REFASHIONING AUSTRALIA'S NUCLEAR BARGAIN?

Abstract

This article explores the challenges that Australia faces in reconciling its commitments to nonproliferation and uranium exports during a time when the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is under major stress and the world uranium market is bullish. The “grand bargain” that has framed Australian participation in the nonproliferation regime and the nuclear fuel market since the 1970s was only tenable in an era of stagnant uranium demand and a stable nuclear balance. However, contemporary nuclear proliferation dynamics and the revival of interest in nuclear energy have accentuated the incompatibility between Australia's commitment to nonproliferation and the desire to profit from uranium exports. The contemporary international strategic environment, international nonproliferation regime, and nuclear energy market are characterized by developments that not only undermine the basis of Australia's grand bargain, but also present challenges and opportunities for the refashioning of Australian policy.

Keywords:

• Australia
• nonproliferation
• uranium
• nuclear fuel

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Michael Wesley and Andrew O'Neil for comments on an earlier draft of this article and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

Notes

1. John Howard, “Review of Uranium Mining Processing and Nuclear Energy in Australia,” Media Release, June 6, 2006.

2. UMPNER Taskforce, Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy—Opportunities for Australia?, Report to the Prime Minister, December 2006, p. 28. Nonetheless it should be noted in this respect that the report stressed the high cost of enrichment while being marginally more enthusiastic regarding the prospects for an Australian conversion industry. I thank one of the anonymous referees for highlighting this point.

3. Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Isotopes and Identity: Australia and the Nuclear Weapons Option, 1949–1999,” Nonproliferation Review 7 (Spring 2000), pp. 12–14.

4. For the Fraser government's response to the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry, see: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2nd Session, 13th Parliament, 2nd Period, August 16–November 8, 1977, pp. 645–660.

5. See Wayne Reynolds, Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2000); Alice Cawte, Atomic Australia (Kensington: UNSW Press, 1992).

6. Thomas L. Neff and Henry D. Jacoby, “Nonproliferation Strategy in a Changing Nuclear Fuel Market,” Foreign Affairs 57 (Summer 1979), p. 1125.

7. For former Prime Minister Bob Hawke's view, see Bob Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs (Melbourne: William Heineman, 1994), pp. 217–220.

8. Richard Leaver, “‘Middle Power Niche Diplomacy’ and Nuclear Proliferation: The Failure in Success,” in Richard Leaver and Dave Cox (eds.), Middling, Meddling and Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), pp. 193–200.

9. For an example of this logic, see: Gareth Evans, “Non-Proliferation and the NPT,” address to the NPT Review and Extension Conference, New York, April 18, 1995.

10. Marianne Hanson and Carl Ungerer, “The Canberra Commission: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 53 (April 1999), p. 7; Gareth Evans, “Achieving a World Without Nuclear Weapons,” address to the Opening Session of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra, January 23, 1996; and Leaver, “‘Middle Power Niche Diplomacy,’” pp. 195–196.

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13. Hanson and Ungerer, “The Canberra Commission,” p. 10.

14. For the expression of such rhetoric, see: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia, 1997); Alexander Downer, “Charting Australia's Regional Future: The White Paper on Foreign and Trade Policy,” speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association, Sydney, August 29, 1997; and Russell Trood, “Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 1997,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52 (July 1998), pp. 189–190.

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45. Since 1968, only five states have “gone nuclear”—Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea—while four others (Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan) ceased their suspected nuclear programs, and three former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) relinquished inherited nuclear weapons to sign the NPT as NNWS.

46. Leaver, “‘Middle Power Niche Diplomacy,’” pp. 193–200; Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, pp. 217–220; Evans, “Non-Proliferation and the NPT.”

47. For the Keating government's initial response, see, “Resumption of French Nuclear Testing: Statement by Prime Minister,” June 13, 1995, in “Communication of 17 August 1995 Received from the Permanent Mission of Australia,” International Atomic Energy Agency, August 30, 1995, p. 2. For accounts of the public outcry, see, Robert Milliken, “Bomb Test Protesters Besiege French Embassy,” Independent, June 19, 1995; Kim Richard Nossal and Carolynn Vivian, A Brief Madness: Australia and the Resumption of French Nuclear Testing (Canberra: Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense No. 121, Australian National University, 1997).

