Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in De Facto States

Abstract

De facto states are considered to be highly specific entities, thus meriting a detailed analysis of how conflict transformation functions within such states and what role is played in them by civil society organizations (CSOs), which are traditionally considered one of the key actors in conflict transformation. The authors discuss the factors that limit the activities of these CSOs as a result of the restricted sovereignty of de facto states. The study is based on three field research projects focusing on CSOs in Abkhazia, carried out in 2009, 2014, and 2015.

Notes

^1. In his 2006 text, Kolstø does not denote these entities as de facto states but as quasi states; however, it is clear from the context that he is referring to de facto states. In 2006 the terms de facto states or unrecognized states (which are now used in the large majority of studies) had still not yet become established, and various alternative terms were used, e.g. separatist states, quasi states, pseudo states, etc. Kolstø himself uses the term de facto states in his texts from 2010 onwards (see Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012 or Pegg and Kolstø 2014). The same applies to other authors, e.g., Berg and Mölder 2012; Caspersen 2008; or O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2011, etc.

^2. For more on this topic see, e.g., Caspersen and Stansfield 2011, 4.

^3. For more on the aims and forms of expert interviews, see, e.g., Flick 2009, 165–69.

^4. Abkhazia is currently recognized by four UN member states (Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru). In 2011 Abkhazia’s independence was also internationally recognized by two Pacific states, Vanuatu and Tuvalu. However, both states subsequently withdrew their recognition of Abkhazian statehood when they signed a treaty establishing diplomatic and consular relations with Georgia. Vanuatu did so in 2013, Tuvalu in 2014.

^5. For more on the Abkhazian conflict and its consequences, see, e.g., Souleimanov 2013.

^6. This periodic division is based on 2014 interviews with a representative of an Abkhazian non-profit organization (Interview no. 12) and an Abkhazian journalist (Interview no. 8). Both respondents more or less agreed with the division; however, they added that the second and third phases overlapped considerably. The focus on Abkhazian domestic issues dates back to around 2000, but dialogue with the Georgian side became much less frequent from 2008 onward.

^7. The proceedings of the fifteen conferences organized by the UCI Center for Citizen Peacebuilding were published under the rubric “Aspects of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict.” Available at: www.peacebuilding.uci.edu/research/reports/pb_cs_abkhaz_pub.php.

^8. The gradual democratization of the Abkhazian regime has been reflected in its evaluation by the Freedom House Freedom in the World dataset. At the end of the 1990s and into the new millennium, Abkhazia had a rating of 6 (not free country) in terms of political rights. In 2005 there was a shift to a rating of 5, and in 2013 to 4 (partly free), the rating that Abkhazia had also in the last report in 2015. In terms of civil liberties, Abkhazia is rated 5 (partly free) throughout the period under investigation.

^9. The treaty gave Russia permission to use the military bases in Gudauta and Ochamchira for the next 49 years. It states that Russian soldiers have unlimited freedom of movement within Abkhazia, are exempt from the payment of taxes, and are exempt from prosecution under Abkhazian laws. Russian units also guard the land and sea administrative border line between Abkhazia and Georgia. On the basis of the treaty, in 2010 alone Russia invested a total of 465 million USD to provide security to Abkhazia (RIA Novosti 2009, September 15). For comparison, this sum exceeded the 2010 budget of Georgia’s entire defense ministry by 30 million USD (Civil Georgia 2009, December 4). Due to the treaty, a quarter of the inhabitants of Abkhazia no longer consider a potential return to a state of war to be a genuine security risk (O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2011, 18–20).

^10. This treaty creates a new joint force of Russian and Abkhazian troops. Abkhazia also agreed to harmonize its foreign and defense policies with Moscow’s. Over the next three years Putin promised subsidies to Abkhazia amounting to 270 million USD (Guardian 2014, November 25).

^11. In 2009 Russia provided 1.9 billion RUB (65.5 million USD) as a direct contribution to Abkhazia’s national budget, accounting for 60 percent of Abkhazia’s entire budgetary spending in that year. The same sum was transferred by Russia to the Abkhazian budget in the following year, when the Russian contribution made up 49 percent of the national budget (ICG Report No. 202, 5). In 2011–2014 a total of 40–60 percent of the national budget was financed directly by the Russian Federation (Interview no. 6).

^12. In May 2014 the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi experienced a wave of protests, leading President Ankvab to step down. The official rhetoric of the opposition, led by Raul Khadjimba (who had stood without success in previous presidential elections), drew on arguments pointing out the poor economic situation and the long-term lack of essential reforms. These economic arguments, in the opinion of our respondents, are certainly justified, but five of the respondents mentioned primarily political factors and spoke of a coup d’état.

^13. For more on American policy toward Abkhazia as revealed by the Wikileaks documents, see Pegg and Berg 2014.