THE ADVOCACY STATES

Abstract

While the current momentum for the elimination of nuclear weapons can be traced in part to the highly influential 2007 and 2008 Wall Street Journal opinion articles by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, a more accurate picture of this momentum must take into account the role played by what are called here the “advocacy states.” Motivated by a combination of humanitarian and strategic concerns, and mindful of the dangers of deterrence as well as proliferation, accidental use, and terrorist acquisition of nuclear material, these states have, for the past fifteen years, mounted a steady and repeated call for nuclear disarmament. Their activities have taken two main forms: the preparation of various state-sponsored reports investigating the utility and attendant dangers of nuclear weapons and making a strong case for nuclear disarmament; and the formation of like-minded groupings of states, namely in the New Agenda Coalition and the Seven-Nation Initiative, that are active in diplomatic forums and in practical projects. This article assesses the advocacy states' activities and shows that the states' reports and groupings increasingly focus on providing research, expertise, and technical assistance for the challenges facing disarmament. The article examines briefly the question of extended nuclear deterrence and disarmament (given that many of the advocacy states are Western allies) and considers the likely future role and activities for advocacy states. The author argues that these states have played a vital role in creating a climate in which the Obama administration can engage the movement toward disarmament.

Keywords:

• Nuclear weapons
• security
• diplomacy
• disarmament
• deterrence
• United States

Notes

1. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2007, p. A15; George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13.

2. This paper acknowledges the crucial role that civil society and NGOs have played in sustaining momentum toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, especially over the past ten years. (Key examples of such groups include the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Reaching Critical Will, the Acronym Institute, and the Verification Research, Training and, Information Centre.) This paper focuses on the role of sovereign states and state-sponsored activity; therefore, the nature and impact of NGO activities are not considered here, other than as they relate to the initiatives of particular states.

3. Although Australia, Japan, Norway, and Canada are formal U.S. allies, New Zealand formally ruptured its ties with the Australia-New Zealand-United States alliance in the 1980s as a result of U.S. nuclear policies. Nevertheless, New Zealand continues to consider itself as part of a broad Western grouping, despite its further political distance from Washington.

4. One thing that becomes evident is that for some of these states—notably U.S. allies Japan, Norway, and Australia—their position within the extended U.S. deterrence umbrella sits oddly against their calls for disarmament. This issue is examined below.

5. For an overview of the development of the taboo against nuclear weapons, see Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: the Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” International Security 29 (Spring 2005), pp. 5–49.

6. The International Court of Justice's 1996 advisory opinion on the lethality of nuclear weapons use, while not categorical, was important in reinforcing the non-nuclear norm. The court concluded that the use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law and reiterated the need for the NWS to fulfill their commitments to disarm, as required by Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. See International Court of Justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” <www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&p3=4&case=95>.

7. There is, for instance, little sympathy with the “more is better” argument advocated most famously by Kenneth Waltz, who argued that selective proliferation would be beneficial for international security. See Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Paper No. 971, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). Further proliferation, whether by so-called rogue states or even by Western allies such as Japan, South Korea, or Germany, is likely to be viewed overwhelmingly as destabilizing to the international system.

8. See Michael MccGwire, “Is There a Future for Nuclear Weapons?” International Affairs 70 (April 1994), p. 213.

9. Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1996), <www.dfat.gov.au/cc/index.html>.

10. For an overview, see Richard Butler, Australia and Disarmament (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, 1989); and Trevor Findlay, The Making of a Moral Ornament: Australian Disarmament and Arms Control Policy, 1921–1991 (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, 1991).

11. Report of the Canberra Commission.

12. See Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945–1988 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1992).

13. Christopher Westdal, “Statement to the Main Committee of the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” New York, United Nations, May 2, 2000.

14. “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century,” Ottawa, Canada, House of Commons, December 1998, <www.ccnr.org/scfait_recs.html>.

15. Marianne Hanson, “Advancing Disarmament in the Face of Great Power Reluctance: the Canadian Contribution,” Working Paper No. 37, Liu Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, 2001.

16. William Graham, “Nuclear Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Security Environment: Analysis of the Canadian Report,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 31 (1999), p. 691.

17. Rideau Institute, “Restoring Canada's Disarmament Policies,” Expert Seminar, Ottawa, February 3–4, 2008, <www.rideauinstitute.ca/file-library/disarmament-seminar.pdf>.

18. “Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century: The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, July 25, 1999, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/forum/tokyo9907/index.html>.

19. Cited in Satsuo Sigesawa, “From Canberra to Tokyo,” Hiroshima Research News 2 (1999), p. 2.

20. Marianne Hanson, “Regulating the Possession and Use of Nuclear Weapons: Ideas, Commissions, and Agency in International Security Politics—The Case of the Canberra Commission,” in Ramesh Thakur, Andrew Cooper, and John English, eds., International Commissions and the Power of Ideas (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2005), pp. 123–41.

21. Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1995), pp. 86–87.

22. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993); Carl Ungerer, “The Force of Ideas: Middle Power Diplomacy and the New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament,” in Carl Ungerer and Marianne Hanson eds., The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Sydney: Allen and Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 2001). On active leadership in international relations, see Malnes and Young, cited in Ungerer, “The Force of Ideas.”

23. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers; Richard Leaver and James Richardson, The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses (Sydney: Allen and Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1993).

24. For detailed studies of the NAC, see Tad Daley, “The New Agenda Coalition for Nuclear Abolition,” The Humanist 61 (March/April 2001); Jean E. Krasno, The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2004); Darach MacFhionnbhairr et al., “Constructing a New Agenda,” in Joseph Cirincione ed., Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Routledge and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000); and Ungerer, “The Force of Ideas.”

