CAN THE EURATOM TREATY INSPIRE THE MIDDLE EAST?

Abstract

This article examines whether and how the delegation of sovereign regulative powers in the nuclear field by states to supranational regional authorities can further nonproliferation purposes. More precisely, it asks whether the second Rome Treaty, which instituted the European Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom), could serve as a model for the creation of other regional authorities in the nuclear field, particularly among Middle Eastern and Arab nations. It argues that the Euratom Treaty provides interesting technical provisions, particularly regarding 1) safeguards against the diversion of fissile materials by state and non-state actors, 2) confidence-building measures for state actors when they establish R&D in nuclear technologies, and 3) fuel supply assurances for state actors. Building on archival research of the Euratom Treaty negotiations and the Euratom Commission, the article argues that, today, supranational provisions included in the Euratom Treaty would have stronger nonproliferation effects than looser forms of international cooperation. However, the article also points to specific weaknesses in the Euratom Treaty and outlines how legal scholars and diplomats can avoid some of its pitfalls.

Keywords:

• Euratom
• sovereignty
• nuclear energy
• nonproliferation

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Katherine Newmann and the Global Network on Inequality; to Frank von Hippel, Zia Mian, and Alexander Glaser for their encouragement; and to the Departments of Sociology and History of Science at Princeton University. The views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author.

Notes

1. Pierre Rousselin, “Paris, capitale de la Méditerranée” [Paris, Capital of the Mediterranean], Le Figaro, July 12, 2008.

2. Grégoire Mallard, “Exporter du nucléaire, une décision politique” [Nuclear Exports, A Political Decision], Le Monde, August 13, 2007.

3. Nathalie Nougayrède and Philippe Ricard, “Le projet d'Union pour la Méditerranée conjugue ambitions et incertitudes” [The Union Project for the Mediteranean Combines Ambitions and Uncertainties], Le Monde, July 13, 2008.

4. This article is based on archival research in the Archives of the European Communities, where I consulted the following papers: Jean Monnet, Jules Guéron, Etienne Hirsh, Max Kohnstamm, François Duchêne, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Français (MAEF) [French Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Commission Euratom, Parlement Européen; and in Princeton University's Mudd Library, where I consulted the following papers: John Foster Dulles, George Ball, and Livingston Merchant.

5. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), p. 7. A recent counterexample is John Krige, “The Peaceful Atom as Political Weapon: Euratom and American Foreign Policy in the Late 1950s,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 38 (Spring 2008), pp. 9–48; an older one is Lawrence Scheinman, Euratom: Nuclear Integration in Europe (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967).

6. Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 24–38.

7. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 183.

8. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 205.

9. Indeed, the European forces (including those nuclear) would have been placed under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) within the framework of NATO. European Defense Community Treaty, Articles 2 and 5, May 27, 1952, <mjp.univ-perp.fr/europe/1952ced.htm>.

10. Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, 1976), p. 114.

11. EDC Treaty, Article 106.

12. EDC Treaty, Annex 2 of Article 107.

13. Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 104.

14. Admiral G. Cantu, L'agence pour l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale pour le contrôle des armements [The West European Union Control Agency] (Paris: UEO, 1973), p. 18.

15. Comité d'action pour les Etat-Unis d'Europe, “Résolution,” JMDS-000117, Florence: European Archives, October 1955, p. 1.

16. MAEF, “Projet de procès verbal de la conférence des affaires étrangères des Etats membres de la CECA des 20 et 21 octobre 1956” [Report on the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the ECSC member states], MAEF/460f/56mts, Florence: European Archives, November 13, 1956, p. 4.

17. Some analysts hypothesized that some form of agreement might have existed between West Germany and France, at the time, but no proof was given before the 1990s. See Wilfrid Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 74.

18. MAEF, “Protocole secret entre les Ministres Français, Allemand, Italien de la défense” [Secret Agreement between the French, German, and Italian Defense Ministers], MAEF000019-21, Florence: European Archives, November 25, 1957, pp. 1–3.

19. Georges-Henri Soutou, L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996 [The Uncertain Alliance: Franco-German Politico-Strategic Relationships, 1954–1996] (Paris: Fayard, 1996), p. 113.

