NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Abstract

Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam recently announced that they are launching nuclear energy programs, and Malaysia and the Philippines soon may follow suit. As a result, by 2020, at least three states in Southeast Asia could possess latent nuclear capabilities—the option to pursue military applications of dual-use nuclear technology. Analysis of the nuclear programs, domestic proliferation pressures, and the external threat environment in Southeast Asia leads the authors to conclude that the nuclear intentions of states in that region are entirely peaceful and the probability of future nuclear breakout there is low. However, this finding does not justify complacency. In the long term, the benign outlook for regional security may change, and in the near term weak regulatory regimes present serious challenges to nuclear safety and create opportunities that non-state actors may exploit. To minimize these risks, the authors recommend creating a “proliferation firewall” around the region, which would combine strong global support for Southeast Asian nuclear energy programs with innovative regional multilateral nuclear arrangements.

Keywords:

• Southeast Asia
• nuclear energy
• proliferation
• dual-use technology

Notes

1. Conference on Disarmament, Final Record of the 1028th Plenary Meeting, Geneva, CD/PV.1028, June 21, 2006.

2. Associated Press, “Annan: Nations Should Disarm and Stop Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Herald Tribune, November 28, 2006.

3. Jon B. Wolfsthal, “The Next Nuclear Wave,” Foreign Affairs 84 (January/February 2005), pp. 136–50.

4. Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (February 2007), pp. 167–94; Paul Leventhal, Sharon Tanzer, and Steven Dolley, eds., Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Can We Have One Without the Other? (Brassey's: Dulles, VA, 2002).

5. See, for instance, Ariel Levite, “The Current Proliferation Predicament,” in Joseph F. Pilat, ed., Atoms for Peace: A Future after Fifty Years? (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), pp. 84–85; Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security 29 (Fall 2004), pp. 5–49.

6. See Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle (Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results), Special Issue, Security Studies 2 (Spring-Summer 1993), pp. 159–71.

7. Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004), pp. 1–15 of web version, <www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_4faces.pdf>.

8. For a summary of current Southeast Asian nuclear plans, see World Nuclear Association, “Asia's Nuclear Energy Growth,” information paper, August 2008, <world-nuclear.org/info/inf47.html>.

9. Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours,” Survival 49 (Summer 2007), pp. 111–28.

10. Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32 (Winter 2007), pp. 113–57.

11. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2001).

12. ASEAN, “Joint Statement on the Commission for the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” Manila, July 30, 2007, <www.aseansec.org/20775.htm>.

13. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 85. Also see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), especially chapter 2.

14. Solingen, Nuclear Logics, p. 22.

15. Robyn Lim, “Australia and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” Issue Analysis no. 82 (March 2007), pp. 6–7.

16. World Bank, Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia's New Opportunities: Indonesia Public Expenditure Review 2007 (Jakarta: World Bank, 2007), p. 76.

17. Indonesia's 2006 national energy policy (in Indonesian), <www.presidensby.info/DokumenUU.php/81.pdf>.

18. “RI Exploring Possibility of Cooperating with US to Build Nuclear Power Plant,” Antara News, July 15, 2006.

19. See Republic of Indonesia Law No. 30/2007 on Energy (in Indonesian), <www.legalitas.org/database/puu/2007/uu30-2007.pdf>.

20. IAEA, “Technical Cooperation Report for 2003 Report,” GC(48)/INF/6, August 2004, p. 13.

21. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Nuclear Power in a Changing World,” DG 08122006, December 8, 2006, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n024.html>.

22. Michael Richardson, “If Oil-Crunched Indonesia Goes Nuclear...,” Straits Times, June 4, 2004.

23. “South Korea, Indonesia Agree to Build Reactors, Share Nuclear Fuel and Technology,” Associated Press, December 7, 2006.

24. “Indonesia, South Korea Sign Preliminary Deal to Develop Nuclear Power Plant,” Associated Press, July 25, 2007.

25. Geoff Thompson, “Indonesia Wants Australia's Uranium,” ABC [Australian Broadcasting Corporation] Radio, August 31, 2007, <www.abc.net.au/am/content/2007/s2020364.htm>; Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation, February 7, 2008, Article III, para. 17.

26. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World: Country Report: Indonesia,” 2008 edition, <www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2008&country=7412>.

27. “PLTN di Muria Musnahkan Etnik” [Nuclear Plant Will Annihilate Ethnic Group], Jawa Pos, April 5, 2007.

28. On WALHI's campaign (in Indonesian), <www.walhi.or.id/kampanye/energi/pltn/>. On NU's opposition, see “NU Minta Pemerintah Kaji Ulang PLTN Muria” [NU Asks Government to Review Muria Nuclear Plant], Suara Merdeka, July 14, 2007.

29. “Gus Dur: If Still Full of Doubt, No Need to Build a Nuclear Power Plant,” Antara, July 13, 2007.

30. “Upacara Bendera Masyarakat Balong Tolak PLTN” [Balong Community Flag Ceremony Rejects Nuclear Plant], Tempointeraktif, August 17, 2007.

31. Suherdjo, “Locals Reject Nuclear Project on Mount Muria,” Jakarta Post, February 29, 2008; “Indonesian Governor Opposes Nuclear Power Plant,” Agence France-Presse, March 6, 2008; “Indonesia Tetap Akan Bangun PLTN” [Indonesia Will Continue to Build Nuclear Power Plant], Kompas.com, March 12, 2008, <kompas.com/read/xml/2008/03/12/14581321/indonesia.tetap.akan.bangun.pltn>; “Penggunaan Nuklir Dukung Kesejahteraan Rakyat” [Use of Nuclear Power Support People's Prosperity], Kompas.com, November 11, 2008, <kompas.com/read/xml/2008/11/11/12161028/penggunaan.nuklir.dukung.kesejahteraan.rakyat>.

32. Daniel B. Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 186–188.

33. Poneman, Nuclear Power, pp. 99–100.

34. Richard K. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs & Nonproliferation,” Foreign Policy 26 (Spring 1977), p. 164; Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, “Arms Control and the Developing Countries,” World Politics 18 (October 1965), p. 15; and Ciro Zoppo, “Nuclear Technology, Weapons, and the Third World,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 386, (November 1969), p. 114.

35. Robert M. Cornejo, “When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian Nuclear Aspirations in the Mid-1960s,” Nonproliferation Review 7 (Summer 2000), pp. 31, 36–38.

36. Poneman, Nuclear Power, p. 101.

37. Takashi Shiraishi, “Rewiring the Indonesian State,” in Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey, eds., Making Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1996), pp. 164–79.

38. Leonard C. Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), see especially ch. 3, “Strategy and Defence: The Indonesian Approach,” pp. 177–274.

39. J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963–1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 154.

40. Lucy Williamson, “Indonesia's Public Transport Perils,” BBC News, January 18, 2007, <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6270797.stm>.

41. Sudjanan Parnohadiningrat, “Indonesia and Iran's Nuclear Issue,” in Indriana Kartini, ed., Indonesia and Iran's Nuclear Issue (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005), p. 6.

42. “MPs Regret Indonesia's Abstain [sic] on Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Antara News, February 15, 2006.

43. “Indonesia Bisa Bekerja Sama dengan Iran” [Indonesia Can Cooperate with Iran], Kompas, August 28, 2006.

44. “Hassan Wirajuda Dicecar DPR” [House Interrogates Hasan Wirajuda], Koran Tempo, March 30, 2007.

45. “Menlu RI: Indonesia Memperoleh Dukungan Jika Ingin Mengembangkan Energi Nuklir” [Indonesian Foreign Minister: Indonesia Will Obtain Support If It Develops Nuclear Energy], May 12, 2006.

46. “US to Help Build Vietnam's First Nuclear Plant,” Agence France-Presse, March 20, 2007; Chua Hearn Yuit and Yeo Lay Hwee, “The Demise of the NPT: New Players in the Proliferation Game,” Japan Focus, May 16, 2006.

47. “Vietnam Nuclear Establishment Meets to Chart Plans,” Thanh Nien News, August 31, 2007.

48. “Nuclear Power Exhibition Planned Tomorrow in Capital,” Viet Nam News, May 15, 2006.

49. Phan Van Khai, prime minister of Viet Nam, “Approving the Strategy for Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy up to 2020,” Decision No. 01/2006/QD-TTg, January 3, 2006.

