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Abstract
An increasing number of countries recognize the special risks of nuclear terrorism associated with the civilian use and storage of and commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU). They are especially concerned that non-state actors might gain access to HEU and use it to build and detonate improvised nuclear devices. The risk is aggravated by the very large global stocks of HEU, some of which are inadequately protected. Although HEU has few commercial uses, and most experts believe it is technically feasible to substitute low-enriched uranium for HEU in nearly all civilian applications, efforts to reduce HEU stocks have been impeded by a variety of economic, political, and strategic considerations. This article analyzes the nature of these impediments and discusses what is required to overcome them.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Saga Foundation for support related to research on combating nuclear terrorism. He also appreciates the research assistance provided by David Peranteau.
Notes
1. Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005).
2. See Stefan Leader, “Osama Bin Laden and the Terrorist Search for WMD,” Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1999, pp. 34–37; Daly, Parachini, and Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor,” pp. 31–33.
3. See David Albright and Holly Higgins, “A Bomb for the Ummah,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2003, pp. 49–95.
4. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 267.
5. For an assessment of these documents, see David Albright, “Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,” Policy Forum Online, Special Forum 47, Nautilus Institute, November 6, 2002, <nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html>.
6. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), pp. 275–276.
7. For a recent U.S. government perspective, see testimony of John D. Negroponte before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” January 18, 2007, <www.dni.gov/testimonies/20070118_transcript.pdf>. A thoughtful nongovernmental perspective is offered by Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007 (Cambridge, MA, and Washington, DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007), pp. 3–5.
8. In April 2008, the IAEA announced progress on plans to package and transport 8,000 spent fuel elements to Russia, where they will be reprocessed. See, Global Security Newswire, “IAEA Announces New Funds to Support Decommissioning of Serbian Nuclear Research Reactor,” April 15, 2008, <www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008_4_15.html#645B88AD>.
9. Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis, “The Bomb in the Backyard,” Foreign Policy, November/December 2006, pp. 32–39.
10. David Albright, “Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials: Summary Tables and Charts,” July 12, 2005, Revised September 7, 2005, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), <www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/summary_global_stocks.pdf>.
11. See Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007, p. 8. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union manufactured approximately 125,000 nuclear weapons. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945–2006,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2006, pp. 64–66.
12. John McPhee, The Curve of Binding Energy (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1974), pp. 189–194. A technically sophisticated terrorist group might be able to achieve success with a smaller amount of HEU if it could construct a “reflector” to enhance the chain reaction. For a concise and clear discussion of the technical issues involved, see Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 35–38.
13. National Resource Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002), p. 45.
14. See, Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Cambridge: Harvard University and Washington: Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2004), pp. 20–21.
15. Use of plutonium in a “gun-type” device would cause the bomb to pre-ignite because plutonium emits neutrons at a far faster rate than HEU. According to some analysts, such a plutonium device could produce a “fizzle” yield in the range of 10–20 tons of TNT equivalent. See Stanislav Rodionov, “Could Terrorists Produce Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons?” in Committee on Confronting Terrorism in Russia, National Research Council, Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002). I am grateful to Charles Ferguson for providing this reference.
16. Jan Prawitz, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with author, September 5, 2002.
17. Luis W. Alvarez, Adventures of a Physicist (New York: Basic Books, 1988), p. 125.
18. See Nikolai Sokov, “CNS Analysis of the Russian Government's White Paper on WMD Nonproliferation,” CNS Research Story, July 25, 2006, <cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060726.htm>. Data on classified sources come from the author's interviews with Russian experts and officials in 2006 and 2007.
19. Zimmerman and Lewis, “The Bomb in the Backyard.”
20. Zimmerman and Lewis, “The Bomb in the Backyard.”
21. This figure includes military stockpiles. Estimates about global stocks of HEU vary considerably and depend in part on how one treats approximately 300 MT of excess weapons uranium that is designated for downblending to LEU. ISIS uses a total of more than 1,900 MT, while the Global Fissile Material Report 2007 refers to “more than 1700 tons.” See Albright, “Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials,” p. 2; International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2007: Second Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, p. 10, <www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf>.
