disarmament expert, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 7, 1999.

47. Fred Hiatt, “Kuchma Brings Blunt Style to Ukrainian Presidency,” Washington Post, July 12, 1994, p. A14.

48. Golos Ukrainy, July 21, 1994, p. 5.

49. Golos Ukrainy February 15, 1996, pp. 6–7. See also Golos Ukrainy, March 21, 1996, pp. 7, 9–10.

50. People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 1, 1999.

51. People's Deputy, national security expert, and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 21, 1999.

52. This counterfactual was explicitly rejected in the following interviews in Kiev, Ukraine: former senior official at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and People's Deputy (at time of interview), March 15 and May 17, 1999; high-ranking officer in Soviet Armed Forces and official advisor to Ukrainian defense minister, March 15, and May 20, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry March 17, 1999; People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, April 1, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, April 28, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, May 11, 1999; and People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, May 14, 1999.

53. Stephen Saideman, “Conclusion: Thinking Theoretical about Identity and Foreign Policy,” in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, eds., Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 169–200.

54. Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, “Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy,” in Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Origins of National Interests (London: F. Cass, 1999), pp. vii–xxii.

55. Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 290.

56. For a zero-sum view of identity construction, see Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Jonathan Mercer “Anarchy and Identity,” International Organization 49 (Spring 1995), pp. 229–252.

57. Oleksandr Derhachov, “Current Geopolitical Transformations in Ukraine,” Political Thought (Kiev), no. 2, p. 201.

58. Zenon Kohut, “History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine,” in S. Frederick Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 123–145.

59. Kuzio, “National Identity and Foreign Policy,” and Roman Solchanyk, “The Post-Soviet Transition in Ukraine: Prospects for Stability,” in Taras Kuzio, ed., Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation, pp. 17–40.

60. Nicholas S.H. Krawciw, “Ukrainian Perspectives on National Security and Ukrainian Military Doctrine,” in Bruce Parrot, ed., State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 145.

61. Vydrin, “Ukraine on the Nuclear See-Saw,” p. 194, and Nikolai Kulinich, “Ukraine in the New Geopolitical Environment: Issues of Regional and Subregional Security,” in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 124.

62. Support for total nuclear disarmament was highest in January 1992 (78 percent) and lowest in September 1993 (64 percent). The other two polls, one in November 1992 (72 percent) and the other in October 1993 (65 percent) showed similar results. See U.S. Information Agency, “In Ukraine, Few Expect Civil War or External Attack,” USIA Briefing Paper, B-14-95, March 23, 1995.

63. Ian Bremmer, “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 46 (1994), no. 2, pp. 261–283.

64. Pirie, “National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine”; Subtelny, Ukraine: A History; Takach, “In Search of Ukrainian National Identity: 1840–1921”; and Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s.

65. Solchanyk claims that support for retention of the weapons climbed to 45 percent in the fall of 1993, but he offers no data to confirm the reliability of the poll. See Roman Solchanyk, “Ukraine: A Year of Crisis,” RFE/RL Research Report, January 7, 1994, pp 38–41.

66. See Paul Kubicek, “Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting, and Legislative Behavior,” Europe-Asia Studies 52 (March 2000), pp. 273–294.

67. The majority of Ukrainians polled between 1992 and 1994 were not concerned about an attack: January and November 1992, 64 percent and 55 percent; September 1993, 63 percent; and October 1994, 66 percent. The October 1994 survey reveals that 81 percent of Ukrainian citizens had a favorable opinion of Russia. See U.S. Information Agency, “In Ukraine, Few Expect Civil War or External Attack,” and U.S. Information Agency, “Ukrainians Embrace Collective Security and Favor Eastward Expansion of NATO,” USIA Briefing Paper, B-7-96, February 14, 1996.

68. U.S. Information Agency, “Ukrainian Elites Concerned Over External and Internal Threats to Independence,” Russia/NIS Opinion Alert (1996b), April 2, 1996.

69. William Zimmerman, “Is Ukraine a Political Community,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (March 1998), pp. 43–55.

70. Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward Allworth, Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 121, and Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State.”

71. See Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State.” See also Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, p. 22. Wilson places the total percentage of Russophones (Ukrainians: 33–34 percent; Russians: 20–21 percent) at 53–55 percent. See also Stefan Korshak and Vitaly Sych, “Ukrainians Support Both Ukrainian and Russian Languages,” OMRI Daily Digest, August 12, 1998. In a poll of 1,000 people, 45 percent of the respondents spoke Russian at home, and only 29.8 percent spoke Ukrainian. Those speaking both languages at home, or a combination of the two known as surzhyk, totaled nearly 24 percent.

72. Pirie, “National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine,” pp. 1085–1086, citing A.P. Ponomar'ov, Suchasna sim'ia i pobut robitnykiv Donbasu (Today's Family and the Everyday Life of Donbas Workers), Kiev, 1978, p. 38, and A.P. Ponomar'ov, Mezhnatsional'nye braki v UKSSR i protsess internatsionalizatsii (Interethnic Marriage in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Process of Internationalization), Kiev, 1989, pp. 67, 77–78, 80–82. The percentage increased dramatically to more than 50 percent by the 1970s in the Donbas region.

73. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999. The deputy, who had ties to the government, argued that Kravchuk needed a deal on nuclear weapons to remove the issue from the 1994 presidential campaign. This would undermine Kuchma's ability to appeal to antinuclear and antinationalist voters.

74. Golos Ukrainy, June 5, 1993, p. 4.

75. This fact was largely confirmed in all the interviews with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, February–May 1999.

76. See A Russia that We … , unpublished manuscript, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, Kiev, Ukraine, 1995; and Moskovskie Novosti, November 7, 1993, p. 5A.

77. “Newsbriefs on Ukraine,” Ukrainian Weekly (online edition), January 24, 1993, <www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/1993/049306.shtml>.

78. Chrystia Freeland and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Ukrainian Premier Urges Keeping Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post, June 4, 1993, p. A22. For similar claims in academic works, see Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation,” p. 42; Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, p. 102; and Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 102.

79. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Fears Ukrainian-Russian Clash,” Washington Post, June 6, 1993, p. A32.

80. Virginia I. Foran, “Ukrainian Holdout: The Real Problem with the Treaty,” Washington Post, January 3, 1993, p. C3. Garnett insists that many of the 162 deputies who signed a letter in April 1993 declaring Ukrainian ownership of the weapons “did so simply to increase Kiev's negotiating leverage with Moscow on compensation issues.” See Garnett, “Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT,” p. 11.

81. For example, see R. Jeffrey Smith, “Ukrainians Endorse Arms Plan,” Washington Post, June 8, 1993, p. A16. The journalist asserts that several deputies told Defense Secretary Les Aspin that Russia remains a concern.

82. Garnett, “Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT,” p. 11.

83. “Press Conference by the Ukrainian Ambassador,” Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, December 29, 1992.

84. Bernauer, Brem, and Sutter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” p. 137.

85. Golos Ukrainy, May 7, 1993, p. 2; October 26, 1993, p. 1, 2; and January 4, 1994.

86. Golos Ukrainy, October 26, 1993, p. 2.

87. Andrew Higgins, “Zealot for the Bomb Defends Ukraine,” Independent (London), June 19, 1993, p. 10; Golos Ukrainy, July 9, 1993, p. 3, 7. See Bohdan Nahaylo, “The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms,” RFE/RL Research Report, February 19, 1993, pp. 40–41.

88. J.F. Dunn, “The Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Debate,” Soviet Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, March 1993, p. 14.

89. Golos Ukrainy, July 23, 1993, p. 3.

90. People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 7, 1999; former officer in the Soviet Armed Forces and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 12, 1999.

91. People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 7, 1999. He argued that nuclear weapons would have given Ukraine the symbolic political power to insist on its conditions for reform.

92. People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 1, 1999; People's Deputy, national security expert, and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 21, 1999; and People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 14, 1999.

93. People's Deputy and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 1, 1999.

94. People's Deputy, national security expert, and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 21, 1999.

95. Disarmament expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 23, 1999. Another nationalist deputy acknowledged the problem of a rogue state identity. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999.

96. People's Deputy (at time of debate) and disarmament expert, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 7, 1999.

97. People's Deputy and disarmament expert with government connections, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 24, 1999; nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999.

98. People's Deputy and disarmament expert with government connections, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 24, 1999.

99. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999.

100. Disarmament expert at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, interview with the author, February 17, 1999; disarmament expert and independent scholar, formerly of Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, February 23, 1999; nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999. See also Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation,” p. 42, and Garnett, “Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT,” p. 8.

101. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, fn. 48, p. 55.

102. Fred Hiatt, “Russian Parliament Moves to Reclaim Control of Crimea,” Washington Post, May 22, 1992, p. A27. See also William Drozdiak, “Ukraine's Leader Says Russia Still Has Imperial Ambitions,” Washington Post, June 18, 1992, p. A40.

103. A Russia that We … , quoting Ukrainian News Bulletin, July 12, 1993.

104. See “Ukrainian Leadership's Nuclear Weapons Concept,” Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, December 24, 1992; “Interview: President Leonid Kravchuk Outlines Ukraine's Position on Nukes,” Ukrainian Weekly (online edition), January 17 1993, <www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/1993/039303.shtml>; Freeland and Smith, “Ukrainian Premier Urges Keeping Nuclear Arms,” p. A20. This was also confirmed by most officials personally interviewed by the author, Kiev, Ukraine, February–May 1999.

105. “President Leonid Kravchuk Outlines Ukraine's Position on Nukes,” Ukrainian Weekly, January 17, 1993; Smolansky, “Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor,” p. 73, quoting Moscow TV, December 16, 1992, in FBIS-SOV, December 17, 1992, p. 41.

106. Nezavisamost March 24, 1993.

107. “Russia and Ukraine Need Economic Alliance,” Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, January 13, 1993.

