Cultural Statecraft in the Russian and Chinese Contexts: Domestic and International Implications

Abstract

This article examines Russian and Chinese cultural statecraft as a component of domestic and foreign policy. I argue that Russian and Chinese political elites view cultural statecraft first and foremost as a domestic priority that is directed toward the elaboration of a legitimating narrative for the regime. This process is generated in response to both domestic and international factors and can be viewed as an attempt to provide an inoculating defense against the penetration of neoliberal Western values. At the same time, this effort leads to tendencies toward a cultural exceptionalism that constrains both states in their attempts to employ cultural themes as an element of a foreign policy strategy.

Notes

^1. In a series of recent articles, Nye has criticized China and Russia for their state-centered approach to projecting attraction and their rejection of initiatives to create an autonomous civil society. See Nye 2011b; 2012a; 2012b; 2013.

^2. Remark made at the forum “Crisis in US-Russia Relations: The View from Moscow,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Cambridge, MA, October 23, 2014.

^3. The draft Osnovy gosudarstvennoi kul’turnoi politiki (Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy) was published on the website of Rossiiskaia gazeta on May 15, 2015, available at http://www.rg.ru/printable/2014/05/15/osnovi-dok.html; accessed September 16, 2015.

^4. http://en.gpf-yaroslavl.ru/presscenter/publications/Speech-of-President-of-Russia-Dmitry-Medvedev-at-plenary-session-of-Global-Policy-Forum-The-Modern-State-Standards-of-Democracy-and-Criteria-of-Efficiency; accessed October 14, 2010.

^5. Cultural security as a component of Chinese identity is a prevalent theme, in particular in the scholarship of William Callahan. See, for example, Callahan 2006; Callahan 2015. Also see Edney 2015; and Li 2014.

^6. Zhongguo gongchandang di shiqi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyiǐ (CCP Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Seventeenth National Party Congress), October 15, 2011, at http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=NWhrkMOWPmAVQF6-e7oQr0mNtpmf6M3nnojFZTuscXnslgAIi2iiO6Q8qchfrVNPwEglBKj8_W0lIkhoebZyGq; accessed October 20, 2015.

^7. In fact, the leaked telephone conversation between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and U.S Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt did provide ample confirmation of U.S. government efforts to orchestrate a power transition behind the scenes, as well as exposing tensions in the U.S.-EU relationship. See “Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nyland-Pyatt Call,” February 7, 2014, at www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-6079957; accessed March 13, 2015.

^8. The Hanban website lists 443 Confucius Institutes and 648 Confucius Classrooms. See http://www.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_10961.htm; accessed October 15, 2015.

9. This includes funding for RT television broadcasts, previously a focal point of Kremlin appropriations. Plans to initiate transmission in German and French, moreover, have currently been placed on hold. See Dzaidul 2015.

^10. John Fitzgerald (2014), however, notes the resonance of Chinese cultural values among Chinese emigres of the Cultural Revolution generation, who have becoming increasingly conservative as they have grown older.

^11. Zhao Tingyang, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has been a prime advocate in China of the Tianxia concept, but it has also received considerable discussion among Western scholars. See Zhao 2011; Carlson 2011; Callahan 2011.