22. See Albright, “Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials.” Albright uses a figure of 175 MT for the size of civilian HEU stocks, but that amount includes 123 MT of excess U.S. weapons HEU. For alternative estimates, see Philipp C. Bleek and Laura S.H. Holgate, “Minimizing Civil Highly-Enriched Uranium Stocks By 2015: A Forward-Looking Assessment of U.S.-Russian Cooperation,” paper presented at the International Workshop on The Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015, U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, November 12–13, 2007; Alexander Glaser and Frank N. von Hippel, “Global Cleanout: Reducing the Threat of HEU-Fueled Nuclear Terrorism,” Arms Control Today 36 (January/February 2006), pp. 18–23; IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report 2007.
23. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, “DOE Needs To Take Action To Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors,” GAO-04-807, July 2004, p. 28.
24. See Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007, pp. 13–16.
25. A more detailed discussion of this issue is provided in the concluding article in this special section by Cristina Hansell. See also George F. Vandegrift, Allen J. Bakel, and Justin W. Thomas, “Overview of 2007 ANL Progress for Conversion of HEU-Based MO-99 Production as Part of the U.S. Global Threat Reduction-Conversion Program,” paper presented at the RERTR 2007 International Meeting, Prague, September 23–27, 2007.
26. For a description of research reactor characteristics, see “Research Reactors,” UIC Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper No. 66, Uranium Information Centre Ltd., Melbourne, Australia, May 2007, <www.uic.com.au/nip66.htm>.
27. There currently are only three of these very powerful “pressure-tube test reactors”: at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dmitrovgrad, Russia; at the Institute of Atomic Energy in Swierk, Poland; and at the Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy near Chengdu, China.
28. The RERTR program recently issued a Request for Information (RFI) aimed at jump-starting “production-level fabrication” of U-Mo research reactor fuel. While RERTR is developing this fuel, the RFI notes that “the capability to fabricate this new fuel … does not currently exist.” DOE, “Request For Information—NNSA Fuel Fabrication Capability Project,” RFI No. DE-RI52-08NA28733, March 10, 2008.
29. E. Bradley, P. Adelfang, and I.N. Goldman, “International Atomic Energy Agency Support of Research Reactors Highly Enriched Uranium to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel Conversion Projects,” paper presented at Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Meeting, Tucson, Arizona, July 8–12, 2007.
30. IAEA Consultancy, “Consultancy on the Status of Pulse Reactors and Critical Assemblies,” January 16–18, 2008.
31. IAEA Consultancy, “The Future Use of Critical and Subcritical Assemblies,” Vienna, February 7–10, 2005, p. 1.
32. The two projects are: the International Reactor Physics Experiment Evaluation Project, initiated in May 2000, and the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Project, begun in October 1992.
33. See Alan J. Kuperman, “The Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Conversion of Isotope Production to LEU Targets,” paper presented at the RERTR 2004 International Meeting, Vienna, Austria, November 7–11, 2004, p. 3. Among the producers, Nordion has been most steadfast and vocal in its opposition to conversion.
34. On NECSA's statement: Nicky Smith, “Second Reactor Mooted,” Financial Mail, November 23, 2007. On the Dutch statement: Ann MacLachlan, “NRG to Study Potential for Use of LEU for Mo-99,” NuclearFuel, December 17, 2007, p. 1.
35. Daniel Horner, “Main Barriers to LEU Conversion for Isotopes Not Technical, U.S. Says,” NuclearFuel, January 2, 2006, pp. 3–5.
36. Nikolay Melnikov et al., “Dolgovremmennoye bezopasnoye khraneniye ostrabotavshedgo yadernogo topliva sudovykh yadernykh ustanovok v Severo-Zapadnom regione Rossii” (Long-term safe storage of spent nuclear fuel from naval reactors in the Northwestern region of Russia), Mining Institute of the Kola Science Center, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2003, p. 4.
37. There are some indications that the new icebreakers will use fuel enriched to 36 percent, although the vessels have sufficient room for a LEU fueled reactor. See the article by Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit in this issue for a detailed discussion of the prospects for icebreaker conversion.
38. Aleksandra Gritskova, “Atomnyy ledokol ispytayut vpervyye” (Nuclear icebreaker tested for the first time), Kommersant, February 1, 2007.