48. For a thorough discussion of the A.Q. Khan network, see Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” International Security 29 (Fall 2004), pp. 5–49.

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51. Perkovich, “Bush's Nuclear Revolution,” p. 6; Carter, “America's New Strategic Partner?” p. 37.

52. On alternative approaches, see Michael Wesley, “Its Time to Scrap the NPT,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59 (September 2005), pp. 284–287; O'Neil, “Nuclear Proliferation and Global Security,” pp. 351–359. On Australia's commitment to existing regime, see, for example, Downer, “The Threat of Proliferation: Global Resolve and Australian Action.”

53. See UMPNER Taskforce, Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy—Opportunities for Australia?, pp. 51–62.

54. Deutch et al., “Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,” p. 66; The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study.

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57. See Michael Clarke, “‘In the National Interest’: Australia's Proliferation Strategy in a Changing International Environment,” Regional Outlook No. 9, Griffith Asia Institute, pp. 1–30.

58. For example see, Alexander Downer, “The Impact of Energy Security on Australia's International Relations,” speech to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, October 11, 2006, <www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2006/061011_es.html>.

59. Andrew Davies, “Australian Uranium Exports and Security: Preventing Proliferation,” ASPI Strategic Insights 28 (August 2006), p. 2.

60. For a thorough account of this, see Ian Holland, “Waste Not Want Not? Australia and the Politics of High-Level Nuclear Waste,” Australian Journal of Political Science 37 (July 2002), pp. 283–301.

61. Ian Holland, “Waste Not Want Not?”, pp. 287-288.

62. See The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, p. 2; Karine Fiore, “Nuclear Energy and Sustainability: Understanding ITER,” Energy Policy 34 (2006), pp. 3334–3341; Jacques Percebois, “The Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: Technologies of the Front and Back-Ends of the Fuel Cycle,” Energy Policy 31 (2003), pp. 101–108.

63. Deutch et al., “Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,” p. 66.

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65. See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” July 18, 2005.

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67. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD, 2006), p. 377.

68. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD, 2006), p. 377. Author's emphasis.

69. Davies, “Australian Uranium Exports and Security,” p. 16.

70. UMPNER Taskforce, Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy—Opportunities for Australia?, p. 28.

71. UMPNER Taskforce, Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy—Opportunities for Australia?, p. 91.

72. Davies, “Australian Uranium Exports and Security.” p. 15.

73. Davies, “Australian Uranium Exports and Security,” pp. 16–20.

74. Alexander Downer, “Speech and Question and Answer Session, Energy Environment and Air Quality Policy Forum,” Los Angeles, January 13, 2007.

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76. Kevin Rudd, “Leading, Not Following: Australia's Place in the Emerging International Order,” speech to the Global Foundation, Melbourne Town Hall, Melbourne, March 8, 2007.

77. See for example, Chris Evans, “Labor and Uranium—An Evolution,” speech by Chris Evans to the Labor Business Roundtable, Perth, March 23, 2007; Kevin Rudd, television interview, ABC 7:30 Report, April 30, 2007, <www.alp.org.au/media/0407/tviloo301.php>.

78. See for example, Chris Evans, “Labor and Uranium—An Evolution,” speech by Chris Evans to the Labor Business Roundtable, Perth, March 23, 2007; Kevin Rudd, television interview, ABC 7:30 Report, April 30, 2007, <www.alp.org.au/media/0407/tviloo301.php>.

79. Chris Evans, “Australian Uranium—A Labor Perspective,” speech by Chris Evans to the Australian Uranium Conference, Esplanade Hotel, Fremantle, July 25, 2007.

80. Chris Evans, “Australian Uranium—A Labor Perspective,” speech by Chris Evans to the Australian Uranium Conference, Esplanade Hotel, Fremantle, July 25, 2007.

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84. “Labor Pledges to Overturn India Uranium Deal,” ABC News Online.

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86. Robert McClelland, “A New Agenda for Australia in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” address to UN Association of Australia and Medical Association for the Prevention of War, Canberra, August 14, 2007. Author's emphasis.

87. See McClelland, “A New Agenda for Australia in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”; “Sale of Uranium to India Will Undermine Non Proliferation,” ABC News Online.

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92. Tow, “The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Security Geometries.”

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95. Ayson, “Kevin Rudd and Asia's Security.”