20. When, during the December 1957 NATO meetings, the heads of state of France, West Germany, and Italy informed Eisenhower and Dulles that they signed these nuclear agreements, U.S. officials gave them a green light—as long as unification of continental nuclear efforts went along with political integration of Britain and the United States. See for instance: MAEF, “Communiqué de la rencontre entre Christian Pineau et Macmillan” [Report on the Pineau-Macmillan Meeting], MAEF 000019-21, Florence: European Archives, November 26, 1957. Gerard Smith, then head of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, even prepared drafts of a treaty instituting a “North Atlantic Nuclear Authority” (NACNA), approved by Dulles and Adenauer. Gerard Smith, “Interview with Philip Crowl,” John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University: Mudd Library, October 13, 1965, p. 46.

21. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 2.

22. Euratom Commission, “Memo on the Safeguards on Peaceful Nuclear Activities of the NPT by the American Mission to the Euratom Commission,” JG-000124, Florence: European Archives, April 3, 1967, pp. 1–5.

23. Jan Giljssels, “Euratom et le projet de traité de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires sous l'angle du droit” [Euratom and the Non-Proliferation Treaty from the Legal Perspective], Les cahiers du droit de l’énergie atomique [Legal Review on Atomic Energy] (Spring 1968), pp. 37–72.

24. Founded by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, the WENRA defined the safeguarding mechanisms of fissile materials for two incoming EU member states (Bulgaria and Romania). See Autorité de SÛreté Nucléaire, “Chapitre 7: Relations internationales,” Rapport Annuel [Annual Report], 2007.

25. William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, and Jim Walsh, “A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff,” New York Review of Books, March 20, 2008.

26. MAEF, “Note 614 sur la Coopération économique” [Note 614 on Economic Cooperation], MAEF 000613, Florence: European Archives, November 9, 1956, pp. 1–3.

27. Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Autumn 1996), pp. 54–86; George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

28. The European Parliament was supposed to have a great import in the legislative process when elected by universal suffrage, even though it waited a long time to acquire this power.

29. Jules Guéron, “Remarques sur le livre de B. Goldschmidt, L'aventure atomique” [Notes on Goldschmidt's Book, The Atomic Complex], JG-000194, Florence: European Archives, undated, pp. 1–8.

30. Jules Guéron, “Note à Monsieur Nicolas Vichney sur l'Euratom et le Général” [Notes for Nicolas Vichney on Euratom and the General], JG-000104, Florence: European Archives, September 23, 1965, pp. 1–6.

31. Alain Peyrefitte, “Note au Général de Gaulle sur la négociation européenne et les conditions de son succès” [Notes for General de Gaulle on the Success of European Negotiations], JMDS-000223, Florence: European Archives, August 29, 1960, pp. 1–16.

32. On Iran and the Khan network see David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the AQ Kahn Network and Future Proliferation Networks,” Washington Quarterly 28 (Summer 2005), pp. 111–128.

33. Joseph S. Nye, “Maintaining a Non-Proliferation Regime,” International Organization 35 (Spring 1981), pp. 15–38.

34. MAEF, “Projet de procès verbal de la conférence des affaires étrangères des Etats membres de la CECA des 20 et 21 octobre 1956,” p. 8.

35. Soutou, L'alliance incertaine, p. 137.

36. Bertrand Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy (LaGrange, IL: American Nuclear Society Press, 1982), p. 295.

37. John F. Kennedy, “Address to the Canadian Parliament,” papers of Livingston Merchant, box 8, Princeton University: Mudd Library, May 17, 1961, p. 3.

38. MAEF, “Proposition de la délégation française a la conférence des Six au Quai d'Orsay par le Professeur Vedel sur les utilisations militaires de l’énergie atomique” [French Proposal on the Military Uses of Atomic Energy Written by Professor Vedel for the Conference of the Six ECSC Member-States], MAEF-000613, Florence: European Archives, October 21, 1956, pp. 1–5.

39. Euratom Commission, “Note des Services juridiques de la Commission sur les Bilatéraux américains” [Note of the Legal Services of the Euratom Commission on the American Bilateral Treaties], BAC 118/1986-51, EUR/C/3141/60f, Florence: European Archives, March 8, 1960, p. 7.

40. Euratom Commission, “Note des Services juridiques de la Commission sur les Bilatéraux américains” [Note of the Legal Services of the Euratom Commission on the American Bilateral Treaties], BAC 118/1986-51, EUR/C/3141/60f, Florence: European Archives, March 8, 1960, p. 8.

41. Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex, p. 295.