108. High-ranking officer in Soviet Armed Forces and official advisor to Ukrainian Defense Minister, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 15, 1999. The interviewee was present at the Rada hearing when Kuchma outlined his strategy to use the weapons as bargaining chips.

109. Golos Ukrainy, July 21, 1994, p. 2.

110. Golos Ukrainy, July 21, 1994, p. 2.

111. See Lepingwell, “The Trilateral Agreement on Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 12–20. Steven E. Miller, “The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 78–79.

112. Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After,” p. 698, quoting Nezavisimaya gazeta, January 11, 1993.

113. In its 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty, Ukraine adopted a non-nuclear and non-bloc status. Former senior diplomat at Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and (at time of interview) People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 26, 1999; former senior official at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and (at time of interview) People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 17, 1999.

114. Nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999; former senior diplomat at Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and (at time of interview) People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 26, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 11, 1999.

115. Nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 28, 1999.

116. Former senior official at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and (at time of interview) People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 15 and May 17, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999; former senior diplomat at Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and (at time of interview) People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 26, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 28, 1999; and nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 11, 1999.

117. Former senior diplomat at Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and (at time of interview) People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 26, 1999.

118. Former senior official at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and (at time of interview) People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 15 and May 17, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 28, 1999; and nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 11, 1999.

119. Nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 28, 1999. The translation from Russian is the author's responsibility. This official stressed that he and many other officials, along with Ukrainians in general, have relatives in Russia.

120. Nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999. The translation from Russian is the author's responsibility.

121. This was the general argument that subjects stressed in our interviews. The comparison to U.S.-Canadian relations was made by the nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999, and the political analyst at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999.

122. Former senior official at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and (at time of interview) People's Deputy, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 15 and May 17, 1999; nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999; People's Deputy and member of the Communist Party, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 1, 1999; People's Deputy, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 7, 1999; People's Deputy, national security expert, and member of the Ukrainian Communist Party, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 21, 1999; and nuclear disarmament expert at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 11, 1999.

123. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999.

124. Bohdan Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 451–452.

125. A nationalist criticized Rukh for treating Kravchuk as a Communist, calling it a strategic mistake. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999. This point is also raised by Vydrin, “Ukraine on the Nuclear See-Saw,” p. 196.

126. Bernauer, Brem, and Sutter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” p. 138; Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence, pp. 451–457; Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After,” p. 683; and Vydrin, “Ukraine on the Nuclear See-Saw,” p. 196.

127. Nahaylo, “The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms,” p. 34, and Lepingwell, “Ukraine, Russia, and the Control of Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 14–15. See also Bernauer, Brem, and Sutter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” p. 138, and Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence, p. 457.

128. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 103–104, and Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After,” p. 687. This led one American participant in the negotiations to remark that the government and the Rada may have been engaged in a deliberate good cop/bad cop strategy in order to extract more concessions from Russia and the West. Although I surmised from interviews that this may have been the case, I could not prove it was planned in any sense. See Garnett, “Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT,” pp. 11–12.

129. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 104; Nahaylo, “The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms,” p. 41.

130. People's Deputy, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, April 7, 1999. The deputy remarked that Prime Minister Kuchma's role was to appease Russia, whereas President Kravchuk appeased the West.

131. Nuclear physics expert and People's Deputy, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, May 18, 1999. See also Nahaylo, “The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms,” p. 41.

132. For a discussion of the nexus between external pressure and increased Ukrainian demands, see Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence, p. 457.

133. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 102–104, and Bernauer, Brem, and Sutter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” pp. 118–119.

134. Bernauer, Brem, and Sutter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” p. 119.

135. Kievskie Vedomosti, January 12, 1993, p. 2, and March 27, 1993, p. 2.

136. High-ranking officer in Soviet Armed Forces and official advisor to Ukrainian Defense Minister, interview with author, Kiev, Ukraine, March 15, 1999. The interviewee was present at the Rada hearing when Kuchma outlined his strategy to use the weapons as bargaining chips.

137. Freeland, “Ukrainian Premier Urges Keeping Nuclear Arms,” p. A1.

138. Ukraine agreed to surrender the remaining nuclear weapons and its half of the Black Sea Fleet in exchange for debt forgiveness of $2.5 billion and nuclear fuel rods. For a discussion of the Massandra deal, see Golos Ukrainy, September 2, 1993, p. 3, and September 8, 1993, p. 1, 2; Moskovskie Novosti, November 7, 1993, p. 5a; Lepingwell, “Negotiations over Nuclear Weapons: The Past as Prologue?” pp. 6–8; Bohdan Nahaylo, “The Massandra Summit and Ukraine,” RFE/RL Research Report 2 (September 17, 1993), no. 37, pp. 1–6; and Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 108–109.

139. Golos Ukrainy, June 5, 1993, pp. 4–5; September 29, 1993, p. 2; and October 26, 1993, pp. 1–2.

140. Ukrainian Weekly, January 10, 1993. See also Golos Ukrainy, May 29, 1993, p. 5.

141. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, fn. 86, p. 167, quoting Le Figaro, November 29, 1993.