50. “Vietnam Government Approves Ambitious Power Plan,” Thanh Nien News, September 7, 2007.

51. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2007 Update, September 2007.

52. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2008 Update, September 2008.

53. “Vietnam Government Approves Ambitious Power Plan,” Thanh Nien News; Asian Development Bank, “ADB Ups Energy Investment in Viet Nam,” news release, September 21, 2007.

54. “Vietnam Boosts Nuclear Cooperation with Russia,” RIA Novosti, May 17, 2005.

55. “Seminar on Nuclear Power Held in Capital,” Viet Nam News, October 18, 2006.

56. U.S. Department of Energy, “United States and Vietnam Agree to Cooperate in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” National Nuclear Security Administration, September 12, 2007.

57. “IAEA Approves Six Projects for Vietnam as Chief Visits,” Viet Nam News, December 12, 2006.

58. Peter Waldman, “Body Count,” Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1997; Jonathan B. Tucker, “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” Nonproliferation Review 8 (Spring 2001), pp. 25–42; “Release of Vietnam Nuclear Weapons Report,” Congressional Record, March 10, 2003, p. S3405, <thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r108:S10MR3-0021:>. Peter Hayes and Nina Tannenwald, “Nixing Nukes in Vietnam,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003, pp. 52–59. F.J. Dyson, R. Gomer, S. Weinberg, and S.C. Wright, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia,” Study S-266, Institute for Defense Analyses, Jason Division, March 1967, <www.nautilus.org/archives/VietnamFOIA/report/dyson67.pdf>.

59. Statement by Nguyen Duy Chien to the Third Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, April 27, 2004; Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Le Luong Minh, Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations, Head of Delegation of Viet Nam at the General Debate of the 2005 Review Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” May 5, 2005, <www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt05vietnam.pdf>.

60. “Vietnam Calls for End to World's Nuclear Threat,” Nhân Dân, April 11, 2007.

61. Ta Minh Tuan, deputy director, Institute of International Relations, Hanoi, comments noted in “Chairman's Report,” Second Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, Manila, Philippines, December 2–3, 2005.

62. “Viet Nam Opposes Use of Nuclear Weapons: President,” Viet Nam News, August 4, 2004.

63. The Law on Atomic Energy entered into force on January 1, 2009. The National Assembly of Vietnam, Law on Atomic Energy, Order No. 13/2008/L-CTN, Law No. 18/2008/QH12, 12 June 2008. See, “Vietnam Legalises Use of Civilian Nuclear Energy,” Thomson Financial News, June 3, 2008, <www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2008/06/03/afx5073670.html>.

64. “Viet Nam Calls for Nuclear Disarmament at UN Meeting,” Viet Nam News, April 11, 2007.

65. Track I initiatives are defined as official level diplomatic negotiations and discussions, involving high level government representatives. Track II initiatives occur at a lower level, often involving academics and other experts in informal discussions that aim to feed ideas into the Track I level. On Vietnam's activities, see UN Security Council, “Note Verbale Dated 12 December 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations,” December 30, 2005, S/AC.44/2004/(02)39/Add.1; Vietnam Report to the APEC Counterterrorism Task Force Meeting on Enhancing Secure Trade in the APEC Region, February 26–27, 2006.

66. Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Le Dung, quoted in Grant McCool, “Vietnam Plays New Anti-Terror Role,” China Post, April 13, 2007, <www.chinapost.com.tw/news/archives/editorial/2007413/107049.htm>.

67. Roger Mitton, “Vietnam Under Pressure to Join Anti-Terror Initiative,” Straits Times, March 29, 2007.

68. National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA Announces Key Nuclear Non-Proliferation Projects with Vietnam,” March 19, 2007, <nnsa.energy.gov/news/1134.htm>.

69. “Chairman's Report,” Fifth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, San Francisco, February 12–13, 2007.

70. On the government's attempt to increase awareness, see Phan Van Khai, “Approving the Strategy for Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy up to 2020”; on signs of new willingness, see Jorn Dosch, “Vietnam's ASEAN Membership Revisited: Golden Opportunity or Golden Cage?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28 (August 2006), pp. 236–37.

