The Good Faith Assumption

Abstract

There are a number of competing paradigms on nonproliferation issues, each with their own self-consistent set of axioms that have to be dealt with on their own terms. If these different approaches are not appropriately acknowledged during discussions, they can become a permanent barrier to the resolution of underlying issues. This article identifies some of the key interest groups that are involved in discussions of nuclear nonproliferation issues and seeks to delineate the paradigmatic differences between these groups. These differences in approach can give rise to the perception that one or more of the parties to any discussion are arguing in bad faith. While bad faith may be a cause of at least some of the disputes that arise on nonproliferation issues, assuming bad faith as an explanation for these differences is counterproductive; it prevents any serious discussion of the issues underlying such disputes and obstructs attempts to reach a common understanding.

Keywords:

• Nonproliferation
• disarmament
• safeguards
• negotiations

Acknowledgements

This paper represents the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of any government or employer.

Notes

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3. J. David Singer, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Geocultural Divide: The March of Folly,” International Studies Review 9 (2007), pp. 663–672.

4. “Final Document,” XIII Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Cartagena, April 8–9, 2000.

5. The acronym WLGG is not normally used in any context beyond this article; it is simply a shorthand way of referring to the various the Western groups of interest to this article. It is more common to simply use the term “like-minded” to refer to these groupings, but that term would be readily misinterpreted when discussing the differences between disparate groups.

6. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970.

7. IAEA, “Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden (The ‘New Agenda’ Coalition),” INFCIRC/565, June 22, 1998.

8. Statement by Ambassador Augustine P. Mahiga, permanent representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations, 2005 NPT RevCon, May 5, 2005.

9. Statement by Ambassador Le Luong Minh, permanent representative of Vietnam to the UnitedNations, 2005 NPT RevCon, May 5, 2005.

10. Statement by Abdul S. Minty, South Africa's governor to the IAEA Board of Governors, to the 2005 NPT RevCon, May 3, 2005.

11. Working paper submitted by Australia, “Perspectives on Issues Related to Cluster 2,” NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.32, May 7, 2007, NPT PrepCom.

12. IAEA, “Record of the 1093th Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors,” paras. 12–31, GOV/OR.1093, June 18, 2003.

13. IAEA, “Record of the 1094th Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors,” para. 73, GOV/OR.1094, March 13, 2004.

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15. UN General Assembly, Statement by Mr. Ismail of Malaysia, fifty-eighth session, New York, A/58/PV.55, November 4, 2003.

16. IAEA, INFCIRC/565.

17. Article VI of the statute of the IAEA lays out the rules for the composition and election of theBOG. The statute has been amended three times, most recently on December 28, 1989. A further amendment to the statute is in process, but it has not yet gained sufficient ratifications to enter into force. This proposed amendment would result in a major restructuring of the BOG.

18. IAEA, “Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Board of Governors,” as amended up to February 23, 1989.

19. Statement by IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei to the Fifty-First Regular Session of the 2007 IAEA GC, September 17, 2007.

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21. “Working Paper Submitted by Malaysia, on Behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, May 8, 2003.

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28. IAEA, “The Agency's Accounts for 2006,” GOV/2007/13, April 10, 2007, p. 1.

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37. On the resolution, see IAEA Report GC(51)/14 and GC Resolution GC(51)/RES/17, September 22, 2007. An explanatory memorandum on “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat” is contained in IAEA document GC(51)/1/Add.1, July 16, 2007. Other relevant documents include “Communication Received from the Resident Representative of Cuba, on Behalf of the Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement, Regarding the Request to Include in the Agenda of the Conference an Item Entitled ‘Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat,’” GC(51)/24, September 14, 2007, and “Communication Received from the Resident Representative of Israel Regarding the Request to Include in the Agenda of the Conference an Item Entitled ‘Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat,’” GC(51)/25, September 14, 2007.

38. Each of the non-NPT three have facilities under the older form of noncomprehensive, facility-specific IAEA safeguards that are detailed in IAEA, “The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968),” INFCIRC/66, September 16, 1968. The relevant agreements are as follows: India: INFCIRC/211, 260, 360, 374, and 433; Israel: INFCIRC/249; and Pakistan, INFCIRC/34, 116, 135, 239, 248, 393, 418, and 705.

39. IAEA, “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/153(corrected), June 1972; IAEA, “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards,” INFCIRC/540 (corrected), September 1997.

40. IAEA, INFCIRC/540 (corrected).

41. IAEA, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol,” GC(51)/RES/15, September 2007, <www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC51/GC51Resolutions/English/gc51res-15_en.pdf>; IAEA, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol,” GC(39)/RES/17, September 1997.

42. IAEA GC, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol,” GC(51)/RES/15, part (b): “Convinced that the Agency's safeguards promote greater confidence among States, inter alia by providing assurance that States are complying with their obligations under relevant safeguards agreements, and thus contribute to strengthening their collective security” (emphasis in original).

43. IAEA GC, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol,” GC(51)/RES/15, part (c): “Considering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Agency's essential role in applying safeguards in accordance with the relevant articles of these treaties” (emphasis in original).

44. IAEA GC, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol,” GC(51)/RES/15, section 3: “Bearing in mind the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency's safeguards system, urges all States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible” (emphasis in original).

45. IAEA GC, “Forty-Fifth (2001) Regular Session—Record Of The Tenth Plenary Meeting,” GC(45)/OR.10, October 2001.

46. IAEA GC, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol,” GC(50)/RES/14, section 4: “Affirms that measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system with a view to detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities must be implemented rapidly and universally by all concerned States and other Parties in compliance with their respective international commitments.”

47. “Working draft of the safeguards resolution text—SG_Res_Draft_20Sept2007_-_working - PM.doc.” The additional safeguards resolution text proposed by Egyptian delegation in 2007: (c bis): “Encouraging the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, and the Agency's essential role in applying safeguards in this context”; (c ter): “Recalling that the Agency in carrying out its functions in accordance with Art III.B.1 of the Statute, shall conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international co-operation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies”; (i bis): “Recalling that, in its final document, the 2000 NPT Review Conference agreed on practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons including arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes”; and (1 bis): “Encourages the Secretariat, in accordance with article III.B.1 of the Statute, to enhance the role of the Agency (to assist) in furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament in conformity with the policies of the United Nations and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies.”

48. “Working draft of the safeguards resolution text—SG_Res_Draft_20Sept2007_-_working - PM.doc.”

49. “Working draft of the safeguards resolution text—SG_Res_Draft_21Sept2007_-_working - PM.doc.” The compromise safeguards resolution text proposed by Brazilian and South African delegations in 2007: “Recognising the role that the Agency has played in the dismantlement of historic and current nuclear weapons programmes through the safeguarding of material, equipment and activities previously devoted to nuclear weapons programs that have been irreversibly transferred to safeguarded peaceful uses and recognising the lessons learnt from these activities that have substantially enhanced the Agency's technical capabilities and therefore effectively strengthened the safeguards system, thereby contributing to safeguarded worldwide disarmament in accordance with its Statute.”

50. IAEA GC, “Committee of the Whole Record of the Eighth Meeting,” GC(51)/COM.5/OR.8, September 2007.

51. IAEA GC, “Fifty-First (2007) Regular Session—Record Of The Ninth Plenary Meeting,” GC(51)/OR.9, September 2007.