39. See, for example, Associated Press, “Russia Will Build 42 Nuclear Reactors by 2030, Nuclear Chief Says,” November 28, 2006.
40. See, Cristina Hansell Chuen and Ole Reistad, “Sea Fission: Russia's Floating Nuclear Power Plants,” Jane's Intelligence Review, December 2007, pp. 48–52.
41. Valentin Ivanov, Russian State Duma deputy, personal interviews with CNS staff, Washington, DC, November 8, 2005; Valery Rachkov, Rosatom Nuclear Power Department head, personal interviews wtih CNS staff, Moscow, November 18, 2005. See also Vyacheslav Belyayev and Konstantin Leontyev, ”Reactor Out to Sea,” Nuclear Engineering International 49 (January 2004), p. 18.
42. See Massimo Salvatores et al., “Advanced Fast Reactor Development Requirements: Is There a Need for HEU?” paper presented at the Technical Workshop on HEU Minimization, Oslo, Norway, June 18, 2006.
43. James Clay Moltz, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, e-mail communication with author, March 1, 2008. See NASA, “Prometheus Nuclear Systems and Technology,” <www.nasa.gov/directorates/esmd/acd/prometheus_peis.html>. The NASA budget request for fiscal 2009 indicates that Prometheus Power and Propulsion is no longer a discrete program. See NASA, “Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Estimates,” <www.nasa.gov/pdf/210019main_NASA_FY09_Budget_Estimates.pdf>.
44. “Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Sam Bodman,” 2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, DC, November 7, 2005.
45. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 187–188, 242–257, 331.
46. See William C. Potter and Elena Sokova, “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What's New? What's True?” Nonproliferation Review 9 (Summer 2002), p. 113.
47. World Nuclear Association, “Research Reactors,” May 2007, <www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf61.html>.
48. David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, “Civil HEU Watch: Tracking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium,” ISIS, August 2005, p. 10. China has exported several miniature neutron source reactors, which contain about 920 grams of HEU as fuel. These reactors were exported to Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Nigeria, and Ghana. The French fuel producer uses Russian-origin HEU to fabricate the fuel rods for the FRM-II.
49. These instances are discussed in the article by Elena Sokova in this issue.
50. Statement by Andrew Bieniawski, DOE assistant deputy administrator for Global Threat Reduction for the National Nuclear Security Administration, at the Oslo Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear Sector, cited in Cristina Chuen and William Potter, “The Oslo Symposium: On the Road to HEU Minimization,” CNS Research Story, August 22, 2006, <cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060822.htm>.
51. “Combating the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism by Reducing the Civilian Use of Highly Enriched Uranium,” working paper submitted by Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden, NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/WP5, May 20, 2005.
52. Statement by Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA director general, at the 2005 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 2, 2005.
53. See Chuen and Potter, “The Oslo Symposium.”
54. Statements by Abdul Minty, deputy director-general of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited in Chuen and Potter, “The Oslo Symposium.”
55. This approach is discussed in more detail by Cristina Hansell in the concluding article in this special section.
56. The author witnessed the expression of this position by Canadian diplomats during the negotiation of the Norwegian et al. Working Paper on HEU at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. See also Daniel Horner, “Main Barriers to LEU Conversion for Isotopes Not Technical, U.S. Says,” NuclearFuel, January 2, 2006, pp. 3–5.
57. One possible approach to pursue regarding conversion of HEU targets would be to negotiate a conversion agreement and schedule among the major isotope producers in order to minimize the effect of conversion on market share. This approach is discussed in this special section in the article by Cristina Hansell on isotope production.
58. On this point, see Cristina Hansell's article on isotope production in this issue's special section.
59. See Peter Crail, “Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach,” Nonproliferation Review 13 (July 2006), pp. 355–399.
60. See William C. Potter, “Remembering Nonproliferation Principles,” in Jeffrey Laurenti and Carl Robichaud, eds., Breaking the Nuclear Impasse (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2007), pp. 61–68.
61. This case is discussed in more detail in the article by William C. Potter and Robert Nurick in this special section.
62. Special National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, SNIE 4-1-74, August 23, 1974, p. 43.