71. Ralf Emmers, “Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia: A Study of Indonesia and Vietnam,” Asian Survey 45 (July/August 2005), pp. 645–65.

72. Douglas Pike, “The Turning Point: Vietnam in 1991,” Asian Survey 32 (January 1992), pp. 74–81. For a recent official exposition of this policy, see Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Vietnam Foreign Policy,” excerpt from The Political Report of The Central Committee—Vietnam Communist Party, 9th Tenure, at The Party's 10th National Congress, updated July 28, 2007, <www.mofa.gov.vn/en/cs_doingoai/>.

73. See the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, February 24, 1976, and the various protocols amending the treaty.

74. In December 2006, Washington made Vietnam eligible to receive non-lethal military equipment. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. and Vietnam Agree to Broaden Military Ties,” New York Times, June 6, 2006; Grant McCool, “Vietnam Plays New Anti-Terror Role,” China Post, April 12, 2007.

75. Emmers, “Regional Hegemonies,” pp. 664–65.

76. Ramses Amer and Nguyen Hong Thao, “The Management of Vietnam's Border Disputes: What Impact on its Sovereignty and Regional Integration?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27 (Autumn 2005), pp. 429–53.

77. A commitment to the peaceful settlement of competing sovereignty claims in the South China Sea was signed in 1992. ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, July 22, 1992.

78. Rizal Sukma, “ASEAN After Bali Concord II: Challenges and Prospects,” paper presented at the 1st Berlin Conference on Asian Security, Berlin, September 13–15, 2006, pp. 2–6.

79. Amer and Nguyen, “The Management of Vietnam's Border Disputes,” p. 437.

80. Proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies include intrinsic technical design features that dramatically reduce the dual-use options associated with nuclear energy development. A number of fourth-generation nuclear reactors, such as the Molten Salt Reactor, have been designed to advance these proliferation-resistant technologies. For more information, see the website of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, <www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/mccprolresistance.html>.

81. Because no technology exists that can completely eliminate proliferation risks, extrinsic proliferation resistance features would also have to be built into the firewall at an early stage. These include advanced operational and institutional arrangements that boost transparency and facilitate effective verification. An example of an extrinsic proliferation resistance measure is the IAEA Additional Protocol.

82. See the Type II and Type III MNA options, set out in the Pellaud Report: see IAEA, “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report,” INFCIRC/640, February 22, 2005.

83. This could include an innovative technical proliferation break: a built-in disabling mechanism, which would allow centrifuges to safely self-destruct. John Thompson and Geoffrey Forden, “Multilateralism as a Dual-Use Technique: Encouraging Nuclear Energy and Avoiding Proliferation,” Policy Analysis Brief, Stanley Foundation, March 2008, p. 7.

84. For a history of the concept and discussion of current multilateral fuel cycle proposals, see Tariq Rauf and Fiona Simpson, “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Is it Time for a Multilateral Approach?” Arms Control Today 34 (December 2004), pp. 17–21; and S.V. Ruchkin and V.Y. Loginov, “Securing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: What Next?” IAEA Bulletin 48 (Spring 2007), pp. 25–26.

85. Ron Smith, “International Solutions to the Spent Fuel Problem,” report for the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence Building and Security Measures, February 2000; Tatsujiro Suzuki, “Regional Cooperation on Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Northeast Asia: Proposals and Prospects,” SNL Fourteenth International Security Conference, Chantilly, Virginia, April 4–6, 2005.

86. Levite, “The Current Proliferation Predicament,” p. 89.

87. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing our attention to this point.

88. Operation of EURATOM Safeguards in 2002, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, Brussels, 10 December 2003, COM(2003)764 Final, <ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safeguards/doc/com_2003_0764_en.pdf>.

89. The idea that Southeast Asia should adopt the Euratom system, for example, has not received an overly enthusiastic response from Southeast Asia's experts and officials, despite the benefits it could offer. See “Chairman's Report,” Seventh Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, May 25–26, 2008, <www.cscap.ca/WMD_SG_7th_Meeting_Report.pdf>.

90. “Chairman's Report,” Sixth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific, Jakarta, Indonesia, December 9–10, 2007, p. 3.