25. For a history of New Zealand's activism in this area, see Kate Dewes and Alyn Ware, “Aotearoa/New Zealand: From Nuclear Ally to Pacific Peacemaker,” paper presented at the international symposium, “The Security of the Asia-Pacific Region in the Post-Cold War Era,” Nihon University, Japan, November 19, 2004; Naoki Kamimura, “Nuclear Disarmament Policies of Australia and New Zealand,” in Wade L. Huntley, Mitsuru Kurosawa, and Kazumi Mizumoto, eds., Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty First Century (Japan: Hiroshima Peace Institute, 2005); Lawrence Wittner, “Nuclear Disarmament Activism in Asia and the Pacific, 1971–1996,” Asia-Pacific Journal 25-5-09 (June 22, 2009); Andreas Reitzig, “In Defiance of Nuclear Deterrence: Anti-Nuclear New Zealand After Two Decades,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 22 (2006), pp. 132–44.

26. Matt Robson, cited in Kamimura, “Nuclear Disarmament Policies of Australia and New Zealand,” p. 228.

27. New Agenda Coalition, “Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden,” June 9, 1998.

28. Ungerer, “The Force of Ideas,” p. 265.

29. Ultimately, however, the NAC resolution was voted against by India as not going far enough in condemning the established NWS and the unequal nature of the NPT. See Ungerer, “The Force of Ideas.”

30. Ungerer, “The Force of Ideas,” p. 265.

31. Daley, “The New Agenda Coalition.”

32. Krasno, The United Nations, p. 202.

33. Don Mackay, “New Zealand, on Behalf of the New Agenda Coalition,” Geneva, April 30, 2008, Geneva-53249-v1-NAC Cluster I Statement, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements/Cluster1/April30NewZealand.pdf>.

34. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, “FAQs,” <www.wmdcommission.org/sida.asp?id=6>.

35. Gareth Evans, “The Blix Commission's Wake-Up Call: Meeting the Nuclear Challenge,” presentation to International Conference on a Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Disarmament, Brussels, April 19, 2007, <www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4784>.

36. “Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Chile, Norway, Romania, South Africa, and the United Kingdom on Strengthening Adherence to International Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Efforts,” Seven-Nation Initiative, July 26, 2005.

37. Jonas Gahr St⊘re, “Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: A Norwegian Perspective,” in Peter Struck and Ditmar Staffelt, eds., Deutschland in der Globalisierung: Chancen und Herausforderungen [Germany in Globalization: Opportunities and Challenges] (Berlin: Detlev Prinz, 2008).

38. The 7NI website, <www.7ni.mfa.no/About/About.htm>.

39. See, for instance, the speeches by Robert McClelland, “Time to Repair Our Reputation: The Rise and Fall of Australia as a Good International Citizen,” speech to the Lowy Institute, Sydney, June 17, 2007; Kelvin Thomson, “Australia as a Good International Citizen: Security, Overseas Aid, and Nuclear Disarmament,” speech given at VCE Foreign Affairs Forum, August 7, 2009; and Stephen Smith, “A New Era of Engagement With the World,” speech given at the Sydney Institute, August 19, 2008.

40. Indeed, Rudd's stop at Hiroshima on the same trip was the first time a Western head of government had visited that city while in office—itself an indication of Australia's new position. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, “Joint Statement,” International Crisis Group, September 25, 2008, <www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5697&l=1&m=1>.

41. International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, ICNND, 2008/2009, <www.icnnd.org/>.

42. International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, ICNND, 2008/2009, <www.icnnd.org/>.

43. The most recent indication of Australian commitment is the recommendation made by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties’ “Inquiry into Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament,” whose recommendation was that the government “makes clear in international fora its support for the adoption of a Nuclear Weapons Convention,” an idea that had been resisted previously. See <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/nuclearnon_proliferation/report/front.pdf>.

44. Alison Kelly, “The New Agenda Coalition: Progress and Outlook on 2010,” May 12, 2009, <vimeo.com/4635692>.

45. Caroline Millar, Australian ambassador for disarmament, statement made to the Second Preparatory Committee, April 28, 2008.

46. See in particular George Perkovich and Patricia Lewis, “The Vantage Point,” ICNND, January 2009, <www.icnnd.org/research/Vantage_Point.doc>.

47. See Tanya Ogilvie-White, “The Defiant States: The Nuclear Diplomacy of North Korea and Iran,” Nonproliferation Review 17 (March 2009), pp. 109–132.

48. Cited in Rideau Institute, “Restoring Canada's Disarmament Policies.”

49. Cited in Rideau Institute, “Restoring Canada's Disarmament Policies.”

50. The concept of extended deterrence is itself plagued with ambiguities and assumptions: for most, U.S. extended deterrence has come to imply nuclear deterrence, something that is far from clear. The ANZUS Treaty, for example, makes no mention at all of a U.S. nuclear guarantee to its parties.

51. On those who see extended deterrence as incompatible with disarmament, see for example Anthony DiFilippo, who talks about the need for Japan to abandon its nuclear deterrence policy if it is to be seen as consistent in its calls for disarmament. Anthony DiFilippo, Japan's Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). An illustrative argument of those who believe deterrence and disarmament can coexist is that of Yukio Satoh, “Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step for Nuclear Disarmament,” Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online, 09-18A, March 5, 2009, <www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09018Satoh.html>.

52. George Perkovich, “Extended Deterrence on the Way to a Nuclear-Free World,” paper commissioned by the ICNND, May 2009, <www.icnnd.org/research/Perkovich_Deterrence.pdf>.

53. On the issue of a state's self-identification with moral values, see Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001).

54. Gareth Evans, “Address to the Opening Session of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” Canberra, January 23, 1996.